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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about the kingdom of Aceh Dar al-Salam in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century when four women ruled in succession: Sultanah Tajul Alam 
Safiatuddin Syah (1641-1675), Sultanah Nur Alam Naqiatuddin Syah (1675-1678), 
Sultanah Inayat Zakiatuddin Syah (1678-1688) and Sultanah I{amalat Zainatuddin Syah 
(1688-1699). How and why these queens came to power, and how they exercised it, are 
problems that have fascinated enquirers, prompting a range of comments and 
observations, especially the assertion that the queens were mere figureheads, during 
whose reigns the male elite (orangkaya) captured power. The Sultanahs were held 
responsible for the erosion of royal power and the kingdom's decline in the seventeenth 
century. Yet no in-depth study has ever investigated these claims. The main objective of 
this thesis is to evaluate the received views on these female sovereigns. The thesis also 
seeks to examine the origin, nature and impact of these Sultanahs. Female rule seems a 
curious phenomenon in a Muslim state. Furthermore, in a largely patriarchal kingdom 
such as Aceh, queens seemed to be strangely out of place. This unique episode in Aceh's 
history happened when European Companies -the Dutch VOC (Veerinigde Ooost-Indische 
Compagnie) and the English East India Company - were gradually increasing their 
commercial hold and flexing their military muscles in the region. Indigenous polities 
suffered increasing interference and pressure from Westerners. Most Malay and Muslim 
coastal polities in maritime Southeast Asia fell into European intruders' hands. By 
exploring the circumstances and arguments surrounding female accession, and 
examining some key episodes that show how power worked in Aceh at the time, I hope 
to approach a new understanding of how and why the male elite of Aceh placed the fate 
of the kingdom in the hands of women, and with what effects. 
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Glossary 
Words in the thesis that are explained in the glossary below are identified with *. 
Footnotes that are elaborated in Appendix 1 are marked with #. 
adat customary practice 
alim religious scholar 
balai audience hall 
bendahara treasurer or at times first ranking member of the 
court after the ruler. 
bahar, bharen (Dutch a Malay measure of weight varying roughly from 
plural of bhaar) 210-230kg 
bintharas court officials 
boedjangh royal messenger 
capados eunuchs 
chap seal 
chialoup boat 
coopman trader 
darn rat crisis 
derhaka disobedience 
dewa-raja kings with divine powers 
dattlat sovereignty, power (mystical) and authority of 
ruler 
estemie ruler's order without bearing the royal seal 
fatwa religious decree 
firman ruler's order 
gamputg/ kampong village 
gorab vessel 
hadith sayings of the Prophet 
hadith repertories testimonies of the Prophet's disciples concerning 
his words and deeds 
hakim judge 
hikayat folklore 
hukumat laws 
ijtrhad interpretation of Islamic law 
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imam head of congregational prayers 
jawi Malay in Arabic script 
jihad holy war 
Kadhi Maliku'l Adil, religious judge 
Qadi Malik alAdil 
kali Acehnese version for kadhi 
Kanun/ Oanun Canonical laws 
kati a measure of weight, 1 kati is about 625g 
kerajaan a state of having a king 
khal fah God's shadow or representative on earth 
khutbah religious sermon 
kris dagger 
kurnia grant 
Laksamana admiral of the navy 
Mahamulia/Maha His/Her Highness 
Melia 
mandalas circles of kings/influences 
mudhakkar being a male 
muhrim/mahram is an unmarriageable kin with whom sexual 
intercourse would be considered incestuous, a 
punishable taboo 
muqim collection of villages 
musyawarah consensus-building 
naeleers captains 
nanggroe/ negeri district 
ondercoopman junior trader 
oppercoopman senior trader 
orangkaya rich nobles who were also state officials 
padi paddy 
panglima(s) governor(s) 
penghulu village head 
perahu small boats 
Perdana Menteri prime minister 
pt ji pt jian compliments 
Putri princess 
Rjxraad/Ajxraaden State Council member/State Council members 
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tuba customary dues 
sagi literally means a three-point or triangular sieve to 
separate rice from husks; here it refers to the 
three provinces comprising a confederation of 
districts 
saki' magical 
sarakata court document bearing the ruler's seal 
saudagar raja king's merchant 
sembab obeisance 
Serambi Mekah veranda of Mekah 
shahbandar an administrative official or representative of a 
merchant group in a port 
Sheikh al Islam the highest religious judge 
Sri auspicious 
suassa 
sutti 
syariah 
tandil 
etlama 
ttleebalan& hulubalang 
ummab 
vivuwenregeeringen 
wakil 
zwali 
alloy of copper and bronze 
ritual burning of high-born widows on their 
husbands' funeral pyre 
Islamic law 
bodyguard 
religious scholars 
local leaders holding political and military 
authority 
community of believers 
government by women 
representative 
legal guardian of a bride 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the seventeenth century, the kingdom of Aceh Dar al-Salam was best known 
as a staunchly Islamic kingdom in the north of the island of Sumatra and a major trading 
centre for pepper. Pepper propelled Aceh's ascendancy in the sixteenth century and 
made it Melaka's successor as the main Muslim commercial centre supplying the 
Mediterranean through the Red Sea, rivalling the Portuguese., Soon after Sultan 
Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) inaugurated what was deemed as the "golden age" in 
Acehnese history, when Aceh's influence expanded and reached as far south as Padang 
in Sumatra and Johor on the Malay Peninsula, 2 four female monarchs in succession 
ruled this Muslim kingdom for half a century (1641-1699). Female rule seems a curious 
phenomenon in a Muslim state. Furthermore, in a largely patriarchal kingdom such as 
Aceh, queens seemed to be strangely out of place. This unique episode in Aceh's history 
happened when European Companies -the Dutch VOC (Veerinigde Ooost-Indische 
Compagnie) and the English East India Company were gradually increasing their 
commercial hold and flexing their military muscles in the region. Indigenous polities 
suffered increasing interference and pressure from Westerners. Most Malay and Muslim 
coastal polities in maritime Southeast Asia fell into European intruders' hands. It is 
extraordinary that in such dangerous times, the male elite of Aceh placed the fate of the 
kingdom in the hands of women. 
Despite these historical curiosities, thus far, no in-depth research has been 
undertaken to explore this strange episode. Sultanah Tajul Alam Safiatuddin Syah (1641- 
1675), Sultanah Nur Alam Naqiatuddin Syah (1675-1678), Sultanah Inayat Zakiatuddin 
Syah (1678-1688) and Sultanah Kamalat Zainatuddin Syah (1688-1699) remain elusive. 
I Anthony Reid, An Indonesian Frontier. Acehnese and other Histories of Sumatra, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), p. 6. See also, Charles Boxer, `A note of Portuguese reactions to the revival of the 
Red Sea spice trade and the rise of Aceh, 1540-1600, ' Journal of Southeast Asian Histoy, 10.3 (1969). There 
are numerous studies devoted to explain the rise of Aceh after the fall of the Sultanate of Melaka in 1511 
such as those by A. K. Dasgupta, Paulo Pinto and Jorge Alves. A. K. Dasgupta, `Aceh in Indonesian Trade 
and Politics 1600-1641' (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Cornell University, 1964). 
2 Aceh's purported "golden age" under the rule of Iskandar Muda (1607-1637) has also been well 
explicated by Lombard. Denys Lombard, Le Sultanat dAlieb au temps d'skandarMuda (1607-1636), trans. by Winarsih Ariffin, KerajaanAceh, Jaman Sultan IskandarMuda (1607-1636), Gakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1986). 
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Although little researched, the mystery surrounding the reigns of these queens has 
fascinated many enquirers, prompting a range of comments and observations, which are 
as varied as those who made them. These comments and observations range from 
hearsay to studied opinions to scholarly work by some nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century Dutch and English scholars such as Valentyn, Veth, Van Langen, Marsden, 
Braddel, Snouck Hurgronje and Veltman. More recent writings on these queens are by 
Anthony Reid, Leonard Andaya and some Indonesian writers such as Hoessin 
Djadjadiningrat, Mohammad Said, Iljas Sutan Pamenan, Ali Hasjmy, Rusdi Sufi, Gade 
Ismail and Amirul Hadi. 3 Their accounts, though noteworthy, have raised more 
questions by flagging up contradictions. Furthermore, these accounts are generic in 
nature and do not purport to study female rule in Aceh comprehensively. Only three 
studies, those by Takeshi Ito+ (1984), Auni Luthfis (1993) and Mulaika Hijjas6 (2001) 
directly focus on these female monarchs. 
Origin, Nature and Impact of Female Rule 
Accounts of the women who reigned in Aceh have centred on the origin, nature 
and impact of their rule. Anthony Reid explained that female rule in Aceh originated as 
a deliberate experiment conducted by the *orangkaya. This experiment was a response to 
the absolutism of Iskandar Muda and the choice of successors to Iskandar Muda was 
indicative of the ambivalent attitude of the court elite to his reign .7 Reid 
further 
elucidated that female rule was one of the few devices available to a commercially 
oriented aristocracy to limit the despotic powers of kings and to make the state safe for 
3 Please refer to bibliography for full details. 
4 Takeshi Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh: A Historical Study of the Sultanate of Aceh' 
(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Australian National University, 1984). 
S Auni Luthfi, "The Decline of the Islamic Empire of Aceh, 1641-1699' (Unpublished Master's thesis, 
McGill University, 1993). 
6 Mulaika Hijjas, `The Woman Raja: Female Rule in Seventeenth Century Aceh' (Unpublished Master's 
thesis, University of Oxford, 2001). 
7 Anthony Reid & Takeshi Ito, 'From harbour autocracies to feudal diffusion in 17th century Indonesia: 
The Case of Aceh', in Feudalism: Comparative Studies, ed. by E. Leach, S. N. Mukherjee, and J. Ward, (Sydney: 
Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture, 1985), p. 14. 
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international commerce. 8 Reid concluded that having experimented with the female 
alternative, these aristocrats sought to perpetuate it. 9 
Inherent in this explanation was the idea that the orangkaya were supreme in 
Aceh and ruled as a unified oligarchy. Based on Reid's arguments, the orangkaya might 
have opted for female rule because a female ruler might be more compliant and reliant 
on the orangkaya, who wished to secure their positions and share the kingdom's wealth. 
But why did the orangkaya not choose a weak male ruler or better still, a minor with one 
of the elites acting as a regent, perhaps? Furthermore, why choose a woman in 1641, not 
earlier or later? Indeed, why choose a woman - something that was never ventured 
before in the dynastic succession of the Acehnese Sultanate, at such a critical juncture, 
when some Malay polities and even Portuguese Melaka had succumbed to the VOC? A 
strong leadership, a la Iskandar Muda, perhaps would seem to be a more appropriate 
response to meet this threat. Reid's thesis on the origins of female rule in Aceh invites 
further research. 
The nature of female rule in Aceh is even more problematic than its origins and 
has been intensely debated. Thomas Braddel hailed the institution of female rule as "a 
most singularly revolution" that happened in Aceh. '° Similarly, William Marsden 
described it as "a new era in the history of the country", and noted that female rule in 
Aceh had attracted much notice in Europe. " An Acehnese, Ilyas Sutan Pamenan, 
writing in the twentieth century, felt that female rule was strange (ganjil) and asserted that 
the people did not accept this institution because the subjects only recognised the rule of 
males. On the other hand, P . J. Veth saw female rule in Aceh not as an aberration, nor 
an experiment conducted by the elite, but as part of the indigenous practice of Southeast 
Asian states. He cited other examples of *vrosrwenregeeringen in Patani, Borneo, Palembang 
and Celebes. 12 Mohammad Said, a local, argued too that female rule in Aceh was not an 
aberration and was part of *adat. He argued that a few centuries previously, Aceh had a 
8Anthony Reid, `Female Roles in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia', Modern Asian Studies, 22, Part 3, (1998), 629- 
645, p. 641. 
9 Reid, `Female Roles', p. 641. 
10 Thomas Braddel, `On the History of Acheen', The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Aria, vol. IV, 
(1850), 15-25, p. 19. 
11 William Marsden, History of Sumatra Introduced by John Bastin 3rd. edn (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1986) pp. 447,454. 
12 P. J. Veth, `Vrouwenregeeringen in den Indischen Archipel', T#drehrift voorNederlandsch Indie, Derde 
Derie, 4de Jaargang, Tweede Deel, (1870), 354-369, pp. 362-365. 
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female navy Admiral and this was acceptable in the Acehnese custom since women 
could be rated as powerful and as capable as men. 13 Pamenan disagreed and even argued 
that female rule was not only unacceptable but also inappropriate especially since Aceh 
was not economically secure at that time. He contended that Aceh needed a strong hand 
to earn the respect of foreigners and a woman would not be able to carry out such heavy 
and important responsibilities. 14 
Despite the disagreements, most writers appear to agree on one thing: the impact 
of these female rulers on the history of Aceh. One of the most striking and popular 
perception of the Acehnese female sovereigns was that they were weaklings, mere 
ceremonial rulers who were responsible for the decline of the monarchy and royal power 
by the end of the seventeenth century. Braddel wrote that in 1641, twelve orangkaya 
seized the reins of power and in order to carry on the government without opposition 
from the people, they placed the widow of the late king on the throne but without power 
to interfere in the management of affairs. 15 Marsden noted that "the nobles finding their 
power less restrained... than when ruled by kings... supported these pageants whom 
they governed as they thought fit... " Marsden viewed the queens as ceremonial rulers 
with no power to appoint or remove any of the orangkaya. 16 Veth's slightly different 
nuanced explanation stated that female rule was favoured by the nobility because female 
rule provided a means for them to exercise their power and personal influence but did 
not assert that these queens were powerless. Early twentieth-century scholars such as 
Snouck Hurgronje and T J. Veltman were even more scathing. Hurgronje claimed that 
Aceh's weak female governments were responsible for undermining the monarchy-" 
Veltman saw all female sovereigns as weak, manipulated by the orangkaya and concluded 
that Sultanah Safiatuddin's reign contributed little to the greatness of the realm. te More 
recent historians such as Amirul Hadi and Auni Luthfi saw the "rise of the orangkayd' 
13 Mohammad Said, Aceh SepanjangAbad, (1, Medan: Pengarang Sendiri, 1961), p. 379. 
11 Ilyas Sutan Pamenan, RentjongAceh di Tangan Wanita, (Jakarta: DJ Waringin, 1959), pp. 35-36. 
15 Braddel, `On the History of Acheen', p. 19. 
16 Marsden, History of Sumatra, pp. 447,454. 
17 Snouck C. Hurgronje, De Attjehers, translated by the late A. W. S. O'Sullivan with an index by R . J. 
Wilkinson (Leiden: Brill, 1893), p. 94. 
18 T. J. Veltman, 'Nota over de geschiedenis van her landschap Pidie', Tjdschriff voorIndirche Taal-Land-en 
Volkenkunde, 58 (1919), 15-157, pp. 66-67. 
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under the reigns of female rulers and the transition of power from royalty to nobility 
"possibly due to the mildness of the queen in governing the state". 19 
Strangely, although the above writers concluded that the female monarchs were 
mere figureheads, they actually praised the governments that operated during their 
reigns. Braddel expressed his bewilderment by exclaiming that "in a rude state of society 
and among a people like the Achinese, one is not prepared to hear of such a refinement 
in the art of government; and surprise is increased by learning that this government 
lasted for upwards of sixty years, and examination will prove that the affairs of the 
nation were better administered during this period than at any other time before or 
since. "20 Marsden commented that the first Sultanah, Safiatuddin Syah, "reigned with a 
degree of tranquillity little known in these countries, upwards of thirty-four years. "21 
While these writers concluded that the governments under these female rulers were 
stable and peaceful, none attributed this good governance to the queens but implied that 
this was due to the orangkaya's skill unfretted by royal power. Indeed, an earlier period 
where the oran(gkaya were dominating politics existed from the 1570's-1590's where kings 
became mere pawns of their game but this period saw one of the more disastrous 
periods in Aceh's history. Inability to recognise that a woman ruler might actually be 
successful in her own right smacks more of a biased sentiment than an informed 
judgement. 
This assertion that the female sovereigns of Aceh were mere figureheads and the 
orangkaja were the ones who held the reins of power does not have sufficient evidence 
behind it. Its advocates seem to suggest that the nobles formed a powerful, 
homogeneous group, which promoted and prolonged female rule. Yet, there has been no 
detailed study of the politics involved. Very little is known about these orangkaya who 
were said to wield so much power. Who were they? What was their basis of power and 
authority and who were their supporters and their enemies? Thomas Bowrey, William 
Dampier and Jacob de Roy, who were present in Aceh during the reigns of these female 
monarchs, noted opposition by some orangkaya to female rule from the first; yet three 
more females ruled. 
19 Auni Luthfi, The Decline', p. 124. 
20 Braddel, `On the History of Acheen', p. 20. 
21 Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 449. 
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Contemporary commentaries on the reigns of these queens include accounts 
written by indigenous court chroniclers such as Nuruddin al-Raniri, European officials 
such as the employees of the Dutch and English East Indies Companies, merchants and 
travellers such as Wouter Schouten, Thomas Bowrey and William Dampier, amongst 
others. Their assessments of the queens were more favourable than later writers, who 
exude a stronger whiff of cultural and sexual bias. Thomas Bowrey, who was in Aceh 
from about 1675-1689, noted that the orangkaya(s), the *shahbanday(s) and the Queen's 
greatest eunuchs were all very submissive to her and respected her, not daring to do any 
business of importance before they had thoroughly acquainted her with the matter at 
hand. If she agreed, she would send down her seal to show that she had granted their 
request. If she withheld the seal, the orangkaya must desist from the business and mind 
something else. 22 Indigenous literature corroborated the positive point of view. Bustan 
its-Salatin, written by the famous seventeenth-century *ulama, Nuruddin al-Raniri, 
depicted Sultanah Safiatuddin as a great and generous queen. 23 Initial findings from 
VOC records also revealed that the VOC was in favour of female rule. The Dutch hoped 
that the queen would safeguard their privileges, 24 and reported that she was a better ruler 
than her predecessor husband, Iskandar Thani, since she was able to maintain peace and 
control outright rivalries amongst her nobility. 25 
Most recent writings, especially by those who referred to contemporary accounts, 
have tended to adopt a slightly more favourable view of these monarchs. Mulaika Hijjas, 
like Marsden, concluded that these Acehnese women rulers were pageant queens but 
unlike Marsden, she asserted, that because of the Malay sense of the importance of these 
spectacles and of theatre in state power, the queens who presided over rituals and 
ceremonies were not frail, but were successful exponents of traditional kingship-" 
Takeshi Ito, Anthony Reid and Leonard Andaya believed that as the kingdom of Aceh 
declined in the latter half of the seventeenth century, so did royal power. But in his 
most recent article, Andaya described Sultanah Safiatuddin's government as humane and 
22 Thomas Bowrey, Account of Countries Round Bay of Benga11669-1689, (London: Haklyut Society, 1905), 
pp. 299-300. 
23 Bustan al-Salatin, ed. by Siti Hawa Haji Salleh (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), p. 44. 
24 J. A. van der Chijs and others, Dagh-Register van Batavia, 1640-1682, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, Batavia: G. 
Kolff & Co. 1887-1928), p. 423. 
25 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
26 Mulaika, `The Woman Raja', p. 89. 
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successful. She held the reins of government with great skill and was successful in 
adapting to the aggressive policies of the Dutch. 27 Anthony Reid asserted that under the 
queens, "the orangkaya found that they could govern collectively with the queen as 
sovereign and referee and there was something of the quality of Elizabethan England in 
the way they vied for her favour but accepted her eventual judgement between them". 28 
Takeshi Ito claimed that despite the decline of royal authority after the reign of Iskandar 
Muda, Sultanah Safiatuddin was still able to maintain integrity and respect for the 
monarchy. 
The variety of interpretations and debates and the shifts in views about these 
enigmatic women generated the inspiration for this study. With so many hypotheses 
presented, questions unanswered, the reigns of these queens still represent an intriguingly 
ill explored period in Aceh's history, more surprisingly so since this missing puzzle is 
critical to explain the fate of the most powerful indigenous state in the Straits of Malacca 
at that time. Thus far, no comprehensive study directly focusing on these female rulers 
has been undertaken, using both European and indigenous contemporary sources. Was 
the decision to place female rulers on the throne an internally motivated one, as 
suggested by Reid, or was it due to external stimuli? Was this a deliberate experiment, a 
temporary political expediency, or merely an accident of history? 
More intriguingly, why did this phenomenon end in 1699, never to be repeated 
again? Reid explained that female rule eventually failed when Aceh ran out of credible 
candidates who still had the charisma of the monarchy about them. Veth, on the other 
hand placed much more emphasis on the Islamic factor, which ended female rule-29 He 
commented that Aceh was very much influenced by ideas from Arabia brought to Aceh 
by Arab ulama and merchants. These foreigners were hostile to the idea of female rule 
and claimed that this was against Islamic prescribed rules. Towards the end of Kamalat 
Syah's rule, this priestepartý, armed with a letter from Mekah issued by a certain Kadhi 
Maliku'l Adil made a strong bid to get rid of the female ruler and in 1699 this faction 
27 Leonard Andaya, `A very-good natured but awe-inspiring government' The reign of a successful queen 
in seventeenth-century Aceh, in Hof en Handel .A arische vorsten en de VOC 1620-1720, ed. 
by Elsbeth 
Locher-Scholten and Peter Rierbergen, (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2004), 59-84, p. 81. 
28 Reid, `Female Roles' p. 641. 
29 Veth, `Vrouwenregeeringen', pp. 368-369. 
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won. Kamalat Syah had to step down because of this letter described as a *fatwa by latter 
writers, which stated that Islam forbid female rule. 
If female leadership was anathema to Islam, and Aceh was famously known as 
the staunchly Islamic state, the "Veranda of Mekah", how was it possible that the 
kingdom had four female sovereigns? It would be strange indeed, if the Acehnese elite 
after having respected female rulers for almost sixty years suddenly realized that Islam 
forbid this. Islam, some argued, demanded the seclusion of women and relegated them 
to the realm of the private (dalam). The political sphere, a public domain, was generally 
seen as a prerogative of men rarely encroached upon by the female sex, so how did the 
queens negotiate these traditional and religious values in their daily conduct of political 
affairs with men? What was the relationship like between the queens and the 
predominantly male elite within the patriarchal and Islamic context of the Acehnese 
court? Besides this relationship, other aspects worth exploring are the implications of 
female rule in regard to the issue of political power and state-formation. What was their 
basis of power and authority, who were their supporters- the orangkaya or the Mama, 
which faction supported the queens, when and why? In short, how did these 
purportedly "forbidden" and "invisible queens", behind the golden curtain, rule? 
Interest in queens of medieval Europe is an outgrowth of feminist historical 
studies since the 1960's. However, only recently has the institution of queenship begun 
to attract attention. A renewed interest in women first produced accounts of prominent 
women- nobles, abbesses, saints, including some medieval queens that excited popular 
interest such as Eleanor of Aquitaine, Blanche of Castile, Margaret of Anjou, Isabella of 
Castile. These works were limited because of tendencies to depict the queens as moral 
pendants to husbands or sons and to dwell on their lives, not offices. Then, the study of 
queenship fell into disrepute when political history was demoted. The popularity of 
socio-economic history in the 1980s shifted focus from elite political female roles to 
their less well known and unfortunate sisters. A distaste for administrative and 
institutional histories also impeded investigations into queenship. 
15 
Recent publications however suggest a renewed interest in the institution and 
workings of queenship. 30 The disentanglement of history from political history and 
power from political power has opened fresh approaches to discussions of gender and 
power in the Middle Ages. Recent studies do not focus on biographical studies of 
individual queens but instead have sought to dissect the ways in which queens pursued 
and exploited means to power and how others interpreted their actions. 31 
By contrast, it was only in the 1990s, did Southeast Asian historians like Reid32 
and later Barbara Andaya33 include ordinary people and women in the historical picture. 
In contrast with anthropology, historical studies on women in the early modern era 
remain under-researched. Among major shortcomings of available work on the queens 
is that the accounts and the use of evidence are limited, and the approach sometimes 
frankly partial. 4 The present study deploys a variety of sources and aims to cover events 
as exhaustively as possible or tolerable. It does not aspire to be feminist. Whilst the 
focus here is on women, the object of this study is not to see them as women but 
primarily as rulers exhibiting a fascinating anomaly. Nevertheless, this study cannot 
ignore other historians' rethinking of the past; and looking at Aceh's history through the 
lens of gender opens up a wide variety of avenues and challenges. It challenges 
traditional orthodoxies, which regard the dominant role played by men alone in the 
events of the state. This study also challenges attempts to generalize the roles played by 
men and women across countries and period. It examines a specific episode in a 
particular period that might help illuminate the more general hypothesis about roles of 
women in society and the factors that shaped them as well. By examining the Acehnese 
queens, this study shows how by transgressing "feminine roles", these females injected 
or integrated new elements or features into the largely masculine concept of the 
traditional monarch and the realm. This study also helps to show how definitions of 
30 For a list of these publications, see, John Carmi Parsons, Family, Sex and Power: The Rhythms of 
Medieval Queenship', in MedievalQueenrhip ed. by John Carmi Parsons, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993,1998), pp. 1-2. 
31 Parsons, MedievalQueenship, p. 2. 
32 Reid draws attention to the high status of women in the early modern era as part of the defining regional 
or Southeast Asian characteristic, See Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Volumes 1, 
(London: Yale University Press: 1993), pp. 146,162. 
3 Barbara Andaya, Women, Gender and History in Early Modern Southeast Aria: Other Pasts, (Center of 
Southeast Asian Studies: University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2000), pp. 25,26. 
34 No in-depth study of the queens has been attempted that corroborate Dutch, English and Malay 
records. 
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gender roles operated in Aceh and how these definitions generated its activities and 
societal concerns. 
Chapter 1 explores the beginning of this phenomenon and explains why the first 
queen, Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah succeeded her late husband and predecessor, Iskandar 
Thani (r. 1636-1641). Chapters 2,3 and 4 detail the workings of the Acehnese court and 
examine the relationship between the female monarchs, their orangkaya and European 
envoys. Chapter 5 identifies the features unique to female rule and its impact on 
Acehnese conception of kingship, power and state-formation. 
DidAceb Decline under Female Sovereigns? 
Although in 1600, Southeast Asian interacted as equals with Europeans, by 1700, 
Reid argued, the inequalities were already manifest. 35 Reid claimed that thriving Muslim 
port-polities such as Aceh, Johor, Makassar, Banda and Sulu generally declined by 1680 
as a result of European encroachment on its commerce and politics 36 The year 1680 
witnessed "the end of commerce, " in Southeast Asia where indigenous states retreated 
from international commerce. One main reason he cited was the critical military 
encounters with Europeans, which eclipsed some local ethnic shipping, trade decline, 
loss of revenue and the failure of the last stand of Islamic commerce. 37 Reid's majestic 
survey of Southeast Asia, his ideas on regional coherence and impact of Europeans in 
the early modern era were valuable but they raised adverse responses from historians 
such as Van Goor, Victor Lieberman, Dhiravat Pombejra and Barbara Andaya. 
Although appreciative of his illuminating insights, their main contention was, given the 
highly complex nature of the region and the existence of a high degree of diversity, 
regional patterns could not be generalized to apply to all or even most states. Lieberman 
rejected these regional characterisations in the case of Burma 38 and Pombejra had 
35 Anthony Reid, Charting the shape of early modern SoutheastAsia. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2000), p. 12. 
36 See studies by Lombard for Aceh, Andaya for Johor and Macassar, Villiers for Banda and Warren for 
Sulu. See bibliography for full details. 
37 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Volume 2: Expansion and Crisis, (London: Yale 
University Press, 1993), pp. 268-325. 
38 Victor Lieberman, `Was the Seventeenth Century a Watershed in Burmese History? ', in South East Aria 
in the Early Modern Era ed. by Anthony Reid, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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convincingly shown that they were wide of the mark in the case of Siam. 39 Barbara 
Andaya argued that Reid's regional periodization of decline in 1680 might create an 
artificial even misleading framework when applied to individual polities 40 Van Goor 
asserted that although Macassar and Banten came under Dutch control by the 1680s, it 
was not necessarily the case that they declined. Furthermore, alternative foci for 
religious, cultural and economic life flourished after 1680 in ports such as Kampar on 
the east coast of Sumatra 41 
What about Aceh? This raises another important question regarding the nature 
and impact of female rule in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Most historians 
claimed that Aceh declined by 1699. Did Aceh really decline, in relative or absolute 
terms? And if Aceh did decline, was it because of female rule? In this regard, both 
Indonesian and European writers contended that Aceh's power dipped after the glorious 
reign of Iskandar Muda (1607-1637). Mohammad Said42, Ilyas Sutan Pamenan43, Anthony 
Reid44, Merle C. Ricklefs45 and Leonard Andaya46 all concurred. Reid argued that the 
reduced skill and authority of rulers who succeeded Iskandar Muda and the growing 
power of the Dutch led to the decline of royal power. 47 According to Reid, Aceh, 
pressured by a Dutch blockade in 1647-50, could not prevent the VOC from gaining 
control of the dependencies that produced the pepper and tin on which its prosperity 
had been based. 48 In line with his argument about the seventeenth-century crisis in 
Southeast Asia, where most states experienced the end of the age of commerce by 1680, 
he indicated that Aceh too suffered and fell into disunity after its brief golden age 49 
'° Dhiravat Pombejra, `Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was there a shift to Isolation? ' in 
South East Asia in the Early Modern Era ed. by Anthony Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
40 Barbara Andaya, `The Unity of Southeast Asia: Historical Approaches and Questions', journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 28,1 (1997), p. 163. 
41 Jan Van Goor, `India and the Indonesian Archipelago from the Generale Missiven den VOC', Itinerario, 
16-2,23-39 (1992): 29. 
42 Mohammad Said, Aceh SepanjangAbad, p. 377. 
43 Ilyas, Ren jongAceh di Tangan Wanita, pp. 35-36. 
44 Reid, 'Female Roles in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia, ' p. 641. 
Is Merle C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c1300,2nd edn., (Basingstoke Hampshire, London: 
McMillan Press, 1993), p. 36. 
46 Leonard Andaya, Kingdom of Johore 1641-1678 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 56. In a 
recent article, 'A very-good natured but awe-inspiring government' (2004), Andaya sought to re-examine 
this earlier assertion. He concluded in this article that the impact of the first queen was positive and the 
queen ruled in her own right. The issue of whether Aceh declined was not ascertained. 
47 Anthony Reid, `Trade and Problem of Royal Power in Aceh-Three Stages: c1500-1700', Monographs of the 
Malaysian Branch of the RayalAriatic Society, 6, (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Mas Sdn Bhd, 1975), p. 52. 
as Reid, Southeast Aria, Vol. 2, p. 266. 
49 Reid, Southeast Aria, Vol. 2, pp. 303-4. 
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Ricklefs claimed that Aceh entered a long period of internal disunity and ceased to be 
significant outside Northern Sumatra. From 1641-1699, royal authority was restricted to 
Aceh itself. The Sultanate became a weak symbolic institution. s° 
This widely accepted view has not gone unchallenged. G. W. Irwin argued that by 
the end of the seventeenth century the attempt of the VOC to engross the tin trade of 
Western Malaya had failed. He suggested that the Dutch were defeated partly by the 
superior resources, tactics and persistence of their rivals, but even more by the rigidity of 
their own economic policies. s' It appeared that Aceh was unique since it had to be 
treated with caution by the Dutch, who preferred persuasion to force lest too much 
pressure provoked retaliation: the Acehnese might make it difficult for the Dutch to gain 
access to pepper in the Sumatra West Coast. This contrasted with many writers' picture 
of a weak Malay polity, dominated by the VOC's might. 
A preliminary study of VOC sources revealed that Aceh had control of its 
pepper and tin trade as late as the 1670's. As for the elephant trade, in 1650, the VOC 
representative, J. Truijtman, reported that Sultanah Safiatuddin did not consent for the 
VOC to buy even one head of the animal. 52 Not only had the VOC failed to gain a 
toehold in the elephant trade, Aceh was successful in actually increasing this trade from 
1640's to 1660's. 53 
The received view on Aceh's decline from the mid-seventeenth century could 
not stand unchallenged in the light of new evidence. Indeed the concept of decline itself 
has to be re-examined or reinterpreted. It is difficult to agree with the assessment that 
the absolute and tyrannical rule of Iskandar Muda constituted the "golden age" in Aceh's 
history. In a region where politics were fluid, powers transient, and where the regional 
balance of power was precarious, no state or ruler could exercise hegemony. In the 
Malay world where soft power was as potent as hard power, the military might and 
expansionist policies of Iskandar Muda should not be the main criteria in determining 
the success of the ruler. To maintain peace and stability for commerce to thrive was an 
even bigger challenge. If Aceh declined during the second half of the century, how 
50 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since e1300, p. 36. 
51 George W. Irwin, 'The Dutch and the tin trade of Malaya in the Seventeenth century, in Studies in the 
Social History of China and Southeast Asia, ed. by Nicholas Tarling & Jerome Ch'en, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 287. 
52 Ph. Coolhaas, ed., Generale Missieven, Vol. 2, (The Hague: Martinuss Nijhoff, 1960-1974), p. 461. 
53 Ito, The World ofAdatAceb, p. 415. 
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could the state defy the fate of other Malay polities and remain politically and 
economically autonomous? Furthermore, during the time of the queens, Malay writing 
and literature developed to a height unrivalled till today - which could be said to have 
constituted the real golden age. 
If one were to shift the perspective of more recent writings on the idea of decline 
of Aceh in the late seventeenth century and to focus more on what Van Leur observed 
about the importance of the continuity and survival of indigenous forms and their 
ingenuity to absorb and adapt to new influences, then a study of the relative importance, 
continuity and change of indigenous economic forms and political institutions as 
manifested in Aceh in the second half of the seventeenth century is not only beneficial 
but necessary to test the above hypothesis. 
Tier that Unbind 
Besides the accepted view that Aceh declined under weak female rulers, another 
common assertion is that they were responsible for the loss of Aceh's power over its 
vassal states of Perak and Sumatra West Coast. Barbara Andaya concluded that with 
Aceh's decline in the mid-seventeenth century, and the slow crumbling of the 
relationship with the VOC, Aceh lost its useful vassal state - Perak. Vassalage had 
brought no benefits to Perak and now Aceh could no longer enforce its former control. 54 
According to Kathirithamby-Wells, the decline of Aceh made the VOC protectorate of 
Sumatra West Coast possible. She argued that the Dutch capture of Melaka in 1641 
severely eroded Acehnese commercial supremacy and political importance, boosted 
Dutch prestige and damaged Aceh's bargaining powers to such an extent that Sultanah 
Safiatuddin Shah was obliged to adopt a conciliatory policy. 55 
54 Barbara W. Andaya, Perak, the abode of grace: a study of an eighteenth-century Malay state, (Kuala Lumpur, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 48. 
ss Kathirithamby-Wells, J., `Acehnese control over West Sumatra up to the 1663 Treaty of Painan', 
International Conference on Arian History, No. 87, Kuala Lumpur, (1968), p. 465. 
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These assertions will be more easily and fairly evaluated when we examine certain 
aspects of Aceh's relations with the VOC. In line with the received view, she appeared 
to be much weaker than her male predecessors. In 1650, the VOC succeeded in 
pressuring the Sultanah to sign a treaty agreeing to the sharing of the tin in Perak, equally 
between Aceh and the VOC. The Treaty of Painan of March 1663 and another Treaty 
signed in April 1668 placed a number of Sumatra West Coast states under the protection 
of the Dutch. 56 The question here is how real were the losses? What was the nature of 
ties that bound Aceh's vassal states to her and to what extent were the Sultanah's male 
predecessors successful in controlling these vassals as assumed? A more accommodative 
and peaceful diplomacy does not necessarily entail a weakening of control and power. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine Aceh-vassal ties during the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah 
and seek to address these questions. 
Though this thesis does not aim to achieve the impossible task of providing all 
the answers to the above questions, it seeks to attempt a more comprehensive and 
focused study of these Sultanahs of Aceh than has previously been available. Given new 
evidence that hints at a different picture of Aceh under these female rulers, the clues 
have to be pieced together to obtain a fuller glimpse of this past still shrouded in 
uncertainty and controversy. In this process, the thesis purports to explore the above 
issues further to help illuminate the current debate. Whether this research supports the 
current widely accepted premises about these female monarchs or whether it will show 
that these female rulers have been judged too harshly remains to be seen. Given the 
current debate on the role and status of Acehnese women in a newly emergent 
autonomous Aceh, a better understanding of the roles and contributions of women in 
the past, especially at the helm of power, would either serve as a source of inspiration or 
the very least, a lesson in history. A more concerted effort has to be made to understand 
these elusive queens better. 
Historiography 
Autonomous' History 
56 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', pp. 473,478. 
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A study of how the underlying political and social structure of a port-polity such 
as Aceh could be best served by adopting the indigenous perspective - without 
excluding the invaluable contribution of European sources - in order to understand 
internal developments and to examine whether the changes arose from within, as the 
dynamic of tradition modified the world-view of the Acehnese elite; or whether these 
new developments were responses to external stimuli; or where the balance lay. S" 
This approach to the region's history owes much to the Dutch historian, J. C. Van 
Leur. Van Leur went much further than W. F. Stutterheim and B. Schrieke by shifting the 
colonial historians' lens "a hundred and eighty degrees, from that observed from the 
deck of the ship, the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house" to 
the Asian perspective. He advocated the writing of `autonomous' history where the 
focus of enquiry shifts to natives instead of Europeans. The consequent revolution in 
the historiography of the region, the "Nusantara", came about in the period of 
nationalism during the inter-war years. Prior to this, the Eurocentric tradition was 
exemplified by colonial historians, such as F. W. Stapel, C. Gerretson and E. C. G. 
Molsbergen. 58 Writing at the height of Dutch power in the East Indies, these historians 
"were not concerned at all with the Asian side of things". 59 Another group of historians 
who could be termed "externalists", were H. Kern, N J. Krom and G. Coedes who 
stressed on external influences such as Indianization in shaping Southeast Asian history 
and essentially saw Southeast Asia as incapable of engendering its own civilization, 
manifested in the "indigenous incapacity/external benefaction" dichotomy. 10 In striking 
contrast to the externalists, Van Leur saw the importance of local agents and internal 
forces in stimulating change and development. 61 This historiographic tradition tended to 
stress on the continuity and survival of indigenous institutions. Autonomous history 
5 See Sunait Chutintaranond and Chris Baker, eds., Recalling Local Pasts: Autonomous History in Southeast Asia, 
(Chiangmai, Thaniland: Silkworm Books, 2002). 
58 M. A. P. Meilink- Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and 
about 1630 (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 4. 
59 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade, p. 4. 
60 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallel; SoutheastAs an Global Context, C. 800-1830, Vol. 1. Integration on the 
Mainland (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 7. 
61 See J. C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, (The Hague: W. 
van Hoeve Ltd., 1955). 
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gained popularity and acceptance in the 1960's with the burial of colonialism and 
imperialism. John Smail applied ideas of autonomous history to the period after 1850.62 
Gender History 
Feminist historical studies have been a major influence in the reshaping of the 
idea of period and the methods by which topics are selected and discussed. Feminist 
studies, however, have now moved towards broader studies of how gender is 
understood, how women and men define themselves, are defined by others and by 
societal and cultural institutions. 63 Whilst general gender studies are useful in 
illuminating the relations between men and women in history, it is important to note that 
definitions of sexuality and gender roles are culture and period specific. Furthermore, 
the study of gender issues is intrinsically interdisciplinary, encompassing literature as well 
as history, economics and anthropology, which form the basis of cultural history. 
As mentioned earlier, unlike Europe, women in Southeast Asia were included 
only fairly recently. The pioneering works of Anthony Reid and more recently, Barbara 
Andaya, discussed the roles and status of women in the regional context of "Southeast 
Asia. " While Reid highlighted the important roles and high status of women as a 
defining feature in Southeast Asia, Barbara Andaya was mote ambivalent in her 
assessment. She pointed out that Reid's assessment of women's position met a more 
guarded response from other disciplines. Anthropologists were generally reluctant to 
assert a regional pattern and saw female status as subject to constant negotiation in 
specific environments. 64 She further argued that the coming of world religions like Islam 
and Christianity to Southeast Asia limited the existing dominant and public roles of 
indigenous women. 65 
62 John Smail, `On the possibility of an Autonomous History of Modem Southeast Asia', journal of Southeast 
Asian History, 2 (1961), pp. 72-102. 
63 Jessica Munns, & Penny Richards, eds., Gender, Power and Privilege, (Great Britain: Longman Pearson 
Education Limited, 2003), p. 2. 
64 Barbara W. Andaya, The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Eary Modern Southeast Aria, (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2006), p. 2. 
65 These developments had a direct bearing on the construction of gender in contemporary Southeast Asia. 
"In stressing the behaviour expected of "good" women the newly arrived religions of Islam and 
Christianity joined Buddhism and Confucianism in presenting forthright and persuasive models of female 
modesty and submissiveness. See Andaya, B., The Flaming Womb, p. 230. 
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While these regional studies are useful in scoping patterns of women's status and 
roles, a more empirically based case study, such as the study on the female rulers of 
Aceh, could help illuminate, enrich or even complicate the picture painted by Reid and 
Andaya of women in Southeast Asia in the early modern era. The study of women 
placed in the specific contexts of status, class, religion and society at a particular 
historical time might engender a surprisingly different and unique picture compared to 
the regional sketch. Though studies on traditional concepts of kingship, monarchy, 
state-formation, power and commerce of the region abound, and the study of women in 
general is beginning to take its rightful place in Southeast Asian historiography, none has 
combined the two by examining the elite class and their activities from the lens of a 
gender-based study. 
East-West Interaction and the History of European Expansionism 
The early modern era is a period characterized by the encounter between the 
East and the West, one of expansion and interweaving of maritime connections within 
and between hemispheres which is seen as the basic factor in the creation of what 
Immanuel Wallerstein have termed the modern world-system. 66 Placed in this context of 
East-West interactions, the historiographic tradition of pre-colonial Southeast Asia tends 
to swing from the "Eurocentric" phase on the one end, to the "Autonomous" phase on 
the other. A more recent approach to Southeast Asian historiography is exemplified by 
the writings of Anthony Reid, who pointed out to Southeast Asians in the age of Asia's 
economic boom and with the rise of Asian Tigers and Dragons that their predecessors 
too had gone through the "Age of Commerce (1450-1680)". Their skilful use of the 
East-West economic interdependence and trade relations, western technology and new 
world-views or religions, had created a prosperous, urbane and cultured Southeast Asia 
comparable to Europe. 67 The original contribution of Reid, however, which could 
constitute the third paradigm shift68 to Southeast Asian historiography so far, is to see 
66J. E. Wills, `Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination', American 
Historical Review, (February 1993), p. 83. 
67 Reid, Charting, pp. 7-12. 
68 Lieberman, Strange Parallels, pp. 15-16. 
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that disparate individual polities share common features and experiences constituting a 
coherent whole. 69 Besides placing the study in a regional Southeast Asian context, Reid 
also sees the region as closely bound up with international commerce and tries to place 
Southeast Asia in the context of a wider maritime world. 7° 
Tracing the historiographical transformations of East-West encounters in 
Southeast Asia, one sense the idea that presently the pendulum, which has swung from 
the one end of Euro-centricism to the other, of Asia-centricism, has now come to rest 
somewhere in the middle. In the present era of globalization, when East and West are 
inevitably intertwined and interdependent, one could be confident enough to study East- 
West encounters in a more detached and objective manner; in terms of mutual heritage, 
which requires understanding and inputs from both sides. 71 Placed in this context, the 
"long drift to European hegemony in Asia in the early modern era could be seen to be 
less over-determined, less a forgone conclusion and much more multi-causal and 
contingent to specific contexts". 72 
This study explores Aceh-VOC relations not in the mould of an analytic 
separation of European intrusion and Asian response but in the hope of placing the 
interaction in a more congruent and mutually adaptive perspective" Following the 
argument of Van Leur that Western dominance was not yet in place in the seventeenth 
century, and that the kingdom of Aceh remained largely unmolested by the Dutch, one 
could posit that there was a high degree of interaction whereby Dutch supremacy was 
not yet a forgone conclusion and the nature of interaction was likely to be more complex 
and multifaceted depending on specific contexts. 
Using Aceh as an empirical case study, and judging from preliminary evidence, 
one could argue that in the course of the seventeenth century, Aceh was exceptionally 
effective in maintaining its own independence, its own trade network and in engaging 
and counteracting the Europeans. 74 
69 Reid, Southeast Asia Vol. 1, p. 7. 
70 Reid, Southeast Aria Voh 2, p. 129. 
71 Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blusse, eds., `Introduction' in Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Arian 
trading Networks in the 16th and 17h Centuries (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), p. 4. 
72 Wills, `Maritime Asia', pp. 83-84. 
73 Wills, `Maritime Asia', pp. 84-85. 
74 Wills, `Maritime Asia', p. 98. Although Wills made this claim, he did not elaborate his argument. 
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It would be useful to ascertain whether Reid's regional hypothesis applies to 
Aceh. Given that Reid's hypotheses on Southeast Asia in the early modern era, 
exemplified in the third paradigm shift mentioned above, have been tested in Burma, 
Siam, and Java, it is rather peculiar that no such study has been undertaken for Aceh, a 
major and important port-polity in the Malay Archipelago in the seventeenth century, to 
determine the nature and extent of European-indigenous state interaction. This study 
attempts to fill the gap. 
Sources 
This study will use four core groups of sources: 
1) Dutch VOC documents 
2) English East India Company Records 
3) Malay indigenous published manuscripts 
4) Contemporary travellers accounts 
Dutch VOC Documents 
The VOC documents relating to Aceh as deposited in the Nationaal Archief are 
in the Overgekomen brieven en papieren (OBP) uit Indie aan de Heren XVII en de 
kamer Amsterdam, 1614-1794. Before 1660, the documents on Aceh are in a separate 
section under "Atchin". Post-1660, there is no longer any "Atchin" section and most 
reporting about Aceh is in documents scattered in the Sumatra West Coast, Melaka, 
Batavia, Jambi and Palembang sections. There is no Aceh Dagh-Register because the 
Dutch East India Company did not have a permanent factory there. However, political 
and economic news about Aceh were subsequently reported in the Batavia and Malacca 
Dagh-Register and the Generaal Missiven, letters from the Governor-General in Batavia 
to the Heeren Seventeen. The most useful and richest sources of information regarding 
Aceh are found in the correspondences between the envoys and senior traders appointed 
to serve in Aceh and the Governor-General in Batavia and the daily registers kept by 
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these officials describing the Company's day-to-day affairs in Aceh. After 1663, the 
Dutch East Indies Company no longer had a factory in Aceh and thus there was no need 
to appoint envoys and senior traders in Aceh. Reports on Aceh become harder to find 
and vivid details on the court proceedings and internal developments are lacking. This 
unfortunate gap affects this study, tilting coverage in favour of the reign of the first 
Sultanah, Safiatuddin Syah. 
Another important source of information found in the VOC records are the 
letters exchanged between the indigenous rulers and the Governors in Melaka and 
Batavia. Most of these original letters, written in Malay in the *jawi have perished, the 
remaining few being very rate indeed. Only one original letter from Sultanah Safiatuddin 
to King Charles II remains. The rest of these letters are translated in Dutch, copied and 
kept together with the other papers in the OBP. These letters are valuable because they 
constitute the indigenous perspective on events. Although these courtly letters are also 
tools of diplomacy and propaganda, read with caution they provide valuable insights to 
the understanding of the institution of monarchy in the Malay world. Major limitations 
arise from Dutch translators' tendency to translate freely, and inadvertent mistranslations 
that occurred owing to linguistic and cultural differences. In most cases, the important 
first section of the letter, the *puji pjian which describes the sender, the royal person, is 
either omitted, summarized or standardized for all letters. The VOC copiers saw this as 
unnecessarily distracting from the actual content, the business at hand. On the contrary, 
this puji pujian carefully crafted represented what the ruler and his realm stood for in the 
Malay world. 
English East India Company Records 
The EIC documents are found in the India Office Records of the British Library. 
For the study purposes, the relevant records are those that fall within the period of 
interest i. e. 1639 to 1701. The English East India Company records are not as rich as 
the VOC's because Aceh and Sumatra did not factor significantly for the English 
Company in the second half of the seventeenth century since the Company concentrated 
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their activities farther north in India. " The missions sent to Aceh were sporadic and the 
English were not able to found a more permanent settlement in Aceh or Sumatra West 
Coast owing to the intense competition from the Indian traders and the VOC. Though 
it might be a useful future research agenda, it is beyond the scope and capability of this 
thesis to study English sources about Aceh found in other Indian port records and other 
European sources such as Portuguese, French and Danish. 
Malay Indigenous Published Manuscripts 
The third valuable category of sources used to gather information for this 
research is the classical Malay manuscripts, which gives an understanding of the 
metaphysics of indigenous society. There are several major indigenous chronicles and a 
range of religious treaties written during the reign of queens that provide an extremely 
good corpus of information to reconstruct the cultural dimension of female rule 
in Aceh 
at a time of cultural renaissance in a major Malay polity. These manuscripts are found 
in 
the Universiteit Bibliotheek, Leiden Universiteit. 
The Malay Records include: 
1. Kitab-Sejarah written in the 16 `h and 17' centuries such as the Taj us-Salatin, Bustan 
us-Salatin and Sulalat us-Salatin. 
2. The Hikayatr and Adats such as the HikayatAceh and AdatAceb. 
3. Qanun or laws such as Oanun Meukota Alam and Qanun al As i Darussalam 
Travellers'Accounts 
The other valuable source of information is the contemporary accounts of 
numerous European visitors both English and Dutch to Aceh, who had close links with 
the ruling elite and conducted business in Aceh for a length of time. These include the 
accounts given by Frederik de Houtman, John Davis, Augustin de Beaulieu, Nicolaus 
de 
75 Nevertheless, English activities in Sumatra West Coast are detailed in Chapter 4. 
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Graaff, Peter Mundy Wouter Schouten, Thomas Bowrey, and William Dampier, Jacob 
de Roy amongst others (publishing details in the bibliography). 
Methodology 
Corroboration of sources 
VOC documents are the backbone of this study since the meticulous record 
keeping of VOC officials provides detailed information on the politics of Aceh and the 
economic background. The English East India Company records supplement 
information from VOC documents to establish the research framework and to counter- 
check the information whenever possible. Accounts of country traders, travellers and 
residents in Aceh complement the information given by both Company officers. 
European accounts must be approached with care and read at times against the 
grain since they naturally provide a European perspective with its attendant inbuilt bias 
and cultural ignorance or unfamiliarity. They lack information on the patterns of 
thinking of the locals. The extensive indigenous accounts are therefore analysed to glean 
Acehnese world-views, which demand informed reading to understand the generic and 
symbolic significance of information presented. An understanding of adat and Islamic 
historiography is crucial. A good command of classical Malay and jan is needed. 
An interdisciplinary approach illuminates the problems. I draw on 
anthropological research that has explored the role of women in the evolution of local 
societies in Southeast Asia, while literary tools help me examine how women were 
perceived and represented in the writings of men. Bearing in mind the limits of skills a 
scholar could master, it will be more prudent to tap the richness of research on women 
already undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Succession of the First Female Ruler of Aceh - Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah 
Overview of historical succession from 1514-1702 
Only one attempt has been made to explain the factors governing succession in 
Aceh in the seventeenth century. In his analysis, Amirul Hadi, concluded that the rules 
of succession in Aceh in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were at best obscure. ' 
Before we try to clarify them, a brief narrative overview is in order, from the kingdom's 
founding by Ali Mughayat Syah in the sixteenth century to the reign of Sultan Badr al- 
Alam Syariff Hashim Jamal al-Din (r. 1699-1702). 
The origins of the kingdom of Aceh and its Sultans are still mired in confusion? 
The Sultanate of Aceh Dar al-Salam, however, which began in the sixteenth century was 
believed to be a result of the unification of two small kingdoms, Aceh in Dar al-Kamal 
and Lamuri in Mahkota Alam, both at the northern tip of the island of Sumatra but 
separated by a river-3 Constant rivalry between these two kingdoms ended when 
Munawwar Syah, king of Lamuri, attacked and defeated Inayat Syah, king of Aceh, 
whose realm had to unite with Lamuri. Sultan Shams Syah, son of Munawwar Syah, then 
ruled this united kingdom. In order to strengthen his position, Shams Syah married his 
son, All Mughayat Syah to the daughter of Inayat Syah. All Mughayat Syah (r. 1514- 
1528)4 expanded the kingdom by conquering neighbouring Daya (1520), Pidie (1521) and 
Pasai (1524). 5 After his death, the entire northern tip of Sumatra came under the 
I Amirul Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra: a study of seventeenth-centurAceh (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 65. 
2 The historical survey given above draws largely from the indigenous chronicle, the Bustan us-Salatin and 
the study made by Djajadiningrat. # 
3 De HikayatA jeh ed. by Teuku Iskandar, (s' Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), p. 72. 
4 Raden Hoesein Djajadiningrat, `Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische werken vervatte gegevens over de 
geshciedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh' Bidra, gen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 65 (1911), 135-265 p. 
212. Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, p. 247, did not give the start date of his reign, only the end 
date of 1530. 
5 KF. H. Van Langen, 'De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat', BKI, 5.3 (1888), 
translated as Susunan Pemerintahan Aceh Semasa Kesultanan [Structure of Government during the Aceh Sultanate], by 
Aboe Bakar (Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Banda Aceh, 1997), p. 14. # 
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influence of the Sultanate. Ali Mughayat Syah was thus, the founder and first Sultan of 
Aceh Dar al-Salam. 6 
As the son of Shams Syah, Sultan All Mughayat Syah was a descendant of 
the Mahkota Alam Dynasty. It is not known whether Ali Mughayat Syah was the eldest 
son of Shams Syah or whether that distinction belongs to another character, Raja 
Ibrahim, known to the Portuguese as a distinguished warrior; or whether they were the 
same. 7 Nor is it clear, in any case, how he came to succeed his father. When he died, 
his son, Salah al-Din (r. 1528-37), succeeded him. ' Known to be a weak leader, he was 
challenged by his younger brother, Ala al-Din al-Qahar, ruler of Pasai. Ala al-Din took 
power from him and ruled from 1537-1568.9 He was a strong ruler and continued his 
father's legacy of expansion and attacking the Portuguese in Melaka. After his death, his 
son, Sultan Husayn, succeeded him and took the title Sultan All Riayat Syah (1568- 
1575). 10 He was the second son of Al-Qahar; the first, Abd Allah, the ruler of Aru, was 
killed in the campaign against the Portuguese in Melaka in 1568. Al-Qahar had three 
more sons, Sultan Mughal, Sultan Abangta and Sultan Abangta Abdul Jalil. Sultan 
Abangta Abdul Jalil, replaced his eldest brother as the Sultan of Aru. Sultan Mughal 
became the Sultan of Priaman while the remaining son, Abangta, who was seen to be 
ambitious, was executed by Al-Qahar. " Sultan All Riayat Syah was deemed to be a wise 
ruler who was revered by his people and the ulama. 12 Sultan Ali Riayat Syah died in 1575 
after ruling for eight years. His death brought much political instabilities in Aceh, which 
witnessed a succession of three Sultans. Sultan All Riayat Syah was succeeded by his 
four-month old son who died seven months later. Very little is known about why this 
6 The Bustan us-Salatin described Ali Mughayat Syah as the first Sultan of Aceh Dar al-Salam, defender of 
Islam and a fine warrior, p. 31. The date of reign given by the Bustan is 913-928 H, (1507-1522). 
Djajadiningrat `Critisch', p. 212, places him at r. 1514-1528, and Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, 
p. 247, at r. ? -1530. 
7 In another comprehensive but little referenced study of the genealogy of the Acehnese Sultanate, H. M. 
Zainuddin, an Acehnese historian, stated that Laksamana Raja Ibrahim was the younger son of Sultan Ali 
Mughayat Syah. See H. M. Zainuddin, TarichAjeh dan Nusantara, (Medan: Pustaka Iskandar Muda, 1961), p. 
395. 
8 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch, ' p. 212. The Bustan, however, states that he ruled for seventeen years. Bustan, 
Iskandar, p. 31. Lombard states that he ruled from 1530-1539 Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, p. 
247. 
9 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 212. Lombard puts Ala-al Din date of reign at 1539-1571. Lombard, in 
Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceb, p. 248. 
10 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 212. Lombard puts Ali Riayat date of reign at 1571-1579. Lombard, in 
Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, p. 248. 
11 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 32. 
12 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 32. 
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infant was chosen as successor and who was the Regent appointed to rule on his behalf. 
The Bustan merely stated that the next ruler was his uncle, Abangta Abdul al-Jalil who 
took the title Sultan Sri Alam. 13 Assassins killed him in 1576,14 allegedly because of his 
bad temper. " Zayn al-Abidin, grandson of al-Qahar, became the next ruler but 
supposedly because of his murderous and bloodthirsty nature, he too was murdered after 
a few months, in 1577.16 
The Bustan gave no explanation on how they were murdered or any clue as to 
who the killers were. It was also not clear under what circumstances these kings 
succeeded the throne. Only the HikayatAceh revealed a little bit more about these 
Sultans but even then, this chronicle was tantalizingly silent on their deaths. The Hikayat 
Aceb depicted Sultan Sri Alam as extravagant since he had depleted the kingdom's 
Treasury by giving expensive gifts to certain soldiers and elites from Fansur (Baros). 
This Hikayat related that the orangkaya and ulama in Aceh had then gathered and decided 
that this state of affairs was injurious to the kingdom and that this Sultan must be 
deposed. " The Hikayat was however, silent on how this was done, merely mentioning 
that he was replaced by Sultan Zayn al-Abidin. 'a This was in contrast to the Bustan's 
account that the Sultan was killed. The Hikayat Aceh then continued to relate that Sultan 
Zayn al-Abidin was also a bad ruler, extremely bad tempered and bloodthirsty. Again, 
here the elites of the kingdom felt that if this Sultan was not stopped, it would spell 
disaster for them, thus they decided to depose the Sultan. The Hikayat Aceh was again 
mysteriously silent on how this was done. It merely stated that after this Sultan ruled for 
two years, he died. 19 Although these indigenous chronicles seemed to imply that the 
elites played an important role in appointing and demoting rulers, they revealed almost 
next to nothing about the identities and rights of the orangkaya and court officials except 
for mention of the highest titles. 
After this period of violent successions, an era of foreign-born rulers ensued. 
Sultan Ala al-Din known as Mansur Syah, of Perak origin, succeeded to the throne and 
13 Bustan, Iskandar, pp. 32-33. 
14 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 212 
is Bustan, Iskandar, p. 32. 
16 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 212. H. M. Zainuddin gave a differing account. See Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, 
p. 399. # 
17 HikayatAceh, Iskandar, p. 96. 
to HikayatAceh, Iskandar, p. 97. 
19 HikayatAceh, Iskandar, p. 98. 
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reigned from 1577-1586.20 Again, no explanation is to hand of the circumstances of his 
succession or of why a foreign-born ruler came to be chosen to rule Aceh. The Busfan 
described him as a pious and just ruler who upheld Islamic law. Despite being popular, 
he was also killed, for reasons unfathomable 21 Next in line, was Sultan Mahkota Buyung 
from Inderapura who took the title Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Syah. ' He reigned from 
1586-88 and again for unknown reasons was killed. 23 
After a decade of foreign rule, the succession returned to the Aceh's Dar-al- 
Kamal dynasty. Sultan Ala-Addin Riayat Syah, son of Firman Syah, descendent of Inayat 
Syah of the Dar al-Kamal dynasty, was installed on the throne in 1588 and ruled until his 
overthrow in 1604.24 He took the title Sultan All Mughayat Syah al-Mukammil. He had 
four sons, two of which had died and the remaining two sons were installed as rulers in 
Pidie and Pasai. 25 He also had two daughters, one of which was the mother of Iskandar 
Muda, *Putri Raja Indra Bongsu 26 He was said to have been chosen by the orangkaya and 
was already very old when he ascended the throne (the main reason it appears as to why 
he was chosen), but after becoming king, he was alleged to have killed many of the 
orangkaya who had supported him earlier. 2' His own eldest son, the ambitious Sultan 
Muda, the ruler of Pidie later deposed him in 1604. Sultan Muda, then took the title 
Sultan All Ri'ayat Syah. 2 Sultan All Ri'ayat Syah's brother, Hussain Syah, then took over 
as ruler of Pidie. Hussain Syah opposed his brother's deposition of their old father and 
in this opposition, he was supported by his nephew, Iskandar Muda. Their rebellion 
20 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 159-160. # 
21 Bustan, Iskandar, pp. 33-34. Djajadiningrat mentioned that he was killed by his ukebalang (soldier) but no 
reason was given as to why he was killed, Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 213. Zainuddin suggested that he 
was killed because the elites of Aceh wanted a return to their own native royal lineage of Mughayat Syah, 
Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 400. # 
22 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 34. Sultan Mahkota Buyong came to Aceh to look for his sister who was married to 
the late Sultan Sri Alam. When Sri Alam was killed, he was said to have been asked to succeed to the 
throne of Aceh. See J. Kathirithamby-Wells, `The Inderapura Sultanate: the foundations of its rise and 
decline from the 16th - 18th century', Indonesia, 21 (April 1976), 65-84, p. 68 and Amirul, Islam and State, p. 
69. 
23 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 34. Zainuddin ventured that during this Sultan's reign, Zayn al-Abidin returned to 
claim the throne. He was supported by the Acehnese elites and the army so much so that Ali Riayat Syah 
of Inderapura had to rely on his soldiers from Inderapura. In the ensuing struggles between these two 
factions, Sultan Ali Riayat Syah was killed, Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 401. 
24 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 213, pp. 162-163. # 
25 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 34. 
26 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 169. Zainuddin cites her name as Indra Ratna Wangsa. See Zainuddin, Tarich 
A jeh, p. 403. 
27 Beaulieu related this account when he was in Aceh in 1621. John Davis was the one who mentioned 
that this king was very old. See Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', pp. 162-163. Cf. En. 16 and fn. 22. # 
28 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 34. Also Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 213. 
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against All Riayat Syah failed and Iskandar Muda had to flee to Pidie to avoid being 
punished by Sultan All Ri'ayat Syah. Hussain Syah refused to surrender Iskandar Muda 
to his brother. All Ri'ayat Syah therefore attacked Pidie. Hussain Syah was defeated and 
Iskandar Muda, who was supporting this uncle, surrendered to Sultan All Ri'ayat Syah. Z' 
He was however, released in 1606 when the Sultan needed his services to repel an attack 
on Aceh by the Portuguese. Iskandar Muda succeeded in repulsing the Portuguese 
attack but the Sultan himself succumbed immediately after to an unknown cause of 
death. Iskandar Muda lost no time in getting the support of the orangkaya to place hirn 
on the throne. His uncle from Pidie was then duly captured and executed 30 
Iskandar Muda ruled from 1607 until his death in 1636.31 The Bustan considered 
him to be a great ruler and conqueror. Under him, Aceh expanded its territories and 
continued attacks against the Portuguese in Melaka. 2 Iskandar Muda died without 
leaving any direct heir of his own since his only legitimate son was believed to be killed 
under his own orders a few weeks before his death 33 As his successor, he named his 
son-in-law, Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1636-1641), who became the third foreign-born 
ruler to rule Aceh. Iskandar Thani was the son of the Pahang ruler named Ahmad Syah. 
He was brought to Aceh at the age of seven when Pahang was conquered by Iskandar 
Muda in 1618 and was married to his daughter, Puteri Seri Alam. Iskandar Thani died in 
1641, childless, at a young age of thirty-one, reasons unknown. With no apparent male 
heir, his widow, the daughter of Iskandar Muda succeeded him and became the first 
female ruler of Aceh, taking the title Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin Syah. 34 She enjoyed a long 
reign of thirty-five years until her death in 1675. She was succeeded by another woman 
who was crowned Sri Sultanah Nur al-Alam Naqiyyat al-Din Syah. She ruled for three 
years until her death in 1678.35 According to Zainuddin, she was the daughter of 
Hussain Syah, the ruler of Pidie and the uncle of Iskandar Muda 36 Apart from this claim 
29 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 174. Also, Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 403. 
30 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 175. Zainuddin made no mention of what happened to Hussain Syah. 
31 Both Lombard and Djajadiningrat placed his reign from 1607-1636 illustrating the fact that the 
information on the historical succession of the Sultans of Aceh in the seventeenth century is much more 
definite than the century before. See Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 213. Lombard, in Winarsih, KerajaanAceh, 
p. 249. 
32 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 35. 
33 Translation of Lombard, in Winarsih, KerajaanAceb, p. 236. # 
34 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 214. Also Lombard, in Winarsih, KerajaanAceh, p. 249. 
35 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 214. Lombard's study stops at this first Sultanah Taj al-Alam. 
36 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 408. He provided no evidence or source for this claim. 
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there is no other information about her origin nor the circumstances leading to her 
succession. A third woman came to succeed to the throne of Aceh and was crowned as 
Sultanah Inayat Syah Zakiyyat al-Din Syah and she ruled from 1678 until her death in 
1688.37 Again, her origins cannot be verified. The Busfan stated that she was the 
daughter of a certain Sultan Muhammad Syah 38 Zainuddin claimed that she was the 
daughter of Mahmud Syah or Sultan All Riayat Syah (1604-1607) 39 After her death in 
1688, the last of four queens by the name of Kamalat Syah was installed, her origin 
seems to be totally obscure. She ruled until 1699 when she was deposed by a challenger 
of Arab descent, Sultan Badr al-Alam Syariff Hashim Jamal al-Din (r. 1699-1702). 
40 
Criteria for Succession 
Not many countries in the seventeenth century had written succession laws, at 
least not in the Malay world. The closest indication of any written prerequisites a 
candidate must possess before being appointed as Sultan is found in the Kanun Syarak 
KerajaanAceh4' based on *. ryariah. It states that the candidate must be a Muslim of good 
lineage, an adult (have reached puberty), an Acehnese citizen, courageous, wise, just, 
loving and soft-hearted or merciful (lembut hati), conversant with the nuances of 
language, a keeper of promises, not physically handicapped, truthful, loving, patient, 
restrained (keeping anger in check, controlling baser instincts), forgiving, firm yet 
submissive to Allah's will and thankful to Allah 42 
Most rulers did not meet all these prerequisites. Nevertheless, the common 
sources of legitimate succession that could be gleaned from the above narrative are 
religion, good lineage usually of royal birth, nomination by a previous ruler, oligarchic 
nomination or election. Conquest can confer legitimacy, as, in appropriate cultural 
37 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 214. 
38 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 74. No explanation was given as to who this Sultan Muhammad Syah was. 
39Zainuddin, TarichAjeh, p. 409. This means that the second and third queens were cousins of Sultan 
Iskandar Muda and their grandfather was Sultan al-Mukammil. Again, no evidence provided. 
40 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 192. 
41 The Kanun Syarak Kerajaan Aceh [Aceh Canonical Laws] was written in 1853 by Tengku di Meulek, 
descendent of Aceh's Arab Jamal al-Din dynasty during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Mansur Syah. The 
Kanun Syarak Keajaan Aceh however, was believed to be based on an earlier kitab Tar, kirah tabakah written in 
1507 during the reign of Sultan All Mughayat Syah. See Abdullah Sani Usman, Nilai Sastera Ketatanegaraan 
dan Undang-undang dalam Kanun Syarak KerajaanAceh dan Bustanu. r Salatin, [henceforth referred to as Kanun 
Syarak Keajaan Aceh] (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2005), p. 18. 
42 Abdullah Sani, Kanun Syarak KerajaanAceh, p. 38. 
35 
environments; as can the ruler's sacrality, piety, or prowess. Amirul isolated a few salient 
factors in determining historical succession in Aceh. First, rulers must be of royal 
lineage 43 Secondly, the succeeding ruler may be chosen by the reigning one but this 
designation must be agreed by important state officials in order to avoid future crisis. "' 
The consent of these state officials was important especially in cases where the previous 
ruler had failed to propose a name or in times of crisis. The other condition for 
succession was that the potential sovereign must possess personal qualities such as 
military prowess, leadership capabilities and moral superiority. as 
Before commenting on Amirul's arguments and analysing how these pertain to 
the context of female succession, one other important condition that should be 
examined but was not explained by Amirul was the succession of foreign-born rulers to 
the throne of Aceh Sultanate. As mentioned above, three foreign-born Sultans ascended 
the throne of Aceh Dar-al-Salam. They were Sultan Ala al-Din of Perak (r. 1579-1586), 
Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Shah (r. 1586-89) from Inderapura, and Sultan Iskandar Thani 
(r. 1636-1641) from Pahang. These Sultans, though foreign, were accepted as legitimate 
because they were related to Aceh's royal family by marriage. Besides this royal lineage, 
the orangkaya and ulama accepted them because of the special circumstances surrounding 
their accession. After the death of Sultan Ali Riayat Shah in 1579, Aceh was faced with a 
dearth of native-born, suitable heirs and this failure to install a good ruler brought about 
the need to look elsewhere for a successor. So the prince from Perak was chosen in 
1579. This ushered in a decade of rule (1579-1589) under foreign rulers with royal 
marriage ties with Aceh's ruling dynasty. Though legitimate, these foreign rulers ended 
up killed and it was not until 1636 that Aceh once again came under a foreign ruler, 
Iskandar Thani, son of a Pahang prince. When Iskandar Thani died unexpectedly in 
1641, leaving no male heir, the choice of a foreign ruler would be a logical one and in 
keeping with the Sultanate's customary succession practices. The first two foreign-born 
Sultans who ruled in the years 1579-1589 were chosen and placed on the throne by the 
elites of Aceh whilst the third was chosen by the reigning Sultan. Since Iskandar Thani 
died suddenly and did not name a successor, the only other way a foreign-born Sultan 
43 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 74. 
44 Arnirul, Islam and State, pp. 87-88. There is only one clear case of this happening - the naming of 
Iskandar Thani as successor by Iskandar Muda. 
45 Amite, Islam and State, p. 89. 
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could succeed was by the choice of the orangkaya and ulama of Aceh. In 1641, the elites 
certainly had some legal choices of contenders. As a result of relations by marriage, the 
possible contenders were from Perak, Pahang and Johor. 
When news of the death of Iskandar Thani reached the ears of the neighbouring 
Malay polities, rumours were rife as to who would go to Aceh to succeed to the throne. 
The Dutch records revealed that the Sultan of Johor, Sultan Abdul Jalil (r. 1 623-1677) on 
his return to Johor from Patani wanted to stop over in Aceh to succeed Iskandar 
Thani. 46 Back in 1613, when Aceh razed Johor to the ground, its ruler, Sultan Alaudin 
managed to escape with his son, Abdul Jahl. His brother, Sultan Ma'yat Syah, was 
carried off to Aceh to be married to Iskandar Muda's sister, thus securing the Sultan of 
Johor a legitimate ground to contest for the throne based on marriage ties. Sultan Abdul 
Jalil succeeded Sultan Ma'yat Syah when he died in 1623. As mentioned earlier, Aceh 
already had reigning Sultans related by marriage to the Aceh royal house from both 
Pahang and Perak making these Sultans legible for succession. 
So why did the elites of Aceh not choose another foreign-born Sultan to rule 
Aceh this time round as they did before when no apparent heir was in sight? This 
question is a difficult one to answer. One indication perhaps was that the elites of Aceh 
generally preferred native to foreign-born Sultans. Despite being "chosen" by the elites, 
both Sultan Mansur Syah of Perak and Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Syah of Inderapura were 
killed. H. M. Zainuddin suggested that Sultan Mansur Syah was killed because the elites 
of Aceh wanted a return to their own native royal lineage of Mughayat Syah. They were 
not happy with this Perak Sultan because he married his daughter to the Sultan of Johor. 
The result of this union was a son, Raja Hashim, and the Sultan intended to name this 
grandson as his successor. The elites opposed this and he was eventually killed by a 
*uleebalang. 47 H. M. Zainuddin ventured that during Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Syah of 
Inderapura's reign, Zayn al-Abidin, grandson of Al-Qahar, returned to claim the throne. 
The Acehnese elites and the army supported this claimant from Aceh's original royal 
lineage that Ali Riayat Syah of Inderapura had to rely on his soldiers from Inderapura. 
In the ensuing struggles between these two factions, Sultan All Riayat Syah was killed 
48 
46 Chijs, DaBh-Register, 1640-1641, p. 362. 
47 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 400. 
49 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 401. 
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There is the suspicion that Sultan Iskandar Thani too might have been killed 
since he was still very young and his death came so unexpectedly. " The Dutch officials 
reported that Iskandar Thani was not loved by the Acehnese because he was a 
foreigner. " Indeed, in addition to this, he was not liked because he was wasteful and had 
depleted the Treasury. The elites of Aceh were not happy that he had ordered a lot of 
very expensive jewellery from the Company and after his death, they had refused to 
accept these jewels from the Dutch saying that they were not obliged to carry out his 
orders. Tensions between the Company and Iskandar Thani had already arisen in 1640, 
a year before his death when Iskandar Thani refused to help the Dutch to conquer 
Melaka. This was his way of registering his displeasure at the Company's decision to ally 
itself with his vassal, Johor behind his back. But when Melaka was finally successfully 
conquered by the Company with Johor's help in 1641, this only resulted in leaving Aceh 
in a balance of power that was not in her favour. Furthermore, Aceh had recently lost 
another vassal, Pahang, Iskandar Thani's own birthplace to Johor in 1638. These 
circumstances, plus the weakened state of the Acehnese military after the 1629 fiasco in 
Melaka added to the sense of insecurity of the Acehnese. Because of this bad experience 
with this Pahang-born ruler, the elites of Aceh learnt a very important lesson, which 
made them more determined to keep out foreigners beyond its borders. The elites thus 
looked inwards, to a native-born to lead them and to gather their strength to meet and 
respond to these outside challenges. Strangers, at that moment, were not welcomed. 
These circumstances coupled with rumours rife, made the Acehnese elite even more 
wary of attempts at marrying their queen, Iskandar Thani's widow and Iskandar Muda's 
daughter, to strange princes who could later claim the throne. The Acehnese orangkaya, 
thus secretly made a pact never to allow a foreign prince to claim the throne of the 
kingdom or to be obeyed voluntarily. " In these circumstances, a native heir, or in this 
case, even an heiress, was preferable. It is significant to note here that given the fear of 
the elite, that the throne could fall into foreign hands, they accepted that Iskandar 
Muda's daughter could rule in her own right without the need to have a male spouse. 
Indeed, they jealously guarded their queen from marrying again. Revulsion or fear of 
49 The Busfan reveals a plot hatched by those who were against Iskandar Thani who poisoned his food. 
This plot was however foiled and the conspirators were executed, Busfan, p. 46. 
50 Nationaal Archief [henceforth identified as NA], Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642, 
f. 572R. 
51 NA, Justus Schouten and Johan van Twist in Malacca, July 1641, f. 343V. 
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foreign-born princes at that moment was one explanation for the need to install a local- 
born one, albeit a female. 
This brings us to the main object of discussion. In 1641, an entirely new variable 
emerged on the issue of legitimate succession: sex. Can a woman succeed to the throne 
of the Sultanate of Aceh Dar-al-Salam? In a Muslim and largely patriarchal kingdom 
such as Aceh, this could indeed be problematic. So how did the elites deal with this 
issue, how and why was she chosen and was this choice consistent with prior customary 
practices and traditions? First, the above four conditions governing the succession that 
Amirul identified need attention. He concluded that the procedure for succession was 
less structured in Aceh than in other Malay Sultanates. This very obscurity surrounding 
the rules ensured that the Acehnese approach to this issue was flexible and pragmatic. 
" 
On the other hand, Amirul saw pragmatism as constrained by ideology. He asserted that 
at the core an Islamic-moral paradigm prevailed. 
It appears that in the case of a female succession, royal lineage applies, certainly 
for the first Sultanah, Safiatuddin Syah. This is consistent with earlier practices of male 
succession where it is believed that most rulers were of royal blood. Granted that there 
are some inconsistencies regarding the identity of the Sultans and their succession in the 
sixteenth century, most accounts do corroborate on the dynastic lineage of the Aceh 
Sultans, especially in the seventeenth century. The kingdom of Aceh was founded on 
the basis of unification of the Dar al-Kamal and Mahkota Alam Dynasties and rulers 
from Mughayat Syah to Zayn al-Abidin sprang from these two dynastic lines. In 1589, 
after the era of foreign-born rulers, al-Mukammil restarted the Dar-al-Kamal line which 
ended with his son, All Riayat Syah, in 1607. The two dynastic lines were then reunited 
in the person of Iskandar Muda whose father was Mansur Syah, grandson of al-Qahar of 
Mahkota Alam dynasty. His mother was Putri Raja Indra Bongsu, daughter of al- 
Mukammil of Dar al-Kamal. 53 Safiatuddin Syah was Iskandar Muda's daughter, clearly 
from a royal mother since another son of Iskandar Muda, from a non-royal mother was 
disqualified to succeed 54 According to Zainuddin, Safiatuddin's mother was Putri Sani, 
52 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 65. 
53 Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, pp. 248-249. Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 216. 
54 Ali Hasjmy has also identified the mother of this princess. She was said to be royal and her title was 
Puten (Princess) Ratna Indra. Evidence given is rather vague though because the naskab tua (tr. old 
manuscript) mentioned by Hasjmy could not be properly identified. All Hasjmy, 59 Tabun Aceh 
Merdaka 
dibawab Pemerintahan Ratu (Banda Aceh: Penerbitan Bulan Bintang, cl 977), p. 33. 
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the daughter of Daeng Mansur whilst her half brother was the son of a concubine from 
Lam Si. 55 He became the *panglima of one of the provinces in Aceh instead and took the 
title Panglima Polem. sb Very little else is known about her other legitimate siblings 
except for the brother who was killed by the orders of their own father, Iskandar Muda, 
a few weeks before his deaths' It is possible that there was indeed a dearth of other 
suitable royal male heirs with impeccable lineage since Iskandar Muda was so paranoid 
that he killed many royal males during his reign. He killed his own nephew, the son of 
the Sultan of Johor (this Sultan married Iskandar Muda's sister) because he was jealous 
that his own mother favoured his nephew. He also put to death other royal relations 
such as a son of the Sultan of Bantam and another of the Sultan of Pahang? Iskandar 
Thani too contributed to this shortage of royal male heir since Peter Mundy, an English 
traveller who visited Aceh, reported that he killed about four hundred people namely 
Iskandar Muda's other diverse daughters together with their sons who he alleged tried to 
usurp his throne. 59 Thus, at the time of Iskandar Thani's death, it appears that none 
other with such impeccable lineage existed other than the daughter of Iskandar Muda 
and the widow of Iskandar Thani, Safiatuddin Syah. In such a circumstance, on the 
account of royal lineage, she was the only one most qualified to succeed and therefore 
the only one who would be most likely to be accepted by all as legitimate. 
Unfortunately, the origins of the other three Sultanahs are still inconclusive. 
Thus far, a search of the VOC sources has confirmed the accession dates of these 
queens but not their identities and origins. From the indigenous chronicles, only the 
Bustan mentioned the female rulers. The Bustan confirmed the identity of the first queen 
but the identity of her immediate successor, Nakiatuddin Syah remained a mystery. 
According to Zainuddin, Nakiatuddin Syah was the daughter of Hussain Syah, the ruler 
of Pidie, the uncle of Iskandar Muda. 60 Teuku Iskandar, editor of the Bustan stated that 
the second queen was another daughter of Iskandar Muda but he provided no evidence 
55 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 426. 
56 Van Langen, in Aboe Bakar, Susunan Pemerintahan, p. 15. 
57 According to Zainuddin, this son, named Merah Pupok, was also not from a royal mother but the son of 
another concubine from Pasai, Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 426. 
58 Iskandar Muda imprisoned and tortured his own mother whom he suspected of being engaged in a 
conspiracy against him. Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 446. 
59 Peter Mundy arrived in Aceh in February 1638, four months after the reported executions ordered by 
Iskandar Thani. Peter Mundy, The Travels of PeterMundy, vol. III, part II, no. XLVI, (Cambridge: The 
Hakluyt Society, 1907,1919), p. 330. 
60 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 408. He provided no evidence or source for this claim. 
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for this speculation. " The third queen, Zakiatuddin Syah, the Bustan told us, was the 
daughter of a certain Sultan Muhammad Syah. The Bustan ended with the mention of this 
third queen without elaborating on the identity of this Sultan Muhammad Syah and his 
daughter. Djajadiningrat suggested that the third queen might be the daughter of the 
second queen. 62 Zainuddin claimed that the third queen, Zakiatuddin Syah was the 
daughter of Mahmud Syah or Sultan All Riayat Syah (1604-1607). 63 The fourth queen, 
Kamalat Syah remains a complete mystery. 64 Although their origins are still in doubt, it 
is hard to imagine that they were not from royal lineage since their succession would 
surely be opposed. No such claims of illegitimacy were ever made to contest their 
succession. The three foreign-born rulers, Ala al-Din (r. 1579-86) of Perak and Ala al-Din 
Riayat Syah (r. 1586-89) of Inderapura and Iskandar Thani (r. 1636-1641) were all royal 
themselves who married into the Acehnese royal line. Therefore, it appears that royal 
lineage is an essential pre-requisite of succession in Aceh even in the context of a female 
succession. Furthermore, it seems that as long as they were of royal lineage, the order in 
which progeny appeared did not matter, since the eldest son did not necessarily succeed. 
Other sons or brothers, or for that matter daughters or sisters of previous rulers could 
succeed to the throne. 
Another criterion of succession is the designation of an heir by the reigning 
ruler. " The wish of the dying ruler, had however, to be declared in front of the court 
officials and confirmed by them. The Bustan reported that Iskandar Muda had gathered 
the most important officials such as the *Kadhi Malik al Adil, *Perdana Menteri, *hulubalang 
and other religious leaders, most prominent being Syeikh Shamsuddin al-Samatrani, the 
*Syeikh al-Islam and announced that when he passed away, his "son" Sultan Mughal 
[Iskandar Thani] would take his position and the court officials present agreed Gb The 
nomination by the reigning ruler, however, did not appear to be a common practice for 
61 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 13. 
62 Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 189. Djajadiningrat based this claim from some written manuscript of 
Snouck Hurgronje, the details are unknown. 
63 Cf fn. 39. 
6' According to All Hasjmy, based on the genealogy given in the naskab tua, the origins of these female 
rulers could be traced back to the same family dynasty, i. e. the grandfather of the founder of the Sultanate 
of Aceh, All Mughayat Syah, whose name was Sultan Alauddin Abdullah Malikul Mubin. However, the 
evidence here is inconclusive. See All, 59 Tahun, p. 39. 
65 This procedure of naming or designating a successor was widely practiced in other Malay kingdoms and 
was one of the preconditions recognized in the S jarah Melayu for legitimate succession. 
66 Busfan, Iskandar, pp. 43-44. 
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succession in Aceh since this was more often than not contested. Iskandar Muda's 
naming his son-in-law as heir designate was the only example mentioned in the 
indigenous chronicles. Even then, Iskandar Thani did not last long since he incurred the 
displeasure of some circles of the orangkaya with his extravagant behaviour and his 
support of the execution of Shams al-Din followers. This appointment may be an 
exception rather than the rule given the kind of power wielded by Iskandar Muda. Other 
successions were more a result of an oligarchic nomination and consensus of the 
orangkaya. This was in line with the Acehnese tradition of *mu. yawarah where a decision 
tended to be made by the majority rather than one person even though he was the 
Sultan. A successor accepted by the majority elite would stand a better chance of 
survival rather than one appointed by the Sultan. 
Amirul argued that the consent or compliance of these state officials with the 
wish of the dying sovereign served to avoid "future crisis in the succession". This is 
impossible since these conditions are mutually contradictory and cannot prevail 
simultaneously. An heir is either designated or elected, never both. The appointment of 
Iskandar Thani by Iskandar Muda could not survive his death, since Iskandar Thani 
"died" in mysterious circumstances. Neither did it prevent a future crisis since Iskandar 
Thani's unexpected death threw the court into an uproar. It is thus clear that election 
from the orangkaya and ulama factions was crucial in determining the choice of a 
successor. Whether the consent needed to be unanimous would be difficult to ascertain 
but it would be likely the result of a consensus of the dominant elites. I suggest that this 
election by the elites constituted one main criterion in the kingdom's succession history. 
Circumstances leading to the succession of the first female ruler ofAceb Dar al-Salam 
The critical question here is why did the orangkaya decide to nominate and pay 
their oath of allegiance to a female successor in 1641? Amirul contended, "with the 
death of Iskandar Thani in 1641, the power of the orangkaya reasserted itself in the midst 
of the resulting political confusion, as he had left no son to succeed him. The orangkaya 
played a major role in the crisis by installing his widow on the throne... " and "the 
accession of this ruler marked the beginning of a gradual transferral of power into the 
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hands of the aristocrats. s67 Unfortunately, in making this assertion, Amirul did not offer 
any explanation as to why or how the orangkaya "installed" this widow or how their 
"power reasserted itself. "" Let us first examine both contemporary and recent accounts 
on the first female succession in Aceh. In the main, these accounts differed on two 
major questions - firstly, whether her succession was smooth and peaceful or 
problematic; whether she was installed immediately after the death of her husband or 
some days after. Secondly, the alleged debate that took place at court amongst the 
elites as to whether a woman could be allowed to lead or rule an Islamic kingdom. 
One contemporary account, that of Nicolaus de Graaffs, a Dutch surgeon, who 
was in Aceh at the time of Iskandar Thani's death, described a problematic succession. 
He wrote about an oprchudding (state of commotion) under the orangkaya where many 
people lost their lives and the Company's lodge was closed for four to five days because 
each of the orangkaya desired to be king. 69 Because of this chaotic situation, it took three 
days before Safiatuddin was installed. " 
The rest of the contemporary accounts, Dutch and indigenous did not mention 
any disturbances. A Dutch Company official, the *oppercoopman Jacob Compostel who 
resided in Aceh wrote in a letter dated 26 February 1641 that the King of Aceh had 
departed this world on the 15`h of February 1641, without leaving any children to 
succeed and thereafter, after a lapse of three days, his widow was crowned as Queen and 
resumed duties of administration 71 Similarly, the ulama Nuruddin al-Raniri who was 
present at the time of the queen's accession to the throne, had written in the Burtan us- 
Salatin, that Iskandar Muda's daughter was chosen as the successor and was enthroned 
as Paduka Seri Sultan Safiatuddin Syah Berdaulat zillu' 1-Lah fil `alam ibnat Sultan Raja 
Iskandar Muda Johan Berdaulat without any opposition. But, unlike the Dutch reports, 
'2 he wrote that the Sultanah's reign started on the very same day of her husband's death. 
67 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 81. 
68 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 81. 
69 Nicolaus de Graff, Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaffgedaen naar alle gewesten des were/ds, beginnende 1639 tot 1687 
ed. by J. C. M. Warnsinck, Cs-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1930), p. 13. See also, Raden Hossein Djajadiningrat, 
Kesultanan Aceh trans of Critisch by Teuku Hamid (Departmen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan: Proyek 
Pengembangan Permuseuman, Daerah Istimewa Aceh, 1982-1983), No. 12, p. 56. 
70 Djajadiningrat stated that three days were taken before the queen was installed. Djajadiningrat quoted 
Nicolaus de Graaff (1701), p. 9: See Djajadiningrat, `Critisch', p. 188. However, in the 1930 edition of 
Reisen van Nicolaws de Graaff ed. by Warnsinck, there was no mention of how long it took before the queen 
was installed. 
71 Chijs, Dagh-Register van Batavia, 1640-1641, p. 322. 
72 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 58. 
43 
Modern historians tended to agree with contemporary accounts that described a 
peaceful succession though some pointed out that initially some difficulties and 
opposition arose because of her sex. The Acehnese historian, Mohammad Said, agreed 
with al-Raniri's description that Safiatuddin's enthronement took place smoothly on the 
very day her husband died and opined that she had the full support of the orangkaya and 
the ulama, especially Nuruddin al-Raniri and Abdul Rauf. 73 He argued that a woman 
holding high positions in Aceh was not a strange phenomenon since in earlier times 
Aceh already had a woman admiral. 
Another Acehnese historian, All Hasjmy held the view that the succession of the 
queen was without bloodshed but it was not without some difficulties. There was a 
period of mu. ryawarah amongst the orangkaya and the other ulama headed by al-Raniri and 
Hasjmy ventured that the discussion centred on the issue as to whether a female ruler 
was legal in Islam. It must have taken some time before everyone came to agree to 
enthrone the widow of Iskandar Thani, the daughter of Iskandar Muda as the successor. 
This happened after the ulama ruled that a female could become a ruler as long as she 
met the requirements of religion, moral conduct, and knowledge. 4 
Another Acehnese historian, Rusdi Sufi, claimed that there were three days of 
mourning before the orangkqya unanimously decided to appoint the late king's widow as 
successor. But just before her coronation there was some opposition in the court over 
the issue of the legality of a woman becoming the head of the Muslim kingdom since a 
woman could not even be appointed as an *imam or *wali. 75 Rusdi Sufi suggested that 
this issue was resolved when another *alim, Al-Singkel proposed the separation of 
politics and governance from religion thus absolving a female ruler from performing the 
rituals expected of a Muslim leader such as leading men in congregational prayers in 
mosques on Fridays. 76 
The above narratives alluded to the important role of the oran(gkaya and the ulama 
in consenting to her succession by consensus. Only H. M. Zainuddin argued that 
Safiatuddin was already influential behind the throne during the time her husband was in 
73 Mohammad Said, A jeh SepanjangAbad, pp. 377-379. 
74 Al, 59 Tabun, p. 49. 
75 Rusdi Sufi, `Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah', in Wanita Utama dalam Ilntasan S /arah, ed. by Ismail Sofyan, 
Hassan Basry and Ibrahim Alfian, 1"' edn., (Jakarta: Jayakarta Agung Offset, 1994), p. 43. 
76 Rusdi, `Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah', in Wanita Utama ed. by Ismail and Others, p. 44. # 
44 
power. When he died, she herself contested for the throne but the ulama opposed her 
claim by decreeing that a female could not rule in Islam because a woman could not be 
appointed as an imam or a wall. Safiatuddin responded to this opposition by using her 
army led by Maharaja Lela. In the ensuing struggle, one alim, Fakih Hitam was killed, 
and al-Raniri himself was kidnapped and then later killed. During this turbulence, 
another alim, Sheikh Abdul Rauf, intervened and proclaimed Safiatuddin as Queen on 
the condition that the role of the imam and wali was taken by an alim from the royal 
family. 77 Although it is not impossible that Safiatuddin herself contested for the throne 
rather than being nominated by the elites, this account is problematic because there is no 
evidence of al-Raniri's opposition and kidnapping. His writing in the Bustan on her 
smooth succession and the support she obtained from her subjects did not even hint of 
dissent. It is difficult to believe that Safiatuddin could be accepted as ruler if she did not 
get the blessings of the Syeikb al-Islam, the highest religious judge, and most prominent 
alim at that time. Contrary to Zainuddin's claim, al-Raniri was not killed but he left Aceh 
in 1644. 
So, how does one reconcile these inconsistencies to explain the first female 
succession in Aceh's history? In weighing the above accounts, Nicolaus de Graaff, the 
resident Dutch surgeon's report was the most immediate and neutral. It appeared that 
Iskandar Thani's death was certainly unexpected for it caused an uproar amongst the 
orangkaya and made the succession issue critical since no apparent successor was in sight. 
In an unprecedented move, some of the orangkaja appeared to have tried to put 
themselves up as a candidate but others vehemently opposed, which split the nobility 
into factions. Whether the claim was opposed because of the issue of legitimacy since 
the previous rulers had royal blood or because of sheer jealousy none of the orangkaya 
wanted to pay allegiance to their own kind. None of the orangkaya faction was perhaps 
strong enough to support their candidate. To force the issue might bring Aceh into a 
civil war. None of the orangkaya could afford this especially given the uncertain external 
condition where the VOC with the help of Aceh's enemy Johor had just conquered 
Melaka. Both representatives were on their way to Aceh to discuss peace and there was 
77 Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 406. Although, the period of commotion and lost of lives mentioned here 
corroborated de Graaff's account, Zainuddin's claim that al-Raniri was killed had been proven wrong since 
most scholars cited al-Raniri's death to be in September 1658 in Gujerat. See Azra Azyumardi, The Origins 
of Islamic reformism in SoutheartAria: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama'in the 17'b and 1 
Centuries, (Honolulu: Allen and Unwin, University of Hawaii Press, 2004) p. 62. 
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a rumour that the Sultan of Johor was on his way to Aceh too to claim the throne, which 
was legitimately his due to the marriage ties between the Johor and Aceh royal families. 
He might even marry Iskandar Thani's royal widow and daughter of Iskandar Muda to 
seal this deed. The initial commotion reported by de Graaff therefore, did not erupt into 
violence and the scramble for power did not last longer than a few days. Thus, the 
peaceful succession reported by most other accounts. 
The orangkaya however, had to find a suitable candidate fast. Based on the above 
discussion, one of the criteria of succession was that the candidate had to be of royal 
blood. More importantly, the candidate had to be acceptable to the dominant majority 
of the orangkaya. The other politically prominent group that had to give consent would 
be the ulama or religious scholars at court. As mentioned above, the next suitable royal 
candidate that met the legitimacy criterion and closest in term of consanguinity to the 
previous rulers were none other than the widow and daughter of Iskandar Muda. The 
only "problem" was that she was female. The "female" factor was unprecedented in the 
history of Acehnese royal succession. 
This female factor must have bothered the elite of that time but it appeared to 
have bothered recent Acehnese male historians more since they placed emphasis on the 
alleged religious debate whether a female could succeed as a ruler in Islam. This was no 
trivial matter since the last queen was deposed allegedly because of afatwa from Mekah 
which stated that Islam forbid a female from ruling a country. An excellent political 
pedigree would not have guaranteed the succession if there was still the issue of whether 
female leadership was legal in a Muslim state. 78 As mentioned by some scholars earlier, 
the Sultanah was enthroned only after three days and they conjectured that this delay was 
due to a debate that took place as to whether female rule was allowed in Islam. Rusdi 
Sufi claimed that a section of the elite who opposed her succession argued that Islamic 
law did not even allow a woman to be an imam or even a wali, what more a ruler. This 
view however was opposed by another group of ulama headed by Nuruddin al-Raniri79 
78 Rusdi, `Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah', in Wanita Utama ed. by Ismail and Others, p. 43. 
79 This alim's full name is Nur al-Din Muhammad b. Ali al-Hamid al-Shafi'i al-Asha'ri al-Aydarusi al-Raniri 
al-Surati. He was appointed by Iskandar Thani as Sheikh allslam, the chief religious position and remained 
as such under the first Sultanah until he left Aceh in 1643. See Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian 
World, (London: C. Hurst & Co. 2001), pp. 116-118. # 
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and (later by) Abdul Rauf al-Singkel, 8° two of the most prominent ulama in Aceh in the 
17 `h century. Many scholars81 were of the opinion that because of the intervention and 
support from these two ulama, a female successor was enthroned. 
Not much information is available on the religious debates that seemed to have 
put the politics of the kingdom in such a state of indecisiveness. Jacob Compostel, the 
VOC oppercoopman in Aceh at that time, made no mention of any religious debate and 
those scholars who mentioned the role these ulama had played in the presumed debate 
did not offer any evidence. But it is not surprising that the issue of whether a female was 
allowed to rule would attract controversy in a Muslim polity such as Aceh. Although not 
much information is available to confirm that such a debate took place, it is safe to 
conclude that without the concurrence of the leading alim of that day, viz. al-Raniri, the 
first Sultanah could not be enthroned. However, it is difficult to agree with Amirul 
when he claimed, "an orthodox alim like al-Raniri has approved a legal ruling allowing 
for a queen to take the throne". " No such legal ruling orfatwa allowing a female to rule 
a Muslim polity was mentioned in al-Raniri's works. As Amirul himself pointed out, 
there was nothing in the Bustan, where al-Raniri sought to explain, why a female ruler 
was allowed to rule in the first place. Nothing was mentioned in the Bustan about 
whether her sex qualified or disqualified her to be a legitimate successor. Indeed, al- 
Raniri wrote in the Bastan stating that her rule was accepted and justified because she had 
the qualities of a good ruler, i. e. she was just, generous, loving, caring and pious and 
exhorted her subjects to do good 83 The possession of these virtues determined rightful 
rulers regardless of their sex. The Bustan described good male rulers in much the same 
way. I venture that this neutral attitude toward female rule suggests a less conservative 
and extreme interpretation of Islamic tenets regarding female roles and perhaps reflects a 
as such under the first Sultanah until he left Aceh in 1643. See Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indones an 
World, (London: C. Hurst & Co. 2001), pp. 116-118. # 
80 Abd al-Rauf b. Ali al-Fansuri al-Singkili (c. 1615-1693) was born in Singkel, West Sumatra. He left Aceh 
in 1642 for the Middle East to study and returned in 1661. After his return, he was appointed as Sheikh a! - 
Islam. He remained in this position until his death in 1693. Riddell, Islam, pp. 125-128. Also Azra, The 
Origins of Islamic Reformism, p. 71. 
81 These are All Hasjmy, Rusdi Sufi, Cheah Boon Keng and Amirul Hadi. See Rusdi Sufi, `Sultanah 
Safiatuddin Syah', p. 43. Cheah Boon Keng, `Power behind the throne: The role of Queens and Court 
Ladies in Malay History', Journal of the Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Socigy, 66 (1993), Part 1,1-21, p. 11. 
Amirul, Islam and State, pp. 83-85. As mentioned earlier, All Hasjmy claims that because the ulama, headed 
by Al-Raniri, ruled that a female could rule in Islam, she was enthroned. 
82 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 83. 
83 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 73. 
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less gendered pre-modern concept of rule and power. It demonstrates a respect for 
sovereignty *daulat per se regardless of the sex of the person in whom it is manifested. 
The silence on the question of female rule reflects a normal and valid acceptance of the 
varied potentialities of women instead of the more modern emphasis on masculinity and 
the concomitant unease with a woman who is not subordinate to a man. Since these 
religious debates that purportedly delayed the Sultanah's succession could not be 
ascertained, it might be likely that whether a woman was accepted in Islam was not a 
critical question asked by the elites of Aceh in 1641. Furthermore, as will be discussed in 
chapter 5, there was no separation of politics and religion under the female monarchs. 
Indeed, Sultanah Safiatuddin emphasized her role as the upholder of Allah's laws. 
Nevertheless, this question whether female rule was acceptable in Islam remained an 
important one and needed to be addressed. It revolved on how Islam was interpreted to 
shed light on the role of a woman as sovereign. The outcome of this interpretation 
*ýtihad might have been dependent upon the relative authority and the influence of the 
persons involved in the mu. ryawarah, especially the ulama. 
Regarding Amirul's argument about al-Singkel's role and his works84 in 
supporting the succession of the first Sultanah, Safiatuddin, it must be noted that the 
Mirat al-Tallab was written after he returned to Aceh in 1661.85 Whilst his role and work 
would be important in the perpetuation of female rule in the subsequent enthronement 
of the subsequent three queens, it could not be used nor should it be confused to justify 
the first Sultanah's accession in 1641. It may be probable, based on the accounts by 
Rusdi Sufi and Zainuddin, that he was one of those ulama who supported her accession 
to the throne way back in 1641, even before al-Singkel was appointed as the Sheikh a! - 
Islam and before he was commissioned to write the Mirat al-Tallab. Whether, he was key 
to the installation of the first Sultanah may be still a matter of debate since he was fairly 
young in 1641 (about twenty-six years old). Furthermore, he had not gone to the Middle 
East to further his studies, which might affect his stature as an experienced alim 
compared to the older and more authoritative al-Raniri who held the position of Sheikh 
al-Islam in 1641. 
84 Abd al-Rauf al-Singkel wrote about twenty-two works ranging from law, Quranic exegesis, theology and 
mysticism. In his Mirat al-Tullab, completed in 1663, he left open the possibility of women being in 
leadership position, for example, as a judge. See Amirul, Islam and State, pp. 85-86. # 
85 Amjrul, Islam and State, p. 85. 
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Pre Modern conceptions of kingsb p/queenshit, 
More queens ruled in earlier times when conceptions of power and authority 
were not defined in terms of sex. Dean Miller argued that the early European and 
Byzantine concept of the ruler was of a hermaphroditic being, uniting masculine and 
feminine principles, and implied that the concentration on masculinity was a modern 
phenomenon. In ancient and pre-colonial Africa, women held power in the 
phenomenon of queen mother. In Southeast Asia, ancient and pre-colonial concepts of 
power and authority were defined in terms of dualities of male/female with implications 
of fertility and complementariness. 86 With the advent of world religions like Christianity 
and Islam, interpreted and executed by males, power and authority began to be 
constructed and defined as necessarily male. Even then, early Islam and Christianity 
gave women a much more prominent position compared to the latter years when 
religion became institutionalised and bureaucratized by male elite. Only in recent years 
with a more feminist reading of the Quran and Bible that women began to interpret 
religion themselves resulting in the redefining ideas of power, authority, and leadership. " 
How was women's involvement in politics viewed in the Malay world in the early 
modem era? It is important at this juncture to draw on the earlier Malay/Islamic 
political treatises that laid out the theory on kingship. In the context of Muslim 
Southeast Asia, the religious scholars in Aceh might well have referred to these 
contemporary religious and other writings that touched on the issue of female 
participation in politics and governance. 
As mentioned earlier, the Kanun Syarak KerajaanAceb did not consider being male 
as a pre-requisite to becoming a ruler. The Taj us-Salatin, a political treatise, written in 
86 Leonard Andaya, 'The Stranger-King Complex in Bugis-Makassar Society, ' unpublished paper presented 
at the Stranger-Kings in Southeast Asia and Elsewhere Workshop, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5-7 June 2006, p. 1. 
87 See Muslim feminist writings by Fatima Memissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory, (London: Zed 
Books, 1996); Fatima Mernissi, ForgottenQueens of Islam, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 
and Amina Wadud, Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2006). 
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Aceh in 1603 by al Jauhari, aa viewed female rule as legal in the absence of a male heir. 
This was clearly not written as a response to the circumstance that faced Aceh in 1641. 
One could argue that this treatise was way ahead of its time and was a reflection of the 
local religious scholars' attitude towards leadership and women in general. In chapter 
five of the Taj us-Salatin, under the heading of *kerajaan and the *hukumat regarding the 
sultan, the writer, albeit, reluctantly89 stated that a female could succeed a male king, but, 
only in special circumstances viz. in the event of the non-existence of a male heir in the 
royal family and to prevent crisis (darurat) in the country 9° Although he placed caveats 
on female leadership, the very discussion on the legality of female leadership put this 
indigenous scholar's thesis in sharp contrast to the views held by Islamic scholars found 
in the Muslim heartlands at the time. Mainstream Islamic doctrines formulated in the 
Middle East implied that a leader should necessarily be male. " Taj us-Salatin explication 
of theories of female leadership, had unconsciously or inadvertently perhaps, taken on a 
distinctly local interpretation of Islamic doctrines to explain and reflect a local political 
reality, i. e. the existence of female rulers in the archipelago way before the issue of 
female succession arose in Aceh. 
The Sulalat-ur-Salatin92 or commonly known as Seejarah Melayu, (believed to be 
written in 1612), did not seem to object to female rule either or the involvement of 
several powerful aristocratic women behind the throne during the Malaccan Sultanate; in 
some instances even judge their influence as positive. Tun Sri Lanang, told his readers 
that a woman, Sikadar Syah, ruled the kingdom of Bentan and he described in great 
detail the greatness and prosperity of Bentan under her rule. For example, she bestowed 
upon Sang Sapurba and Sang Nita Utama, emissaries from Palembang, two crowns so 
decorated with precious stones that one could not even glimpse the gold underneath 93 
88 Taj us-Salatin, ed. by Khalid Hussain (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), p. xiv. 
89 I suggest that Al Jauhari reluctantly agreed to female rule because, in his explication of the ten 
prerequisites to good leadership, he advised kings to spend less time with women because according to 
him, they lacked good deeds. He also stated that a king, by right, should be a male because a king is also an 
imam and a woman can never be an imam, Tajus-Salatin, Khalid, p. 60. # 
90 Tai us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 60. 
91 Al-Ghazali cited manliness, good horsemanship and skills in bearing arms as necessary qualities a ruler 
should possess. See Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of 
Islamic Political Theory (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press) p. 121. # 
92 See, S jarah Melayu - The Malay Annals ed. by Cheah Boon Keng (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1998), pp. 10-20. 
93 S jarah Melayu, Cheah, p. 25. 
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The Acehnese perception of power and kingship 
The Taj, as mentioned earlier, placed two caveats to female succession. It 
appears that the first condition- absence of a suitable male heir fitted Aceh's situation in 
1641. The second was to avoid darurat. Amirul contended, "the emergence of the first 
queen should be seen in the context of a political crisis that came to represent a serious 
threat to the social order, a circumstance that was used to justify her rule. "" The 
unexpected death of Iskandar Thani leaving Aceh with no apparent male heir constituted 
a crisis in succession. The ensuing panic coupled with the uncertain external situation 
needed a speedy solution. It did appear that at that juncture, a female was preferable to 
anarchy. The ulama in Aceh could have used the Taj to justify their choice. However, it 
appears that the elite in Aceh did not see the need to justify her rule based on her sex. 
Although al-Raniri did not spell it out clearly why a female should be allowed to rule in 
his writings, the fact that the Bustan described the Sultanah being enthroned on the very 
day of the death of the previous ruler showed that he wanted to demonstrate that her 
succession was not at all problematic. 95 One can argue that it is not surprising that al- 
Raniri would write in praise of his patron and his widow, the first Sultanah, since her late 
husband commissioned the Bustan to be written by al-Raniri and appointed him as the 
Syeikh al-Islam, the highest religious position at court. This may be true, but, one must 
take note that he finished writing this chronicle after he had left Aceh. Thus, his firm 
support of this Sultanah's succession, deemed smooth in the Bustan, reflected the 
concept/belief that female rule could be accepted even under less exceptional critical 
situations. Amirul himself had shown very convincingly that al-Singkel had no 
objections to the female sex taking the mantle of power regardless of whether it was born 
out of necessity or crisis, and al-Singkel even saw female rule as nothing exceptional or 
strange but as a "normal phenomenon. "96 This explains why three more female 
sovereigns ascended the throne up to 1699. 
Spatially and culturally far away from the heartland of Islam in the new frontiers 
and far-flung regions of insular Southeast Asia, the ulama found themselves faced with a 
uniquely different political reality from that faced in mainland Islam, that was the 
9 Amirul, Islam and State, pp. 81-82. 
95 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 58. 
96 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 85. 
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tradition of powerful women in general and high-born women who played important 
roles at court. One finds only a handful of Muslim female sovereigns in other parts of 
the world. The neglect, sometimes silence, in mainstream Islamic discourses on women 
rulers perhaps reflects the insignificant numbers of these female sovereigns in Islamic 
history. The few women rulers who have been recognised and recorded in history are, in 
this instance in India, Sultana Radiyya who ruled Delhi in 1236.97 Others are Mongol 
Queens such as Tindu who ruled the fallarid Dynasty from 814-822, Kutlugh Khatun 
who reigned from 1257-1282, her daughter, Padishah Khatun ruling from 1282-1295, 
her niece, Absh Khatun who ruled the Atabek dynasty from 1263-1287 and Sati Bek 
who became Head of State in 1339.9ß The Fatimid Dynasty, who first established their 
own Ismai'li Shi'i caliphate in Yemen to rival the Sunni Abbasids, placed two queens on 
the throne, Malika Asma and Arwa who held power from 1019-1038.99 In the Maldives, 
three Queens Sultana Khadijah, Sultana Myriam and Sultana Fatima ruled from 1347- 
1388. "u The very fact that the number of such politically active and prominent women is 
very small, even though Islam has been established in the world for the past fourteen 
centuries, shows that women holding high positions in the world of politics are an 
exception rather than the rule. Mernissi's survey also showed that amongst the number 
of Muslim women who had ruled in their own right, more women were found ruling in 
the peripheral areas of Islam. "' 
According to Reid, "Austronesian societies... which include Polynesia and 
Madagascar as well as Indonesia and the Philippines have been more inclined than 
perhaps any other major population group to place high-born women on the throne. s112 
Indeed, the elites of Aceh need only look back in history to consent to the succession of 
a female ruler. Prior to the founding of the kingdom of Aceh, in the Northern part of 
Sumatra, a historical precedent had been set where female rulers appeared not only to 
have already been in existence but were highly honoured and commemorated. A pair of 
97 Peter Jackson, `Sultan Radiyya Bint Iltutmish, ' in Women in the Medieval Islamic World, ed. by Gavin 
Hambly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 181-182. 
98 Hambly, Women in the Medieval, pp. 13-17. 
99 Farhad Daftary, `Sayyida Hurra: The Isma'ili Sulayhid Queen of Yemen', in Women in the Medieval Islamic 
World, ed. by Gavin Hambly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 118. 
100 Fatima Memissi, Hidden from History- ForgottenQaeenr of Islam (Pakistan: Al-Abbas International, 1996), p. 
89, pp. 107-108. 
101 Fatima, Hidden from History, pp. 107-108. # 
102 Reid, `Female roles in Pre-colonial Southeast Asia', p. 639. 
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gravestones, one written in Old Javanese and one in Arabic characters, were found in the 
village of Minye Tujoh in Aceh, inscribed with the dates of death 781 or 791 A. H. (1380 
or 1390 A. D. ) respectively. "' According to Ibrahim Alfian, 104 the stones mark the grave 
of a Queen Nur Ilah, with the appellation "Queen of the Faith ... who has rights on 
Kadah [Kedah] and Pase [Pasai]. s105 In what is now the district of North Aceh, another 
gravestone made of marble with exquisite Arabic calligraphy and Quranic verses was also 
found. The Arabic calligraphy translates as "this is the grave of a brilliant holy woman, a 
Queen respected by all ... Nahrasiyah... who died on 17 Zulhijah 823 (1428). 106 Although 
only male Sultans had ruled the kingdom of Aceh since its founding, the tradition of 
powerful women being accepted as rulers in its antecedent Muslim kingdom of Pasai was 
an exemplary tradition that Aceh appeared to continue. Besides Pasai, Patani, a Malay 
Muslim polity in what is now southern Thailand, is another example where four women 
ruled in succession, from 1584 to 1688. The Hikayat Patani related that when Sultan 
Bahadur died, there was no male heir to succeed him. The orangkaya appointed his 
daughter, Raja Ijau as Patani's next ruler. 107 Several more instances of female rulers in 
the region were in Sukadana between 1608 and 1622, in Jambi between 1630 and 1655 
and in Solor from 1650 to 1670.108 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
undertake a comparative study of these queens, the preponderance of these female rulers 
may show that sex was not the main criteria for succession. 
Many scholars109 drew attention to the prominence of women in the Acehnese 
court as a reason allowing female leadership to be accepted. Although not exactly 
holding the highest position in the kingdom, they were nevertheless powerful in their 
own right. Mohammad Said argued that female rule was not an aberration in Aceh since 
the kingdom had a female *laksamana and historically Acehnese women took up 
103 W. F. Stutterheim, `A Malay sha'ir in Old-Sumatran characters of 1380', Acta Orientalia, 14 (1936), 268- 
279, pp. 276-277. 
104 Ibrahim Alfian, `Ratu Nur-Ilah', in Ismail Sofyan and Others, Wanda Utama Nusantara p. 2. 
105 Translated from Old Javanese by C. Hooykaas, quoted by Ibrahim Alfian, `Ratu Nur-Ilah', in Ismail 
Sofyan and Others, Wanita Utama Nusantara p. 3. 
106 Ibrahim Alfian, `Ratu Nahrasiyah', in Ismail Sofyan and Others, Wanita Utama Nusantara p. 16. 
107 Hikayat Patani, ed. by Siti Hawa Haji Salleh, (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka: Kuala Lumpur, 1992), p-28- 
108 Cheah, `Power behind the throne', pp. 1-2. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare these 
female rulers in the region. This invites further research. 
109 Such as Veth, Reid, Cheah and Mohammad Said. 
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positions of power. 1° Contemporary European travellers who visited royal courts of the 
Sultans of Aceh reported that palace women served as emissaries, advisors and guards. 
John Davis, who visited Aceh in 1599, claimed that Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Shah al- 
Mukammil's (1589-1604) "chiefest counsellers" were women. "' Al-Mukammil also had a 
woman as laksamana since "hee will trust no men. "' 12 Even Iskandar Muda (r. 1606- 
1636) taken to be the greatest ruler the Acehnese ever had, relied on female guards for 
his protection. "' 
Conclusion - Why Female Rule in 1641 ? 
Reid argued that the commercially oriented aristocrats who made every effort to 
maintain political control in the interests of mercantilism prompted the rise of female 
rule in the age of commerce. "a A woman ruler would be more appealing since women 
were commonly perceived to have a tighter grip on purse-strings and more shrewd in 
matters of business given the common role of Southeast Asian women as financial 
managers of the household, as petty traders and money-changers in the market place. In 
Aceh's case, Reid ventured that the orangkaya'c aversion to absolutism was the reason 
why they chose a female ruler. Iskandar Muda, wrote Reid, "had been a particularly 
frightening example of the dangers of absolutism, seeking to monopolize trade with the 
English and the Dutch while killing, terrorizing and dispossessing his own orangkaya. 11 
s 
These were indeed plausible reasons for choosing a female candidate. Nevertheless, this 
did not explain why the orangkaya chose a female candidate in 1641. If commercial 
reason prompted the orangkaya to choose a female candidate, this should have been done 
perhaps decades earlier. If it was an aversion to absolutism, then the orangkaya should 
have appointed a female candidate in 1604 after the death of the tyrannical al-Mukammil. 
Furthermore, the orangkaya would have no way of knowing beforehand whether the 
110 Mohammad Said, A jeh SepanjangAbad, p. 379. Only Pamenan argues that female leadership was a 
strange phenomenon in Aceh. See Pamenan, Ren jongAceh, pp. 34-35. 
111 The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator ed. by A. H. Markham, (London: Hakluyt Society, 
1880), p. 150. 
112 Markham, The Voyages and Works of John Davis, p. 150. 
113 Augustine de Beaulieu, 'The Expedition of Commodore Beaulieu to the East Indies', Navigantium atque 
Itinerarium Bibliotheca orA Complete Collection of Voyages ed. by John Harris, Vol. 1, (London: Hakluyt Society, 
1764), p. 744. 
114 Reid, `Female Roles' p. 641. Also, Amirul, Islam and State, p. 81. 
Its Reid, `Female Roles', p. 641. 
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chosen candidate would serve their motives. As mentioned earlier, al-Mukammil was 
believed to have been chosen by the orangkaya because he was very old, but once in 
power he decimated the orangkaya who supported him. I suggest that the orangkaya who 
elected a female ruler on the throne did not choose her because she was female. They 
chose Safiatuddin Syah who happened to be a female. Nevertheless, by the 
unprecedented action of accepting a female candidate, the orangkaya in a sense was taking 
a gamble the outcome of which only time would tell. 
I suggest that there is perhaps, no one important reason that could help explain 
the beginning of female rule in Aceh, rather the succession of the first female ruler was a 
result of a unique confluence of events and personalities. It was largely internally 
motivated- a function of circumstances facing the situation in the kingdom at the time. 
A response to external circumstances that were at that time uncertain given the 
increasing European incursions would logically necessitate the choice of a strong king 
such as Iskandar Muda. Most women became rulers because of special circumstances 
(deaths of husbands, fathers) rather than by laws or customs of succession and some of 
these exceptional queens survived despite male opposition in the name of religion and 
misogyny. They had to devise elaborate legitimation processes, imperial and coronation 
rituals, a few even had to declare a new dynasty. Queen Njinga of Ndongo-Matamba 
(r. 1624-1663) overcame the illegitimacy of her sex by trying to become a man. 116 
Chinese sources condemned the imperial ambitions of women as unnatural calamities. 
Empress Wu Zetian who ruled China in 686 and 693 was an exception, even then, 
traditional Chinese historians condemned her short rule as anomaly, a gender reversal 
and a violation of nature comparable to having hens instead of roosters crowing at 
dawn. "' In Aceh however, Islam as interpreted by the elite and acht, which allowed 
women to assume positions of power enabled the first female ruler to succeed. 
The accession of the first female ruler set a new tradition in the succession 
history of the Acehnese kingdom since three more female rulers followed. The option 
to place the first female on the throne was a deliberate albeit cautious one, not by choice 
but because of circumstances. This was no mere accident of history and as I will show 
116 John K. Thornton, `Legitimacy and Political Power: Queen Njinga 1624-1663', Journal ofAfrican History, 
Vol. 1,32 (1991), 25-40, pp. 38-39. # 
117 Jennifer W. Jay, `Imagining Matriarchy: Kingdoms of Women in Tang China', Journal of theAmerican 
Oriental Society, 116.20 (Apr Jun 1996), 220-229, p. 228. 
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in later chapters, the success of the first Sultanah paved the way for three more female 
successors. Thereafter, this idea of a female ruling this Muslim kingdom became widely 
acceptable. Very little information is available on the succession of these three other 
female rulers in the indigenous chronicles and VOC sources. However, the very fact 
that all sources mentioned that all three were replaced because of their deaths and not 
because they were killed or was deposed (except for the last queen) showed that the 
historical successions during this period of six decades of female rule were peaceful. 
This was in contrast to the earlier period of violent and unstable historical successions of 
the 1570s - 1580s. The only mention of a problematic succession in 1688, quickly 
resolved in favour of female rule, was described by William Dampier. He related that 
"all the orangkaya were not for the election; many of them were for choosing a king. s118 
This episode however, illustrates that the option of female successors was not a dictate 
of a homogenous group of orangkaya but a contested one. Female rule was not simply a 
device of the elite who sought to weaken royal power in order to promote and 
perpetuate their own interests. 
In summary, the above discussion shows that although Aceh had no fixed rules 
or laws of succession in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were some 
identifiable pre-conditions for qualification before a candidate was accepted as a 
legitimate successor to the throne. These pre-requisites were, candidates having royal 
lineage and candidates having the consent and support from at least the majority of the 
orangkaya and Mama. As a Muslim kingdom, the ruler must therefore, be a Muslim. 
These pre-requisites took precedence over the practice of designation by the reigning 
ruler since as in Iskandar Thani's case; an appointed heir did not survive if he or she did 
not obtain the consent and support of the elite. The reasons for consent and support 
were however, changeable, determined by the attitudes and perceptions of the elites and 
the political and religious milieu of the time. During the time of the first female 
succession in 1641, the sex of the candidate did not seem to factor heavily for the elites. 
Other factors such as being a Muslim with an impeccable lineage took precedence since 
Safiatuddin was an adult closest in consanguinity to her predecessors. In Aceh, unlike in 
France, there was no Salic Law forbidding the succession of a female ruler. 
118 William Dampier, Voyages and discoveries VoL 2 ed. by N. M. Penzer (London: Argonaut Press, 1931), p. 
100. # 
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Furthermore, unlike Queen Mary Tudor and Queen Elizabeth in England, Sultanah 
Safiatuddin did not have a John Knox to contend with. t1' On the contrary, the ulama in 
Aceh at that time interpreted Islamic law in line with local adat, which were favourable to 
women. Thus, the queens did not have to be like a Njinga of Ndongo-Matamba to find 
acceptance. The first female succession in Aceh did not contradict adat laws nor did it 
contradict Islamic tenets. " 
Another condition or tradition of succession that could be identified was the 
preference for a royal native-born rather than a royal foreign-born. The orangkaya of 
Aceh clearly preferred Safiatuddin Syah, the daughter of Iskandar Muda of the Dar al- 
Kamal and Mahkuta Alam dynasty to the son of any other foreign royal house. The 
killing of all the two (possibly three if one were to include Iskandar Thani) foreign-born 
Sultans from Perak and Inderapura attested to this. So would the pact the elites made in 
Aceh in 1641 never to be ruled under a foreign-born Sultan again. 121 
Still, it must be borne in mind that political and religious mindsets do shift and 
the formation of new guards amongst the elites changed the criteria for succession, such 
as in 1699, when female rule was said to be forbidden in Islamic law. Female 
involvement in politics has been one of the most controversial and highly debated issues 
in the Muslim world. While in some instances, female participation has been applauded 
and praised, in other cases it has been condemned as un-Islamic. Historians of different 
periods look to their own selection of Islamic memory where female participation 
existed highlighting on either the positive or the negative impacts of female involvement 
and using these "evidences" as justification for or against female participation in 
politics. '22 Political conservatism in mainstream Islam, however, does not view women's 
political participation favourably. Conservatism, usually interpreted only by men, sees a 
woman's claim to political power as an aggressive violation of the rules of the game. As 
soon as a woman comes to the throne, a group of men whose power she challenges 
would oppose her in the name of the . yariah, thus 
denying her of spiritual validation. 
119 John Knox in his treatise, The First Blast of the Trumpet, published in 1558, stated that a woman had no 
natural right to rule any realm, even when the royal line of succession included no male heir. See, Robert 
Healey, Waiting for Deborah: John Knox and Four Ruling Queens' Sixteenth Century Journal, XXV/2, 
(1994), 371-389, p. 376. 
120 Discussed further in Chapter 5. 
121 This pact however lasted until 1699 since after Sultanah Kamalat Syah was deposed, an Arab succeeded 
her, probably foreign-born. Even then, this Arab dynasty did not last long with most of the rulers 
deposed, see Chapter 5, pp184-185 and 230-231. 
122 Hambly, Women in the Medieval, p. 9. 
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After ascending the throne, much depended on Sultanah Safiatuddin herself 
whether she could remain as the ruler of Aceh Dar al-Salam. The qualities and attributes 
of a good ruler, identified in the Taj, the Bustan and the Kanun are being just, morally 
upright and possessing the willingness to uphold Islamic law. Was she able to achieve 
this or would she need to gain acceptance only after demonstrating that she had enough 
prowess as most other powerful traditional kings did? Practically, perhaps the most 
important "condition" that guaranteed the acceptance and survivability of the ruler was 
that point of equilibrium, where the balance was struck between meeting the need and 
the interests of the ruler, the elite and of course ultimately the kingdom. Was Sultanah 
Safiatuddin Syah able to strike this balance? 
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CHAPTER 2 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's Early Years: Keeping Afloat 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the consent of the majority of the 
orangkaya was needed to install the first female ruler to the throne of Aceh Dar al-Salam. 
Whether or not she remained on the throne and for how long, I suggest, depended much 
on the recently widowed princess herself. A good start was crucial as it enabled her to 
tackle the vital matter of securing her position on the throne and getting the support if 
not the compliance of her orangkaya, especially those who initially opposed her accession 
if indeed the alleged debate between the orangkaya did take place. As mentioned earlier, 
very little is known about who these orangkaya were, the functions they undertook and 
the power they wielded in the Acehnese court, especially in the sixteenth century. There 
is more information about these elites though, in the seventeenth century when 
Company officials wrote about them especially when these court officials had a hand in 
Company's affairs. This chapter is a result of the mining of the accounts of court 
politics of VOC officials' who resided in Aceh for months on end on Company's 
business. The narrative constructed below, contrary to popular belief, shows that the 
orangkaya were not a homogeneous group but a fractious one. Whilst a fractious nobility 
might work in her favour, these divisions meant that the Sultanah had a daunting task 
ahead to manage and balance these factions to keep herself on top. 
Dealing with Sultan Iskandar Thani's Legacy 
Iskandar Thani's sudden death on the 1 5`h of February 1641 brought confusion 
at court. He died unexpectedly at a young age of thirty, ' childless and left a young 
widow of twenty-nine. Iskandar Thani ruled for less than five years and historians saw 
this short interlude in Aceh's history as uneventful. 3 Others viewed him as a pious and 
mild ruler. Contemporary records suggest otherwise. Although Iskandar Thani's 
I He was believed to be born in 1612. Peter Mundy reported that he was 25 years old when he took over 
power in December 1636. See Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, p. 236. 
2 Ali, 59 Tahun, p. 87. 
3 Andaya, `A very-good natured but awe-inspiring government, p. 65. 
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succession was never contested since Iskandar Muda chose him as his heir before his 
death and the orangkaya was believed to have consented to this appointment, his short 
reign had many opponents. Sultanah Safiatuddin inherited a more precarious legacy than 
was commonly supposed. 
Eight months after Iskandar Thani's succession to the throne (August 1637), 
there was an attempt to get rid of him by poison. The Burtan related that several people 
had conspired with the official food-taster to put poison into his food. But owing to the 
will of Allah, Iskandar Thani had a fore-taste of this plot when his food did not taste as it 
usually would and he stopped eating immediately. ' The Bustan did not reveal more about 
this plot or the conspirators, merely stating that Iskandar Thani investigated and duly 
punished the guilty. The Bustan however, mentioned that the Kadhi Maliku'lAdd and the 
Perdana Menteri agreed with this punishment. 
Another contemporary record written by Peter Mundy, an English traveller who 
arrived in Aceh in February 1638, mentioned an act of treason against the king of Aceh. 
He related that about three to four months ago (November 1637): 
wee understood of about four hundred persons putt to death by this king some 
three or four monthes since with sundry sorts off exquisite torments, vi. divers 
cutt in peeces, others sawne in two... some hung on iron hookes by the heeles, 
stretched wide abroad and molten lead powred into the fundaments of the men 
and privities of the weomen to cause them to conffesse... s 
Peter Mundy revealed that this act of treason was hatched by "his wives sister (the old 
King's daughters both) in beehalffe of her sonne, intending by poison to take this King 
away, thatt her said sonne mightt reigne. " 6 Her plot was discovered and she was the 
first to taste his fury plus others who had conspired or were suspected of this treason. 
Iskandar Thani had other enemies, namely the followers of the previous Syeikh 
al-Islam, Shamsuddin al-Sumatran. Sultan Iskandar Muda had appointed Shamsuddin al- 
Sumatrani as the leading religious scholar of the kingdom, promoting the teachings of a 
4 Burtan, Iskandar, p. 46. 
5 Mundy, The Travels of Peter Mundy, p. 330. 
6 Mundy, The Travels of Peter Mundy, p. 330. # 
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more mystical, Sufistic brand of Islam, the Wujud jyah wihdatulwujud. 7 After succeeding 
to the throne, Iskandar Thani, in contrast, leant more towards a less mystical brand of 
Islam and supported the more orthodox ulama Nuruddin al-Raniri from Gujerat. He 
appointed him as the Syeikh al-Islam in 1637.8 These two groups came to a violent clash 
during the reign of Iskandar Thani. With the death of al-Sumatrani in 1630 and with 
Iskandar Thani's blessings, al-Raniri led a hunt against the wihdatulwujud faction and 
issued a fatwa denouncing them as heretics. This enabled those who refused to renounce 
their teachings to be killed and their writings burnt. According to Ahmad Daudy, the 
wihdatulwujud group, followers of Hamzah Fansuri and Shams al-Din were also 
involved in a plot to capture power from Iskandar Thani. Thus, Iskandar Thani allowed 
these most brutal killings of those in this Wujud! ýyah faction to take place and at the same 
time eliminating this political opposition. 9 
It appears that at the time of Sultanah Safiatuddin's accession, al-Sumatrani's 
group was seriously weakened by the executions. It also appears that those who might 
oppose her succession, or a rival claimant in the person of her nephew (if Peter Mundy's 
account is accurate), would not be strong enough, since Iskandar Thani had thinned their 
ranks. Thus, at the beginning of her reign it is safe to venture that this majority group of 
the important elites in power, both from the orangkaya i. e. the Perdana Renten and the 
ulama, al-Raniri supported her candidacy. The stand of the other factions opposing her 
husband regarding her installation was not clear. In most probability, as argued in the 
earlier chapter, they would support her because of the absence of any other suitable male 
heir. Still, she had to contend with a fractious elite. 
It was thus fitting that one of the first feats of Sultanah Safiatuddin was to seal 
the support from the dominant orangkaya. The first responsibility she had to fulfil was to 
ensure the previous ruler's, her late husband's, proper burial. She organised one of the 
grandest funerals the kingdom had ever witnessed. The successful execution of this 
7 The brand of wujuddiyah embraced by Shams al-Din and Hamzah Fansuri is wihdatulwujud i. e., the 
belief that the universe is part of God, like foams on waves. This is in opposition to the brand of 
wujuddiyah followed by ar-Raniri i. e., wihdatusshuhud, the belief that the universe is not part of God but 
exist as a reflection or witness to the existence of God. See Zainuddin, Tatich AUeb, p. 105. 
8 Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, pp. 218-219. This rise of orthodoxy was also prevalent in India at 
that time under Sultan Aurangzeb. 
9 Ahmad Daudy, Allah dan Manu is dalam konrepsi Syeikh Nurudin al-Raniri [God and Man in Syeikh Nxrudin al- 
Ranii's Conception] (Jakarta: LV Rajawali, 1983), pp. 41-42. 
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responsibility was significant too in a sense that this announced her inauguration as the 
first female ruler of Aceh to her subjects. 
A Truly Royal and Magnificent Funeral Procession 10 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's performed her first responsibility with aplomb. Nicolaus 
de Graaff, wrote that: 
the funeral procession was executed in such royal magnificence; with a huge 
following of princes, the elites, about two hundred and sixty elephants, some 
were bedecked with expensive golden silk cloth whose tusks were suffused with 
gold and silver, others with palanquin decorated with costly draperies and multi- 
coloured flags embroidered in gold and silver threads. Rhinoceros and Persian 
horses, expensively clothed, strutted proudly with gold and silver bridles. Also, a 
retinue of the king's women formed part of the funeral procession. The king's 
coffin was made of *suassa finely draped with gold cloth. At the end of the 
procession, the king's body was laid to rest beside his predecessors in a royal 
mausoleum behind the palace. For a hundred days more his women brought 
tobacco, food and drinks here as if he was still alive. As soon as the king's body 
was buried, two silver canons were fired, its sound reverberating the whole night 
long interspersed with shouts of "God Save the new Queen" (God Bewaar de 
nieuwe Koningin). Thereafter, all was calm and in peace. " 
The ulama, Nuruddin al-Raniri detailed more information on this magnificent funeral 
ceremony in his Bustan us-Salatin. He vividly described the grandeur of this funeral 
ceremony and the richness of the bejewelled tomb the Sultanah had ordered to be 
specially made in memory of her husband, the Sultan who loved jewels. She instructed 
her stone craftsman to make a headstone that was never before made by previous kings. 
10 Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaf ed. by Wamsinck, pp. 13-14. 
II Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaffed. by Warnsinck, pp. 13-14. See also, Lombard, in Winarsih, Kerajaan Aceh, 
pp. 203-204. 
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The Bustan detailed this splendid ceremony. 12 It started from the palace, reached the 
main mosque Masjid Baitu'r-Rahman, and on orders from the Sultanah camped round its 
precincts. That night, all the princes, court officials and palace guards kept vigilance 
over the tombstone. Tents were erected and the entourage occupied themselves with 
mock fights, games, and plays. Interestingly, the Bustan related that many communities 
took part in the activities. The Javanese had spear-fights and held masked plays (wayang). 
The Chinese also staged their own wayang using masks and pulled their own man made 
dragon. Even the Klings held their own theatre. These festivities, much to the delight of 
the people, went on all night. The next day, Sultanah Safiatuddin mounted an elephant 
and ordered the procession to continue to Kandang Daru'd-Dunia (the royal gravesite). 
Since this was the last leg of the ceremony, all along the way, the Sultanah's officials 
distributed and scattered on the ground her generous alms of gold, silver, gold plates cut 
into small pieces and gems. The Bustan related that all those who obtained her alms 
became rich. Finally, the tombstone reached the burial site. 
Of the sixteen pages used to describe her reign, al-Raniri spent about thirteen on 
describing this ceremony. 13 Al-Raniri concluded that this ceremony was so well-executed 
by the Sultanah, so beautifully done and well-planned that never before was such a 
ceremony witnessed in other courts and other lands above and below the winds. 14 Al- 
Raniri claimed that under the Sultanah, Aceh truly lived by its name of *`Serambi Mekab' 
and this testimony was confirmed by her subjects. 's 
Never before was any funeral ceremony of previous kings, even one as great as 
Iskandar Muda, was noted by European travellers and indigenous chronicle alike as the 
one the Sultanah organised for her late husband. This ceremony informed the 
kingdom's subjects of the death of their king and it announced the accession of a new 
one - in this case a queen. Sultanah Safiatuddin proclaimed her inauguration with great 
effect and style, one that would be etched in her subjects' memory. They would certainly 
appreciate her generosity on this occasion too, amply demonstrated in the distribution of 
12 The description of the funeral ceremony is summarised and translated by this author from the Busfan, 
Iskandar, pp. 60-73. # 
13 Bustan, Iskandar, pp. 58-74, where al-Raniri describes the start and end of her reign but the funeral 
ceremony takes centre-stage from pp. 60-73. 
14 Bastan, Iskandar, p. 68. 
15 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 68. 
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alms for her people of such worth that those who obtained them could actually become 
rich. 
The Sultanah and her orangkaya -first dealings 
Besides dealing with her own elite, her subjects, the young Sultanah had to 
manage foreign ambassadors who arrived in her court. The VOC officials were one 
such group and she had to treat them with care especially since the Company had just 
conquered Melaka and becoming a power to be reckoned with in the Straits. Her 
relations with Company officials started on a good footing. Writing on the state of 
affairs after the first few months of the Sultanahs's rule, Jacob Compostel, the 
Company's Resident in Aceh, wrote that the kingdom under her temperate rule 
continued in peace and prosperity. Compostel reported on the favourable state of the 
Company's fortune since the Company's profit of thirteen months amounted to 
f. 49445.1.6 and losses to amount f. 9545.2.1. Compostel also reported that the Sultanah 
treated him well. The problem faced by the Sultanah however, was that in pleasing this 
foreign elite, she incurred the displeasure from some of her own. 
The Dutch reported that there were four principal orangkaya who formed the 
main Council, the *ßjxrraad, who advised the Sultanah and they had much influence at 
court. The Dutch described them as the Lebai Kita Kali, the Maharaja Sri Maharaja, the 
Laksamana, and the Paduka Tuan. Compostel noted that the orangkaya Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja "had conceived a great distrust against the rising state of the Company. " He 
had suspected the Lebe Kita Kali, to have conspired with Commissar Schouten and 
Compostel against the Acehnese Crown. " According to Compostel, this suspicion and 
rumours were spread by a Portuguese renegade named Manuel Mangbangh. 
Nevertheless, this suspicion had also arisen from the orchestration and promptings of 
the orangkaya Maharaja himself. This caused the Sultanah great consternation and she 
ordered an enquiry. This investigation (not elaborated by Compostel) found that these 
rumours were unfounded. The Sultanah took swift action against the alleged 
rumourmonger, Manuel Mangbangh and he was punished to death by pouring molten 
16 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 96. 
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lead down his throat, despite the protests of the Orangkaya Maharaja. The Orran4gkaya 
Maharaja, although not punished, fell out of favour with the Sultanah. The Sultanah 
Compostel was happy to report, continued to favour the Dutch. ' 
The orangkaya then were divided not only between the pro and anti Iskandar 
Thani factions mentioned above, they were also divided between the pro and anti Dutch 
factions. Compostel wrote that the Sultanah, the Lebe Kita Kali, the Orangkaya Maharaja 
Lilla together with her *capados continued to favour the Dutch, especially the Kali, who 
showed them "exceptional affection". " The anti-Dutch faction consisted of the Council 
member Orangkaya Maharaja Sri Maharaja and his follower the Panglima Dalam. The 
Manuel Mangbangh episode, however, illustrates the swift action taken by 
the Sultanah to secure her rule by quelling rumours and then punishing those that might 
cause instability. The harsh punishment meted out to Manuel Mangbangh served as an 
example. Interestingly, the Sultanah treated opposition from her own orangkaya more 
circumspectly and certainly with no taint of harshness or cruelty that characterised earlier 
kings. Orangkaya Maharaja was in the Sultanah's disgrace and was absent from court for 
a few months. But in a matter of two to three months he was rehabilitated and was once 
again in her favour and soon enough he too made peace with the Kali. This tactic of the 
young Sultanah apparently worked since Compostel noted that thereafter, the Maharaja 
was "very friendly" towards him and "publicly showed" that he did not like people who 
wanted to disadvantage the Dutchl19 
Two months after the Mangbangh episode, Compostel reported that the 
situation in Aceh was still peaceful but he noted that there were some hidden jealousies 
amongst the four Rijxraaden. An interesting observation made by Compostel was that the 
Sultanah, through her capados, was secretly "feeding these jealousies". 0 Her eunuchs, as 
will be seen in later sections, was one main conduit where the Sultanah would plant her 
eyes and ears and help her manage and balance her factious elite. Another way to effect 
this art of fine balancing her orangkaya was by her prudent giving away of rewards and 
punishment, as illustrated above, which would characterise her rule and was key to her 
success as the first female ruler of Aceh in the succeeding years. In summarising the 
17 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 96. 
18 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
19 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
20 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
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Sultanah's rule by November 1641, Compostel noted that she had been more established 
in her position and with great authority ruled absolutely. " Compostel wrote that this 
princess had higher royal worthiness compared to the earlier kings. 
The Sultanah started her reign on a good footing. Her initial acts, to an extent, 
were a measure of her personal political sagacity; a hint of a shift in leadership style that 
contrasted with her male predecessors. It is important to note however, that the 
peaceful conditions described by Compostel was also a result of the orangkaya's 
willingness to maintain this status quo, especially considering the vulnerable state the 
kingdom was in at that time - given the recent violent internal divisions and the uncertain 
external conditions because of the tilt in the balance of power in the VOC's favour. 
Despite his praise for the Sultanah, Compostel warned that the court of Aceh 
was pregnant with inconsistencies since there were many orangkaya who mistrusted the 
Dutch. He recommended to the Governors in Melaka and Batavia that the continued 
residence of a distinguished person was necessary in order to preserve the Company's 
alliance and prominence 2' Indeed, this alliance between the VOC and the Acehnese was 
sorely tested in the next episode, dubbed the "Jewel Affair. " To the best of this author's 
knowledge, no study has revealed such a detailed account of court affairs in Aceh under 
the Sultanah or for any other ruler for that matter. Since this detailed narrative is 
important in providing insights to the workings of the Acehnese court and the leadership 
style of the Sultanah - at the risk of a protracted narrative - it is worth following all its 
twists and turns. 
The Jewel Affair. The Sultanab, her orangkaya and the Dutch Foreign Envoy r 
The "Jewel Affair" refers to the VOC officials' attempt to pressure Sultanah 
Safiatuddin and her orangkaya to accept and pay for some very expensive jewels ordered 
by her late husband, Sultan Iskandar Thani. At first glance, this episode appears to be 
just one of the many commercial transactions engaged in by both parties. However, on 
closer examination this episode becomes significant because it helps to illuminate two 
21 Chijs, DaBh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 163. 
22 Chijs, Dagh-Regirter, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
23 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1641-1642, p. 163. 
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things: first the nature of early Dutch-Aceh relations and secondly the subtle and overt 
workings of the court of Aceh under the reign of the Sultanah. This affair tested the 
wills and diplomacy of both parties since it dragged on for almost 
four years. It shows 
that east-west encounters were still at a trial phase where both powers needed to 
learn 
about each other in order to know when to compete and to compromise. 
It shows that 
east-west encounters were not only about commercial and military contests at the macro- 
level but they were also about compromises between personalities and human relations 
at the micro-level. Internally, this episode reveals the shaping of a leadership style that 
was merely hinted in the first few months of her reign. In particular, the 
"Jewel Affair" 
shows how the Sultanah and her male predecessors used jewels in political culture 
highlighting the contrasting leadership styles between the late Sultan and the new 
Sultanah. 
Jewels and the aura of Kingship 
Associations with rare and precious materials, some in the form of regalia are an 
important aspect of kingship in other parts of the world as in Southeast Asia. Precious 
materials like gold, silver, and precious stones are commonly used as symbols of royal 
magnificence meant to increase the status and charisma of the wearers. The "Crown 
Jewels" were supreme symbols of princely magnificence which when used would rub off 
their charisma onto their wearers 24 The dress and insignia of kings could also have 
propagandistic significance such as the diadema band of Alexander the Great, believed to 
be associated with the hero-god and conqueror of the East, Dionysus. This badge 
became a symbol of his victory and power at Gaugamela and his proclamation as "King 
of Asia" at Arbela. 25 During Suleyman the Magnificent's reign (1520-1566), his grand 
vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, ordered a spectacular golden helmet for the Sultan, which was 
produced by Venetian goldsmiths in 1532. Although this helmet was foreign to the 
Ottoman imperial regalia and considered as a non-Islamic royal status symbol, this was 
24 Bruce Lenman, `The Exiled Stuarts and the Precious Symbols of Sovereignty', in Eighteenth Century, 25.2 
(2001), 185-200, p. 185. 
25 E. A. Fredricksmeyer, 'The Origins of Alexander's Royal Insignia', in Transactions of the American Philological 
Association (1974-), 127 (1997), 97-109, pp. 97,107. 
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displayed as part of parade accessories in ostentatious ceremonies with the aim of 
communicating Ottoman imperial claims to a European audience. 6 
Besides being symbols of sovereignty and power these jewels could take on *sakti 
and divine powers as they did in Southeast Asia 27 Siamese kings regarded the magical 
nine-stone jewel (permata sembilanjenis) as part of their regalia's The Sulalat us-Salatin or 
the S jarah Melayu mentioned the importance of precious stones in legitimising the 
predecessors of all Malay Rajas. Chapter two of the Seejarah Melayu brought its readers to 
a hill named Si-Guntang Mahamiru in the land of Andalas, Palembang, where the first 
mythical Malay Rajas appeared. On this hill lived two widows- Wan Empuk and Wan 
Malin who worked on a vast and fertile rice field 29 As the *padi were ripening, one 
night, Wan Empuk and Wan Malini saw what seemed to look like fire at a distant 
horizon. The next morning, they decided to investigate the source of the light. To their 
amazement, they saw theirpadi turning into gold, the leaves turning into silver and the 
stems into copper. There, they found three young and good-looking princes who had 
ascended from the universe below the sea. They were clothed royally and each wore a 
crown studded with gems. They were riding on white cows30. The two widows were 
awestruck by their good looks and fine clothings and deduced that they were the cause 
of their padi turning into gold. When they queried the three princes about their origin, 
they related their story and introduced themselves as the great- great grandsons of 
Iskandar Dzulkarnain. As prove, they pointed to their gem-studded crowns and clothing 
and the magical transformation of the padi fields. 
In Aceh, gold, suassa, precious stones, horses, and elephants are symbols of royal 
wealth and status. Sultan Iskandar Muda was one example of a king whose love for rich, 
expensive jewels was not only confined to personal tastes but as a reflection of his royal 
wealth, prestige and magnificence. According to Gallop, the Sultan's immense wealth 
was strikingly conveyed not so much by his precious regalia but by everyday objects 
26 See Gulru Necipoglu, `Suleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of, 
Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry', The Art Bulletin, 71.3 (1989), 401-427, p. 401. 
27 A chakravartin is considered to possess seven treasures, one of which is a magic jewel or cintamani. J. 
Gonda, Ancient Indian Kingship From the Religious Point of View (Leiden: E . 
J. Brill, 1969), p. 38. 
28 Annabel Teh-Gallop, `Musings on a Piece of Wallpaper Some Thoughts on Early Royal Letters from 
Aceh', Unpublished paper, International Workshop on Malay Manuscripts, Leiden University Library, 16- 
18 March 1988, pp. 12-13. 
29 S jarah Melayu ed. by Abdul Samad Ahmad (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1984) p. 19. 
30 S jarah Melayu, Abdul Samad, p. 21. 
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fashioned out of solid gold, suassa, and silver encrusted with precious stones like his 
water pipes, saddles and even his bathing scoop 31 Besides these everyday things, the 
nine-stone jewel (permata sembilanjenis), mentioned above constituted part of his royal 
power. 32 Iskandar Thani, his successor, inherited not only all the treasures and jewels 
from his father-in-law but also his love for these expensive jewels for their beauty and 
also for their reflection of wealth and royal status. 
The HikayatAceh depicted Iskandar Muda as the "King of Kings" in the Malay 
world. 33 He was seen as the representative of the Caliph in the Malay world whilst 
recognizing the Sultan of Rum (Turkey) as the Caliph in the Islamic West. In his letter to 
King James I, Iskandar Muda presented himself as the "subduer" and "conquerer" of 
several "kingdoms, territories and sovereignties" of Tiku, Pariaman, Deli, amongst 
others and Johor, with all the territories subjected to it 34 Iskandar Muda and Iskandar 
Thani adopted many high-sounding titles, such as MakhotaAlam (Crown of the 
Universe), Perkasa Alam (Courage or Warrior of the Universe), ` Khalifah Allah and 
Sq idina as-Sultan to reflect their universal kingly status. 
It is not in the least surprising that these men who wished to project charisma 
and prowess; Kings who claimed the title of King of Kings displayed symbols of 
magnificence befitting their status to impress other lesser kings. Audience days and royal 
processions on festival days provided the perfect opportunity to display these 
magnificent precious and rare jewels to inspire awe from foreigners and subjects alike. 
On these important days, the Sultans bedecked with dazzling jewellery truly resembled 
the glittering sun and moon they were so fond of associating themselves. Iskandar 
Thani described himself as "... King of the whole world, who like God, is glittering like 
the sun at midday, whose attributes are like the full moon... ""' 
For other monarchs who could not admire this visual display of power, 
especially European ones whom they sought to impress, they would apportion a 
substantial part of their letters to describing and enumerating their kingly possessions 
31 Teh-Gallop, `Musings on a Piece of Wallpaper', p. 12. 
32 Teh-Gallop, `Musings on a Piece of Wallpaper', pp. 12-13. 
33 Hikayat A jeh, Iskandar, pp. 153,167. 
3+ Teh-Gallop, `Musings on a Piece of Wallpaper', p. 13. 
35 Localized versions of the Persian title, Shah-i Alam (Ruler of the World). 
36 "Coninngh vande gantsche werrelt, degefyck een Godt daerover is, glinsterende als the son op den middach, ten Coningh, 
die 7n rchynselgefyck de volle maengeeft... "see Iskandar Thani's letter to Antonio van Diemen in Chijs, Dagh- 
Register, 1640-41, pp. 6-7. # 
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and treasures ranging from the palace, gold mines, elephants, and horses. Iskandar 
Muda and Iskandar Thani's letters37 to foreign potentates' best illustrate how they 
represented themselves and how they wished to be perceived by other powers. Iskandar 
Thani drew attention to the gold deposits Aceh was blessed with, the numerous 
mosques made of copper and gold (suassa), the throne he sat on made of fine gold 
encrusted with costly precious stones and his numerous elephants and horses clothed 
with golden coverings set with precious stones. 38 
The Sultan who Loved Jewels 
The Dutch officials in Aceh reported that Iskandar Thani had a lust for jewels. 39 
Peter Mundy, who had an audience with Iskandar Thani observed that the Sultan's 
clothes were something ordinary, following the fashion of the country "but [he] was 
adorned with many jeweils off diamonds, etts. [and other] pretious stones. "' Paulus 
Croocq was certainly impressed with Iskandar Thani's crown and clothing which he 
described was so dazzlingly encrusted with mostly diamonds and some rare stones. 
Iskandar Thani's throne, he reported was newly made and he estimated it to be worth 40 
*bahar of heavy gold or 100,000 gu. ildersl41 So not surprisingly, the Dutch seized upon 
Iskandar Thani's fascination with precious stones and they would often bring all kinds of 
jewelleries to entice Iskandar Thani. They learnt that Iskandar Thani was even prepared 
to accept jewels instead of realr or cash from the Dutch in exchange for pepper and 
payment of tolls. 42 Interestingly, this Sultan was not so much interested in any type of 
37 Letter from Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh to King James I, 1615. See, Teh-Gallop, `Musings on a Piece 
of Wallpaper', pp. 12-13. Iskandar Thani's letter to Antonio van Diemen in Chijs, Daah-Regirter, 1640-41, 
pp. 6-7. In contrast, Sultanah Safiatuddin's letters emphasized her moral attributes to increase her aura as 
ruler rather than material treasures. See Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
38 NA, VOC 1131, ff. 1433-1466, f. 1433: Letter from Iskandar Thani to Governor General Antonio van 
Diemen, 1640. 
39 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640-41, p. 4. 
4° Mundy, The Travels of PeterMundy, Vol. 3, pp. 335-336. 
41 NA, VOC 1131, f. 1194. Iskandar Thani described himself as "the auspicious Sultan, the honoured and 
revered Paduka Seri Sultan Alauddin Mughayat Syah, Champion Sovereign, shadow of God on earth, the 
vicegerent of Allah, King of the whole world, who like God, isg4ttering like the sun at midday, [my italics] 
whose attributes are like the full moon, is the king chosen by Allah whose characteristics are like the 
Pleiades, who is king of kings, descendents of Alexander the Great. " ... "see Iskandar Thani's 
letter to 
Antonio van Diemen in Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640-41, pp. 6-7. 
42 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640- 41, p. 4. See also: NA, Letter from Commissaris Paulus Croocq to the 
Governor General, 10 September 1639, VOC1131, ff. 1142-1176, f. 1162. 
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jewels but he had a special fascination for diamonds; in particular very prominent 
(aensienel j cke) diamonds with all faces cut. Furthermore, Iskandar Thani was not keen on 
the ready-made ones brought by the Dutch such as the table and pointed diamonds that 
other kings were so fond, he preferred to order the special designs that he liked and he 
wanted them crafted in the Netherlands itself. Commissar Deutecom reported that the 
Sultan was particularly pleased with a sketch of a belt designed in the Persian manner 
that was woven from silk, set with diamonds and wished to possess this rare and 
extremely expensive treasure estimated to cost about a few thousand taels. 43 He was 
very specific in his instructions in that only beautiful pure cut diamonds were to be used 
and that this must be crafted in the Netherlands itself. " To this order, he added his 
request for two to three emerald pendants and more beautiful diamond pendants, which 
he wanted holed presumably to be threaded later by chains. " 
The Sultan's fondness for rare and costly diamond pieces was well known not 
only to the Dutch but also to others. Iskandar Thani forgave Radja Tancas of 
Minangkabau who had fallen out of favour with him after he presented the Sultan with a 
beautiful diamond ring. 46 The English too brought jewels to Aceh when they found out 
that the Sultan had bought some small but costly rare pieces of jewellery specially 
brought from London from an English merchant's wife, a Mrs. Courten 47 He bought a 
very expensive *kris with a golden and diamond studded handle from the Portuguese 
which the Company officials estimated to be about 30,000 reap. of eight. " Besides being 
an avid buyer and collector of jewels, Iskandar Thani had a penchant for showing off 
these beautiful and costly jewels to the foreign envoys who visited Aceh. 49 Once, he was 
showing off some of his jewellery to a Company official and turned to ask him whether 
Batavia had such big diamonds. The Dutch official diplomatically answered that no king 
in the whole of the Indies would possess such rich treasures. 50 
This practice of preferring diamonds to the more common gold and the habit of 
43 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1639-55, p. 57. 
44 NA, VOC 1131,1639, f. 1165. 
45 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1639-55, p. 109. 
46 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1639-55, p. 4. 
47 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640, p. 3. 
48 NA, VOC 1131,1639, f. 1167. 
49 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1639-55, p. 57. The Dutch reported that Iskandar Thani had shown his 
costly jewels at different times to Commissaris Deutecom who was in Aceh in 1639. 
50 NA, VOC 1119,1636, f. 1214. 
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ordering jewels made in Europe was not customary in Aceh. Although it could be argued 
that this showed nothing more than Iskandar Thani's personal absorption with 
diamonds and his narcissistic and spendthrift nature, this practice could acquire a greater 
significance when one saw how this could enhance the status and prestige of his 
kingship. Being a Sultan who wished to claim that he was the "King of Kings, " one who 
was concerned about his status compared to other neighbouring kings and what other 
kings might think about him, wearing glittering cut diamonds made in Europe would 
certainly add to his status, not to mention his lead in setting a new fashion trend. 
Iskandar Thani would be the first among the monarchs in maritime Southeast Asia who 
would be wearing accessories so copious and glamorous during audience days and 
ceremonial processions, and more importantly, they were specially made in Europel That 
would certainly impress and dazzle not only his subjects but other representatives from 
the surrounding polities and foreigners from afar especially the numerous Europeans 
who had begun to frequent Malay courts during this period. It is likely that this focus on 
diamonds was Iskandar Thani's way of reinventing himself setting him apart from his 
predecessors. His keenness to possess a Persian-style belt may reflect his intention to 
represent himself to be on par with other great Muslim kings in the Persian and Mughal 
courts. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what and how much jewellery he 
had ordered before his death. According to Valentijn, "the Company suffered a heavy 
loss through the sale of the deceased King of Atsjien jewellery, since but 5,025 taels51 of 
the said jewellery were taken over by the Queen. 52 Andaya stated that the jewels were 
worth 6,000 taels. 53 A further search of the Company sources, however, revealed a 
figure to be much more than it first appeared. In his letter to Jacob Compostel, Antonio 
Van Diemen mentioned that the total cost of the jewels brought by Schouten was 
51 A tael or thail is a unit of weight and a monetary unit used in China, Japan, Tonkin, Cambodia, Siam, 
Aceh, Makassar etc. As a unit of weight, I tael is about 37.5 gram. The worth of 1 tael in monetary unit 
varies from place to place. In Aceh, the tael is usually measured in gold. 1 tael is worth 4 rijksdaalders, 16 
golden mas. If in silver, worth about 60 stuivers or 8 silver mas. See W. F. Stapel, Pieter van Dam's 
Beschrijvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, (`s Gravenhage: Martinuss Nijhoff, 1931) pp. 834-835. 
52 F. Valentyn, `Valentyn's Account of Malacca', translated by D. F. A. Harvey, journal of Malayan Branch of 
RoyalAriatic Society, 16 (1965), 225-246, pp. 236-237. Valentijn did not mention the total sum brought by 
the Dutch. 
53 Andaya, `A very good-natured but awe-inspiring government', p. 77. 
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f. 82018.6.8.54 More detailed information could be gleaned on the jewellery from the 
Queen's letter to Antonio Van Diemen. Sultanah Safiatuddin wrote that she 
acknowledged the receipt of a gold chain with 1064 diamond stones, 2 arm-rings with 
306 diamond stones, a golden his with 211 diamond stones, 2 pendants with 58 
diamond stones, 4 hoop-rings beset with table-diamonds, 4 ruby rings with set 
diamonds, 4 diamond rings, 1 hoop-ring beset with 16 table diamonds, 4 earrings in 
gold. 55 This was worth 10,000 taels out of the 15,000 brought by Commissar Sourij. 
The third part of the jewels amounted to about 8,500 taels. 
The Conflict over the payment of jewels 
The first signs of trouble over the payment of jewels appeared in Antonio van 
Diemen's letter to Iskandar Thani, where he drew attention to the fact that Iskandar 
Thani had declined to accept and pay for the jewels brought by a delegation led by 
Commissar Jan de Meere in 1640.56 Although Jan de Meere advised for the return of the 
jewels, Antonio van Diemen firmly urged the king "to unburden us [the Dutch] with 
these and accept them in a pleasant way. " 57 The Dutch, Van Diemen argued, would 
not make it difficult for the King if these diamonds could be returned to the 
Netherlands. However, that was impossible because Iskandar Thani ordered these 
diamonds to be specially crafted according to the Acehnese style. " He stressed that if 
these jewels were not accepted and paid for, they would cost the Dutch great losses. 
54 NA, ff. 223-227, f. 225: Letter from Antonio Van Diemen, Governor General in Batavia, to Jacob 
Compostel, Resident in Aceh, 1642. This was the sum brought by Justus Schouten which was about 6 834 
taels. Two other envoys, Pieter Sourij brought 15,000 taels and Vlamingh Oudshoorn brought another 
8,500. Total sum brought would be 29,500 taels. The Queen accepted a total of 21,000 taels, the Dutch 
would have lost 8,500 taels. After this whole episode, the Company was still left with five diamond and 
one emerald rings. 
55 NA, VOC 1141, ff. 146R-148V, f. 146R. Letter from Queen of Aceh to Governor-General in Batavia. 
56 NA, VOC 1136, f. 951V. 
57 NA, VOC 1136, f. 951V. 
58 NA, VOC 1136, f. 951V. For example, the eight crafted jewels especially made to decorate the shirt of 
the king, which according to Van Diemen was very costly. This specific order fashioned in the style of the 
Acehnese made it impossible for the Dutch to sell them to other Kings. For instance, the king of 
Mataram preferred table-shaped diamonds whilst the King of Siam fancied pointed ones. 
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The Sultanah who preferred cash than jewellery 
When the next envoy, Commissar Justus Schouten arrived in Aceh, he found 
that the Sultan who was responsible for ordering all these diamonds had passed away 
and in his place was his young widow, Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah 59 The Dutch had no 
idea how this would affect their jewel trade. Indeed, the situation was rather critical 
since the Company officials were uncertain how this new successor would respond to 
the Company. Dutch-Aceh relations had soured under Iskandar Thani when he 
suddenly refused to help the Company conquer Melaka in 1640 after promising to do so 
earlier. The Dutch saw this sudden reversal of intent as a reflection of the Sultan's 
ambitious designs in the Straits. 60 So after Melaka was conquered from the Portuguese, 
the Company officials were not certain of Aceh's next move. 
One of the first things Commissar Justus Schouten wrote in his report to 
Antonio van Diemen after informing the Governor of the accession of the new Sultanah 
was that she had refused to accept and pay for the very expensive jewels. This he noted 
was very damaging to the Company and of course did not augur well for relations 
between the Company and the newly crowned ruler of Aceh. Schouten reported later 
that despite his great insistence, only a part of the jewels was accepted, 5025 taels at f. 16 
1/5 per tael. b' The Sultanah refused to accept the rest even when Schouten offered to 
sell them at cost price. As far as the Acehnese were concerned, her reasons were 
impeccable - that her late husband had been too extravagant resulting in the depletion of 
the Treasury. Furthermore, these jewels and accessories were specially designed and 
made for the male king's clothes and certainly could not be worn by a womanl62 
59 Iskandar Thani passed away unexpectedly at the age of thirty-one on the 15th of February 1641. 
60 For a fuller account of the reasons behind Iskandar Thani's refusal to help the Company and the 
Company's perceptions of him, see Sher Banu Khan, `Ties that Unbind: The botched Aceh-Dutch 
Alliance in the Conquest of Melaka', unpublished manuscript, presented at the TANAP-UGM Workshop 
in Jogjakarta, 2003. 
61 NA, f. 339V. Justus Schouten and Johan van Twist in Malacca, July 1641. This presumably would be the 
5025 taels of jewellery accepted by the Queen as mentioned by Valentyn. 
62 NA, f. 339V. Schouten, Johan van Twist in Malacca, July 1641. 
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The Sultanab, her Orangkaya and Commissar Pieter Sourij 
After Justus Schouten, the next Commissar appointed to represent the 
Company's delegation to Aceh was Pieter Sourij. 63 His task was to get Sultanah 
Safiatuddin to accept and pay for the remainder of the jewels and Governor-General 
Antonio Van Diemen specifically instructed him not to bring them back to Batavia 6' 
Commissar Sourij's detailed report is extremely useful because it gave a rare 
glimpse of how affairs were conducted under the reign of the Sultanah. From here, we 
gathered that matters of business must be discussed first with her rjxraden before they 
could be forwarded to the Queen on audience day. The Company officials had to learn 
quickly whom they had to petition first and who the Company's friends were. In the first 
year of her reign, the most important council member was the Lebe Kita Kali. ` Being a 
friend of the Company, he gave Compostel two important pieces of advice. Sourij 
should visit the other orannkaya to discuss about the sale of the jewels but he must be 
kept informed of their answers. " He also cautioned him that the Dutch might face 
problems with the rest of the orangkaya since the kingdom did not need any more jewels 
as Aceh was already so well known for its jewels; there was no need to look any further 
than the jewel-studded grave of Iskandar Thani to prove this 67 More importantly, the 
Kali said that since a queen now ruled Aceh, it was in the nature of women not to be 
willing to see her treasury depleted. GB 
On the 12" of July, Sourij had his first audience with the Queen. The Sultanah, 
much to Sourij's surprise, decided to accept the jewels with the consensus of her 
orangkaya. Happy at this good turn of events, Sourij decided not to be impolite by 
discussing questions of payment. Sourij did not want to prejudice the good standing the 
Company had at that moment. The first shock Sourij faced was one week later when the 
63 Pieter Sourij stayed in Aceh from the 15th of May to the 18th of August 1642. 
64 NA, f. 556R. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. In his letter to Jacob Compostel, 
Antonio Van Diemen mentioned that the total cost of the jewels brought by Sourij was f. 82018.6.8. NA, 
ff. 223-227, f. 225 Letter from Antonio Van Diemen to Jacob Compostel, 1642. More information on the 
jewels is gleaned here, when Sourij wrote that the cost of production for these jewels was 12,000 taels but 
the Dutch asked for 15,000 taels considering the dangers of transportation at sea and interest costs. 
65 The Kali, was said to be the illegitimate son of Iskandar Muda, thus the Sultanah's half-brother. Ito, The 
World ofAdatAceh, p. 71. 
66 NA, f. 557R. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
67 Bustan, Iskandar, pp. 60-73. 
68 NA, f. 560V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
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Queen ordered the orangkaya and her jewellers to gather at the *balai to value the price of 
the jewels. All the orangkaya were present except interestingly, the Kali. Maharaja 
Adonna Lilla, the Queen's capado, together with the Shahbandars and two other orangkaya 
came with the jewel box and opened it for the others together with the Queen's jewellers 
to value. After the jewels were carefully examined, the price that was determined was 
totally unacceptable to the Company delegates - an outrageous 5,900 taels 69 At that 
moment, the Queen herself was not present, being in the inner precinct of her palace. 
Sourij protested, claiming that either the Acehnese diamond jewellers did not know their 
stones or they simply refused to declare the real amount( The Dutch delegates 
threatened a walk out. Maharaja Adonna Lilla then wrote the price down and brought 
this to the Queen inside the palace. This did not help to calm Sourij one bit, since the 
Queen agreed with the price valued by her jewellers. Sourij warned that this better not 
be a trick or mere excuses devised by the Acehnese for not taking the jewels since they 
remained obliged to take them and he was not allowed to bring the jewels back to 
Batavia. Sourij stressed that the Governor-General himself had requested the Acehnese 
to unburden the Dutch of these expensive jewels especially since Iskandar Thani had 
ordered them. The Acehnese retorted that although their King had ordered this, and his 
family members were obliged to take, he was now dead and all that was done by him had 
died with him. They explained to Sourij that Iskandar Thani was not loved by the 
Acehnese and his name was remembered and honoured less than Iskandar Muda. Sourij 
replied that regardless of the fact that Iskandar Thani was a foreigner or was not loved, 
the Governor-General, out of the affection of the Acehnese kingdom had obliged him, 
and the Acehnese should therefore not refuse the jewels without any fundamental 
reasons. " From the Dutch point of view, the Acehnese as subjects of the King, dead or 
not, were obliged to carry out his orders. The Acehnese argued otherwise, stating that 
the Queen following the law of the land was not liable to execute her late husband's 
orders. 7' After a soft welcome, the situation had indeed turned problematic for Sourij. 
69 NA, ff. 571R-571V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
70 NA, f. 572R. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
71 The rights and obligations of successor Kings in Aceh (and as it seems, in the Malay world during the 
pre-modern period) do not appear to be written and codified in any form, thus this law would most 
probably be one belonging to the oral tradition. Snouck Hurgronje, in his epic study of the Acehnese, 
states that no King of Aceh felt obliged to fulfil the promises or concessions granted by his predecessor. 
Hurgronje, De A jehers, p. 126. 
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Back at the balai, where the Dutch and Acehnese elite were eye balling each 
other, after much whisperings and discussions, the Shahbandars offered 2,000 taels 
more. Sourij declared angrily that he would not accept such "frivolous talk" any longer 
and that they would not accept anything less than 15,000 taels. Sourij warned the 
Acehnese that their refusal to pay for the jewels would lead to the Governor-General's 
displeasure. Maharaja Adonna Lilla then asked whether this meant that the Queen would 
be forced to accept them. This was too much for the Company officials to tolerate. 
Sourij and the other Company officials then started to walk out from the balai in a huff. 
It was at this tense juncture, that the Queen decided to intervene and sooth matters. 
When the Company officials reached the third gate of the palace compound, by the 
order of the Queen, Sourij and the others were called back to go and sit at the balai and 
were subsequently treated to a banquet, which they accepted with courtesy. Sourij 
complained that after four hours of fruitless discussion, there was still no progress made 
regarding the sale of the jewels and subsequently returned to their lodge. 72 The Queen's 
timely intervention left him disappointed, but no longer angry. 
In the meantime, Sourij and other Dutch officials had to engage and lobby all the 
other important orangkaya. To do this, appropriate gifts were arranged to accompany the 
request for help. Such gifts were carefully calculated and the worth of these must 
commensurate with the order of the rank and importance of those orangkaya. Sourij 
learnt soon enough that although these gifts usually ensured fair reception, they did not 
always result in co-operation. The orangkaya at that time were divided into two factions - 
one comprising those who were against accepting the jewels and the other consisting of 
those who were willing to accept but at a reasonable price. The Maharaja Sri Maharaja 
and his follower, the Panglima Dalam73 belonged to the former camp. The Panglima 
Dalam was friendly in his manner but pointed in his opinion about buying the jewels. 
Although he diplomatically told Sourij that some jewellery might be bought, like the four 
golden earrings and some rings since the Queen usually wore some jewellery to 
important occasions, he made it clear to Sourij that the rest of the jewellery were useless. 
72 NA, ff. 72R-572V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
73 The Panglima Dalam is also known as the Laksamana. 
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The jewels served no other purpose other than just to be admired, so paying for them 
would be like throwing money away like throwing water. 74 
Since Sourij's arrival in Aceh, he had been unsuccessful in meeting up with the 
next most important njxraad, the second in rank in the Council, the Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja. Sourij complained that the latter had been avoiding him by giving the excuse 
that he was sick. When Sourij was finally able to make an appointment to see the 
Maharaja at the latter's house, he found him with some other orangkaya. Despite the 
Maharaja's reluctance to see him, he treated Sourij well and gave him an Acehnese dress 
as present. Sourij remarked that the Maharaja was a man of not many words and as 
usual, again pretended to be sick. Despite being ill though, on this occasion, the 
Maharaja managed more than a few words. He told the Dutch officials that if it was a 
matter of 200-300 taels it would not be a problem especially since the Acehnese had 
been friends with the Dutch for so long. "Although both parties were so different and 
their lands were so far apart, in their hearts they were affectionate with each other. " He 
promised that he would prove himself a good friend of the Dutch; nevertheless, he made 
it clear that as far as it was in his power to do so, he would ensure that the means of the 
kingdom would not be harmed. 75 
The oraqkaya who belonged to the latter camp, was the Lebe Kita Kali and his 
follower, Maharaja Sestia 76 They were both secretly trying to work out a compromise 
price that would be acceptable to the Company, the Queen and the other orangkaya. 
Maharaja Sestia's uppermost concern was to maintain good relations with the Company. 
Thus, he wanted this jewel affair settled in a way that was the least damaging to the 
friendship between Aceh and the Dutch, especially since the Governor-General had 
been in friendship with Aceh since the time of Mahkota Alam (i. e. Iskandar Muda, the 
Queen's father). He suggested that the Company now must continue to show the same 
friendship to Aceh although it was now ruled by a woman. He advised Sourij that this 
friendship should not be lessened but should be increased. He told the Dutch that 
7' NA, ff. 573R-574R. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. This is a translation of a Malay 
proverb which means that if one throws money like one throws water, then one does not value the money 
since water in this context is seen as abundant and thus of little value. 
75 NA, f. 576R. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
76 Sourij was convinced that Maharaja Sestia and the Kali had been discussing this matter amongst 
themselves since they both spoke "the same words. " NA, f. 575V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May- 
August 1642. 
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although a radical change had taken place in the court of Aceh with a woman on the 
throne, there would be no radical change in the friendship that previous Acehnese kings 
had shown to the Dutch. Being the daughter of Iskandar Muda, she would continue in 
the tradition of her illustrious father. Indeed, he pointed out that she had shown herself 
to be even more accommodative towards the Dutch than her male predecessors. As far 
as Maharaja Sestia and the Kali's arguments were concerned, their decision to accept the 
jewels demonstrated not so much their pro-Dutch attitude but more the need to 
maintain good friendship with the Dutch since being an ally of the Company was of 
paramount importance to protect the kingdom's interest. The Kali's and Sestia's private 
efforts to keep relations between them and the Dutch cordial seemed to work since 
Sourij told them that the Company would be willing to lower the price and settle for 
12,000-13,000 taels after they offered to pay for 10,000 taels. In the meantime, Possie 
Melor, their translator informed Sourij that all the orangkaya except for Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja were gathered at court engaged in an intense discussion about the jewels since 
it entailed a lot of money. Sourij learnt that many of the orangkqya opposed the purchase 
on the grounds that the jewels served no purpose and that this would be tantamount to 
throwing away good money. Clearly the elites of Aceh were unhappy with Iskandar 
Thani's extravagant spending on these diamonds and were therefore not ready to oblige 
his wishes. To the orangkaya, keeping the Treasury healthy was important to maintain the 
kingdom's power. 
The tussle for an acceptable price for the jewels continued in the big balai at the 
next audience day. Although the Sultanah was supposed to be present, she had sent her 
*chap indicating that she would not be present. The Sultanah left the preliminary 
bargaining and haggling to her capado and thus all attention was on the orangkaya 
Maharaja Adonna Lilla, the Queen's hefte (favourite) eunuch. He raised the Acehnese 
offer from 5,900 taels to 9,000 taels although he claimed that he was not happy with this 
price since upon closer inspection, some of the big stones were worth "no more than 
pebbles" and alluding that he was suspicious of the Dutch true intentions. ' 
Nevertheless, because of the Acehnese affection for the Company and the Governor- 
General, they would pay 9,000 taels. This would be his offer but if the Dutch were not 
77 NA, f. 577V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
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satisfied then they should speak to her Majesty herself since he would not dare to tell 
her. 
This ploy seemed to work since Sourij finally relented and asked for 10,000 taels 
and Maharaja Adonna Lilla promised he would try to help the Dutch fetch that price. 
He indicated that the Sultanah was ready to pay part of the amount in cash and the 
remainder would have to be in the goods exchanged and some discounted from the tolls 
the Company had to pay. Despite this positive change in the Acehnese position, Sourij's 
frustrating moments persisted and it was only a few days before Sourij's departure to 
Batavia were there some signs that the jewel business would be eventually settled. 
During the Audience Day on Saturday, 3`d of August 1642, the Sultanah offered 9,000 
taels for the jewels. Sourij pointedly but politely said if he accepted this amount he would 
not dare return to Batavia to face the Governor-General. He told the Sultanah that the 
honour and respect the Dutch had for her would hinge on the reasonable settlement of 
this issue. This clearly showed that the "Jewel Affair" was more than just a commercial 
transaction but one that had serious diplomatic repercussions on Aceh-VOC relations. 
The Sultanah agreed to pay the amount of 10,000 taels despite much protest from some 
of the orangkaya at the hall. " She promised to make the payment for these diamonds 
partly from the tolls that the Dutch ships had to pay which according to her calculation 
would amount to 4,000 taels. The remainder of 6,000 taels, she would settle in two 
mousums (seasons). " 
The Sultanah, her Orangkaya and CommisrarArnold Vlamingh 
This episode with Commissar Sourij did not bring about a closure but just a 
temporary breather to the jewel affair. The jewel affair continued to test the tenacity and 
the diplomacy of both parties because Sourij sold only a small part of the total amount 
of jewellery. ß° Furthermore, the Governor-General was dissatisfied that he had to pay 
interests on the jewels over the past three years. He appointed the more formidable 
78 NA, ff. 581R-581V. Dagh-Register van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642. 
79 NA, VOC 1141, f. 146V. 
80 On his return to Batavia, Pieter Sourij did not bring back the jewels to Batavia but instead left them in 
Aceh with Biotara CanCanan with the Acehnese envoy to Batavia Sri Bidia Indra as witness. 
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Commissar Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn as the next envoy. He was in Aceh 
from July to October 1644 and his task was unenviable. He had to sell five great 
diamond pieces for 8,500 tael, preferably to be paid 7,000 tael in cash and gold, 500 in 
merchandise and 1,000 in tolls. " There were also some other rings the late King had 
ordered but the Company had given up hope of ever selling these. Vlamingh boastfully 
vowed that he would not return to Batavia with the jewels and incur the Governor- 
General's indignation but would rather wear himself out and be miserable and die in 
Aceh. 82 
When Vlamingh arrived in Aceh on the 13 `h of July, he was welcomed with the 
customary protocol of receiving a foreign ship in the Achenese harbour. Vlamingh's first 
disappointment on landing in Aceh was when he was told that the Queen was away on 
an amusement trip with the English and other foreigners. 83 The Queen's party was 
expected to return to court only on the 21" of July, about a week later. However, even 
then, Vlamingh had to wait longer still since the Governor-General's letter and gifts were 
brought to court in a magnificent procession only on the 31" of July. As for Vlamingh, 
he was granted his first audience with the Queen only on the 6`s of August and even then 
the issue of the jewels was not discussed since it was considered improper to conduct 
business first time at court. Vlamingh's patience was already severely tested with the 
Acehnese delaying tactics even before he had his first sight of the Sultanah. 
Vlamingh tried to keep himself useful and busy in the meantime before making 
his request to Sultanah Safiatuddin. The orangkaya had to be lobbied and gifts had to be 
prepared. Vlamingh proportioned the gifts in such a manner; Lebe Kita Kali (first in 
rank and the Company's patron) - f. 176.18.4, Maharaja Sri Maharaja (second in rank) - 
f. 131.1.8, Laksamana (third in rank) - f. 123.7.5, Siry Paduka Tuan (fourth in rank and 
Company's friend) - f. 174.17.4, Maharaja Adonna Lila (Queen's favourite eunuch) 
159.2.4, Maharaja Sestia (another eunuch, who was also a Company's friend) f. 123.7.4 
and the Lebe Kita Kali's brother-in-law - f. 113.3.4.84 
81 NA, f. 591V, f. 599R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
82 NA, f. 575V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
83 Most probably, this amusement trip refers to a hunting trip that the Acehnese court was fond of 
organizing since the time of previous Kings which was continued by the Queen. It appeared that the 
English officials were complaining of the hunger and terrible conditions they had to endure since they had 
to sleep on mats under tents. Vlamingh whilst disappointed that he was not able to see the Queen soon 
was happy that he escaped this hunt. 
84 NA, ff. 579V-580V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold dc Vlamingh. 
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After learning that the Lebe Kita Kali was away on an elephant hunt, Vlamingh 
decided to concentrate on lobbying the hardliners, the Maharaja Sri Maharaja and the 
Laksamana or Panglima Dalam. Vlamingh was well received at the Maharaja's house but 
when the matter of the jewels was brought up, this time; he did not bother to sweeten 
the ears of the Dutch but directly declined to accept the rest of the jewels from 
Vlamingh. He reiterated his objections to the purchase of the jewels to Vlamingh. He 
reasoned that the King who had ordered such costly jewels was now dead and in his 
place, was the present Queen who according to the Acehnese was not obliged to carry 
out his orders. Furthermore, the Sultanah, being a woman, found cash to be more useful 
than jewels, which would not serve the kingdom better. ss 
Next, Vlamingh visited the Laksamana. Vlamingh reported that unlike the 
"inconsiderate" Maharaja, the Laksamana was downright contemptuous. After the 
customary greetings and gifts, Vlamingh told the Laksamana that because of the 
Acehnese friendship to the Dutch, they should accept the jewels. Instead the Laksamana 
retorted by questioning the Dutch sincerity in wanting to maintain and preserve the 
friendship with the Acehnese. He pointed out that all these talk of the Dutch professed 
friendship ran counter to their actions of merely getting down to the business of selling 
the jewels so much so that the Queen seemed forced to accept them. For good measure, 
he added that the amount of jewels put to sale by the Dutch was not even worth the 
effort spent by the so many words exchanged. Indeed, if Vlamingh's mission was to sell 
jewels, then it had been unnecessary for the Governor-General to send such a high- 
ranking person as the Commissar to Aceh. It would be sufficient to send a mere trader 
instead of a Commissar who rightly should be concerning himself with only courtly 
matters. " He reminded Vlamingh of how Sourij had left the jewels behind hoping that it 
would be accepted when the Queen was not in the least inclined to accept them. The 
Laksamana found it strange that the Governor-General being aware that the Acehnese 
were totally averse towards accepting the jewels was still insistent on making matters so 
difficult for the Queen. He accused the Dutch of "making her ears warm" with this talk 
about the jewels, especially after she had given the Dutch exceptional pre-eminence in 
85 NA, f. 581R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
86 NA, f. 582R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. This crisis of identity 
was a perennial problem faced by the VOC in the East Indies. 
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her land and territory, more than what other foreigners enjoyed. 87 This disagreeable 
posture taken by the Dutch was damaging the old alliance between the two nations and 
that so much had be paid for the jewels which would only lead to the alienation or at 
least attain the displeasure of the Acehnese. sa 
After two months of lobbying and presenting gifts to the orarr&kaya, Vlamingh 
wrote that all hope for the acceptance of the jewels was destroyed. Vlamingh's 
desperation became more apparent when he came to know that despite the violent 
disputes among the orangkaya over the jewels, 89 the Laksamana still "sang his old tune. s40 
Vlamingh lamented that he had gone to the extent of even giving his gun that was 
hanging in his room as a gift to the "rude" Laksamana since the Laksamana's servant had 
spotted the gun and claimed that his master had so wished to have it. 91 Vlamingh 
confessed that he had done all that he could and had thrown away so many gifts but still 
obtained no results. He complained that these "hungry vultures remained insatiable. s92 
After tiring the Commissar and weakening his spirit for almost one and a half 
months, Sultanah Safiatuddin instructed the Dutch to bring the jewels to court the 
following Saturday where the jewels would be valued by her diamond experts and her 
*naeleers and the shahbandars. A decision would then be made regarding the purchase of 
the jewels. Like Sourij, Vlamingh became very furious when the Queen's diamond 
experts valued these jewels at 3,000 taels, which to him, was a disgraceful price for five 
big pieces of diamonds. Vlamingh's ill fortune did not seem to see any end. He reported 
how he was ridiculed by the Queen's jewellers since they asked whether the Dutch had 
been mistaken and placed the cost in taels when it should have been only in reals. 93 They 
asked whether the Company officials had ever seen diamonds since they had seen better 
ones and alluded to the fact that the Company might have even obtained these through 
dishonourable means. 94 The Acehnese further accused the Dutch of aggressively 
pushing the jewels on them and Vlamingh retorted on the "extraordinary manner in 
87 The Sultanah had granted the Dutch afirman allowing them exclusive nation treatment at Sumatra West 
Coast. 
88 NA, f. 582V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
89 NA, f. 591R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
90 NA, f. 589V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
91 NA, f. 595R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Comnzissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
92 NA, f. 589V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
93 NA, ff 593V-594R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
94 NA, f. 594R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
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which he was spoken to" by the Acehnese considering he was a Commissar, an official 
appointed to lead a diplomatic delegation to Aceh by the Governor-General in Batavia. 
He expressed shock at how the Dutch were not treated with more respect and honour 
considering the friendship and courtesy they had shown to the Acehnese envoys when 
they were in Batavia. 
Vlamingh's fortune finally turned for the better when he visited the last in rank 
in the Council of four Sri Paduka Tuan. Vlamingh did not make much headway with him 
either but he gave the Commissar a useful advise as to who was the most powerful and 
exceptionally well regarded by Her Majesty, the one who had more influence compared 
to all the other orangkaya, "the one who could be where the other oran, gkaya cannot" - the 
Queen's favourite cap ado Raja Adonna Lilla. He advised Vlamingh to seek the help of 
Raja Adonna Lilla and to keep him in the Company's faction but he warned that the 
other orangkaya must also be treated just as well and must also be given presents so as not 
to stir up jealousies at court. " 
Realising that he was getting nowhere with the orangkaya, Vlamingh and the 
senior trader in Aceh, Harmanszoon decided to follow Paduka Tuan's advice. They 
pado, Radjia Adonna Lilla, instead to promote resolved to approach the Queen's liefste ca 
the sale of the jewels. When Harmanszoon was finally able to meet Radjia Adonna Lilla, 
the cap ado assured him that he was a friend of the Company and they should not have 
any reservations about the Queen's goodwill for the Dutch just as she had for the earlier 
Commissars who were in Aceh. He told Harmanszoon that the Queen had not fixed the 
price of the jewels yet. Furthermore, the Dutch should not be troubled when the 
orangkqya had offered to pay less than half the cost desired by the Dutch. According to 
Radjia Adonna Lilla, this was the Acehnese way of doing things 9G 
This new approach proved to be valuable. The Queen's liefrte capado provided the 
Dutch with good advice compared to the orangkaya as regards to the Sultanah's stand on 
the matter. Vlamingh's description of the next audience day amply demonstrated this. 
His detailed report was valuable in illuminating how the Sultanah managed both her 
orangkaya and foreign envoys. 
95 NA, f. 585R Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
96 NA, f. 596R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
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On audience day, Sunday, the 11" of September, Sultanah Safiatuddin 
demonstrated that her foremost concern was still in maintaining good relations with the 
Dutch, confirming Radjia Adonna Lilla's counsel. The young Sultanah dealt with the 
Dutch in a skilled and astute manner. She first put the officials in a good temper by 
generously honouring the oppercoopman, Harmanszoon with two titles, namely, Orangkaya 
Poeti (White Orangkaya) and Capitain Radja (Prince of Captains) which he was at liberty 
to use in all the lands under her jurisdiction. When it came to the business of the jewels, 
the Sultanah was rather coy. When Vlamingh requested her to settle the matter of the 
price of the jewels, she declared that it would be 3,000 taels. One could imagine how 
someone like Vlarningh would try his very best to keep his anger under check while 
fronting this young Sultanah. He tried to persuade her by appealing to the fact that these 
were especially ordered by her late husband and that these were very expensive jewels 
specially crafted and brought all the way from the Netherlands. The Sultanah replied 
that the price offered was based on what these jewels were worth and that it was because 
of her friendship with the Dutch and the Governor-General that she had agreed to 
accept the jewels in the first place although she had no desire for them. But, teasingly 
she said, as a sign of goodwill, she would raise the offer to 3,500 taels to which Vlamingh 
promptly replied, was too little. She declared finally that she would offer 4,000 taels and 
then, as customary, she retired to the inner palace and let the orangkaya to gather in the 
balai to discuss the matter led by the Maharaja Sri Maharaja. The general feeling among 
the orangkaya was that they doubted the sincerity of the Dutch and they were particularly 
suspicious as to whether the Governor-General had seriously ordered this course of 
action since Vlamingh had refused to deviate even a penning from the original price. The 
orangkaya complained that this was making it more difficult for them to persuade the 
Queen. They told Vlamingh that the matter of the jewels depended on them since the 
Queen, being a woman did not have the greatest knowledge regarding these things and 
had to be taught. 97 While the orangkaya were still debating on the price, Maharaja 
Adonna Lilla appeared at the balai and after a short discussion with the orangkqya in 
Malay, the Maharaja Sri Maharaja informed Vlamingh that the orannkaya had agreed to 
raise the offer to 4,500 taels but subject to the Queen's concurrence. Vlamingh, as 
expected, disagreed with this slightly higher offer and he showed no sign of relenting still 
97 NA, f. 597R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
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insisting on the original price. Maharaja Adonna Lilla went back to the inner balai to talk 
to the Queen but she, unlike her male elites, would not offer more than 4,000 taels. By 
this time, Vlamingh was in despair and he pithily described how sad and hopeless he felt 
about the whole affair and wished he understood the Malay language! Maharaja Adonna 
Lilla was sent for the second time to the Queen. When he reappeared, he brought with 
him a silver dish with all the jewels that had been bought by the Acehnese from the 
Dutch from time to time. The Acehnese claimed that the pro-rated price of all these 
jewels did not come up to the cost the Dutch demanded for the five big pieces. Realising 
that he was caught in a spot, Vlamingh confessed that he was ignorant of the previous 
jewel transactions but explained that these other jewels were uncut whilst the five big 
pieces were expensive because they were made from cut table diamonds (tafelt diamenten) 
which had to be specially ordered and cut in the Netherlands. As they were discussing, 
another capado appeared from the inner balai and announced that the Sultanah had 
increased the offer to 5,000.98 
Feeling desperate by that time and being worn down after two months of 
fruitless negotiations, Vlamingh wanted this affair to be settled quickly before he 
returned to Batavia. He continued to negotiate with the Sultanah's eunuch. Although 
Vlamingh had reservations that this eunuch was not one of the four r xraaden, it 
appeared that he might have unique access to the Queen ears or rather, he had the 
unique privilege of listening to the Queen's whispers. Vlamingh had consistently 
complained about the "obscure and slow negotiations" he experienced in Aceh since he 
was not allowed to speak with the Queen but only through intermediaries whom, he 
understood was the custom of the land " According to Paduka Tuan, the only "man- 
person" (man persoon) who could speak to the Queen was the cap ado Maharaja Adonna 
Ulla and that all the Queen's business must be executed through him. It slowly dawned 
on the Dutch then that they had to treat this particular cap ado well and keep him in the 
camp that favoured the Company. 1°° True enough, it was Maharaja Adonna Lilla's 
98 NA, f. 598R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
99 Other monarchs in Southeast Asia, including male ones, were also not accessible in the inner palace 
except to women, children and eunuchs. See C. 5, p. 214. 
100 NA, f. 599R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
86 
dealings with the Dutch that finally broke the deadlock. During the discussion with 
Maharaja Adonna Lilla, Vlamingh finally agreed to reduce the price of the jewels to 6,000 
taels, where the Dutch requested for 2,000 in cash and the rest to be paid in tin and in 
tolls. To sweeten the deal, the Dutch presented Maharaja Adonna Lilla with a table 
emerald ring worth f. 268, (one of the many rings ordered by the late King that could not 
be sold), as a token of their hope and appreciation for his willingness to bring the matter 
to the Sultanah, for which he accepted kindly. Maharaja Adonna Lilla then ordered 
Vlamingh to keep this dealing a secret from the rest of the orangkaya so as not to arouse 
any suspicion. He told Vlamingh to make another round of visits to the orangkaya to 
request their help to bring the matter of the jewels to court at the next audience day on 
Saturday the 17`h of September. The eunuch even taught Vlamingh the correct manner 
he should adopt whilst speaking to the Queen and the orangkgya. He advised the Dutch 
to speak to the Sultanah in a submissive manner while to the orangkaya, they should use 
beautiful words! "' 
The next audience day, the Sultanah summoned all the orangkaya to court and 
Her Majesty declared that she had agreed to accept the jewels at 6,000 tael, 1,000 in cash 
and the rest to be paid within three years. 102 This amount of 6,000 tael had to be agreed 
upon by all the orannkaya including the Laksamana and the Lebe Kita Kali who had just 
returned from his elephant hunt. Despite some misgivings from the Laksamana and 
even from the Company's friend, Lebe Kita Kali, they agreed on the price by uttering of 
the word "Daulat' at the balai. Finally, both parties agreed upon a negotiated price. 
On Tuesday, the 20`x' of September, Sultanah Safiatuddin made good her promise 
to pay the 1,000 cash. In an unprecedented move, both in the local court and for a 
Dutch envoy, she also made the Dutch "pay" for their part of the bargain. Partly due to 
her youth and partly feminine mischief, she playfully asked Vlamingh and others to 
"honour" her by dancing in front of her and her ladies-in-waiting (state jufrouwen). 
Despite surely the discomfort and embarrassment, Vlamingh and other Company 
officials actually indulged the Sultanah. He reported that Her Majesty and her ladies 
were exceptionally amused by their hops and the court was filled with loud laughter and 
shouts. "" 
101 NA, f. 599V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
102 NA, f. 600V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
103 NA, f. 601R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Commissaris Arnold de Vlamingh. 
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Conclusion 
This "Jewel Affair" was significant because it tested the young Sultanah's mettle 
in the early years of her reign in her dealings with the foreign elites. It was also a test of 
wills and the diplomatic skills of both the orangkaya and the Dutch Commissars, like 
Pieter Sourij and Arnold Vlamingh. They had no idea how the change in Aceh's political 
leadership would impact their fortunes. This affair demonstrated that despite the difficult 
situation, both parties were able to avoid a potentially destabilising or threatening 
position. Both the Acehnese and the Dutch had to compromise on an acceptable price. 
On the part of the Dutch, there was also that paramount need to maintain the 
Company's good relations with Aceh if the Dutch were to enjoy trade privileges in 
pepper and tin and toll-free trade and exclusive nation treatment at Sumatra West Coast. 
In the precinct of the balai, the "Jewel Affair" revealed the presence of different 
foci of power and influence in the Acehnese court. One that was constantly shifting and 
contested. While the orangkaya thought that the resolution of this affair depended on 
them and the young sovereign, being a woman, needed to be instructed in such matters; 
it appeared that she too had her own ideas. The orangkaya were adamant not to pay a 
higher price for the jewels but she had the final say over the matter. Compromises, 
therefore, had to be made by everyone to preserve the Dutch-Acehnese friendship. 
Even though the orangkaya played an important role in the decision-making and were 
lobbied with gifts and "beautiful words, " the final authority laid in the Sultanah's hands. 
In the end, her policy of accommodating the Dutch prevailed. As the following chapters 
show, she consistently pursued this policy throughout her reign. 
However, the very fact that the Sultanah obtained the concurrence of the 
orangkaya showed that they were involved in the decision-making process. Indeed, the 
Sultanah tended to allow her orangkaya to lead in the preliminary stages of discussion. 
She stepped in to exert and stamp her final authority. Under her reign, the decision 
making process was collaborative, reciprocal through consensus-making muafakat, as 
opposed to the despotism practised by her father, Iskandar Muda. In this episode, the 
orangkaya had important inputs to contribute in the decision-making process giving a 
macro-perspective of how the jewels affected the finances of the kingdom. The young 
queen had her jewel experts, her naleerr and the rhabbandar to give independent advice 
about the worth of the jewels. The queen was not directly involved in the preliminary 
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rounds of the negotiating process, but she lent her stature to resolve conflicts when the 
discussions were seen to be going out of hand amongst her orangkaya and the Dutch. 
The Sultanah was careful and deft at keeping relations cordial and at an even keel 
especially when things were about to get out of hand. As mentioned, Sourij's anger and 
threatened walk out did not lead to a breakdown of diplomatic relations when he was 
stopped and invited to a banquet by the Sultanah. At opportune times, her views were 
conveyed through her eunuchs to the orangkaya. She apparently knew when to send her 
eunuchs out to the balai to soothe the tensions on both sides. 
The Jewel Affair showed that the orangkaya was not a homogenous group as 
commonly believed. They were divided into a pro-Dutch and anti-Dutch faction. They 
were divided in the way they perceived Dutch intentions and the manner to which they 
should respond and deal with the Dutch officials. The faction led by the Kali supported 
the queen's undeclared plan in adopting a soft approach. Accommodating the Dutch, 
was important to maintain good relations, particularly when the Company was becoming 
increasingly stronger after their conquest of Melaka. The other faction led by the 
Maharaja and the Laksamana took the hard-line approach and would rather reject the 
jewels rather than be cowed by the Dutch. The Laksamana was strident and firm in 
disagreeing with the manner and the price demanded by the Dutch for the jewels. Yet, 
despite these differences, at another level, however, the orangkqya were actually 
unanimous and united in their objective to protect the kingdom's interest. To them, the 
purchase of jewels was an extravagance that the kingdom could ill afford since these 
jewels served no useful purpose. Even the Kali who appeared to be pro-Dutch was not 
happy that the Acehnese had to pay so much for the generally unwanted and useless 
jewels. In the end, what became clear was that despite all the disagreements, all factions 
including the Sultanah were able to come to a compromise for the sake of the interest of 
the kingdom. Perhaps at that point in time the balance was struck between meeting the 
need and the interests of the ruler, the elite and of course ultimately the kingdom. 
Despite the disagreement about the final price of the jewels, they rallied behind the 
Sultanah and declared their support for her at the balai. The Jewel Affair illustrated that 
the relations between the orangkaya and the Sultanah were complex and contested. It did 
not show the rise of the orangkaya as commonly believed. Neither did this illustrate a 
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weak Sultanah dependent on her elite. More importantly, it showed how relations were 
successfully managed despite disagreements. 
Gendered perceptions such as the Queen being inaccessible and inconsistent 
because she was a woman were cleverly turned to an advantage. The "inaccessibility 
problem, " as described and identified 
by Vlamingh during the negotiations proved 
valuable since her actions seen as unfathomable to others, gave 
her a wide room for 
manoeuvre. Her "inconsistencies" typically considered as characteristic 
for a woman in 
decision-making was turned into an advantage of buying time for the 
Acehnese during 
periods of difficult negotiations. 
Unlike her predecessor husband, Iskandar Thani, the Sultanah was more 
concerned for the health of her kingdom's treasury. '04 She stopped the dangerous 
precedent started by her husband to accept payment for pepper in jewels instead of reals. 
Conspicuous consumption and extravagant display of wealth to gain charisma, prowess, 
and status worked against economical use of the kingdom's resources. Extravagant 
rulers were not popularly accepted by the orangkaya, Sultan Sri Alam was killed10S and 
Iskandar Thani was possibly poisoned due to his extravagant wasting of the kingdom's 
wealth on expensive trivialities such as diamond jewelleries to boost his ego and status. 
In contrast, to her male predecessors' emphasis on material wealth to gain prowess, 
Sultanah Safiatuddin practical and pragmatic style shaped her reign. 
As a female ruler in a largely patriarchal court, the Sultanah had to devise means 
to stay abreast of court happenings, be they rumours or real. In this context, the 
seemingly unimportant ca a pado, the favourite of the Sultanah, Maharaja Adonna Lill 
assumed an important role in this affair when he acted as the intermediary between the 
Sultanah, her orangkaya and the Company officials. Indeed Maharaja Adonna Lill a was 
the perfect conduit used by the Sultanah to engage the male sex and to serve as her eyes 
and ears in a largely male dominated balai. Sultanah Safiatuddin clearly managed to keep 
herself afloat during the early years of her reign. She had succeeded in devising a 
leadership style and a relationship with her elite that seemed to work. Nevertheless, this 
104 This may attest to Reid's claim that in Southeast Asian societies, women were entrusted with the handling of money, buying and selling goods, promoting family business and making deals. Anthony Reid, `Charismatic Queens of Southern Asia', History Today, 53.6 (June 2003), 30-35, p. 35. 105 Hikgyat A jeh, Iskandar, p. 96. In the Bustan, he was killed. Bustan, Iskandar, p. 32. # 
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relationship was still a fledgling one. This was to be sorely tested in the decades to 
come. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's Maturing Years: Politics of Consolidation 
Part I" Dealing with the VOC 
This chapter, dubbed the "Perak Affair" explores the dynamics between the 
Sultanah, her orangkaya and the VOC officials relating to one of Aceh's vassal states, 
Perak. The Perak Affair illustrates how VOC's incursions into Aceh's political and 
commercial spheres of influence affected traditional inter-state relations and Aceh's 
response. More importantly, this affair illuminates how the contests between the VOC 
and Aceh over Perak's tin trade have tremendous repercussions on Aceh's court politics. 
Just like the Jewel Affair, the Perak Affair, which covers Sultanah Safiatuddin's maturing 
years, details an important case study illuminating the leadership style of the Sultanah and 
the means by which she consolidated her position and survived these turbulent times. 
The Vassal that Lasts: Relations between Aceb and Perak 
According to Wolters, the map of early Southeast Asia was a patchwork of often 
overlapping *mandalas. In each of these mandalas, one king, identified with divine and 
"universal" authority claimed personal hegemony over the other rulers in his mandala 
who in theory were his obedient allies and vassals. 
' In Indianized classical Southeast 
Asia, these centres were ruled by chakravartin or universal monarchs, "king of kings" and 
*dewa-raja to whom other lesser kings ruling weaker states must pay tribute and homage. 
The success of the universal ruler or overlord depended on his ability to dispossess his 
rivals of their claims to space in their own right and bring 
' Oliver W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in SoutheastAsian Perspectives, revised edition, SEAP in 
cooperation with ISEAS, (Ithaca, N. Y.: Southeast Asia Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell 
University, 1999) p. 27. 
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them under his personal influence? Relations between states of unequal status; between 
centre and periphery lay within a mandala. 3 When the Malay maritime polities of 
Southeast Asia embraced Islam, the concept of chakravartin was replaced by the idea of 
the *khalfah4 a universal ruler ruling the Muslim *ummah. In Islam, the khalifah could be 
only a shadow of the divine since divine power belongs to God alone as opposed to the 
Hindu concept of dewa-raja of possessing divine powers. According to Manguin, for the 
centre to achieve ptimur interpares status, the universal ruler must possess some measure 
of legitimacy, charisma derived from prowess, divine radiance, soul-stuff or Sakti. Only 
then, could he lure, retain and regulate overseas exchange at his port to provide foreign 
income and mobilize, manipulate and redistribute the subsequent wealth as a political 
weapon to extend his authority and attract a still larger clientele 
5 
Aceh conquered Perak twice - once in 1575, triumphantly, and again in 1620, 
traumatically. In 1575, when All Riayat Shah attacked Perak, the sultan's widow and her 
children, amongst others, were brought to Aceh. Her eldest son married an Aceh 
princess and later became the Sultan of Aceh taking the title Sultan Alauddin Mansur 
Shah (r. 1579-1586). From 1620 onwards, however, Perak's fortunes turned and she 
became a vassal of Aceh instead. In 1620, the warrior Sultan, Iskandar Muda, invaded 
Perak, devastated it and placed on the throne his nominee, a captive Perak prince, who 
became sultan with the title Sultan Mahmud Shah 6 From then on Perak was a vassal- 
state of Aceh. Many polities were conquered and subordinated to Aceh when Iskandar 
Muda (r. 1607-1636) ruled it. 7 Both Iskandar Muda and his successor, Iskandar Thani, 
saw themselves as king of kings demanding homage and tribute from their vassals. 
2 Wolters, History, Culture and Region, p. 29. 
3 Kobkua Suwannathat Pian, Thai Malay Relations: TraditionalIntra-rr ions! Relations from the Seventeenth to the 
Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 52. 
't See Michael Laffan, `Dispersing God's Shadows - Reflections on the Translation of Arabic political 
Concepts into Malay and Indonesian, unpublished paper written for the project "History of translations 
into Indonesian and Malaysian Languages. n. d. p. 3. See also Marshall G. S Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: 
Conscience and History in a World Civilisation, trans. by Mastuti Haji Isa dan Rosiah Abdul Latiff, Kebangkitan 
Islam, Jilid I, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2004), p. 326. # 
S Pierre-Yves Manguin, The amorphous nature of coastal polities in Insular SEA: restricted centres, 
extended peripheries', Moussons, 5(2002), 73-99, pp. 77-78. 
6 Barbara W. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 43. 
7 By 1621, Aceh had become the undisputed overlord of the northern half of coastal Sumatra whose 
control included Pedir, Pasai, Deli, Aru, in the east and Daya, Labu, Singkel, Barus, Batahan, Pasaman, 
Pariaman, Tiku and Padang in the east. Iskandar Muda subjugated Johor in 1613, and other key tin- 
producing areas on the Malay Peninsula, Pahang in 1617 and Kedah in 1619. Lombard, in Winarsih, 
Kerajaan Aceh, p. 132. 
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The fate of Perak was an example of the changing fortunes of states in a regional 
context characterised by fluidity and impermanence. Perak - Aceh relationship was a 
microcosm of interactions between powerful and weak states in Southeast Asia. Yet 
whereas most such interactions continued to be volatile, the vassal-overlord relationship 
between Aceh and Perak remained constant and governed relations between the two 
kingdoms for the rest of the seventeenth century. The Perak Affair, elucidated below, 
reveals the tensions and complexities of traditional inter-state relations when these were 
intruded upon and then affected by new in-roads from the European Companies, in this 
case, the VOC. Unlike other dramas that unfolded in the region, where traditional 
powers and overlords crumbled to be replaced by new masters, the Perak Affair 
discloses a story of resilience, in which traditional power relations survived for decades 
despite continuous pressure of circumstances that might have been expected to change 
the political and commercial rules of the game. 
The Perak Affair explores the dynamics of inter-state relations within the context 
of this overlord-vassal paradigm during the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah. To what 
extent did she continue the policies of her predecessors? Did Aceh decline under her 
rule, and did Aceh lose her vassal state and her overlord status because of this weakened 
position, as more commonly claimed? There is some support for assent to this question, 
both in sources of the time and in current historical orthodoxy. Balthasar Bort, 
Governor of Melaka, reported that by 1678, "Aceh is impotent and has no appearance of 
once more attaining considerable power. "8 Barbara Andaya claimed that the murder of 
the VOC representatives in Perak in 1651 (explained in detail below) laid bare the extent 
to which Aceh's control had weakened since Safiatuddin's succession. B. Andaya 
asserted "the Queen had for some time been aware of the decline in her prestige and had 
earlier refused the Dutch inspection, of Aceh ships leaving Perak with tin on the grounds 
that it would prejudice her sovereignty and diminish her absolute power in Perak at least 
in the eyes of Perak subjects. "9 She argued that Safiatuddin was weak because she was 
unable to force Muzaffar Shah, the then Sultan of Perak, to surrender the guilty parties 
to the Dutch. R. O. Winstedt was slightly kinder in his assessment of the Sultanah since 
he suggested that although she lost all her other vassals she was able to hold on to Perak 
8 Richard 0. Winstedt, `A History of Perak' Journal of Malayan Branch of RoyalAriatic Society, 12 (1934), 18- 
77, p. 23. 
9 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 46. 
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as a vassal. Winstedt claimed, "partly female rule, partly the growing power of the Dutch 
and their protection of Johor and her allies led to the surrender by Aceh of all her 
conquest in the Malay Peninsula except Perak. "" A closer examination of the events 
that unfolded between Aceh, Perak and the VOC, revealed from Company officials' 
report, illuminate a more powerful Aceh, a stronger and more binding overlord-vassal 
ties than is more commonly believed: ties that continued to bind despite the challenges 
that tended to sever. Contrary to B. Andaya's claim that vassalage to Aceh had brought 
no benefits to Perak, " this very tie helped Perak to continue as a major tin producer and 
to reap profits for many more years. 
Tier that bind., Inter-state relations under Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani. 
Before dealing with Aceh-Perak relations under the Sultanah, a brief background 
of Aceh's relations with other powers under her predecessors is in order. This not only 
serves to compare the leadership and management styles in the conduct of foreign 
relations but to trace the continuities and changes in the traditional ties between Aceh 
and her vassal states. 
Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani maintained the hierarchical traditional ties of 
vassal-overlord relations by binding these states to Aceh through a mixture of military 
coercion, charisma, divinely sanctioned power, legitimacy through conquest and kinship 
ties. They demanded tribute and loyalty but provided less patronage and protection in 
return and at times, these relations were more exploitative and destructive, especially in 
the case of Iskandar Muda. Iskandar Muda did not hesitate to decimate the population 
of those vassals whom he suspected of trying to escape his clutches. He also 
depopulated the conquered polities by transporting their populace to Aceh. 
Unfortunately, he left most of these hostages to die hungry in Aceh. 
The Aceh Sultans were quick to capitalize on the coming of new powers to get 
rid of old rivals, but they were not quick enough to adapt traditional concepts guiding 
inter-state relations and embrace new ones. They had no qualms allying themselves with 
10 Winstedt, `A History of Perak', p. 23. 
11 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 48. 
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a Christian power (the VOC) to achieve their aim of getting rid of the infidel 
Portuguese. 12 Iskandar Muda initiated the Aceh-Dutch alliance against Portuguese 
Melaka and Iskandar Thani revived this initiative, but finally, Iskandar Thani himself 
refused to seal it. He was so angry when he discovered that the VOC, under Governor 
General Antonio van Diemen, had signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Johor 
whom he considered as Aceh's vassal without getting his permission first. To him, not 
only had Van Diemen violated diplomatic protocol by allying the Company with his 
mere vassal first before inviting him to join this alliance to conquer Melaka; worse, he 
had embarrassed and humiliated Iskandar Thani in the eyes of other Malay kings. His 
letter to the Governor revealed clearly his anger and hurt for being so slighted and 
dishonoured. 13 
Iskandar Thani became fearful and suspicious of the VOC, thinking that the 
Company was trying to get Johor's help to conquer Aceh next. Johor, under its new and 
very able *bendahara, was already trying to shake off Aceh's dominance and pursued a 
more independent policy. Perhaps emboldened by Dutch promise of protection, as 
outlined in the Treaty of Friendship14, Johor even tried to reclaim its ancient rights over 
Pahang, another of Aceh's vassal. Angered by Johor's impudence, Iskandar Thani sent 
an armada to Pahang to reinstate his claim and contemplated attacking Johor. It was in 
the midst of these uncertainties that negotiations for an Aceh-VOC attack on Portuguese 
Melaka took place. Iskandar Thani's anger knew no bounds when at that moment he 
found out about a Johor-VOC alliance. In his rage, he refused outright to help the 
Dutch. He would continue with a joint-attack only if the VOC severed relations with 
Johor and Johor sent a delegation to Aceh to ask for forgiveness. Already drawn into a 
draining and protracted siege with Portuguese Melaka, and failing to obtain Iskandar 
Thani's support, the Dutch used Johor as subsidiary forces to defeat the Portuguese, but 
at much costs. 
Partly owing to fear and partly in recoil from a slight to his ego and honour, 
Iskandar Thani had passed on a chance to ally itself with the VOC to attack Melaka. In 
contrast, Johor, armed with a new protector, in lieu of the treaty of friendship and 
12 This was unlike the agony the early Christian powers in Europe had about the legality of allying 
themselves with Muslim powers. 
13 Chijs, Dash-Register, 1640, pp. 6-8. 
14 The Company had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Johor in 1606 (before Aceh 
conquered Johor) and this Treaty was renewed in 1639. 
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alliance with the Dutch, managed to free itself from Aceh's dominance and even 
managed to claim Pahang, another vassal of Aceh as its own. Iskandar Thani's failure to 
discard his ego lost him the opportunity to strike a deal with the VOC that could put the 
new balance of power in Aceh's favour. Instead, he placed Aceh in a rather precarious 
position at the time of his death in 1641. 
Sultanah Safiatuddin'. r Volte-face 
Sultanah Safiatuddin clearly wanted to establish friendship and alliance with the 
VOC. She decided to make use of the treaty system to effect new kinds of relations, in 
contrast to the traditional use of aggression to maintain power and a hierarchical system 
of inter state relations. Aceh's interests would now have to be pursued and safeguarded 
by using new tools of diplomacy where relations were based on mutual interest. The 
Sultanah and her elites realized that in the context of the new realities facing them, 
supernatural and sacrosanct powers of legitimacy, royal lineage and kinship ties, though 
important, were in themselves insufficient to order inter-state relations. New bases of 
legitimacy, peace and order were needed to regulate international relations and to 
conduct trade. 
Sultanah Safiatuddin lost two vassal states in the first year of her reign, not so 
much of her own doing, but more, I argue, to tie loose ends that had already begun to 
unravel under her predecessor's reign. A few months after she came to power, she 
signed a written contract of peace with Johor with the mediation of the Dutch. Peace 
was solemnly proclaimed in public at the Grand Palace. Regarding Pahang, she saw the 
situation there as an almost fait accompli since the Laksamana who was sent to Pahang by 
Iskandar Thani had betrayed him and offered his allegiance to Johor instead. Unlike her 
husband, who was obsessing over the "cursed *boed angh" who turned traitor and was 
devising military means to return Pahang to his fold, Sultanah Safiatuddin reversed her 
husband's policy. In her letter to Antonio van Diemen, she explained that "since all the 
Great Men and inhabitants in Pahang have rebelled against me... and-the Bcndhara of 
Pahangh has handed over the country to Johor... Pahangh is now a land over which the 
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Captain will dispose as he likes. " She only requested for her weapons, ammunition and 
people to be sent back to Aceh. s 
The Perak Affair 
A few years later, in 1644, she would face another challenge to wrestle another 
vassal from her hold - Perak. The VOC after conquering Melaka was determined to 
make the port a commercial success, or at least, to make it pay for its own upkeep. t6 The 
Company officials wanted to ensure that they inherited what they believed were 
Portuguese rights - one of which was the surrender of half of Perak's tin to Melaka at a 
fixed price. The problem was that these so-called rights existed merely in theory. After 
the Dutch conquest of Melaka, the VOC officials realised that in reality, Perak was 
channelling lucrative tin to Aceh instead and the kingdom was reaping the profits of the 
tin trade by selling the highly demanded tin to other traders at her port, the English, 
Indians and Asians. The tussle between Aceh and the VOC over control of the tin trade 
in Perak was long and drawn-out but it was a contest between equals. Unlike Aceh's 
experience with her Johor and Pahang vassal states, the Sultanah was successful in 
keeping her traditional overlord-vassal relations with Perak. In a reversal of her 
predecessors' policies, this relationship was based not so much on coercion, soul-stuff or 
prowess but more on mutual benefit. The Sultanah gaining from Perak's continued 
tribute of tin for decades to come and Perak, enjoying Aceh's patronage and protection 
to continue her profitable tin trade. 
The VOC's main instruments to control the tin trade on the peninsula were to 
pressure the tin-producing areas to sign contracts with the Company and, when 
necessary, blockade them. On the 11 July 1642, the Company signed a contract with 
Kedah with stipulations for Kedah to deliver half of its tin to the Company traders at a 
fixed price and to forbid all other foreign traders without pass from Company authorities 
from trading in its port. A similar contract was signed on the 20 October 1643, with 
Ujong Salang, and on the 1 January, 1645, with Bangen. Only Perak refused to sign a 
15 NA, VOC 1141, ff. 146R-149R, f. 147V. 
16 See Sinnappah Arasaratnam, `Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan Trade 1641- 
1670', in Journal of Southeast Arian History, 10.3 (Dec. 1962), 480-490, p. 481. # 
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contract with the Company saying that they had no right to do so since Perak was a 
dependency of Aceh. " Frustrated with their failure to obtain enough tin, Van Diemen, 
the Governor-General, blockaded the Perak River in 1644 and 1645, allowing only Aceh 
and Perak vessels to pass. The Company stated that they blockaded Perak to claim what 
the Dutch alleged was the Company's right to half the tin of Perak, a right they believed 
was formulated from the Portuguese and now they should inherit. " 
This blockade was ineffective and fruitless. Perak and Aceh vessels continued to 
bring tin from Perak to Aceh, where traders from India, ever willing to pay higher prices, 
bought tin. These Indian traders established themselves at Sumatra north coast and 
transported tin as subjects of the Acehnese Sultanah under the very eyes of the Dutch 
ship captains. Tin was exported from the Malay Peninsula to Aceh where Indian ships 
were already waiting and then from Aceh, these were transported to the more western 
parts of Asia. On the 24 March 1645, the Company sent an envoy, Arnold Vlamingh, to 
Perak to negotiate a contract but the Sultan again refused to conclude a contract on his 
own authority and referred Vlamingh to the Queen of Aceh. 19 Whilst the VOC opened 
diplomatic channels, they maintained their blockade throughout. The Governor of 
Melaka, Van Vliet, wrote to the High Council in Batavia maintaining that the blockade of 
Perak was important because Perak was the prosperity of Aceh. As long as Perak 
flourished, Aceh was Melaka's ruin. He complained that through the supply of cloth by 
the Indians via Aceh to Perak and then to other areas in the Peninsula, nobody wanted 
to come to Melaka. He feared that because of this, Kedah too no longer wanted to 
maintain their contract. Jan Harmanszoon wrote to the Governor General on 25 
February 1645, that Kedah and Perak decided to supply each other with cloth. 2" In 
1646, the Company received 300 baharen of tin, half of what they received in 1645, 
furthermore, Kedah had allowed foreign traders to trade in Kedah once more. ' 
Antonio Van Diemen realised that in order to get to Perak's tin, he had to first 
negotiate with Aceh, as its overlord'' He appointed Arnold Vlamingh to head this 
17 See Bouwsloffen voor de Geschiedens der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel ed. by J. E. Heeres and P. A. 
Tiele (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1890-1895), p. xi. See B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, pp. 44-45. # 
18 Heeres, Bouwstofen, p. xi. See Irwin, `The Dutch and the Tin trade', in Tarling and Ch'en, p. 268. # 
19 Heeres, Bouwao en, p. xlv. 
20 Heeres, Bouwstofen, p. xlvi. 
21 Heeres, Bouwrtofen, p. xlviii. 
22 This was in part the mistake made by Van Diemen earlier, when he lost the opportunity to ally with 
Aceh (a clearly preferred choice) as opposed to Johor against the Portuguese. Iskandar Thani saw this as a 
breach of diplomatic protocol where a vassal was approached behind the back of its overlord. 
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mission. On the 23 June 1645, when Vlaming arrived in Aceh, he was well received as 
usual, but he discovered that the Acehnese were not happy with the Dutch because of 
the Perak blockade and their actions in Sumatra West Coast " The Acehnese and the 
Asian traders, especially those from India, bought pepper from Sumatra West Coast and 
transported them to Aceh. These Indian traders brought their manufactured goods to 
Aceh in exchange for tin and pepper and from Aceh exported cloth to the Malay 
Peninsula and Sumatra West Coast. Due to the exclusive nation treatment privilege 
granted to the Company by the Sultanah in 1641, the High Council in Batavia ordered 
that pepper from Sumatra West Coast must be brought to Batavia first and as long as the 
Company ships were not filled, no foreign ships could be allowed to take pepper. This 
order was so strictly followed that Vlamingh received news that Aceh ships, even those 
belonging to the Sultanah were accosted and the pepper forcefully unloaded from these 
ships. 4 Despite the Company's violation of the contract, which protected Acehnese 
rights to pepper based on its overlord position, the Sultanah honoured her promise of 
granting the Company exclusive nation treatment. During her negotiations with 
Vlamingh, the Sultanah renewed Dutch privileges in Sumatra West Coast but until the 
end of his visit, Vlamingh failed to obtain any contract for Perak except for the vague 
promise from the Sultanah to order the Sultan of Perak to deliver a good quantity of tin 
to the Company. 
Two years on, Vlamingh, who was then the Governor of Melaka, wrote to his 
successor Jan Thijssen, that he had not received a *kati from Kedah and from Perak, not 
more than 10 bahar whilst the Indian traders continued to transport 48,8000 pound of 
tin to Surat and from Perak alone they obtained 1500 bahar. ' Vlamingh proposed a 
radical measure to force Indian traders to pay tolls in Melaka first before they could go 
to the tin quarters. Vlamingh wanted a new trade network to be between Mataram, 
Melaka and Batavia to rival the Surat, Aceh and Sumatra West Coast network. The 
Dutch in Melaka would obtain rice from Macassar, pepper from Sumatra East Coast, to 
be exchanged with cloth obtained from Palimbang and Andragiri. Other foreigners were 
forbidden to trade. ' 
23 For a detailed narrative of Aceh-VOC relations pertaining to the Sumatra West Coast polities see 
Chapter 4. 
24 Heeres, Bouwstofen, p. xlvii. 
25 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. i. 
26 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. xlix. 
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In December 1647, Jochum Roelofszoon Van Deutecom, was sent to Aceh to 
address what the officials termed as the alarming situation where the Acehnese were 
making extraordinary profit and appeared not interested to continue with our friendship 
and alliance. " The Acehnese allowed Muslim traders access to trade and tin in Perak and 
had shut the Dutch out. 28 The Sultanah of Aceh, the Dutch claimed, had forced their 
junior trader Liven van Rossen to give a pass for free passage to a small Muslim ship that 
left Aceh for Perak and returned with tin and other goods to Surat which Arent liarens 
was helpless to stop. The Dutch were sure that the Sultanah herself was making great 
profits from the tin trade. Van Deutecom was accompanied by twenty-four soldiers for 
this mission in Aceh to ensure that everything was in good order and discipline. He was 
assisted by Jan Harmanszoon, the senior trader in Aceh, Johannes Sassan and the junior 
trader Liven van Rossen. After the usual customary reception, Van Deutecom declared 
the desire of the Company to maintain the friendship and alliance with Aceh till eternity. 
Having done this, he asked the Sultanah to grant the Company's requests to trade in 
Perak and to get tin and preferential treatment over Muslims. The Company "requested 
earnestly for the Queen to give her clear opinion and send a short dispatch so that the 
Company could see clearly that they were given better purchases and given the whole tin 
trade to the exclusion of all other nations" in return for the Company's continued 
friendship. If the Company's situation regarding the tin trade did not improve, the 
Company "resolves not to stand this anymore and will move our office and will do all in 
our power to stop the Muslim traders and block the Perak River so that no tin could be 
exported. This is fair for the maintenance of our rights and reputation. " Z9 
To appease Van Deutecom, the Sultanah sent two Acehnese envoys to Batavia to 
negotiate the tin trade of Perak. Even after intense negotiations, the Acehnese envoys 
refused to promise that a yearly fixed quantity would be delivered to the Company, 
certainly not the 600 bahar as Deutecom demanded. They argued that this would hurt 
the interest of the Sultanah; furthermore, there should be free competition between them 
and the Dutch. The claim that the Company were securing the rights that once belonged 
to the Portuguese made no impression on the Acehnese envoys. In an amorphous and 
27 NA, f. 733R. Memorije voor den E. Jochum Roeloffs van Deutecum Raat van Indie gaende de legatie 
aende Coninghinne van Atchin met de jachten Zeerob, ijrslingen ende de fluijt den Engel over Malacca 
waer naer sijn E. Sich sal hebben to reguleren. 
28 NA, f. 733V. Memorije voor den E. Jochum Roeloffs van Deutecom. 
29 NA, f. 734V. Memorije voor den E Jochum Roeloffs van Deutecom. 
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fluid environment such as in the Malay world, there was no such knowledge of fixed 
"legal rights or obligations" even less of inherited rights of previous overlords. " 
Besides pressuring the Acehnese to grant the VOC exclusive nation treatment in 
Perak, the Governor General, Cornelis Van Der Lijn, 31 warned all the Captains of 
Muslim ships who had landed in Aceh not to appear there again, nor could they frequent 
Perak, Kedah and Ujong Salangh and the surrounding areas. The penalty was 
confiscation of cargo unless they had obtained passes from the Dutch chiefs in Surat, 
Coromandel and Pegu. They would also be fined if they went to Aceh and other tin 
quarters or they would be detained and brought to Melaka 32 
The Company however had no legal recourse to stop Muslim traders from 
frequenting Aceh since Aceh had not signed any treaty that granted the Dutch exclusive 
nation treatment in Aceh. In 1648, however, the Dutch found the legal excuse to stop 
Indian traders, especially those from Surat to enter Aceh and other tin producing areas in 
the Malay Peninsula. On the 19-20`" April 1648, the Dutch factory in Surat was attacked, 
plundered and some Dutchmen were killed. In July, the Dutch went to Surat with a big 
fleet of ships to exact indemnity. This resulted in a Treaty33, forced on the Suratis, which 
stipulated that Muslims traders from Surat, Bengal and other places, must leave Aceh, 
Perak, Kedah and Ujong Salangh or their ships would be seized and confiscated by the 
Dutch.. 34 
Muslim traders would be kept out of Aceh and other tin producing areas by the 
Company blockading the Perak River, stopping trade in Kedah and preventing Surat 
vessels from coming to Aceh. The Company would no longer respect Aceh's autonomy 
over her harbour and Surat ships plying her harbour would be forcefully stopped. 35 The 
Company foresaw that there was to be no more rival traders in the surrounding areas 
around Melaka or in Aceh and by end of 1648, they would be able to procure enough tin 
not only for the whole of Persia but also to get enough supplies for Formosa. The 
oppercoopman Huibrecht Van den Broek was sent to Aceh in May 1648 to empty the 
30 Rene J. Barendse, The Arabian Seas: the Indian Ocean world of the seventeenth century (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2001), p. 92. # 
31 Cornelis van der Lijn was Governor General in Batavia from 1645-1650. 
32 Bouwstoffen, p. li. 
3; This treaty was signed on 18th September 1649 between the Company and the Mughal Governor of 
Surat, Miermosa. The Company seized two large ships belonging to the Mughal Emperor with a cargo 
valued at 1.5 million guilders. Arasaratnam, `Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca', p. 487. 
34 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. Iii. 
35 Heeres, Bouwstofen, p. liv. 
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factory and to make an impression on the Sultanah. The Company hoped that this break 
of relations and the emptying of the factory, would make the Acehnese fearful and 
realise the advantage the Company's trade could yield for their kingdom. This plan 
however, was to go hopelessly awry. 
Truýtman's Missions to Aceh and Perak 1649-1652 
Governor General Cornelis Van Der Lijn appointed the oppercoopman Johan 
Truijtman as the Commissar to Aceh to carry out the Company's plans. He arrived in 
Aceh on the 13th of September 1649. Truijtman found five ships- two English, one 
from Gujerat, one from Masulipatnam, one from Bengal plus two other vessels, one 
from Maldives and one from Malabar. 36 Aceh's harbour was busy despite the blockade 
imposed a year earlier. 
On his arrival, Truijtman reported that the Acehnese were not in a happy mood 
at all. One thousand armed men guarded the Aceh River and the Acehnese appeared 
hostile even preparing for war. This distrust for the Dutch was apparent enough when 
the Acehnese stationed a number of guards at the company's lodge to monitor the 
company's servants closely. " This suspicion and displeasure were due to several reasons: 
Firstly, the Dutch blockade of the Acehnese river; secondly, the continued blockade of 
the Perak River whereby the Sultanah's own ships could not enter or exit; thirdly the 
unusual delay in the return of the Acehnese envoys sent by the Sultanah to Batavia to 
discuss the Perak issue and finally, the hostile actions committed on a Malabar ship at 
Aceh's harbour by the Dutch patrolling vessels 3S The Acehnese intercepted letters 
written to the Dutch resident in Aceh, Philip de Salengre, from Melaka. Because of this, 
Salengre was called to court and interrogated. Although he tried to give a good 
interpretation of the letters, the Laksamana chided him by explaining that now more 
people in Aceh were able to read Dutch and that the letters were proof of the 
36 Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn Gouverneur Generale ende Heeren Raad van 
India, over d'expeditie in Aetchijn en de Coninglijk Majestijt aldaer, gevolchlijk ende repective onderhorige 
plaetsen van Ticu, Priaman en Indrapoura, bij heur subalte Gouveneurs ende subjecten alle op de Sumatra 
Westcust door den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman op 13en Augustij Anno 1649 van Batavia naer 
derwaerts gecommitteert. NA, VOC 1171, ff. 180-191, f. 182V. 
37 Heeres, Bouwstof n, p. 483. 
ss NA, ff. 182V-183R. Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn. 
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Company's unfair trading practices, such as forbidding traders from trading and not 
wanting to pay tolls. 9 The Sultanah had asked the English to translate some of these 
letters and Truijtman learnt that, according to the Company's translator, Abdul Latiff 
and the Maharaja Sri Maharaja40, the Company's friend, the English warned the 
Acehnese that Truijtman's mission should not be trusted. 41 
Sultanah Safiatuddin granted Truijtman an audience on the 19th of September, a 
mere six days after his arrival, much sooner than the usual norm of two weeks, attesting 
to the worry the Acehnese had over recent events. Yet, despite the suspicions and 
recent tensions, the Sultanah was as impeccable in her hospitality and received Truijtman 
excellently. " Truijtman reported that they were fetched and accompanied to court by 
Bintara Blangh, Baljouw Sabandar, the Naleer and the two recently returned envoys from 
Batavia who came together with Truijtman, Sri Bidia Indra and Tonadja Radja, the 
Dutch skipper, Resident Salengre and bookkeeper, Brittsen. Fifty-two servants carried 
the Governor-General's letter, placed on a gold plate and carried on an elephant with a 
palanquin and gifts to court. The Sultanah welcomed Truijtman's delegation and treated 
them with elephant fights and stage plays, but since it was fasting month, no food and 
drinks were served. The Queen excused herself for this and hoped that the Dutch 
would not blame her for not treating them with food. Later in the evening, she treated 
the Company officials with more singing performances at Court that was alight with 
candles. She treated them with sumptuous food served in gold plates and honoured 
them with betel-box. Later that night, Truijtman and company were royally sent back to 
their lodge on elephants and horses. The Sultanah even presented them with a few 
horses for their own use. Although no official discussions took place, the Sultanah, as 
customary, already set the setting for an easing of tensions and a more conducive 
platform for discussions by sweetening the Company officials' palette. " Besides this 
description of warm welcome and delightful entertainments, another significant entry in 
Truijtman's report during that audience day was that the two envoys from the Perak 
Sultan were also there and the Perak envoys presented the Sultan of Perak's letter to her 
39 NA, VOC 1171, ff. 196-238, ff. 247V-250V, f. 200V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman 
Johan Truijtman September - November 1649. 
40 It appears that the Sultanah appointed the Kali (a friend of the Dutch) to this position. It is not known 
what happened to the anti-Dutch Maharaja Sri Maharaja. 
41 NA, f. 202R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman, 
42 NA, f. 184V. Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn, 
13 This was in contrast to Iskandar Thani's very hostile and violently angry stance in his reception of Jan de 
Meere after hearing about the Dutch alliance with his vassal, Johor. 
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Majesty. ` Another interesting entry was the information provided by Posje Meloor, the 
company's former translator, now employed as the translator for the English. Truijtman 
wrote that out of his own initiative and in secret, how Posje Meloor, who was at Court 
yesterday, overheard the letters from the Governor-General and those from Perak read 
aloud in Court to the orangkaya. Posje Meloor had clearly heard and understood that the 
Sultan of Perak, Muzaffar Shah, was extremely opposed to the blockade of the Perak 
River and he needed her Majesty's help to redress and give him assistance on this issue. 45 
Another audience day passed (partly because of the fasting month), before 
Truijtman could discuss urgent issues with the Sultanah. In the meantime, just like 
earlier envoys, Truijtman prepared to visit the orangkaya with gifts to facilitate the 
discussion of important matters at court. One such orangkaya was the Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja's closest follower, Raja Binthara. The Maharaja asked the Company officials to 
pay him a visit to conduct preliminary discussions. Truijtman wrote that the meeting 
took place in the house of the Binthara in secret, without the knowledge of the other 
orangkaya, under the cover of darkness. The meeting cleared some major 
misunderstandings although Truijtman had to wait for the next audience with the 
Sultanah to present his requests. To dispel the Acehnese main suspicion and fear that 
the Company was about to wage war against the kingdom, Truitman explained why the 
Company patrolled Aceh's harbour, something they had never done before. This was 
because the Muslims in Surat had attacked and murdered Dutch people and had 
destroyed the company's lodge 46 Thus, the Dutch patrol ships were keeping a close 
watch on their Surat enemies and the blockade around Aceh's harbour was not meant to 
prejudice the friendship between the Dutch and the Acehnese kingdom. Regarding the 
blockade of the Perak River, Truijtman reassured Raja Binthara that the Dutch desired 
no other aim but to execute the good intentions and the order of the Queen, which she 
had given to the Perak Sultan to allow the Dutch to procure tin, which Truijtman 
claimed, had not been properly obeyed. The Raja Binthara replied in a very friendly 
manner that he was very relieved to hear this and would keep the Sultanah informed so 
that the Company's requests and business could be executed in a calm manner. 
44 NA, f. 205V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
45 NA, f. 208V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
46 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. 484. 
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On the 2nd of October 1649, Truijtman appeared in front of the throne of 
Sultanah Safiatuddin and respectfully requested in substance what he had mentioned to 
Raja Binthara before. Truijtman wrote that Her Majesty was very annoyed regarding the 
affair in Perak and the blockade of the Perak River, "even though I have not mentioned 
about them yet, this was asked repeatedly by the Queen. Her Majesty had taken the 
blockade of Perak to heart and showed public displeasure and addressed the court in an 
angry and harsh manner. "" She asked, "How come the Governor-General has now 
besieged my land so much so that my own vessels could not be allowed to enter and exit 
the Perak River? " Truijtman further noted that in the presence of the Perak's envoys 
that had arrived in Aceh a few days before him, she said that she would not allow all the 
company's requests. " She commissioned and nominated a certain notable named Sri 
Maradja Lella, who would go to Perak together with Truijtman, the Perak's envoys and 
her boedjanghs with a written *estemie to the Sultan of Perak, Sultan Muzaffar Shah within 
these five days to redress the problem. She requested Truijtman to provide a pass for her 
ministers and three of her vessels that would depart to Perak. She also promised to 
provide a written estemie to exclude or deny all other foreign traders from trading in Perak 
and all those without passes except those from Aceh. 49 
Truijtman wrote that his final request to her Majesty was to return all the 
intercepted letters that were now under her keep. In order to settle this affair, Truijtman 
suggested that these letters be brought to court and in the presence of all people in front 
of the throne be read in public by the translator who had falsely repeated these letters-'o 
Truijtman complained that because of this intercepted letters, the Acehnese were 
monitoring company servants much to the affront of Dutch friendship. The Sultanah 
answered that since his arrival, all these suspicions had been cleared, passed and had 
been forgotten. She informed Truijtman that her guards were no longer monitoring the 
Company servants. Nevertheless, she continued, although these suspicions had been 
cleared, and the company officials were no longer watched, the Dutch were still closely 
monitoring the Acehnese in her own harbour. She stated that the cause of the Acehnese 
fear- the two Dutch ships, the Delfshaven and the Macarrel which arrived in Aceh on the 
17th of October, patrolling Aceh's harbour without them knowing why, had not been 
47 NA, f. 186R. Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn. 
48 NA, f. 186V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
a9 NA, f. 187R. Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn. 
50 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. 489 
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addressed by Truijtman. 51 Truijtman related that the Sultanah took this matter regarding 
the patrol and blockade of the Aceh River with utmost seriousness. She told Truijtman 
that she would rather go to war if the blockade of Aceh continued and they would not 
tolerate any longer the blockade of the Aceh and Perak River. " She was certainly not 
pleased with Company's actions against foreign ships trading at her port either. The 
Sultanah complained, "in front of our own eyes the Dutch had shot a certain Malabar 
vessel that was anchored at our harbour. " 
On the 7th October 1649, both parties put aside temporarily all tensions due to 
the end of the fasting month and the beginning of the celebration of the Muslim Hari 
Raya Aidilfitri. All in the kingdom were celebrating and as customary, four hundred 
buffaloes were slaughtered and sumptuous feasts prepared to mark the ceremony. The 
Dutch were included in the celebrations. Maharaja Palawan, who was the envoy to 
Batavia last year, presented Truijtman with a big cow as a present for treating him well in 
Batavia. S3 
On the 12`h of October 1649, the Sultanah replied to the various requests made 
by Truijtman. Her resolutions were, namely, that she would distribute/return the 
intercepted letters as was found. She wanted Dutch patrol ships at the Acehnese 
harbour that were keeping watch on the Gujarati Moslem traders, to be taken farther 
away. The Sultanah promised to help and continue to favour the Company Resident and 
other officials who would remain in Aceh. Finally, the Sultanah would write a letter to 
the Governor-General to complain about the blockade of Perak and the monitoring of 
Aceh's harbour so that a solution could be found and these matters redressed. The 
Sultanah registered her displeasure strongly to Truijtman regarding the Company's 
blockade of the Perak River and their patrols of her own River and she demanded 
restitution. The Sultanah decided to send the envoy Sri Bidia Indra to Batavia to 
negotiate about the grievances with the aim of resolving these problems. 
The Sultanah and her orangkaya were not happy regarding Truijtman's refusal to 
grant the Sultanah several passes for her and her officials' vessels to Perak. This was a 
small request in return for the many grants the Aceh court had bestowed on the 
Company. In a private request from the Raja Binthara to Truijtman, the Binthara again 
51 Heeres, Bouwrtofen, pp. 489-490. 
52 NA, f. 187V. Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn. 
53 NA, f. 224R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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registered his unhappiness at Truijtman's refusal to grant passes. During Audience Day, 
when the Sultanah requested for a pass for her orangkaya Sri Maradjia Lella and the other 
nominated persons to Perak with three vessels, Truijtman remained unrelenting. He 
replied that the passes would be given but warned that it was the Governor-General's 
wish that only one vessel would be allowed to return whereas the other two vessels 
would have to remain in Perak. 54 Two orangkaya were especially not happy with the 
Dutch, the Laksamana and his supporter, Paduka Tuan. Throughout Truijtman's stay in 
Aceh they had both refused to see him on the excuse that they were ill and they had 
been absent at court when the Company officials were there. They even boycotted the 
Sultanah's fishing trip, organised before Truijtman and his delegates departed. " 
Truijtman's departure did not leave a good taste at the Acehnese court. Whilst 
the Sultanah accommodated the Company officials, none was returned. Besides the 
unhappiness with the passes, the Sultanah had requested that as a first step to redress the 
anger over the Dutch patrol of Aceh's harbour, the two patrol ships should depart 
together with Truijtman. During the last meeting with the Sultanah before his departure, 
the Sultanah asked why the ships had remained in her harbour especially when she no 
longer kept guard over the Company officials. To which Truijtman replied that they 
were keeping watch of the Gujerati Muslims who were their enemies. The Sultanah 
asked, "if the Gujeratis were the enemies of the Dutch, why must you monitor our 
harbour? " Should you not blockade and patrol outside Surat's harbour instead, where 
your enemies are, not here to the aversion and terror of my people? " Truijtman did not 
seem to sense the resentment against this action and the seriousness and urgency of the 
Sultanah's request. He merely replied that in case her Majesty was displeased, she should 
write to the Governor-General and informed him about it. Upon hearing this, the 
Laksamana and the Sri Paduka Tuan who finally decided to attend business at court 
regarding the Company's affairs responded by saying, "there is no sincere friendship 
when men seek strange ways to become enemies. " They continued, "you should ask 
yourself why you need to blockade a friend's harbour and why we should continue to 
maintain that friendship, it is better to just say what your real intentions are. " Here, the 
Maharaja Sri Maharaja interjected and dissipated the tension by some friendly remarks 
and reiterated that Truijtman had already explained the Company's position clearly 
54 NA, f. 237V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
55 NA, f. 236V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
108 
enough. Truijtman reported that the Sultanah still treated him royally before his 
departure at court but she made her displeasure known by presenting him with a copper 
dagger. The Sultanah excused herself for the small value of the dagger giving Truijtman's 
hasty departure as the cause. " 
The final exchange between Truijtman and the orangkaya considered as the 
Company's friends was telling in revealing the tensions at court and how far the 
Acehnese viewed the Company with suspicion. " A day before Truijtman's departure, he 
together with the Resident Salengre, went to court to fetch the Queen's letter. There he 
met with the Company's friends, at the orangkaya's balai, the Maharaja Sri Maharaja58 with 
his good friend, Radia Binthara and his son-in-law the Maradia de Radia, together with 
two or three *bintharas and the appointed envoys Sibidia Indra and Radia Moedeliar. 
While they were sitting and eating, presented with the Queen's . ruasra 
betelbox, the 
Maharaja requested the Governor-General for a speedy return of her Majesty's envoys 
once the business between the Company and the Acehnese had been settled. He 
signalled to Truijtman how important this mission was in order to make or break the 
friendship between Aceh and the Company. He said, " now or never you must succeed, 
that the desirability between us must be handled, seeing that her Majesty more than ever, 
regarding Perak, henceforth, had allowed no other foreigners to trade there and that the 
tin in Perak remained only for her Majesty and the Company. " The Radia Binthara 
added, "the affair now remains in God's hands and the outcome of this delegation 
whether it ends in the maintenance of friendship or in war, because we have contributed 
in all ways towards the conservation of this friendship. "" The Maharaja concluded by 
reassuring the Company officials that they had the favour of the Sultanah and thus 
should not doubt whether she would change the pre-eminences granted to them. 
When Truijtman left Aceh, he managed to secure some verbal promises 
regarding the Company's new prerogatives for the tin trade in Perak. The Sultanah had 
agreed that only the Company and Aceh could trade in Perak and henceforth no 
European and Indian traders were to be allowed in Perak. This provision was included 
in her written mandate to the Sultan of Perak. She then sent her own envoys to 
56 NA, f. 248V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij den Oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
57 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. 496. 
58 The Sultanah had appointed the pro-Dutch Lebei Kita Kali as the Maharajah Sri Maharajah in 1644. 
The Mali's son took over his position. It is not known what happened to the earlier Maharajah, probably 
he died. One problem with the VOC records is that they do not provide individual names, only titles. 
59 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. 497. 
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accompany Truijtman to Perak to negotiate the contract with the Sultan. After which 
her envoys were to return to Aceh and then proceed to Batavia to conclude and ratify 
the contract. On the 116' of August 1650, Truijtman arrived in Perak and reported that 
the Sultan accepted the Sultanah's order. A contract was then signed between the Sultan 
and the Company representatives on the 15`h August 1650. Governor General van der 
Lijn wrote to the Heeren Zeventien that the Sultan of Perak acted with pleasure and 
satisfaction and readily submitted to the disposition of the Acehnese Majesty. He added 
that the exclusion of all other foreigners in Perak as well as Sumatra West Coast granted 
by the Queen of Aceh was extremely favourable to the company 60 In his Dagh-Register, 
Truijtman mentioned that although the Sultan of Perak generally agreed with most of the 
points, he was not happy with the Company's request to a fixed price of tin and toll-free 
privilege on tin. b' The Sultan stressed that this old custom must be respected. After nine 
days in Perak, Truijtman departed for Aceh on the 19th of August 1650 and arrived in 
September 1650. 
Trouble in theAcehnese Court 
After the seemingly smooth reception in Perak, Truijtman brought the Sultan's 
letter to the Sultanah. When he arrived, he found the Acehnese once again in a state of 
agitation and confusion. This was because the yachts Delfrhaven and Macareel, were still 
blockading and patrolling Aceh's harbour keeping watch over what the Company 
claimed were Surat ships. This action had an adverse effect on Aceh trade for that year. 
Truijtman reported that the trade had greatly changed because of the suspension of 
activities of Muslim traders, bringing about scarcity of cloth and an increase in price. 62 
The Acehnese were also angry because Dutch officials mistreated their envoys to Perak 
by accusing them of not having proper passes and by the Company's continued blockade 
of the Perak River. 
Because of this trouble and humiliation, the Laksamana and the Paduka Tuan 
decided to make their move against the Company and the faction of the orangkaya keen 
60 Generale Mis iven, Vol. 2,1639 to 1655, p. 457. 
61 NA, VOC1175, ff. 305-320. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman in dato 13 Jan 
1651. Bijlagen tot vorenstaend rapport, 1651. NA, ff. 321-328, f. 307R. 
62 NA, ff. 307R-307V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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to maintain Company's interest in Aceh, a few days before Truijtman's arrival. 
Truijtman reported that he heard that they publicly reproached the Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja and accused him of aspiring to be after the throne using the Dutch as 
accomplices. " Truijtman related that the Laksamana and his followers were trying to 
strip the Maharaja Sri Maharaja of his position as the first in rank in the Council by 
spreading lies about him to arouse the fear and suspicions of the Sultanah and the rest of 
the orangkaya. 64 Truijtman wrote, in the presence of the Queen, the Laksamana libeled 
his enemy. Nevertheless, the Maharaja remained calm and unbelievably patient, stoically 
enduring this incident. The Acehnese court was waiting for the Governor General's 
letter and his advice regarding the problem in Perak. Truijtman believed that with this 
letter from the Governor, all the accusations and lies concocted against the Maharaja 
could be proven wrong and he could once again be elevated at court. As for now he 
continued to be suspect. Indeed, Truijtman reported that just before his arrival, the 
Maharaja had gone on an elephant hunt. It was believed to make it easier for him not to 
face the Dutch delegation and be put in a difficult position. 65 
A few days after Truijtman's arrival, the Governor General's letter and gifts were 
brought to court on audience day with the Queen. Truijtman reported that he found a 
very hostile court and the Maharaja's followers were very silent. " Where a little 
diplomacy and sensitivity could have helped ease tensions, Truijtman was instead 
arrogant and defensive. Being the merchant that he was, he immediately proceeded to 
demand new privileges. He wanted royal consent for the purchase of some elephants 
and requested the customary visits to the orangkaya so that he could discuss Company's 
business. His note in his Dagh-Register, demonstrated his total lack of diplomatic 
finesse and sensitivity, "Wholly unexpectedly, " he wrote, "Her Majesty promptly denied 
this request and with such violent demeanor. " The Sultanah also postponed Truijtman's 
visits to the orangkaya as a sign of displeasure and to delay the execution of the 
Company's business. 67 Truitman concluded that all the resistance and hostility from the 
Acehnese was due to the "malicious party" at court. He continued to report that the 
Queen gave "frivolous" reasons and "futile objections" to his request to purchase 
63 NA, f. 308R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
64 NA, f. 308R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
65 NA, f. 308V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
66 NA, f. 308V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
67 NA, £309R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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elephants, saying that during the time of her father Marhom Makota Alam, the Company 
never bought nor exported any elephants. Furthermore, she argued that she had given 
the Company enough privileges in Sumatra West Coast and Perak to the exclusion of all 
other foreign traders, European and Indian. The Sultanah concluded that the Company 
officials should be contented and should not ask for new demands yearly. Truijtman did 
not believe the Sultanah; instead, he saw these as mere excuses. The real important 
reason, Truijtman suspected, was the Muslim trade from Masulipatnam and Bengal 
whose traders since time immemorial had bought a great number of elephants yearly, 
which brought great profits to the Acehnese Queen and her orangkaya. In addition, they 
received much profit from the important toll and other heavy duties imposed on this 
trade. " Besides the Sultanah's outright rejection of Truijtman's new requests, Truijtman 
had to face more problems. Truijtman complained that the "the malicious faction" led 
by the Laksamana, seeing their persuasions were taken into consideration by her Majesty, 
spoke out against the company's rising position. They advocated that the Sultanah and 
the rest of the orangkaya should annul even the company's existing prerogatives, giving 
the reason that the whole court had never consented to these privileges in the first place. 
He added that the Dutch had proven themselves unworthy of such privileges by their 
evil deeds that now, it was time for the Dutch to make their way out 69 
By this time, Truijtman's patience had run out and he was spitting venom at the 
anti-Dutch faction in his notations in his Dagh-register, calling the Laksamana base and 
vile and his followers-crazy-headed and spiteful (dol-koppigen wrevel moedigen). As for the 
Sultanah, Truijtman wrote that she was to be pitied/deplored because she appeared to 
have given the Laksamana faction so much hearing that at a certain time Her Majesty's 
would have no own respect. 70 She gave so much faith to their bad proposals that she 
would be persuaded to do things, he continued. He warned the Sultanah of his intention 
to absent himself for two times from court as a sign of his displeasure. Truijtman 
believed that this threat would give Her Majesty more time and faith to think about the 
affair. 
68 NA, VOC1175, ff. 305-320. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman in dato 13 Jan 
1651. NA, ff. 321-328. Bijlagen tot vorenstaend rapport, 1651. Bijlagen tot vorenstaend rapport, 1651, NA, 
ff. 323V-324R. 
69 NA, ff. 310R-310V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
70 NA, ff. 310V-311R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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In the meantime, the Maharaja and his followers did not sit still. Not a day 
passed, Truijtman wrote, when the good party did nothing. The work was advanced 
through messages sent secretly by messengers on horses to the Maharaja. As a result, the 
threats that were spun by the malicious party ended. Truijtman did not describe how the 
Maharaja was once more favored at the expense of the anti-Dutch faction. Perhaps, the 
Maharaja's return from his hunt accompanied by a long row of elephants for the 
Sultanah helped him to regain his respect and prestige from her and the other elites. He 
was no longer held in suspect. But even in his absence, and even when the court was 
dominated by the Laksamana and his followers, the Sultanah maintained her favor for 
the Dutch, proving Truijtman wrong. True, the Sultanah had rejected the Company's 
demands for new privileges, but she remained firm in accommodating the Dutch 
regarding the tin trade in Perak. She confirmed her earlier promise of excluding all other 
traders in Perak except for the Acehnese and the Dutch. The Queen specified that no 
other vessels would go to Perak but the Company's and the Queen's and two each from 
her orangkaya. The Sultanah ratified the 15s of August 1650 contract and allowed new 
concessions regarding the tin trade. She agreed to allow the fixing of the price of tin at 
311/4 in 
. rpetie per 
bahar (the market price fluctuated between 31-43 per bahar). " She did 
not allow, however, toll-free privileges for the Company in Perak, a privilege that the 
Sultan of Perak himself was not willing to give since this was his and his orangkaya's main 
source of revenue. The Sultanah was "wholly horrified" by this request and she 
sustained that this would greatly prejudice her sovereignty and lessen her authority in the 
eyes of her Perak subjects. She said that the Dutch should not complain about this since 
now they could obtain most parts of the tin. 72 She also refused to allow the fixing of the 
amount of tin the Company could obtain. Truijtman, with the wise counsel of his good 
friend, the Maharaja, decided not to press this demand. The Maharadia explained to 
Truijtman that the Sultanah did not want to stain her worthiness as a queen by promising 
something she doubted, what more something she could not deliver7.3 She could not 
promise an amount since this did not stand in the fields in Aceh nor in the wind but was 
found in the mountains in Perak where whether in dry or wet years nobody could be 
certain of its produce. 
71 NA, f. 315R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
72 Generale Mitsiven, Vol. 2, p. 463. 
73 NA, f. 313R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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After this episode, gone were all the venom and criticisms of the Sultanah. 
Truijtman reported that the Company not only had the Queen's will and generosity but 
also enjoyed her good meaning. 74 He added, "although the oran(gkaya could sustain their 
influence, she still had enough authority to decide over our affairs, although her authority 
over Perak and the Malay people may have declined. " Sultanah Safiatuddin, wrote 
Truijtman, said in her own words: "Commander, we shall give the order to Sultan 
Muzaffar Shah that only the Dutch and Acehnese could trade and export tin from Perak 
as much as they could obtain. " She also said, "since you came here with your family last 
year to stay, you could see for yourself our good intentions. "'S The Sultanah continued, 
"It would be good if you and your family could come here to stay. We shall write to the 
Governor General so that the Muslims could come here to trade and would not be 
expelled. If there were new troubles then we would take care of it. I will recommend to 
the Governor General that I would rule my land in peace as my predecessors had 
done. i76 Truijtman reported, from here on, the displeasures ceased, the old friendship 
continued and the different settlements were concluded under the recommendation of a 
good and sincere Queen. The Dutch were allowed to use the old English quarters for 
their new lodge. " The Sultanah then sealed this agreement with her blessed words Zalla 
Talla (Insya Allah/God Willing) and this was confirmed by all the orangkaya together with 
all their followers with the word "daulat'" in recognition of her sovereignty. In his 
report to the Heeren Zeventien, the Governor General wrote, only from the good pleasure 
and affection from the Queen herself that Commissioner Truijtman received respect and 
good treatment and only later the whole court happened to agree. 9 Truijtman 
concluded his report of this episode by noting that his respect at court had been restored 
and Her Majesty had addressed his just complaints over things of importance so as not 
to subvert their reciprocal and trustworthy old alliance arising from some evil intent of 
some people with small abilities. 8° Truijtman boasted that his actions and threats had 
resulted in the Sultanah's rejection of the "audacious (stouten) Laksamana who had come 
to the extreme. " 
74 NA, £313V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
7S NA, f. 314R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
76 NA, £314V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
77 NA, f. 312R. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
78 Doulat or daulat means the sovereignty or authority of a ruler. If this word was uttered by subjects, it 
means acceptance of the ruler's sovereignty or command. 
79 Generale Mrsriven, Vol. 2, p. 463. 
80 NA, C31 1V. Origineel rapport van den oppercoopman Johan Truijtman. 
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Truijtman's conclusions could not be further from truth. His assessment of the 
Sultanah proved to be biased, judging her to be weak and under the influence of the 
"malicious faction" when she had denied his request and describing her as strong when 
she continued to accommodate Company's interests. Despite the strong resentment 
against the Dutch at court and the absence of the Maharaja, she was able to hold her 
own and stuck to her stance of the dangers of escalating tensions with the Dutch and the 
importance of maintaining good relations with the Company. She did not annul any of 
the privileges granted to the Company as suggested by the Laksamana. Neither did she 
grant all of the demands of the Company after the return of the Maharaja. Indeed, she 
might have had a say in the plan of temporarily absenting the Maharaja on an elephant 
hunt whilst the anti-Dutch faction were venting their displeasures. She perhaps had 
been active in liaising with the Maharaja whilst he was away to ensure that by the time of 
his return with a row of elephants to boot, he would be rehabilitated and honored and 
the anti-Dutch faction weakened. After the Maharaja's return, he and his followers 
supported the Sultanah and the contract was ratified. 
To demonstrate that all was well, the Sultanah presented Truijtman with three 
bahar pepper and two bahar tin and instructed her four Council members of the 
R jxraad, the Governor of Elephants and other officials at court, eleven in total, to 
extend an exceptional welcome to Truijtman, which according to Truijtman, they did 
one after another. Sultanah Safiatuddin herself, with her usual impeccable hospitality, 
closed the above affair by treating him in an extraordinary manner. She invited 
Truijtman for the second time to the innermost court and seated him in front of the 
throne. Before a sumptuous meal was laid, he was treated to a very beautiful Javanese 
dance, in which 26 young girls and 28 young boys took part expensively dressed and 
made up. There after, Truijtman continued, when he was about to depart, Her Majesty's 
letter and gifts were reverently presented. 
Truijtman sailed to Perak on the 9th of November, 1650 and arrived in Perak on 
the 6`h of December. Notwithstanding the Sultan being sick, the Queen's estemie was 
brought to the Audience Hall by Acehnese boedjangh and was accepted. After some 
discussions with the Perak orangkaya, they refused to agree to the fixed price of tin at 
31'/4 per bahar but instead wanted it increased to 40 per bahar. They were also not 
inclined to expel the Muslim traders who had resided in Perak. Here, Truijtman reported 
that the Acehnese boedjangh returned to Aceh to ask for advice. It appeared that after this 
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second consultation with Aceh, the Perak court elite finally agreed that the Muslims 
traders and residents in Perak would depart from there and that the price of tin was to be 
fixed to 311/4 per bahar tin. 81 After this agreement was struck, Truijtman's departed from 
Perak to Melaka and then to Batavia. Despite these concessions, the three-year siege of 
Perak continued. 
The Governor General reported to the Heeren Zeventien, despite the initial 
hostilities faced by Truijtman from the Laksamana and his followers, never an envoy of 
the company was so well received in Aceh. He continued that the court was very 
pleasant and charming and the Sultanah was honourable and generous presenting gifts 
for the Governor-General, 46 bahar tin and for Truijtman 3 bahar pepper, 2 bahar tin, a 
dress, a sword and a kris together with the Queen's letter to the Governor General. 82 
Her Majesty continued to govern a calm government; she was affectionately disposed to 
the Company and had effectively shown her interest in the company's welfare regarding 
the trade in Perak. In addition, she was keen to continue the friendship and alliance, so 
long maintained that no differences between the Company and her Majesty remained. 83 
The Queen even proposed that our envoy go with his family to Aceh to take residents 
there. More importantly, the Governor continued, the Sultan and the oranýkaya of Perak 
accepted the Queen's estemie and confirmed the previous articles of 15 of August 1650 
contract regarding Perak's tin trade. 
The above assessment was in contrast to what Truijtman confided to the 
Opperhooft (Head Resident) in Bengal. He wrote, the Acehnese friendship remained as 
treacherous and unstable as their character. We can justly perceive that no matter how 
much courtesy and humility we show from our honest alliance, this arrogant people 
appear to become more bold and spiteful. He warned that it was important to lift the 
exceptional great anger, envy and discords under the R/ýxraaden and the orangkaya, who 
sufficiently could rule and exceed one above the other in power, since these discords 
were not good or to the advantage of the Company. Her Majesty, he noted, was driven 
like the wind which often resulted in obstacles that otherwise could be easily executed. 
84 
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More Troubles at , 
Aceh'c Cour/' 
True to Truijtman's warnings, the VOC officials in Batavia received news from a 
freeburgher vessel that the whole court of Aceh was in an uproar. The Laksamana, with 
two or three of his accomplices together with some members of the council had rebelled 
against the first Councillor, (opperrten nýxrael) Maharaja Sri Maharaja, and publicly accused 
him of wanting to seize the throne with the help of the Dutch. S6 This caused such a 
great revolt at court under the orangkaya and their followers that foreigners had no 
audience or access to the court for a long-time and it was uncertain whether the Queen 
was sick, dead or alive. The Governor reported that the Laksamana with his followers, 
through sly practices, had gained sufficient control of the court, that in the mentioned 
confusion, Maharaja de Raja, son-in-law of Maharaja Sri Maharaja, who was riding an 
elephant to court was shot to the head and died. Maharaja Sri Maharaja, with the help of 
some people remained alive but he was stripped of his weapons, elephants, his charges 
and authority and was emplaced to live as a private person. The Laksamana cruelly 
tormented the envoys, Sibi d'Indra and Radja Modliaer who were in Batavia during the 
previous year (1650), and accused them of conspiring with the Dutch to sell Aceh to the 
Company. He accused them of trying to bring soldiers and ships to Aceh to install the 
Maharaja Sri Maharaja as King. Finally, they were set free but all their followers, women, 
children and slaves were confiscated and like the Maharaja Sri Maharaja, were installed 
but without any authority. There was still no news about whether the Queen was alive 
or not. 
The Massacre of VOC officials in Perak 
Shortly after this revolt in the court of Aceh, officials in Batavia received news 
from Melaka about the massacre of Company officials and servants in Perak. 87 The 
85 I believe that this revolt took place between the end of 1650 to early 1651, since this revolt took place 
shortly after Truijtman's departure from Aceh on the 9th of November 1650 and before the Perak 
massacre of April 1651. 
86 This news was received on the 13th and 25th August 1651, Generale Misriven, 165 1, pp. 519- 520. 
87 Generale Missiven, 1651, p. 519. NA, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 92V- f. 93R. 
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*ondercoopman Philip de Salengre, the company's resident in Aceh, stated in his letter" that 
five different vessels from Perak were in Aceh at present and he learned from them that 
the Dutch in Perak were building a very big house which appeared to be more of a 
fortress made not only of wood but stone. The Sultan of Perak then sent a vessel to 
Aceh to request that the Queen gave the order to chase the Dutch out of these quarters. 
Salengre believed that since the Sultan was an honourable soldier and a trustworthy 
subject, the Sultanah would surely grant his request. Salengre suspected that the Queen 
would send a special vessel to Perak with the order so that the Sultan would be bold and 
he could do something against the Company. Salengre however, could not ascertain 
whether these murders were by those from Perak only or whether they got the 
permission and help from Aceh. He however, suspected that without the given consent 
from Aceh, the Perak people would not have dared to undertake this action. 9 
Ambush of VOC of cial r in Perak 
After the contract regarding Perak was concluded in 1650, the *coopman Michiel 
Curre, who had resided for some years in Perak, was commissioned in April 1651 to go 
there with the task of building the company lodge. Michiel Curre, together with his wife 
were sent to Perak carrying the governor of Melaka's letter to the Sultan. From early 
advice, the Governor of Melaka was already apprehensive over the situation in Perak. 
Shortly after the departure of Commissioner Truijtman from Perak, troubles began to 
break out, caused by some foreigners who had stayed there for a long time and were not 
willing to leave. It also appeared that because of the problems over some provisions in 
the contract, the company obtained little tin. The Sultan and orangkaya in Perak who 
signed a contract with Truijtman last year appeared to be very unwilling to accept and 
execute the contract. They were unhappy about the clause requiring them to expel 
Muslim traders who had resided there for a long time. Furthermore, the authority and 
influence Aceh had over Perak was so great that they were able to effectively direct 
affairs to their benefit but none for the company. For example, one of the Company's 
soldiers who was sick and walking on the street was attacked by an Acehnese boedjangh. 
88 This letter was dated April 1651; it arrived in Melaka on 2°d of July and later arrived in Batavia on the 
25th of August 1651. 
89 NA, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 93V. 
118 
He threw the soldier to the ground and with his foot on the soldier's chest, the boedjangh 
made threats. He also threatened another ondercoopman Nicolas Mombers whom he later 
murdered. This was because a certain Kling from Choromandel had told the Acehnese 
boedjangh that Nicolas Mombers had a lustful or carnal (vleereljk) conversation with his 
concubine. The Acehnese boedjangh escaped these crimes without any punishment. All 
these incidents made the Governor of Melaka uncertain about the situation in Perak. " 
On the 6th of May 1651, the yacht, Grijpskerken, involved in the siege of Perak, 
initially reported that all the company's crew from the *chialoup the Velsen and Waterhont, 
thirty Dutch men, together with the coopman Curre and his wife were massacred and the 
goods from the company's warehouse were looted. Later, it was discovered that the 
coopman Curre and his wife were protected by a few of the Perak orangkaya. It was 
reported that this cruel act was in retaliation to the Dutch officials' building of a fortress 
instead of a lodge and had secretly brought a chest of canons on land. The Governor in 
Melaka could not ascertain the truth of these reports since no Perak person wanted to 
speak to them although the Company had flown a white flag at the Perak River. The 
Governor then decided to send a certain Muslim to Perak with the letter to the Sultan to 
confirm what happened, what he wanted to do next and to wait for his answer. While 
waiting for this answer, on the 2nd of July a certain Muslim trader arrived in Melaka 
bringing a letter from Curre, dated 16 of June 1651 from Perak. He reported how the 
massacre begun in Perak. 
He wrote that from time to time the Sultan had listened to malicious rumours 
that the company were building a fortress and brought canons on land. The king 
accepted these rumours without ascertaining the truth. In April 1651 when Curre was 
bringing the Governor's letter to court, some Malays from the court attacked him. Eight 
soldiers who defended him were thereafter attacked by a mob. The soldiers, together 
with other people from the Velsen and the Waterhont and another small vessel were all 
massacred, including all the other Dutchmen who were present there except Curre, his 
wife, one Assistant, one carpenter, two sailors, four hired help from Melaka, the 
carpenter's wife and their three children escaped death. Altogether twenty-seven men 
died, the remainder were all placed in different houses of the orangkaya - Curre 
in the 
house of the Orangkaya Besar, his wife and assistant at the Shahbandar's and the rest at 
90 Generale Missiven, 1651, pp. 511-512. 
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other places. " Curre reported that he did not know whether it was the Sultan who did 
not want to co-operate with the Company or whether this order for the murder was 
obtained from Aceh. He also did not know whether the King had begun to regret this 
act after discovering that there were no canons brought to land. Therefore, an 
investigation must be carried out and if the murder was planned then the punishment of 
the murderers would be justif ed. 92 
Commissioner Truijtman was appointed for the third time to Aceh to find out 
who the real mastermind of the Perak murders was and to defer to the High Court in 
Aceh to prove the Company's innocence and their unwillingness to break the alliance 
and friendship with the crown of Aceh. Truijtman was also tasked to investigate the 
current state of the kingdom, whether the Sultanah was still alive and her earlier authority 
still intact or whether the kingdom as rumoured, had been usurped by the 
Laksamana 93 How much responsibility did she bear for the Perak murders? If she was 
responsible, then she had made the Acehnese enemies of the Dutch. 94 If treated as 
enemies, her harbour would be blockaded, foreigners expelled and nobody would be 
allowed to enter until things were back to the Company's full satisfaction. Furthermore, 
those in Perak who committed the murders would expect punishment from the 
Company depending on whether the Court of Aceh was wholly ignorant or innocent. If 
the Acehnese court was innocent, then it was Perak who had now made themselves not 
only formal enemies of the Dutch nation but had also rebelled against their Acehnese 
overlord. The Acehnese then, as overlords, must give the Company the assurance that 
the Company officials imprisoned be released, Company's losses compensated, 
murderers and their accomplices be punished by corporal punishment if necessary, be it 
the orangkaya or the Sultan himself and trade to be continued. All these, as far as the 
Company was concerned, were necessary to maintain justice and respect 95 The 
Governor General was however not sure of the outcome of these measures against 
Aceh, especially how these might affect the Company's privileges at Sumatra West 
Coast. 96 Because of the need to preserve the Company's privileges in Sumatra West 
91 Generale Missiven, 1651, pp. 511-512 
92 Generale Missiven, 1651, p. 513. 
93 Generale Misriven, 1651, p. 514. 
9 Generale Mis iven, 1651, p. 515. 
95 NA, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 94V. 
96 NA, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 95R. 
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Coast, he recommended a more conciliatory stance when dealing with the Acehnese. 
Truijtman was to be responsible for the success of this mission. 
121 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's Maturing Years: Politics of Consolidation 
Part II- Dealing with her Orangkaya 
Truýtman's Mission to Perak andAceb to settle the problem of the Perak Murders 
Truijtman departed from Melaka on the 4th of September 1651 with four 
companies of soldiers, seven vessels armed and manned. He arrived in Perak at the end 
of September 1651 and asked for the release of the Dutch prisoners and the sending of 
the Sultan and the Temenggong to Melaka. 97 Again, the Company had failed to follow 
Malay diplomatic protocol and predictably, those from Perak gave the reason that this 
could not be done unless they received permission and orders from Aceh. Truijtman 
thus departed from Perak on the 11th of October 1651 for Aceh and arrived on the 28th 
of October 1651. The Acehnese were ready for the Dutch delegation's arrival. They 
were met with people running and the showing of joy and within four days (which was 
deemed extraordinary by the Dutch considering the usual delays), Truijtman together 
with the Governor General's letter and gifts, were fetched to court to have an audience 
with the Sultanah. The Company officials who were previously uncertain whether the 
Queen was dead or alive found her in good health. Truijtman reported to the Governor 
General that the whole court was on the firm belief, or that they pretended and 
maintained that they did not know about the affair in Perak. He found a new 
"reformed" (gereformeered) court that was constituted after the Laksamana's coup against 
the Maharaja. The Maharaja Sri Maharaja who was earlier stripped of all his authority 
remained disgraced. His son-in-law, the Governor of Elephants, and their followers 
who were friends of the Dutch were massacred. The Raja Binthara, the Maharaja's right 
hand man, had died, and the envoys who recently went to Batavia, Sri Bidia Indra and 
Raja Modlier were stripped of all their houses and slaves on the accusation 
97 NA, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 749R. 
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that they and their accomplices had sold Aceh to the Dutch. Truijtman, suspected that 
this new court would not last long and would be transformed in a short time. 98 
Despite the court transformation where most of the more influential orangkaya 
were anti-Dutch, Truijtman reported that he was well treated. 99 This was in stark 
contrast to his earlier treatment where the Laksamana roundly told him that the 
Company should be shown the door. In part, this conduct could be explained due to the 
critical juncture where both sides were threading on thin ice where a small trigger could 
lead to an outbreak of war between the two nations. No matter how resentful some of 
the orangkaya were of the Company officials, an outright war with the Company might be 
detrimental to the interest of the kingdom. Although, those in the Council presently 
disagreed with the Sultanah's accommodative stance to the Company, it appeared that 
the Sultanah was once again in-charge and that despite the rising tensions with the Dutch 
demanding redress, the soothing hands of the Sultanah was needed to smooth relations. 
After the usual greetings and ceremonies, Truijtman wrote that he requested for a 
prompt resolution and insisted that those who were responsible for the murder of the 
Dutch servants in Perak be punished to the Company's satisfaction without the need to 
break the Company's alliance with the Acehnese kingdom. Within a mere two days, 
Truijtman received the resolution at court and on the 11th of November had another 
audience with the Sultanah. " Truijtman wrote, the Sultanah, seated on the throne 
declared publicly, "*Mahamulia gives *kurnia and grace, upon the request of the 
Governor General to punish the murderers in Perak. An estemie was prepared and 
handed to her two boed anghs who would accompany Truijtman to Perak and hand the 
estemie personally to the Sultan of Perak, Muzaffar Shah. Sultanah Safiatuddin summoned 
him, upon the receipt of her order, to release all Dutch prisoners and hand them to 
Commander Truijtman. The Dato' Temenggong and the Shahbandar to be stripped of 
their offices and their followers who murdered the Dutch officials be put to death 
together with a Kling who murdered a Dutch ondercoopman. The Orangkaya Besar would 
98 Generale Missiven, 1651, p. 569. Truijtman did not explain why he suspected that this new Council would 
not last. 
99 NA, ff. 748-762, f. 750R. Rapport van de besoignes en verscheijde quade rescontre in d'Atchinse, Perahse 
en Quedase verrichtinge bij den Oppercoopman J. Truijtman als Commissaris voor de derde mael 
gecommitteert aen d'Atchinse Majestijt ende gestelt to Commandeur over de Revengie vloot tegens Perah 
5 September anno 1651 aen d' Edele Heeren Carel Reniersen and the Raad van India, December 1652. 
100 NA, f. 750V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
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succeed the Temenggong and another capable person would replace the Shahbandar. In 
addition, the Acehnese boedjangh, who mistreated the sick Dutch soldier, should be 
punished by having his hands and feet amputated. 101 The Sultanah however, requested 
that the Sultan of Perak be excused and took him under her protection. This was 
because he was related by blood to her dead husband. "' But if he was found to be the 
instigator of the murder, he would be removed from his position and replaced. 1°' The 
costs of punishment and the building of a new company's lodge that was destroyed 
would be borne by those from Perak themselves. "' 
Truijtman reported that his mission in Aceh was a success since he had managed 
to obtain a resolution that conformed closely to the Governor General's request. 
1°5 He 
continued, besides her two boedjanghs, the Sultanah appointed two other notable 
Acehnese to bring her estemie to Perak to ensure that her orders would be promptly 
obeyed to the Company's satisfaction. Contrary to Truijtman's confidence, the sending 
of her own representatives, more significantly, demonstrated the Sultanah's desire that 
the settlement of the Perak problem remained in the hands of her representatives. The 
Sultanah said, "Commander, you should not wage war against those in Perak because it 
is my land, I myself will punish those who have caused trouble and no other. That is a 
promise, because I am powerful enough to do that. You should not do anything against 
my consent in my land and you should not incite anything against me that might bring 
about a war with the Dutch. " 'o6 
On the 18th of November, Truijtman received the Queen's estemie at the balai in 
the presence of the new Kaaden, together with two Dutch officers, Philip Salengre and 
provisional lieutenant Paulus Ketesar. The estemie was read loudly and clearly and 
sufficiently translated. Truijtman wrote that by the 21st of November, it appeared as if 
this affair had been resolved. The Sultanah treated him honourably and presented him 
with a gold kris and 5 bahar pepper and recommended that Truijtman visit her Pii-x-raaden 
101 According to the report sent by the Governor General to the Heeren Seventeen, these orders showed 
the Queen's diligence and determination to punish criminals. Generale Muriven, 1651, p. 570. 
102 According to B. Andaya, this Sultan was from Siak by birth but was brought up at the Acehnese court. 
He then married a Perak princess and installed as the Sultan of Perak (1636-d. 1654) with the title Sultan 
Muzaffar Shah. B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 20. 
103 Generale Misriven, 1651, p. 571. 
1°4 NA, f. 751R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
ios NA, f. 751R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
106 NA, f. 751R-f. 751V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
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and her court often (which was again deemed unusual since it was rather difficult to gain 
an audience or visit the orangkaya). She wanted Truijtman to return to Aceh to report on 
the events in Perak before he went back to Batavia. 107 
Truijtman also received the Queen's letter in reply to the Governor General. 
Before Truijtman departed, the Sultanah reminded him again, 
Commander you should listen to what I have to say, the land of Perak is 
my own land but the tin that is found in Perak is in part for the Dutch 
and the people that live there. It is a rough and proud people full of spite, 
who well deserve the punishment. Especially since these past few years 
they have not properly paid their homage and come to court here like 
how they would usually do, or had been done. Although the Dutch have 
blockaded their river, notwithstanding this, I request that you do not 
spoil this land where the Dutch could draw the most fruits-108 
Sultanah Safiatuddin made successive verbal commands that no war was to be waged in 
Perak and for the land not to be ruined and for the punishment to be meted out by 
herself. The Sultanah was determined that the problem in Perak would not result in the 
rupture of the alliance she had carefully cultivated with the Dutch, worse an outbreak of 
war between the two nations. Truijtman was rather sure of this since he noted that in 
her affection and in her arguments for peace there appeared to be no difference between 
her heart and her countenance not withstanding the Acehnese cunning and hypocrisy 
which they sowed and which generated falsehood and deceit. But he concluded, all must 
be patient to discover the true outcome of this affair. 109 
According to Barbara Andaya, the Sultanah's declaration to the Company 
officials that the people of Perak were proud and rebellious showed the weakness of the 
Sultanah, that it was impossible for the Acehnese court to force Sultan Muzaffar Shah to 
surrender the guilty Drang Besar to the Dutch. 1° Based on the above reports by 
Truijtman and the Resident in Aceh, de Salengre, Aceh still had some influence over 
Perak and those from Perak still looked up to Aceh for help and advice and they were 
107 NA, f. 751V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
108 NA, f. 752R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
109 NA, f. 752V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
110 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 46. 
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still bound by overlord-vassal ties, no matter how tenuous. The Sultanah's so-called 
inability to surrender the guilty party need not necessarily attest to her weakness or that 
of the Acehnese court. On the contrary, it was a likely tactic employed to delay the 
surrender of the guilty and to protect the elites of Perak. The Sultanah might also be 
covering Aceh's complicity (if any) in the murder affair by saying that the Perak people 
had been disobedient and had not sent their envoys when Salengre had reported that five 
Perak vessels were in Aceh to ask for help and advice. This was to absolve Aceh of all 
blame. It was unlikely though, that the Queen ordered this murder since she was 
consistent in wanting to maintain good relations with the Dutch. It was likely that the 
Laksamana faction from the Aceh Council had instigated these murders as a lesson to 
the Company for its arrogance and incessant unreasonable demands. This was done 
however, covertly, by means of a proxy war in a distant state. Nevertheless, even though 
the Laksamana faction gained the upper hand in this struggle, they were either not strong 
enough to get rid of the Sultanah or she had entrenched herself well enough to survive 
the orangkaya's factional struggles. The Laksamana and his followers certainly needed her 
as an authority once again to sooth matters when the Company representatives came to 
seek redress and compensation. 
More troubled currents in the Perak River 
Truijtman departed from Aceh on the 22nd of November 1651 and arrived in 
Perak on the 6`h of December accompanied by two Acehnese boedjangh who held the 
Queen's estemie. After six days in Perak, Truijtman tried to get the first point mentioned 
in the Sultanah's estemie to be expediently executed, i. e. to secure the release of the 
prisoners. They were Coopman Michiel Curre and his wife, their three Malaccan hired 
helpers, some of their slaves except for the two young sailors who worked in the tin 
mines, one being dead and the other sent to Melaka. "' This first point of the estemie was 
promptly obeyed. The second and most important point regarding the deportment of 
the Temenggong and Shahbandar believed to be party to the murders was not so easily 
executed. Truijtman recorded in his report that before his arrival, two Acehnese 
orangkaya had arrived before him, sent by her Majesty with three armed*orabs to Perak in 
I 11 NA, f. 752V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
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order to investigate about this affair. '12 These Acehnese orangkaya and the Sultan invited 
Truijtman to sail upstream to be at the first fort in order to witness the capital 
punishment of the aforementioned officials and their helpers. Truijtman then advanced 
with seven Dutch vessels and on the 20`s of December, and had a meeting with the 
Acehnese orangkaya under that fort by the Perak River. After a long meeting, it was 
agreed that within three days the Sultan's final Resolution regarding the punishment of 
the murderers would be brought and would be made known to Truijtman. He thus 
remained in his vessel there to wait for the Sultan's Resolution. Truijtman then related 
that after a day passed, "these murderous Perak people" with the knowledge or even 
management of the hypocritical Acehnese mediators, broke all talks and attacked the 
Dutch at the fort where several more officials lost their lives. "' Truijtman had to 
summon the rest of the Dutch soldiers stationed well below the Perak River 
immediately. However, because of the high water at that time, the vessels could not sail 
up-river, what more set foot on Perak. No other help was in sight since provisions and 
soldiers could come from Melaka only after twenty-nine days. But luckily for Truijtman 
and company, since it was in the rainy season the Dutch was safe since this would greatly 
hinder the Perak people from destroying the Dutch. Unfortunately, though, because of 
the rainy season, the Dutch troops were afflicted with sickness such as ben-beri and 
except for the strong, the remainder of the people died. "' The Dutch were held at the 
Perak River for fifteen days. The Company put up a white flag and an agreement was 
reached where the Company continued with their siege and the Perak people retained 
their possession of the three forts. Truijtman concluded that judging from the numbers 
of ammunition and rifles used, he suspected that those from Aceh (also based on news 
received from Kedah) had contributed not a little and had given order from their 
place. "' By this time, the exhausted Truijtman wrote that even though he was tasked to 
investigate the truth about the Perak murders and did not intend to succumb to this 
unfortunate occasion, vowing not to return until this affair was finished, he confessed 
that he could do no more. After receiving the awaited order from the Governor in 
Melaka, he took the return journey to Aceh. 
'12 NA, f. 753R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
113 NA, f. 753V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
114 NA, f. 754R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
115 NA. f. 754V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
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Truijtman departed from Dindingh on the 21 Feb 1652 and arrived in Aceh on 
the 8 March and four days later, he had an audience with the Sultanah at court. 
Truijtman complained bitterly how those from Perak not only had not done what Her 
Majesty promised and the mission had failed, they actually committed new acts of 
hostility against the Company officials. "' The Sultanah then ordered one of the 
appointed Aceh's representatives who was sent there, together with her two boedjan, ghs 
and some other Acehnese who had returned from Perak, shortly before Truijtman's 
arrival in Aceh, to stand and explain their stand. Coopman Curre, was also called before 
Her Majesty to make his statements but Truijtman reported that this did not happen 
because of the presence of the orangkaya who disliked the Dutch. These acts of cruelty, 
Truijtman concluded, were put to work by the newly reformed aereformeerde) or 
reconstituted court in Aceh who induced those from Perak to commit these murderous 
deeds against the Dutch. "' It appeared that the new Acehnese court not only had 
advised those from Perak but had actually assisted them to commit this deed. Truijtman 
noted that shortly after the Acehnese revolt, the massacre of the Dutch in Perak 
followed. After which there was recourse of three hundred armed Acehnese soldiers 
with four canons with other sorts of ammunition and rifles of war that were brought to 
Perak from Aceh via Deli. Truijtman confirmed that he received this information from a 
certain Kling named Maracq Yunos who appeared to be sent from Perak and Kedah. 
Truijtman believed that one of the more important reasons for the murders was to give 
the Company a bad taste from the Perak's fruits. He also reasoned that these orangkaya 
had instigated these incidents in Perak because of the Acehnese fear for the Company's 
power. "' What was the Sultanah's role in all this? Interestingly, Truijtman mentioned 
nothing about the Sultanah's complicity nor did he reveal any of his suspicions about her 
role in his reports. However, according to the report of the Governor-General in 
Batavia, Carel Reniers, Sultanah Safiatuddin herself had not respected her words and 
denied that she had given the order to bring the Temengong and Shahbandar to justice. 
She had asked to punish only other lower ranking persons involved in the murder, such 
as the Kling who had earlier murdered the company's servant in Perak. 
116 NA, ff. 754V-755R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
117 NA, ff. 756R-756V. Rapport van de besoignes. # 
118 NA, f. 755R Rapport van de besoignes. 
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Finally, the resolution concluded in the Acehnese court was to let the dead 
remain dead (to let bygones be bygones) so that they could now henceforth live with 
each other in peace and the Dutch to continue with trade as before. The Acehnese 
argued that the Company officials had pestered the Perak people enough and had given 
them enough cause for them to take matters into their own hands. The Dutch had not 
only blockaded the river without reason, but had also belittled and disrespected the 
Acehnese crown. Besides these, the Company had built a stone house higher and more 
notable than the Sultan's palace, which had pierced the eyes of his subjects. Indeed, they 
had built a castle or a strong fort rather than a house and had also smuggled canons on 
land. Through all these odious business of the Company's, they had embittered the elite 
and the common man in Perak that finally brought the murders. 119 
Truijtman was convinced that these recent events proved his suspicion about 
Acehnese famous deceit and hypocrisy. He claimed that the recently despatched estemie 
to the Sultan of Perak was sent in falsehood. Even though the Sultanah sentenced the 
two Perak officials, the Temenggong and the Shahbandar with their helpers and the Kling 
with capital punishment and demoted some of her own officials, Truijtman believed that 
these were not sincere and true. ' He concluded that the Company would get no 
resolution in this affair due to Acehnese falsehood. "' In despair, he requested the 
Governor General'.. to allow him to leave Aceh. After much delay, Truijtman was 
finally allowed to depart, but still laden with gifts from the Sultanah of 36 bahar pepper 
and Her Majesty's letter to the Governor General on yacht the Sap hier. On the 23"' 
March 1652, Truijtman departed Aceh's harbour to sail to Kedah and report on the 
events there. So he concluded this affair, he wrote, with the discovery of the Acehnese 
falsehood and the failed Perak exploit. 
119 Generale Misriven, 1639-1655, vol. II, p. 643. 
120 NA, f. 755V. Rapport van de besoignes. 
121 NA, f. 756R. Rapport van de besoignes. 
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More Crises atAceh'c court"' ... coup and countercoup 
The Governor General, Joan Maetsuyker, reported that there was a great calm 
amongst the Riýxraaden after the Laksamana's coup and the death of Maharaja di Raja, 
the son-in-law of Maharaja Sri Maharaja. The Sultanah survived this ordeal safe and 
sound and appeared again on the throne as usual. However, on a certain audience day, 
the Laksamana with a great number of armed men had come to court to kill the highest 
pontiff (opperstenpaep) a great officer of Her Majesty. This individual whom the Dutch 
addressed as the opperstenpaep most probably referred to the highest religious authority 
figure in Aceh, the Sheikh al-Islam who happened to be Sheikh Syaiful Rijal. Sultanah 
Safiatuddin appointed him to this position when al-Raniri left Aceh in 1644 . 
124 It so 
happened that on that day the Sheikh was absent. It was not certain whether he had 
prior knowledge of the Laksamana's intention. This caused great alarm at court. The 
Laksamana openly defended his action of attempting to kill the Sheikh by accusing him 
of committing adultery (boelerende) with the Sultanah and that he was after the throne. 
125 
The orangkaya Council accepted the decision for the Sheikh to be executed. " But at this 
critical juncture, only Sultanah Safiatuddin's serious and earnest intervention saved the 
Sheikh. Safiatuddin swore an oath in public that she never had any sexual intercourse 
with the Sheikh. She also threatened to set fire in the palace and to burn herself alive. 
The Sheikh's life was saved. This time, the Laksamana's bid failed. The Governor 
concluded his report by stating that the Acehnese kingdom was walking on stilts. 
Nevertheless, he continued, they remained brave and proud and to be feared, for shortly 
with one or the other rogue element, they would try to attack the company by promoting 
their interests and the Company might be belittled by these affronts as by those that 
happened in Perak and Kedah. "' 
123 This crisis happened in 1652 as reported in Generale Missiven, 1653, p. 647. 
124 If it was indeed Syaiful Rijal who was murdered then this explains the mystery that still surrounds this 
ulama. Many historians such as Azyumardi Azra and Peter Riddle claim that very little is known about this 
individual because his writings have not survived. This is strange indeed since the writings of earlier ulama 
such as al-Raniri and Abdul Rauf survive. If he was murdered in 1652, then this explains why there were 
no kitabs in his name. 
125 Generale Missiven, 1639-1655, vol. II, p. 647. This highest priest was referred to as the Queen's mingon 
(sweetheart). 
126 Maetsuyker did not detail who in this orangkaya Council agreed to this execution and whether they 
formed the majority in the Council. 
127 See Irwin, `The Dutch and Tin Trade in Malaya', in Tarling and Ch'en, p. 284. # 
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The Laksamana's disgrace did not bring about an end to the troubles at court. 
The group demoted by the Laksamana's earlier coup (the Company's friend, Maharaja 
Sri Maharaja and his followers) staged a counter-coup. This group, as reported in the 
Dagh-Register was led by the Paduka Maha Menteri, assisted by the Maharaja Sri 
Maharaja, Maharaja Adona Lella and Sri Paduka Tuan. 128 The catalyst was believed to be 
the sacking of Paduka Tuan as the Governor of Elephants and the removal of all his 
relatives from court. Maharaja Lella replaced Paduka Tuan as the Governor of 
Elephants. It was also rumoured that the pontiff (the Sheikh), with the help from 
Maharaja Lella would be made King. After seven days, a group of armed men came to 
court and forced the Sultanah to deport and replace Maharaja Lella with an Intchi 
Rembau, Panglima of Deli. The group of four men without the permission from 
Sultanah Safiatuddin, indeed, with her expressed forbidding, forced the officials in power 
to commit the massacre of the Sheikh and his twelve men. The Sultanah was then 
forced to distribute the Sheikh's belongings especially the kris etc. to their concubines. 
The Sultanah then honoured the revolt group with elephants and granted them entry 
into court. 129 The Dagh-Register report here was clearly unsatisfactory and it cannot be 
clearly ascertained in what manner the Sultanah was forced to distribute the Sheikh and 
his followers' belongings and to whom although the Dutch alleged that these were their 
"concubines". It is not so surprising though, that the Sultanah honoured the group who 
executed this counter-coup since this group supported her policy of accommodation 
with the Dutch. Nevertheless, she clearly opposed their murder of the Sheikh. It 
appears from this incident that the elite of Aceh was more fractious than originally 
appeared since besides the pro and and Dutch factions there was another faction led by 
the Sheikh. 
There are no other references to these internal disturbances in the Aceh court 
since the Company officers were more focused on the next course of action - to salvage 
the Company's reputation because of the beatings and humiliations they received in 
these small polities. It is safe to conclude, however, that from 1653 onwards, although 
there was a power struggle between the different factions of the orangkqya, the Sultanah's 
royal position was not challenged. The most potentially fatal charge used by the 
Laksamana and the Maharaja against the Sheikh, i. e. usurpation of the throne, if proven, 
128 Dagh-Register, 1653, pp. 39-40. A similar entry was made in the Generale Mi liven, 1654, p. 688. 
129 Dagh-Register, 1653, p. 40. 
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would be tantamount to *derhaka, the highest sin a subject could commit to his ruler. 
There is no evidence to suggest whether the Sheikh did try to capture the throne or 
otherwise but he paid for this with his life. The Sultanah's position was seriously 
threatened though, during these tumultuous times when the Laksamana accused her of 
adultery, the most fatal charge that could be inflicted on a queen and for that matter the 
highest religious figure such as the Sheikh al-Islam. Surprisingly, neither the Laksamana 
nor the Maharaja faction claimed the throne or deposed the Sultanah. The Sultanah 
managed to avert this disaster by her decisive action of making a public oath and 
threatening to burn herself. This must have proved her innocence in the eyes of her 
subjects. After 1653, it became clear that the disturbances that threatened the Acehnese 
court were over. The faction that supported the Sultanah to execute her policy of 
accommodation with the Dutch to maintain peace and friendship with the VOC, i. e. the 
Maharajah Sri Maharajah and his followers gained ascendancy. 
Togo to war or notgo to war? 
Whilst the sentiment in the Acehnese court favoured peace and accommodation 
with the VOC, this feeling was not reciprocated in the VOC camp. One issue stood out 
in the 1653 and 1654 reports of the Generale Missiven - how best to respond to the 
humiliations and losses the Company had suffered, i. e. to go to war or not go to war 
with Aceh. Given the murders of Company officials in Perak and Kedah, indignities and 
insults suffered by Truijtman and his delegates in Perak and Aceh, the desire for revenge 
was understandable. One point of view amongst Company officials stated that war with 
Aceh was not undesirable because after the conquest of Melaka, all trade went to 
Aceh. 130 The Indian merchants brought cloth to Aceh and this attracted other traders 
there to exchange their wares for these cloths. The cloth sold in Aceh was much 
cheaper than cloth sold in Melaka by the Company. '31 Furthermore, war was justifiable 
because of the inhuman acts committed by those from Perak on Company officers who 
were then protected and defended by those from Aceh. Without war with Aceh, the 
130 Generale Misüven, 1653, p. 687. 
131 In 1660, Aceh was so full of cloth that one bale of Guinea cloth as good as the one sold by the 
Company fetched only 48-50 teals whilst the usual price was 80 teals. Balthazar Bort, Report of Governor 
Balthasar Bort on Malacca, p. 132. 
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Company could not forbid the Gujaratis, Klings, Bengalis and others to sail to Aceh nor 
could they claim the old Portuguese rights in Melaka which they believed they inherited. 
The anti-war argument stated that war with Aceh would bring more trouble 
because this would alienate the Indian traders, whose supplies of cloth were still needed 
to generate exchange. The blockade of Aceh's harbour might not bring a corresponding 
benefit to Melaka since the trade from Aceh could instead be diverted to Tennasserij, 
situated around 60 to 70 miles from Pegu or between Pegu and Aceh. This was an area 
of great traffic where Indian traders supplied the whole area and its surroundings with 
cloth and other merchandise in exchange with elephants brought overland from Siam 
together with tin. 132 In addition, the Company had only enough strength to blockade 
Aceh's harbour and not the surrounding areas and when this blockade was weak, the 
Company would not be able to monopolize and centralize trade in Melaka. The 
Governor-General, Joan Maetsuyker, confessed that the monopoly would be weak if the 
foreign traders did not see Dutch weapons or might and their right to wage war on 
Aceh. t33 
Besides the above reasons the Governor was also afraid that war with Aceh 
would bring benefits to the English instead. For example, an English yacht belonging to 
Mr Winter from Masulipatnam returned there from Aceh with 16 elephants, benzoin, 
camphor, tin and gold. 134 He was well received in Aceh though he was denied trade at 
Sumatra West Coast. The Governor was afraid that the English might return to Sumatra 
West Coast if the Dutch waged war with Aceh. "Now that we are at peace with the 
English nation, we fear that they would go to Aceh, and if troubles between us and Aceh 
remain, then it would be to our disadvantage. s13' The Dutch feared that the English 
would fish in their troubled waters and they had no legal justification to prevent English 
traders from trading in any port that had not signed the exclusive nation treatment 
agreement with the Company - Aceh was one such kingdom. In addition, due to the 
peace between the Dutch and English, the Indian traders found an ingenious way to 
continue to circumvent the Company's blockade. They loaded their cargo on English 
ships or they employed Englishmen to man their ships and flew the English flag. The 
English issued passes freely to these Indian traders to frequent ports in Aceh and other 
132 Generale Missiven, 1653, Generale Missiven Manuscript, f. 100V. 
133 Generale Misriven, 1654, p. 688. The blockade of Aceh continued until 1660. 
134 Generale Ibiissiven, 1654, p. 688. 
135 GeneraleMisriven, 1654, p. 752. 
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parts of Southeast Asia and the Company faced the dilemma whether to honour these or 
not. 136 Thus, the Company concluded that war with Aceh was not advisable. 
Joan Maetsuyker also reported that besides English yachts, many Muslim ships 
from different places had once more frequented Aceh this year despite the Company's 
threats unlike the previous year (1652). 137 At that point, in time, there were already eight 
Muslim ships in Aceh, one belonging to the governor of Masulipatnam. 13S The 
Company remained gravely concerned about the Muslim traders, since more and more 
traders arrived and they supplied the surrounding lands with cloth and all other 
merchandise that it would be very difficult for Melaka since there was no sale of cloth 
here. t3' Bengal ships brought nine elephants from Kedah, in return for cloth. Twenty- 
six vessels from Perak were said to have sailed to Aceh loaded with tin. The Governor 
began to wonder whether "our siege of Perak is in vain; that this could be stopped and 
more money is spent on more advantageous things. "" Even with the blockade, a great 
many vessels with tin had gone to Aceh. 14' It appeared that those in Perak had enough 
opportunities to take care of their needs and necessities without any need to break away 
from the blockade since they found a new way to transport these supplies into Perak 
from Kedah. Three Muslim ships were found in Kedah, two from Masulipatnam and 
one from Bengal with passes from respective countries and they easily obtained tin from 
Perak overland. 142 A similar situation faced the Company in Aceh, despite the blockade 
of the Aceh River, a year later, thirty-six vessels with tin from Perak arrived in Aceh. In 
Aceh's harbour, the Company found three ships from Surat, four from Choromandel, 
one from Maldives, one belonging to the Sultanah of Aceh herself, two from Macassar 
and one freeburgher ship from Cambodia. 143 
136 Arasaratnam, `Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca', p. 488. 
137 Arasaratnam and Raychaudhuri stated that Indian trade with Aceh increased in the 1660's. Aceh 
continued to be frequented by Indian traders who sold cloth there and bought tin and spices. Indian 
traders began to use Aceh as their centre for the Southeast Asian trade. But, evidence here shows that 
Indian traders had used Aceh as centre of trade and that trade between these traders and Aceh had 
increased a decade earlier - in the 1650's. Arasaratnam, `Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca', pp. 488- 
489. Tapankumar Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690. A study in the interrelation of 
European commerce and traditional economies ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 123-124. 
138 Generale Missiven, 1654, p. 752. 
139 Generale Misriven, 1654, p. 752. 
140 Generale Missiven, 1655, p. 775. 
141 Generale Missiven Manuscript, 1655, f. 47V. 
142 Generale Missiven, 1654, p. 752. 
143 Generale Mis iven, 1655, p. 819. 
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Joan Maetsuyker concluded his reports to the Heeren Zeventien by stating that he 
had already made his objections regarding the English yachts and the great Muslim 
traffic to Aceh, which had caused the trade in Melaka to be stagnant. He wrote, it 
appeared, that "we have no other means than to have a justified war against Aceh but we 
are sending our resolution with these returned ships to inform Uw Edele and we will 
wait for orders because this is an affair of great importance that need great consideration. 
In the meantime, we wait for the expected Acehnese envoys to appear so that we could 
build more trust. "144 The Sultanah and the orangkaya had showed inclination towards 
peace and accommodation. She sent her letters and gifts to both Batavia and Melaka. 145 
Sultanah Safiatuddin had specially sent Abdul Latiff, their best translator and other 
representatives of quality so that there would be no occasion for us to take revenge on 
the recent disrespect done to Truijtman in Aceh. 14' Although the murderers in Perak 
had not yet been surrendered, peace was more achievable now with the death of the 
alleged instigators of the murders, Sultan Muda, Dato' Bendahara and Temenggong of 
Perak, in 1653 and the Shahbandar was now provisionally placed as head of state. 14' 
Batavia too was ready for peace with Aceh. The Governor General reasoned that even if 
they preferred to besiege Aceh to stop the great traffic of Muslim trade, it would still be 
difficult to keep the English out because this would cause displeasure and trouble. "If 
we go to war with Aceh a great door would be opened for the English nation so that 
they would undercut our privileges in Sumatra West Coast and in Aceh which could not 
be easily repaired. "'48 He then decided to send Dirk Schouten, the Company's 
bookkeeper General, via Melaka to Aceh, an experienced hand in these quarters who 
spoke the Malay language well. 149 He was to go with the yacht the Jonge Prins and 
Alkmaer. His tasks were as follows: To get the Sultanah to punish the guilty in Perak as 
promised. To renew and grant privileges on a permanent basis regarding the tin trade in 
Perak, and pre-eminence and freedom at Sumatra West Coast. To pay reparation costs 
for the murders in Perak. Finally, to request the Sultanah not to allow the English and 
the Portuguese to trade in Aceh and other places under her control. 
11 Generale Mi rsiven, 1655, p. 775. 
145 Generale Missiven, 1655, p. 818. 
146 Generale Missiven, 1655, p. 819. 
141 Generale Miasiven, 1654, pp. 751-752. 
148 Generale Mi siven, 1655, p. 821. 
149 Generale Mi s ven, 1655, p. 822. 
135 
Dirk Schouten's Mission to Aceh 
Since both parties were cavorting for peace, it did not take long before another 
treaty was signed in 1655 between Aceh, Perak and the Company. Amongst the 
provisions were the cessation of all hostilities and payment of indemnity of 50,000 Teals 
for damages caused to the Company's lodge in 1651. Since the punishment of the Perak 
murderers was still not carried out since 1651, this provision was again included in this 
1655 Treaty. Sultan Muzaffar Shah, whom Sultanah Safiatuddin had taken under her 
protection, had died of smallpox in 1654 and was replaced by his young son, Sultan 
Mahmud, still a child and an orphan. 15' The Sultanah presented him with a gold kur 
among other things in recognition of his succession to the throne but since he was still 
young, his elderly aunty, Sultanah Amina Todijn, was appointed as Regent. 'S' The 
alleged accessory to the murder, the Shahbandar was to be executed, however, the 
former Temenggong (another alleged accomplice), who now replaced the Dato' 
Bendahara after his death, was to remain in this post. 152 He was allowed to remain in this 
post despite the Company's protests. The Perak Council gave the Company land 
to build a new lodge. The other clauses of the 1650 Treaty, where the Company would 
obtain half of Perak's tin at a fixed price remained in place. The naval blockades of Aceh 
and Perak, however, continued. 
The Tussle for Tin Continued 
Five years later, the Treaties signed still remained on paper. The Bendahara 
dominated the Perak Assembly and his hostility to the VOC made it impossible for the 
Dutch to get its quota of tin. The Company pressed for another Treaty and this was 
duly signed in 1659 between Aceh and the VOC. 153 The same provisions were reiterated 
where the Company demanded compensation for loss of lives and goods in 1651, half of 
150 His mother had died shortly before Sultan Muzaffar Shah and according to the indigenous source, 
Sibilah Melaka Kerajaan Negeri Perak (Genealogy of Melaka and the Government of Perak); the Sultanah of 
Aceh adopted this boy-king. B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 47. 
151 Unfortunately, no more information was available regarding this elderly aunty and whether she was 
appointed by the Sultanah of Aceh. 
152 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 47. # 
153 Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum ed. by J. E. Heeres and F. W. Stapel ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 
1907-1955), pp. 151-155. 
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the tin produce to be shared with Aceh and exclusive nation treatment. New provisions 
were - to the disadvantage of the Company, the Sultanah of Aceh would now 
forgive the 
anti-Dutch Bendahara and permit him to remain in his position. The Shahbandar 
however, was not so lucky since the Sultanah summoned him to Aceh for a trial. 
"' The 
Sultanah generously granted fifty bahar of tin in compensation for the Company's goods 
stolen in Perak in 1651, to be obtained from Perak itself. The price of tin was fixed 
earlier at 31 and 1 /4 real for the Company but since the indemnity payment had a 
balance of 44,000 reals, the price of tin sold to the Company would be 30 real until the 
debt was paid for. Under this contract, the Company failed once again to obtain toll-free 
privilege, the Acehnese arguing that this customary right could not be violated. 
155 Ile 
Company officials declared that "herewith all the above articles are settled irrevocably 
and shall endure as long as the world, ... amen. "156 
One year later, this contract was again duly broken. In 1660, the Alkmaer brought 
122 bahar of tin to Melaka but Aceh obtained 585 bahar. 157 Smuggling continued to the 
profitable markets of Aceh and Kedah. The English envoy, Henry Garry, came to Aceh 
from Surat bringing presents for the Sultanah and he departed with 200 bahar of tin. 
'58 
Joannes Massys bringing only fifty-one bahar of tin for the Dutch, complained that Aceh 
still got all the tin. The Dutch sailed to Perak to enforce the Treaty rights but as soon as 
they left, Perak broke them again. Aceh's agents took away all Perak's tin on the pretext 
that they belonged to their Queen. The Dutch tried to stop three Perak vessels carrying 
one hundred and eighty bahar of tin from going to Aceh but the Sultan declared that 
they were his own emissaries. On the 30`s of October 1662, the Resident Gabriel Bruyl 
reported that the English had persuaded the Queen to order the Sultan of Perak to help 
them export sixty bahar of tin. In 1663, the Company had to abandon Perak's indemnity 
and paid about 34-36 reals per bahar as against the 30 reals promised because the 
Acehnese bid as high as 42 reals. 159 
154 import of GovernorBalthasarBort on Malacca 1678 trans. by M. J. Brenner. Introduction and Notes by 
C. O. Blagden Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 5 (1927), Pt. 2, p. 139. 
155 import of Governor Ballbasar Bort, p. 139. 
156 port of Governor Balthasar Bort, pp. 140,147. Whilst the Dutch wanted privileges to be granted to them 
on a permanent basis, the Dutch revoked privileges given after death. The Dutch had granted the right to 
export 30 bahar of tin from Perak to Paduka Tuan, Governor of Foreigners in Aceh. This right ceased to 
exist after his death. 
157 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 31. 
158 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 31. 
159 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 34. 
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The Company's fortune, however, took a turn for the better in the next decade 
(1664-1675). In July 1663, the Company resolved to close factories in Aceh, Perak and 
Ligor. 16° Lucasz., the Resident of Perak, reported that the Queen of Aceh, dismayed at 
the closing of the Company's lodge at her capital had now written to Perak to allow the 
Dutch to trade as friends adding that although they had quit Aceh, she knew no reasons 
for hostilities. Perak too began to make its own overtures to the Company. In 1663, 
when the anti-Dutch Bendahara died, his successor decided to adopt a more 
independent policy for Perak by playing the Dutch against the Acehnese. 16' The Perak 
people grew tired and bitter because of the continuous blockade and incessant 
interference from outside powers. The now mature Sultan Mahmud himself started to 
favour the Company and he sent a delegation to Melaka to invite the Company to 
reopen its lodge. He told the Dutch that he would sell all tin to them and sever ties with 
Aceh if the Company could protect him. 161 In March 1663 when Aceh demanded the 
customary annual tribute accompanying their homage (40 bahar of tin), Perak envoys 
replied that because of the perpetual blockade by the VOC, according to the Treaty 
Aceh had contracted, they could not afford it. If Aceh resorted to force, they would 
ask Johor to be their suzerain163 Perak also made overtures to the anti-Dutch Sultan of 
Kedah to seek an alliance. The Sultan also began to sell tin to the Sultan of Bantam and 
the johorese. 
This change of favour however, did not bring any significant result to the 
Company's tin trade. In 1667, a rebellion took place against the pro-Dutch Bendahara 
because his opponents maintained that he had sold too much tin to Melaka. Although 
this rebellion was quelled, this Bendahara died in 1674 and the Governor in Melaka 
started complaining once more that the Company received a mere two hundred bahar 
when Perak produced seven to eight hundred bahar a year. 164 The anti-Dutch faction 
still wielded formidable influence. A new Bendahara was appointed in 1674 and unlike 
his predecessor; he emerged as leader of the anti-Dutch faction. In 1678, Balthasar Bort 
as Governor of Melaka, reported that although he insisted on 600 soldiers for the port 
he noted that the power of Johor was much reduced and Aceh was impotent and had no 
110 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 34. 
161 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p . 48 162 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 48. 
163 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 31. 
164 Irwin, `The Dutch and Tin Trade in Malaya', p. 286. 
138 
appearance of once more attaining any considerable power. The Kings of Perak and 
Kedah were of small account. Only European foes were to be feared here. Perak was still 
Aceh's vassal but her suzerain demanded little tin. lbs Bort, however, had underestimated 
these Malay polities' ability to thwart and cause damage to the Company. In 1685, the 
Dutch Resident and eleven more officials were killed in Perak and the Company officials 
accused the Bendahara of engineering this. According to Barbara Andaya, the Sultan 
opposed this attack yet the Company received no redress. This was because the 
Bendahara, also the Sultan's brother-in-law, married to Sultan Mahmud's sister, was 
more powerful. His position was only rivalled by the *saudagar raja, an Indian named 
Sedelebe. By 1686, he was in charge of virtually all the tin trade in Perak. 166 
By the turn of the century, the VOC had to admit defeat in their effort to 
monopolize the tin trade of Perak. In 1681, the Dagh-Register recorded that trade had 
dwindled. By 1680, as a result of peace between the English and the Dutch, competition 
was once again faced from the English, besides the perennial problem of rivalry from the 
local, Indian and Portuguese traders. By this time, these traders were undercutting the 
Dutch at will. 16' "Smuggling" was rampant in Aceh and I{edah. l68 The scourge of piracy 
in the 1690's compounded these problems faced by the Company. In 1689, a Panglima 
Kulup, deemed to be a pirate, burnt the Dutch redoubt in Dinding Island. 169 The 
Company withdrew the blockade of the mouth of the Perak River in 1689 because it 
served no useful purpose. 10 After the Dutch departure in 1690, Perak was free from 
trade restrictions and outside threats. "' In September 1694, the still outstanding debt of 
f. 130,885 due from the Sultan and nobles of Perak was written off by the Council of 
Batavia as bad debts. 172 
165 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 38. 
166 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 50. 
167 Irwin, `The Dutch and Tin Trade in Malaya', p. 286. 
168 Winstedt, A History of Perak, p. 52. 
169 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 50. 
170 Irwin, `The Dutch and Tin Trade in Malaya', p. 287. 
171 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 52. 
172 Irwin, `The Dutch and tin Trade in Malaya', p. 285. 
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Conclusion 
According to B. Andaya, the history of Perak in the seventeenth century was one 
dominated by Perak's failed search for a new powerful friend, a search for a new 
relationship that would replace Aceh. Vassalage had brought no benefits and with 
Aceh's decline, it could no longer enforce its former control. "' Evidence showed a 
different picture. At least before 1670, Aceh had important leverage against the 
Company for the trade in Sumatra West Coast and Perak on the basis of its overlord 
rights in these territories. The VOC's unwillingness to go to war with Aceh meant that 
they had to continue to negotiate for concessions and accept compromises. Perak was 
able to benefit from this situation since Perak was not alone to fend for itself. Perak was 
able to use Aceh as an ally and a protector. Perak evoked the traditional overlord-vassal 
relationship and used Aceh as a protector not because Perak was forced to submit to 
Aceh but because Aceh was useful to protect the tin trade and this relationship largely 
worked. This patron-client relationship conducted under Sultanah Safiatuddin was a 
symbiotic and mutually beneficial one, unlike the more predatory vassal-overlord 
relations enacted under her predecessors. The Sultanah emphasised her role as the 
benign protector of her vassals and subjects as illustrated in her determination not to 
concede toll-free privileges to the VOC since this would be taking the bread out of her 
subjects' mouths. She did not evoke her right as a conqueror and subduer to demand 
tribute and loyalty but elicited loyalty reciprocally. 
After managing to keep afloat in the first few years of her reign, Sultanah 
Safiatuddin experienced many crises and turbulence in the subsequent decades of the 
`40s and `50s. Not only was her position threatened but even her life. Nevertheless, by 
mid 1650s, she emerged unscathed and managed to consolidate her throne. She did this 
through a mixture of measures- by distancing herself from the initial in fighting amongst 
her orangkaya. To "bend with the wind" as described by Truijtman but not as a sign of 
weakness but I suggest as a means of being flexible and to try to work with the faction 
that emerged as the winner at the time such as the Laksamana faction. She continued 
however, to work to facilitate the faction that supported her policy, such as the 
Maharajah faction. Even though at times she appeared to be submerged, she was able to 
weather the storm and prevailed in the end. She used her father's stature and harked 
173 B. Andaya, Perak, Abode of Grace, p. 48. 
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back to her father's reign but she developed her own personal style. Besides the 
Sultanah's political sagacity (after all she was Iskandar Muda's daughter and Iskandar 
Thani's widow), another factor worthy of note that explains why the kingdom did not 
degenerate into chaos was the role of the orangkaya such as the Laksamana who realised 
the need to maintain order for the sake of the kingdom. Just as in the case of the "Jewel 
Affair" where the orangkaya finally conceded to the Sultanah's policy of accommodating 
the Dutch on the purchase of the jewels, the Laksamana had to agree with the treaty 
provisions granting the VOC trading privileges to avoid a potential conflict. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Final Years of Sultanah Safiatuddin and the Rule of her Successors: Politics of 
Resilience and Response in Sumatra West Coast' 
Introduction: Early East-West Encounters 
The Perak Affair supports John Wills' view that in the course of the seventeenth 
century, Aceh was by far the most effective state in the region in maintaining independence 
and a trading network and in engaging and counteracting the Europeans? It also supports 
Van Leur's argument that Western dominance was not yet in place. Van Leur stressed the 
ability of indigenous institutions to absorb and adapt to new influences. In contrast to Euro- 
centric historians, who viewed natives as passive, he saw the importance of local agents and 
internal forces in stimulating change3. During the early encounters, the VOC was learning 
the ways and structures of indigenous polities, without being able to manipulate them for the 
company's benefit. 4 The Sultanah and the Aceh elite, on other hand, could work the 
traditional system of patron-client relationships to maintain its hold in Perak. 
A different story seems to arise in connexion with the pepper trade and the 
Company's relations with Aceh and its subordinate states on the Sumatra West Coast 
(henceforth SWC). The Treaty of Painan of March 1663 and another Treaty signed in April 
1668 placed a number of these states under the protection of the Dutch. 5 According to 
Kathirithamby-Wells, the decline of Aceh made the VOC protectorate possible. She argued 
that the Dutch capture of Melaka in 1641 severely eroded Acehnese commercial supremacy 
and political importance, boosted Dutch prestige and damaged Aceh's bargaining powers to 
such an extent that Sultanah Safiatuddin Shah was obliged to adopt a conciliatory policy. 
I{athirithamby-Wells claimed that her reign saw the steady decline of Acehnese power 
I The Sumatra West Coast (SWC) refers to the coastal areas on the western side of the island of Sumatra 
starting from Aceh Dar-al Salam in the north to the area of Bencoolen in the south. # Please refer to map in 
Appendix 2. 
2 Wills, `Maritime Asia', p. 98. Although Wills made this claim, he did not elaborate his argument. 
3 See J. C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, (Te Hague, W. van 
Hoeve Ltd., 1955). 
4 In Newbury's view, the most effective impositions of authority developed when the imperialists clearly 
understood and took advantage of these very same local and regional political structures. See Colin Newbury 
Patrons, Clients and Empire: Chieftancy, and Over-rule in Aria, Africa, and the Paciftc (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) p. 70. 
5 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', pp. 473,478. # 
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overseas and the increasing powers of the orangkaya at home. ' The sultanate's territorial 
reach diminished or became less effective as a result of internal weakness and external 
commercial pressure from the Dutch. The improved conditions for the Dutch were due 
largely to the decline of Acehnese trade and the related decrease of trade with foreign 
Muslims resulting from Dutch attacks on their shipping. ' Kathirithamby-Wells pointed out 
that the Sultanah gave the Dutch a nominally free hand on the west coast by her firman of 
1641, permitting the Dutch officials to transact directly with the rajas -a course of action she 
viewed as a departure from established procedure. ECathirithamby-Wells stated that although 
it was difficult to judge the sincerity of the Queen's motives in conceding the demands, the 
Sultanah found it difficult to force the local chiefs to comply. 8 Kathirithamby-Wells 
concluded that in the second half of the 17th-century, the SWC, with Dutch assistance, 
forcibly cast off its Acehnese overlord and voluntarily refurbished its ties with Pagarruyong, 
capital of the Minangkabau kingdom. The inhabitants took advantage of an opportunity to 
cast off what they saw as foreign authority, which, despite its long established connections 
with the area, had remained indifferent to the populace. 
To what extent, however, did these treaties change in the distribution of power in 
North Sumatra? Did Dutch ascendance in the Straits bring about a decline of Aceh's 
authority in SWC? Did events in SWC show European commerce and might displace 
indigenous institution, or the survival and continuity of local norms? Alternatively, could 
Wills' paradigm of interactive emergence be applied here as well as in Perak, where local 
Asian powers and European forces mutually adapt in their efforts to counter and respond 
whilst protecting their interests? According to Jan Van Goor, in highly personalized small 
states such as those in the Malay world, inter-generational rivalry and unstable sharing of 
power were the norm. In such a situation, it was common for one rival or the other to call 
for Dutch assistance as they had called earlier local maritime overlords. 10 These alliances 
tended to be as transient and as fluid as the politics surrounding them. In Colin Newbury's 
6 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', p. 465. 
7 No evidence is given for this assertion. 
8 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', pp. 466-467. 
9 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', p. 479. 
I0 Jan van Goor, `Sea power, Trade and State-Formation: Pontianak and the Dutch', in Trading Companies in 
Aria, 1600-1830, ed. by Jan Van Goor (Utrecht: HES Utigevers, 1986), 83-106, p. 84. 
143 
view, the most effective impositions of authority developed when Europeans understood 
and took advantage of these very same local and regional political structures. 
' 
Newbury and Kathirithamby-Wells saw European Companies actively taking the 
lead, while local polities remained as pawns in these encounters. Newbury showed 
Europeans exploiting local institutions. Wells saw only local disintegration and Western 
triumph, claiming that the VOC were successful in controlling local leaders, shipping and 
trade by the mid-seventeenth century. Judging from the evidence outlined below, however, I 
argue that the west coast inhabitants, rather than being merely sandwiched between the 
Acehnese and the VOC, were creating their own opportunities to obtain a better political 
and commercial deal for themselves. Indeed, VOC involvement in west coast politics, 
marked by the signing of the Painan Treaty in 1663, did not signify an end of Acehnese 
control and the beginning of VOC's domination. On the contrary, it launched a contest for 
influence and power among multiplying elites and stakeholders, while power became more 
diffused. Aceh's so-called decline did not make the SWC polities surrender to the VOC for 
protection. Rather, the company's keenness to get involved in local politics in order to 
protect their commercial interests made the VOC an alternative power in regional politics. 
Local leaders, who were extremely competitive and factionalized, could use the VOC to 
support their ambitions, especially in rivalry with ruling elites who were supported by Aceh 
but who might not be from the local ruling families. A few even sought to regain lost status 
and inheritance. The willingness of the elites to acquire new patrons and the VOC's desire 
to obtain new clients explains Aceh's loss of control over some of these west coast states. 
The Painan Treaty was a first step perhaps but not yet a definite one. The Treaty did not 
end Aceh's control over the SWC areas but it witnessed the beginning of a long drawn out 
struggle for power between Aceh, the VOC and the local elites. 12 
Early relations between Aceb and Sumatra West Coasts under IskandarMuda and Iskandar Thani 
The incentive for Acehnese control over the west coast during Iskandar Muda's 
period was, as in earlier times, pepper and gold. Iskandar Muda stationed *panglimas, of 
Acehnese origin, at the main centres of production and export: Tiku, Pariaman, Salida and 
II Newbury, Patrons, Clients and Empire, pp. 12,70. 
12 W J. A. De Leeuw, Het Painanfch Contract, (Amsterdam: H . J. Paris, 1926) p. 82. 
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Inderapura. Under a harsh system whereby Iskandar Muda claimed 15% of the gold and 
pepper produced and fixed the price of the rest, the success of this monopoly depended on 
the pannlimas and how harshly they were punished for disobeying Iskandar Muda's orders. 
Europeans, meanwhile, traded at Kota Raja (Banda Aceh) under royal licence. Exclusive 
privileges and permission to trade elsewhere were extremely difficult to secure. According to 
Kathirithamby-Wells, Iskandar Muda resisted the pressure of European powers for 
commercial concessions and thus preserved his empire from the inroads of colonial 
exploitation. She observed that it was tragic in some ways that his 1629 defeat at the hands 
of the Portuguese, during the siege of Melaka, should have dealt so severe a blow on his 
confidence. In 1632, in return for an alliance against the Portuguese he signed away to the 
Dutch some of the very concessions that he had withheld prudently for so long from them. 
By this agreement, Iskandar Muda allowed the Dutch toll free trade for several years in the 
whole kingdom including SWC, plus freedom to participate in the Perak tin trade. 
Kathirithamby-Wells claimed that the privileges granted on the same grounds in 
1638 by Iskandar Thani proved, in the context of his subsequent liaison with the Portuguese 
and his abstention from attacking Melaka, a worthless sacrifice. " In addition to exclusive 
trade for an indefinite period other privileges constituted a surrender of royal prerogatives. 
The west coast pepper collected as tribute by the Sultan could henceforth be fetched directly 
by the Dutch and paid for at the capital. Similarly, payment for the remaining pepper was no 
longer to be made locally but at Aceh. The local elite did not welcome the change; those at 
Tiku, Pariaman and Inderapura resisted the delivery of pepper unless the king's tolls and 
duties were paid locally. The inability of the Dutch traders to produce a written document 
from Iskandar Thani was the only pretext by which the panglimas could deny them. 
The Sultanah's predecessors provided these inroads into SWC, paving the way for a 
deeper penetration of Dutch influence and control. The concessions were granted not 
because Aceh was weak, but to incite the Dutch against the Portuguese. Meanwhile, the 
VOC's willingness to interfere in local politics made the company attractive to local elites 
with ambitions of their own. As early as 1619, some local elites in SWC offered to transfer 
allegiance to the VOC in return for protection and freedom from the Acehnese yoke: the 
futile attempt by the ruler of Inderapura to seek Dutch protection is an example. At other 
times, anti-Aceh sentiment took the form of monopoly evasions whenever Acehnese 
13 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Acehnese Control over West Sumatra', p. 465. 
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vigilance was relaxed. The predatory and exploitative attitude of Iskandar Muda and 
Iskandar Thani drove local elites to search for another patron. 
Aceh s relations with Sumatra West Coast under Sultanab Safratuddin Syah 
When Safiatuddin came to power, she had to deal with the VOC's increasing interest 
in obtaining pepper, with its attendant pressures in SWC. To show that she welcomed 
company officers she issued a firman concerning privileges her predecessors had promised 
verbally. " She awarded exemption from toll for one ship, the Groll, trading in Tiku, 
Priaman, Inderapura and Padang annually, though other ships had still to pay in ryx dollars. 
's 
This grant limited the blanket grant promised by Iskandar Muda to the Dutch where the 
Company could trade toll-free for several years in all his dominions. She conceded, 
however, her late husband's promise of exclusive trade in the places specified. This was one 
of the top demands of the company, who knew that verbal promises could be changed or 
conveniently forgotten. 16 
Despite the 1641 contact, Pieter Sourij, who visited Aceh from May to August 1642, 
complained that traders from Bengal, Dabul, Masulipatnam and Arakan were still "infecting" 
the SWC. In 1641, when Sultanah Safiatuddin ascended the throne, Gujerati merchants were 
the most powerful traders in Aceh. Company officials complained that Indian traders evaded 
tolls by shipping goods in small bulk. They were unhappy that the Sultanah had granted 
them exemption for only one ship. They wanted the Indians expelled so that they could take 
over cloth deliveries to exchange for pepper instead of having to pay in gold. " Besides the 
14 `CX', OVI-Atjeh-Sumatra Westcoast, Februari-Maart, 1641', in Corpus Diplamaticum, ed. by J. E. Heeres, Vol. 
1, pp. 345-346. This same act originally written in Malay and translated in Dutch could also be found in the 
Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640-1641, pp. 423-425. This act of goodwill from the Queen was reinforced in her first 
letter to the Governor-General in Batavia Antonio van Diemen. This letter was translated from Malay to Dutch 
and the main contents could be found in Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1640-1641, pp. 428-430. 
15Ibid, p. 346. 
16 When, for instance, the company had tried to pin Iskandar Thani to enforce his promise of exclusivity, he 
side-stepped with the explanation that it had been a custom in these places to trade with merchants from all 
nations and that this practice would continue. He assured the Dutch that they would face no problems if they 
joined the queue together with the other traders. NA, VOC 1136, f. 1209R. 
17 NA, Dagh-Register gehouden van Pieter Sourij, May-August 1642, f. 579R. 
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Indians, both European companies faced other local rivals, such as those from Johor and 
Macassar. 18 
Seven years later, on the 2 "d of October 1649, Johan Truijtman visited Aceh and 
made similar complaints. " In an audience with the Sultanah, he asked for her written estemie 
to be given to her panglima at SWC to confirm the company's earlier privileges there. He 
complained that the Dutch had received no pepper from Sillida and Inderapura and very 
little pepper from Tiku and Priaman. 20 He demanded a fixed price for the company's cloth 
in exchange for pepper. Next, Truijtman requested execution of a promise, made the 
previous year, to exempt one ship from toll to the amount of 1070 bhar pepper in Tiku. 
This request raised the ire of some of the orangkaya present but according to Truijtman, the 
Maharaja Sri Maharaja and the Sultanah promised they would accommodate these requests. 
Encouraged, perhaps, Truijtman made his third request, which was for exemption 
from toll for the pepper trade of the whole of the SWC. This time, the Sultanah reacted 
swiftly; Truijtman described her utterance as hard, violent, loud and grave. She said, "How 
could I accept a condition never before applied that could take the bread out of the mouths 
of my people? I will follow the old customs... " Hereupon, the orangkaya rose together as a 
sign of concurrence, and gravely called out "daulaf'. The privilege would amount to some 
8000 reals. The Sultanah, however, clarified that regardless of the amount, her people 
should enjoy their rights. The custom should remain indefinitely. In case the Dutch feared 
that her panglima in SWC would not acknowledge the Company's privilege, she would re- 
issue the written order annually. " She would not grant a permanent fixed sum toll-free to 
the Company. 
Truijtman reported that the Sultanah made known her own displeasures with the 
Dutch over the Company's actions in Tiku. A Genoese ship flying a Dutch flag robbed an 
Acehnese vessel loaded with pepper. ' Although the quantity of pepper was not yet known, 
the Sultanah was extremely unhappy, because of the loss of her subjects, namely two Muslim 
traders. Being more used to giving complaints rather than receiving them, the Dutch 
Commissioner could merely mumble that the Governor-General would handle the business 
18 William Foster, The English Factories in India 1618-1669 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 169. 
19 See earlier chapter on "Perak Affair" for details. 
20 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, p. 487. 
21 NA, Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn, f. 185V. 
22 NA, Rapport substanteel aen d' Ed Heer Cornelis van der Lijn, f. 186R. 
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regarding the incident at Tiku 23 Members of the anti-Dutch faction, unhappy over her offer 
to renew existing Dutch privileges, raised a protest and even the Maharaja Sri Maharajah 
became silent. The Raja Binthara, the Maharajah's follower, however, interjected that it was 
the Sultanah's right to determine the matter as she wished. 
On the 12 `h of October 1649, the Sultanah replied to Truijtman's requests. She 
would make the contract with the company to fix the price of cloth in exchange for pepper 
at SWC. Not only would she give a written *fi man to her panglima at SWC, she would send 
two qualified persons there with Truijtman to execute the contract. She would send a written 
frrman to the Panglima of Tiku to kurnia the Company the rest of the 1070 bhar pepper toll- 
free. She would write to the Governor-General explaining her refusal of permanent 
exemption from toll for the whole of SWC. She would leave restitution by the Genoese to 
the discretion of the Governor-General. 
Her resolutions showed that the Sultanah was keen to maintain friendly relations 
with the Company and accommodated them on several demands, despite protests from the 
Laksamana and his followers. But she was adamant on key points. Toll exacted on pepper 
trade in SWC was the main revenue for the Sultanah and her orangkaya and this right had to 
be protected. True to her word, the Sultanah sent firman to the panglima, reiterating the 
promises made to the Company. After initial resistance from Tiku and Priaman, a contract 
was signed in Tiku, 6 Nov, 1649, by envoys of the Acehnese Crown, Sribidia Indra and 
Radia Moedeliar and oppercoopman Joan Truijtman, Henrick Creijerszoon and ondercoopman 
Joannes Waghter. Another contract was confirmed in Priaman on 9 Nov. 1649. The 
contracts in substance stated that as long as there was trade between the two parties, the 
price of cloth supplied by the Company in exchange for pepper at SWC would remain fixed. 
All foreign nations were to be excluded from SWC except for the Company and Aceh 
24 
Six years later, in 1655, despite the Dutch company officials' pressures to gain 
trading concessions, they still complained about the damage Muslim trade did to the VOC 
25 
23 Heeres, Bouwstof n, p. 490. 
24 Heeres, Bouwstoffen, pp. 501-503. See also Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, pp. 528-529. 
25 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1655-1674, Vol. 3, pp. 19,23. The Dutch reported that the Muslim merchants 
from Surat, Maslupatnarn and Pegu were able to sell their cloth at very low prices in Aceh which were in turn 
bought by the local Asian traders in exchange for their own products such as cloves. A great number of 
Chinese wares brought from Johor, Patani and Melaka were also traded in Aceh. 
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They also faced competition from the English at SWC from 1658.26 The Dutch 
patrolled the coasts, emptying foreign vessels of pepper on the justification that the Sultanah 
had promised them exclusive trade 27 Their incessant demands and high-handed acts 
inspired local anger that culminated in the imprisonment of the coopman Van Voorst and 
other Company officials in Priaman, Tiku and Sillida. The Dutch believed this was instigated 
by the Acehnese since some of the Dutch prisoners were brought to Aceh 28 In 1657, the 
Dutch strengthened their factory at Sillida, and then went to Priaman, where all negotiations 
for the exchange of prisoners were fruitless. They decided to patrol off Priaman instead. 29 
Balthasar Bort led a delegation to Aceh in 1659 to settle these differences and to 
reconfirm company privileges at SWC. Another agreement between the company and the 
Sultanah promised that the panglima responsible would pay the Company 495181/4 reals for 
damages incurred by the Company in 1657. This agreement also reconfirmed the 
Company's exclusive privilege in SWC and the yearly toll-free grant of now 1200 bharen 
pepper to be obtained from Priaman in the first year, Tiku in the second and Sillida in the 
third. 3° After departing Aceh, Bort went to SWC and concluded a treaty with Sillibar in 
1660. Bort then went to Inderapura, Padang and Tiku and concluded similar treaties and 
placed a Resident in each place to foresee trade. He reported that he found the panglimas 
willing to trade with the VOC but they could not afford to pay debts. 31 
From 1655-1659, the VOC's intensified blockade of Aceh and Perak harbours in 
retaliation at the Company officials' murder in Perak had a temporary dampening effect on 
Aceh's trade with the Gujaratis. But after the signing of the 1659 peace treaty between Aceh 
and the VOC, the merchants who were forced to go to Melaka returned to Aceh to trade. 
26 In 1658, the English decided to reverse their policy of withdrawal. Three Dutch ships tried to prevent the 
"Mayflower" from being loaded with pepper. Failing to do so, the Dutch then seized fifty bhars of pepper 
from the ship. Foster, William, English factories, pp. 181,207,255. See also Report of Messrs Zouch, Exton and 
Mason concerning the injuries of the Dutch East India Company towards the English East India Company, 
19th January 1661, Court Minutes of the EIC, pp. 77-81, p. 77. 
V The Dutch went to Inderapura to collect pepper but they found an English ship there and unloaded their 
pepper, see J. L. Van Basel, Begin en voortgang vaqn onzen handel en bezittingen or Sumatra's Westkust', 
Tochrift voorNeerland'. r Indie, 9.2 (1847), 1-57, p. 17. 
28 Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, p. 152. 
29 Basel, 'Begin en voortgang', p. 16. 
30 Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, p. 154. 
31 Basel, 'Begin en voortgang', p. 17-19. 
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The VOC's trade in Melaka was again badly affected. 32 Company officials also complained 
that as a result of the great Muslim traffic in the textile trade, the Company's own textile 
trade had suffered. 33 
So, far from giving the Dutch a free hand on the west coast, the Sultanah actually 
limited the VOC's privileges. Her resistance to the blanket privileges indicated her desire to 
protect subjects of subordinate states. By allowing her subordinates at SWC to trade with 
the VOC directly, she dismantled the policies of Iskandar Muda that had caused much local 
resentment. Although she gave her panglimas a freer hand to trade with the VOC she did not 
tolerate panglimar who contravened her commands especially when this might hurt Aceh's 
strategic interests. When Bort went to Aceh in 1659, the Sultanah allowed the Dutch to 
build a temporary lodge in Padang. The Dutch, however, schemed to build a permanent 
lodge. The Panglima vetoed a lodge of any sort for fear that the Company might fortify the 
factory there. 34 With this attempt botched, company representatives raised a temporary 
wooden lodge further south at Sillida. When the Sultanah learnt about this, she became very 
angry. The Company reported that those in Padang had disallowed them to build a lodge in 
Padang so they went to Sillida instead. Gabriel Bruyl, the then Resident in Aceh, wrote to 
Groenewegen at SWC that the Sultanah had summoned those from Padang to Aceh to 
register her anger at having her orders disobeyed. She also sent an estemie to Sillida to punish 
the Panglima for allowing the Company to build a house to stay there yearly when she only 
gave license for the Company to trade in Sillida and build factory for a month or two in a 
year. He was replaced by a new panslima. The Sultanah ordered Groenewegen to move from 
Sillida. She would only allow the Dutch to build a more permanent lodge at Tiku or Priaman. 
These were Acehnese strongholds and closer to Aceh's capital, thus the Dutch could be 
closely monitored 3S The Company finally decided to establish their lodge at Pulau Chinco, 
which later became the Company's headquarters for SWC, an island off Padang which was 
not only healthy but well away from the Acehnese. 
32 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1655-1674, vol. 3, p. 324. 
33 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1655-1674, vol. 3, p. 337. 
34 Two village heads from Padang met Groenewegen and told him that they did not object to the Company's 
lodge in Padang, on the contrary they welcomed it but it was the Panglima who objected. Chijs, Dagh-Register, 
1663, p-85- 
35 Chijs, Dagh Regirter, 1663, pp. 83-84. 
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VOC and the SWC polities: From Traders to Protectors? 
The De Remedie sailed into Batavia in 1663 with a letter from Jan Groenewegen, dated 
24`h February to the Governor General reporting on the happenings at SWC. Groenewegen 
wrote about his secret meetings with the Rajas there in 1662 about putting themselves under 
VOC protection. " Three orangkaya from formerly Minangkabau-ruled Bajang - Radja Poety, 
Sultan Mamoulia and Maradia Lella - appeared with Dato Pekepia in Sillida in January 1663 
and promised the Dutch, in unbreakable friendship, to deliver their pepper to no one else 
but the Company. 37 Unhappiness with what they claimed was Acehnese domination, which 
they considered foreign, was compounded by the heavy taxes and oppressive behaviour of 
the Acehnese panglima. 'a A provisional agreement was concluded with Groenewegen who 
was the Company's coop man-resident at SWC, to be ratified in Batavia later. 
This "secret" negotiation was well-known to other local elites. A few weeks later 
when Groenewegen visited Tiku, the *penghulu Orangkaya Suri Radja representing Duabelas 
Kota (federation of twelve cities) declared that he too wanted to sign an everlasting contract 
with the Company to overthrow the Acehnese yoke. Similarly, when Groenewegen visited 
Padang, the Penghulu Orangkaya Ketjil welcomed Groenewegen to stay at his house and to 
discuss the possibility of putting Padang under the Company's protection and to chase the 
Acehnese Panglima from there. Sultan Muzaffar Syah, his son, Muhammad Syah and son- 
in-law, Raja Sulaiman met Groenewegen in Sillida to offer to sign a similar contract 39 
In July 1663, the provisional contract became the Painan Treaty, formerly ratified 
between representatives from Bandar Sepuloh, Inderapura, Tiku and Padang, Governor- 
General Joan Maetsuyker and the Council of the Indies in Batavia. Main provisions were for 
exclusive trade - banning the English under threat of fined or chastisement; exemption from 
tolls except for the usual *ruba and other anchorage fees to local rulers; non-interference in 
religion; ' and the Company's right to build a lodge. The locals were to get rid of the foreign 
36 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 81. 
37 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 82. 
38 Those in SWC paid homage to aceh-1 peteh (2stuivers) per house yearly. Chijs, Dagh-Regirter, 1663, p. 88. 
39 Mohammad Dahlan Mansoer and others, Sedarah Minangkabau, (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1970), pp. 93-94. 
10 Steenbrink argued that "the fact that some contracts safeguarded the privileges of pagans or Muslims reveals 
a lenient (and therefore possibly weak) position of the Company". The Company's influence on the local 
population was strongest in Sri Lanka, Malabar and Moluccas where a paragraph on religion was always 
included. Relations with the rulers of Sumatra according to Steenbrink were still superficial in the 17t-18th 
centuries, which was why religion was not discussed. See Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian 
Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950, trans. by Jan Steenbrink, and HenryJansen, 2nd rev. edn (Amsterdam: 
151 
Acehnese yoke and to expel all Acehnese. They would be under Company protection against 
all enemies from the sea but not from land. The Company would try its own officers and 
determine the price of gold. " 
The important questions here are - why did the VOC shift policy in the 1660s and 
why did SWC rulers approach the Company to offer allegiance? Local elites took this 
initiative, contrary to the common belief that the VOC and the Acehnese deprived them of 
agency. 
According to Kathirithamby-Wells, the shift in Dutch policy was conducted, initially 
at least, in strict secrecy, to match alleged Acehnese duplicity over the Perak tin trade. The 
cordial relations which then existed between Aceh and Perak and Aceh's friendly reception 
by Aceh of foreign Muslim traders at Perak generated well founded suspicions of collusion. " 
The steady decline of Aceh under Dutch pressure contributed to the shift. Kathirithamby- 
Wells continued that the Sultanah was anxious to save the remnants of once flourishing 
trade from total destruction by the Dutch. Aceh's internal administration was weak, with 
Safiatuddin Syah getting on in years. The Queen was helpless in the face of dissension 
among court officials and unreasonable Dutch demands which she was no longer in a 
position to reject. In a conciliatory policy, she tried placating the Dutch officials with gifts, 
royal honours and unusual friendliness. " The final reason given by Kathirithamby-Wells 
was the progressive strengthening of the VOC's position after 1650, when officials became 
obsessed with the idea of cornering the bulk of the westward flow of pepper and gold, which 
hitherto had been a strictly guarded Acehnese monopoly. With the intention of being close 
to the main sources of both products, the company proposed to establish its main factory at 
Padang. aa 
There is little evidence to show that Aceh was declining. By 1660, the Company was 
perhaps tired of depending on Aceh in SWC, as shown in successive failures to enforce the 
privileges granted to them. The Company officials were unable to procure even the 1200 
bharen toll-free pepper promised to them in any one of the places stipulated. They 
complained that they could not get even half of the amount in Sillida and had to try to 
Rodopi, 1993), p. 66-69. The Painan Treaty which explicitly called for non-interferance in religion showed that 
the VOC's influence was still very much restricted to commerce. 
41 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, pp. 88,349-350. 
42 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Painan Treaty', p. 470. 
43 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Painan Treaty', p. 472. 
44 Kathirithamby-Wells, `Painan Treaty', p. 473. 
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procure the rest from Tiku. 45 The Acehnese panglima in SWC also prevented the Company 
from trading gold, on the grounds that the Sultanah had not granted the Company access to 
gold in her dominions. The Dutch countered this by citing the 1659 Agreement, which they 
interpreted as covering not only pepper but gold and other goods. In the last two years the 
Company officials reported that the Acehnese had engrossed about 400 catties of gold 
(about 720 Dutch pounds). The Dutch were eager to get their hands on this gold which, 
they deemed as a "remarkable trade" because for about 1 tael heavy inland gold, they could 
get much more cloth than they would get for 1 bahar of pepper. 46 
With frequent set-backs, local Company officials, especially under Groenwegen, had 
begun to side-step Aceh. For example, after some Dutch officials were taken prisoner in 
Sillida, Tiku and Priaman in 1657, the Company tried unsuccessfully to retaliate in Tiku and 
Priaman and strengthened the factory in Sillida. The VOC was also perhaps encouraged by 
the initiatives of some local elites in trying to make their independent deals. Steps to 
conclude contracts without Aceh's knowledge would certainly incur the wrath of the 
Acehnese. Outright war against Aceh was against Company's policy and for locals the 
attempt to overthrow Aceh's overlordship was risky. These, rather than attempted 
emulation of Acehnese duplicity, were the reasons for acting covertly. 
The Painan Treaty signified the beginning of the contest for political and economic 
control between the Acehnese, the VOC and the local elites. Affairs in SWC, where local 
elites were vying for power and wealth, were conducive for the Company to shift policy, 
from dependence on the Acehnese to patronage in its own right, acquiring clients to protect 
Dutch interests. In common with the traditions of a region where stranger-kings were rife, 
and the practical advantages of favouring distiant, manipulable rulers, SWC elites increasingly 
preferred the Dutch to the Acehnese. 47 The VOC wrested vassals from Aceh and worked 
towards control of SWC's trade. However, as with other contracts signed, the Company 
needed a few more decades to begin to translate the terms of the Painan Treaty from paper 
to reality. 
as Chijs, Dagh-Rtgirter, 1663, p. 83. 
46 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 82.1 cattie was 20 taels and 1 tael was 104 Japanese condryns. 
47 David Henley, "Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and 
Elsewhere, " in Modern Arian Studies, 38,1, (2004), pp. 85-144, p. 87. 
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Sultanab Safratuddin's Response 
Safiatuddin and her orangkaya resented events at SWC. Even before the Painan 
Treaty, the Sultanah courted the English and Siam to counter-balance Dutch incursions in 
Perak and SWC. Although the English presence in Sumatra was negligible and intermittent, 
the Sultanah wrote to Charles II on the 12 October 166148 to renew what she deemed as ties 
of friendship from the time of her father. 49 
She urged the English to continue to send their ships to Aceh as they did in the past 
for the sake of lasting friendship. As proof of her friendship, she mentioned the privileges 
she had granted to Henry Gary, who had resided in her kingdom for the past eighteen 
months. She had allowed him to construct a warehouse at the port and granted permission 
to English merchants to trade in Aceh. Furthermore, she allowed three English ships a year 
to trade in Aceh and its dominions. She informed the king that she had done all she could, 
but his subjects were unable to trade in her dominions because the "accursed" (celaka) Dutch 
apprehended them. She besought Charles to safeguard English traders from harm. 
Safiatuddin clearly wanted to use the English as a bulwark against a possible attack 
by the VOC and invited the English to establish their presence in Aceh. This plea however, 
did not appeal because trade in Aceh for the English was already dwindling and the English 
were not willing to be drawn into a brawl between the Acehnese and the Dutch. The 
Sultanah's attempts to renew her alliance with Siam in 1662 produced no results. 
5° The 
Acehnese even sent envoys to their old arch-enemy, Johor, apparently with no results 
either. 51 
18 Translation of letter from Queen of Aceh to Charles II is found in C. O. 77, vol. viii, pp. 192,194,196, Public 
Records Office (now The National Archives). See Foster, English factories, 1661-1664, p. 83. For the letter in 
Malay, see Annable Teh-Gallop, 'Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli: Royal letters from Aceh in the 1711' Century', 
unpublished paper presented at the First International Conference of Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, 
Banda 
Aceh, 24-26 February, 2007. 
49 English trading relations with Aceh first began when James Lancaster brought a letter from Queen Elizabeth 
to the Sultan and landed in Aceh in 1602. See A. K. Das Gupta, 'Aceh in Indonesian Trade and Politics 1600- 
1641' (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1962). 
5° Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 208. The VOC officials made notes of this exchange of envoys between Siam 
and Aceh in 1662 but no more details were provided regarding the mission. 
51 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 433. No more details were given here either. 
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The signing of the Painan Treaty made little initial difference. In July 1663, 
Groenewegen and the SWC representatives returned to SWC from Batavia to find more 
troubles erupting in their territories. Aceh, discovering "betrayal" by vassals, was extremely 
suspicious of the VOC's next moves. News from Perak that the VOC intended to close its 
factories in Aceh and Perak encouraged the Acehnese to believe that the VOC might wage 
war on them. A letter from Groenewegen in Pulau Chinco to the Governor General 
mentioned how the Sultanah sent an estemie to the panglima in Tiku, and all other lands where 
she had appointed her panglimas in December 1663, to inform them that the Dutch had 
broken away from Aceh and Perak. Therefore, they must be vigilant against Dutch activities 
in Bajang and the Queen's lands must be maintained and kept in submission. This news 
alarmed the pro-Dutch faction in Sungei Pagou and they pleaded with Groenewegen not to 
let them down. They informed him that their Panglima and the Acehnese representative had 
asked them to go to Aceh to explain. 52 
While attempting to stem Dutch encroachments in SWC, the Sultanah tried to 
improve relations with the Company. On the 26' of August 1664 two boedjanghr of the 
Sultanah arrived in Melaka bringing her letter and gifts. The Sultanah wrote that she was 
very surprised at the Company's decision to empty the factory in Aceh and Perak and that 
for two years now, no Dutch envoys or ships had been to Aceh. She informed the 
Governor of Melaka that the Company officials who were still in Aceh were in such a state 
that Resident Bruyl, had to borrow 450 tael derham from her. The Dutch did not respond. 
The Acehnese boedjan(ghs were treated well53 but evidence that the Company was sidestepping 
Aceh to concentrate on SWC without Aceh's mediation now seemed irrefutable. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch were to discover that even though the local elites invited 
their protection in return for trade, the Company could not reap the benefits easily. By side- 
stepping the Acehnese, the VOC lost the advantage of a single authority, albeit a 
troublesome one, in dealing with the SWC polities and instead encountered a fluid 
environment, hard to understand and harder still to master. Power in SWC had multiple 
centres. 54 Local rivalries added to the complexity and fragility of the political situation. The 
VOC's attempt to boost local rulers encouraged more jostling for power. The absence of a 
52 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1664, p. 45. 
53 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1664, p. 443. 
54 For a detailed study on nature of Minangkabau authority, see Timothy Barnard, Multiple Center ofAuthority: 
Society and Environment in Siak and Eastern Sumatra, 1674.1827 (Leiden: KITLV Press, Leiden, 2003). # 
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dominant foreign presence facilitated internecine wars, which the Dutch were unable to 
suppress until the end of the century. Instability intermittently stopped trade, while different 
factions used the Acehnese and the VOC as supporting powers in their conflicts. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the political goings-on and the 
changing fortunes of the VOC in the small polities of SWC, such as Inderapurass, Kota 
Tengah, and Barus56. Nevertheless, a brief case-study of Padang could help illustrate the 
fluidity of the political situation and the absence of a hegemon. Padang echoed the other 
polities. 
Troubles in Padang 
The VOC faced obstacles even in areas, distant from Aceh, which were originally 
inclined to ally with the Company. In most of these areas, politics were characterized by the 
competition for power and wealth between leaders who were pro-Company and those who 
were still loyal to Aceh. The Company's fortunes ebbed and flowed depending on who 
gained the upper hand. In Padang, the Company officials found the orangkaya very divided, 
the powerful group being pro-Aceh. The deaths of two leaders who had signed a contract 
with the Company brought about a grave deterioration of the VOC's affairs. Groenewegen 
sent a small force but failed to chase the Acehnese away. The Dutch reported that the pro- 
Aceh faction were promising money to those who could help expel the Company from 
Padang. 57 The Company officials were in a dilemma since they were not inclined to force 
the Padang inhabitants to adhere to the contract yet they were not willing to leave since 
Padang was an important place, closely watched by others as an example. It was only a year 
later that the pro-Company faction managed to gain power there, and even to bring another 
troubled area, Kota Tengah, to their side. The Dutch reported that the Padang heads even 
pawned their wives' jewellery to lure Kota Tengah with gifts. 58 Padang became the 
Company's main administrative centre in 1666. The Company however, failed to extend its 
ss For a detailed account of the history of Inderapura see J. Kathirithamby-Wells The Inderapura Sultanate: the 
foundations of its rise and decline from the 16th - 18th century', Indoneria, 21, April (1976), 65-84. 
56 See Jane Drakard, `An Indian Ocean Port: Sources for the Earlier History of Barus', Anbr'el, 37 (1989), 53- 
82, p. 73. 
57 Letter from Jacob Cauw from Padang to Governor General, dated 9 November, 1664. Chijs, Dagh-Pegrter, 
1664, p. 550. 
58 Chijs, Dagh-Begister, 1665, p. 238. 
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influence in Acehnese strongholds such as Tiku and Priaman. As Groenewegen reported in 
1665, Jacob Corneliszoon, who was in charge in Tiku, was murdered with two other 
soldiers. " The Company retaliated by burning houses and vessels. The Company stationed 
two yachts near Tiku and Priaman and no passes were given in Batavia to those who wished 
to visit these places. ' Groenewegen's death in December 1665 was another setback for the 
Company and its allies. " 
Evert Michielse replaced Groenewegen and later Abraham Verspreet took over his 
position. Verspreet landed in Padang with ships and soldiers to wage a war on all the places 
who were anti-Dutch like Pauw, Priaman, Tiku, Kota Tengah and Oelakkan. Besides the 
leaders from Padang, Ambon and Raja Bugis joined Verspreet. A letter from Padang to 
Governor Maetsuyker reported that the Acehnese from Priaman and Tiku were destroyed; 
and that Orangkaya Kecil became Governor of Padang, Raja Bugis King of Oelakkan and 
Raja Ambon Panglima of Priaman, while Pauw and Kota Tengah were subdued to the 
Company. 62 
However, not all was as reported. A letter from Jacob Pits, mentioned that no 
matter how they dissembled, the hearts of Tiku and Priaman were with Aceh 63 As long as 
Acehnese remained in these areas they swore with their mouths but never with their hearts 64 
Troubles for the Company recurred in Kota Tengah and Priaman. The promotion of 
Padang under the VOC interfered with trade in these areas and they became centres of fierce 
opposition to the Company by the late 1660s. The Company's SWC allies wrote to the 
Governor General appealing for soldiers. One other reason for these renewed troubles was 
the arrival of Raja Palawan from Aceh - not from the sea but from the eastern landward side 
of SWC, presumably to avoid clashes with Dutch naval patrols. He spread the news that the 
Sultanah intended to send forces within three months to bring all her former vassals under 
her control. 65 He declared that the ulama in these areas had now allied with him against the 
enemies of religion. " 
59 Chijs, Dagh-ßegister, 1665, p. 48. 
60 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1665, p. 312. 
61 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1666-1667, p. 8. 
62 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1666-1667, p. 175. 
63 Chijs, Dagh Register, 1666-1667, p. 404. 
64 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1668-1669, p. 278. 
65 See Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1665, p. 239. # 
66 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1670-1671, p. 69. 
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Religion was important. Aceh had played a big part in the dissemination and 
development of Islam in west Sumatra. An important religious centre such as Oelakkan in 
the west coast had numerous Acehnese residents, whose expulsion, as demanded by the 
Company, provoked outrage. Verspreet described Oelakkan as fanatically Muslim and very 
inclined towards the Acehnese 67 Indeed, one of the obstacles encountered during the initial 
treaty negotiations with Barus in 1668 was local opposition to the VOC's demand that all 
Acehnese be expelled from Barus. 68 Like Oelakkan, Barus was also another important 
religious centre that had close connections with Aceh from as early as the latter half of the 
sixteenth century. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Barus was presumably home 
to many religious exiles escaping the persecutions of Nuruddin al-Raniri in Aceh. 69 Hamzah 
Fansuri, the important Sufi religious figure and poet in Aceh was said to have come from 
Baras. 
This arrival of Raja Palawan caused disturbances in Kota Tengah, where about half 
the Council members rebelled against the Company. The rebel leaders were Bendahara Raja 
Macatta (Mahkota), Raja Setia Wangsa and Maharaja Lilla. Jacob Pits went to Kota Tengah 
with Sultan Muhammad Syah of Inderapura and Panglima Raja of Padang to investigate and 
faced demands that the Company expel its Panglima Orangkaya Putih and have their houses 
and properties burnt. In the end, the Company closed its lodge brought all its goods to 
Padang. 7° Kota Tengah was subdued by Padang and Company soldiers only in 1680 
71 
VOC as the new overlord? 
In SWC, the Company did not attempt to replace Aceh as the overlord and protector 
of its former vassals - first, because of the existence of pro-Aceh factions and secondly 
because of religious opposition to the Company in the ulama, which appeared to have some 
clout. 72 VOC strategy was to replace existing overlords by reviving the old kingdom of 
67 Hendrick Kroeskamp, De Westku. rt en Minangkabau 1665-1668 (Utretch: Drukkerij Fa. Schotanus & Jens, 
1931), p. 88. 
68 There were many Acehnese residents in Barus, some of whom married members of the local nobility. 
Kroeskamp, De Westkust, p. 138. 
69 Drakard, An Indian Ocean Port", p. 73, 
70 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1670-1671, p. 71. 
71 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1680, p. 712. 
72 After 1666, opposition against the VOC grew and anti-Dutch protests on the west coast were frequently 
described in the VOC records as having a `Muslim' character and this religious sentiment strengthened the 
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Minangkabau. The VOC made the first contact with the Minangkabau ruler, Sultan Ahmad 
Syah, in 1665, whose claim to overlordship, unless neutralised, might prove dangerous to the 
VOC's prospects of subjugating the west coast to control the pepper and gold trade. 
Despite the contractual language of the Painan Treaty the VOC essentially regarded 
west coast Sumatra as conquered territory. 73 Verspreet however, recognising religious 
opposition to the Company as invariably linked to local support for Aceh, considered. in a 
letter to his superiors in Batavia, dated 23 May 1667, the desirability of finding a way to 
soften Muslim resentment at subservience to the Hollander. 74 He proposed to recognize the 
Minangkabau king as sovereign in exchange for his renunciation of any intention to tax the 
people of the west coast or to act independently of the Dutch. According to Drakard, 
implicit in Verspreet's plan was the idea of placing a Muslim overlord between the Company 
and the people of the west coast. 75 
This plan was accepted and Verspreet and his successor, Jacob Pits, were recognized 
as the Minangkabau king's representative, stadthouder or wakil raja (deputy raja). 76 Verspreet 
reported that the king's name immediately eased the flow of trade. The Company faced no 
more difficulties and obtained 400 tael of pure gold from the inhabitants. " According to 
Drakard, Verspreet distinguished formal authority from actual power: real must back 
nominal sovereignty. 78 
The Dutch appeared to have hit upon a remarkable and unique solution by reviving 
this old shadowy kingdom in the clouds and using its former relations with the west coast 
polities as a source of legitimacy while executing its own policies. " The Company officials 
learnt later that other parties could play a similar game. Local protagonists also used the 
king's name to dignify themselves. For example, in June 1667, Verspreet travelled to Batavia 
with two Minangkabau envoys carrying a letter, ostensibly from the king. Upon their return, 
the envoys brought back letters and gifts from the Governor General for the king. They 
Acehnese link in anti-Company activities. Jane Drakard, A Kingdom of wordy-Language and power in Sumatra 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 55. 
73 Kroeskamp, De IVestkust, p. 110. Also, Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 69. 
74 Kroeskamp, De Westkust, p. 97. 
75 Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 69. 
76 According to Drakard, Verspreet correspondence with the Minangkabau court has not survived but 
Verspreet's new position and authority was described in his own account. Drakard, A Kingdom of Wordy, p. 70. 
77 VOC 1264,1688, f. 288R, quoted from Drakard, A Kingdom of Wordy, p. 72. 
78 Drakard, A Kingdom of Wordy, p. 73. 
79 According to Drakard, a survey of published letters of the VOC in the seventeenth century suggests that 
west coast Sumatra was the only region where VOC representatives used this term to designate their own role. 
Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 70. 
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went instead to Bendahara Putih, a leading chief of one of the highland communities, who, it 
turned out, was the real author of the purportedly royal letter to Batavia. " According to 
Drakard, in selecting the Minangkabau court to act as a powerful local intermediary, the 
VOC entered into a perplexing and often frustrating alliance. 81 
By the 1690s no place in SWC was really calm. On Batoe, Raja Ibrahim, head of 
Tiku, son of the former Padang Panglima, murdered Johannis Sas and three soldiers before 
taking refuge in Aceh. In Baros, the son of the pro-Aceh Raja DiHulu murdered a Dutch 
surgeon and problems between diHulu and his co-ruler, DiHilir, continued. 82 Although the 
English could not make much headway in Priaman and had to establish their base further 
south along the west coast in Bencoolen, the Orangkaya of Manjutta welcomed them with 
open arms. Although the Sultan of Inderapura had been the Company's ally for a long time, 
the Dutch had little trust in those from Inderapura. Pau remained at war with Padang. 83 
The editors of the Corpus Diplomaticum (collected contracts and treaties signed 
between the VOC and local rulers) commented that `in no other region of the Company's 
operations were so many sacred agreements sworn, violated and resworn as on the west 
coast of Sumatra. '84 
English Settlement in SWC. " From Factories to Forts 
The VOC was still unable to exclude the English and Asian traders from SWC. 
Before 1680, the Dutch had made more inroads into local commercial and political affairs in 
the Indies than the English. This situation changed in the 1680s when the EIC began to 
think in terms of fortifying their factories or settlements in Asian ports and using force. " 
After eighty years of having a settlement in Bantam, the English lost their footing in the 
region and also their largest single source of pepper in 1682.86 Pepper was not only 
important as an article of trade. It was also a vital element in resisting Dutch monopolistic 
80 Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 74. 
81 Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 64. 
82 Basel, 'Begin en voortgang', p. 51. 
83 Basel, Begin en voortgang', p. 53. 
84 Heeres and Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, BKI, 91 (1934), p. 423. 
85 I. B. Watson, discussed this policy of fortification and the idea of force in the EIC relations with India in the 
introduction by Patrick J. N. Tuck, ed., The East India Company, 4, p. viii. 
86 A. Farrington, `Negotiations at Aceh in 1684: An Unpublished English document', in Indonesia and the Malay 
World 27.77 (1999), 19-33, p. 19. 
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ambitions and a matter of national pride. 87 With the closure of Bantam to the English 
Company, the English began to cast their eyes on the only other free port in the region 
where they could obtain pepper without Dutch restrictions - Aceh. 
In a letter to the President and Council at Fort St. George from London, the 
Directors of the Company stated that for the purpose of having a "settled head factory" for 
the South Sea and pepper trade, they knew no better place than Aceh or the Princess 
Island. 88 They were uncertain about Princess Island since the Dutch had challenged 
Grantham there and he had been instructed not to open hostilities. As for Aceh, although it 
had long been a port where the English obtained pepper, relations had been at best 
lukewarm. The English, despite the offers from Sultanah Safiatuddin in 1661, had not 
grasped the opportunity to build a factory, partly owing to their inability to compete with the 
Surat merchants who sold cloth and bought pepper in Aceh, and partly to Dutch restrictions 
and the primacy of the factory in Bantam. 
After twenty years, the English finally decided to take up Sultanah Safiatuddin's 
offer. Given the changed circumstances, the English this time wanted more than just a 
factory - they sought a fortified settlement. The EIC Directors wrote to Sultanah 
Zakiatuddin Shah (1678-88), on 1 October 1684, requesting permission to trade 89 The 
Directors argued that it was to the interest of the English and the Acehnese for the English 
"to settle a standing factory" at Aceh or near Aceh where they could defend themselves 
against the designs of the Dutch and to preserve their trade in case the Dutch attempted to 
blockade Aceh's harbour. With the English pending "fortified settlement", the Directors 
pointed out, the Dutch could not blockade Aceh since this act would be tantamount to 
declaring war on the EIC and the English King. 
The London Directors, however, left the Madras Council to take charge of this 
matter, ' with instructions to strike an agreement with the Queen of Aceh in the name of the 
EIC, not the English nation. " The Council sent Ralph Ord and William Cawley to Aceh, 
87 Farrington, `Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 19. 
88 BL, IOR: E/3/90 f. 445. Letter dated 16th March 1684 from London to President and Council at Fort St. 
George. 
89 BL, IOR: E/3/90 f. 376. 
90 BL, IOR: E/3/90 f. 445. Another letter was sent on the ship "Dragon" dated 24th September 1684 to the 
Captain at Aceh, f. 346. 
91 Letter to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, dated 19th October 1683 in Despatches from England; 
1681-1686, Records of Fort St. George, p. 58. 
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where they stayed from October - December 1684,92 and found that during the previous 
decade Aceh had become a popular port for emerging country trade partnerships between 
Indian merchants, free residents in Madras, private merchants, adventurers and 
entrepreneurs. Richard Mohun, a former member of the Madras Council on private trade in 
Aceh in 1684, reported to London that the English could procure good ladings of pepper 
from Sumatra. 93 
The Acehnese elite welcomed the English representatives with the usual hospitality. 
" 
The representatives described the procedure for landing, the procession to court with 
presents for the Queen, attending audience day with the Queen on Saturdays and the 
discussions and lobbying of the Aceh orangkaya. The main difference described here was the 
number of orangkaya who appeared to form the Council. Instead of four, there were twelve 
95 
The most senior was the Orangkaya Maharajah. At his house, Ord and Cawley explained 
that after the King of Bantam had given their port to the Dutch, the English had decided to 
bring their profitable trade to Aceh. The Maharajah replied that the Acehnese had always 
regarded the English as friends, notwithstanding their absence for many years. He welcomed 
their return. It was here that the envoys broached the subject of a fort: the Madras President 
no longer wished to have an English settlement without building a fort for protection. They 
gave the examples of Macassar and Bantam where the English factory and goods were 
damaged when the rulers deferred to the Dutch. The only free port left was Aceh and Ord 
and Cawley did not hesitate to point out to the Maharajah that in all probability the Dutch 
would try to ruin Aceh too. Thus, Ord reasoned, a fort would not only protect the English 
but also deter the Dutch. The Maharajah replied that he had to report this request to the 
Sultanah and the rest of the orangkaya first. Besides the Maharajah, the next important 
orangkaya appeared to be the Shahbandar and the Panglima Bandar, who was in charge of 
foreigners. " 
92 The diary of Ord and Cawley is found in the Original Correspondence of the EIC archives. BL, IOR: 
E/3/44, ff. 171-181. This whole diary has been reproduced by Farrington in his article. Citations 
from the 
diary is taken from this published version. 
93 BL, IOR: E/3/44 no. 5612, Mohun to Sir Josiah Child, dated Aceh 24 June 1684, see Farrington, 
`Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 32. 
94 This diary is especially significant because it gives a detailed narrative of court procedures and negotiations 
in 
Aceh in the 1680's. This serves as a useful comparison to the time under Sultanah Safiatuddin since after the 
Dutch closed its factory in 1663, there were no envoys exchanged between the Dutch and Aceh. This diary 
is 
also the only most detailed and comprehensive account of the English encounter with the Aceh court. 
95 Farrington, `Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 25. 
96 Judging from the important ranking of the orangkaya in charge of foreigners, this might imply that trade with 
foreigners was still high in priority for the kingdom as it was during the reign of Safiatuddin. 
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After two months, by the 3`d of December, the English began to get impatient with 
the delays and met the Orangkaya97 to enquire about the Sultanah's reply. The Orangkaya 
said that there was no reply from the Sultanah yet but the President's letter had been 
translated. The Orangkaya pointed out that there was no mention in the letter about the 
building of a fort in Aceh. Ord answered that the letter was meant only to give the English 
representatives' credentials whilst the requests would be made verbally. The Orangkaya 
asked why was it necessary for the English to request a fort now whereas they had never 
wanted this before. Ord reassured the Orangkaya that the English had no intention of 
conquest, unlike the Dutch, but wanted to avoid what happened at Bantam. The Orangkaya 
replied that in Aceh, unlike Bantam, the Dutch were mortal enemies and every Acehnese 
would rather die than allow the Dutch a footing in the kingdom. He declared that even 
though the Dutch had the greatest force, they had yet not been able to inflict anything on 
the Acehnese. To which Ord replied that this was true in the past, but now they could lay 
siege and, since Aceh was dependent on imported rice, could starve the port-city. The 
Orangkaya repeated that they would rather die than surrender. Ord replied that he had no 
doubt as to the honour of the Sultanah and the elite but the commoners would certainly 
surrender when they got hungry. The Orangkaya finally replied that the Acehnese would 
leave this situation in God's hands, who they trusted would help them in times of need. 
This exchange could have given the English a clear indication of where the Acehnese 
stood. On the 9th of December, the English asked the Shahbandar about the requests. The 
Shahbandar replied that the Sultanah's final answer was that the English had asked for too 
much, which was against the indispensable rules of the kingdom. She added that even if the 
President of Madras had filled her kingdom with gold she could not grant him permission to 
build a fort or house with stone and bricks. The English however, were welcome to build a 
factory with planks. 
Ord's and Cawley's mission was not fruitless. Zakiatuddin gave the English 
permission to fortify her dominions at SWC, either at Priaman or Tiku, though she would 
not place this grant in her fit-man. Besides Priaman, the English were already exploring other 
areas for a possible settlement. Meanwhile, chiefs in Bencoolen invited the English to 
establish a settlement there. The English knew that a quite a large supply of pepper from 
97 Unfortunately, they did not mention which Orangkaya they met for this discussion. Most probably it would 
be the Maharajah, the most senior ranking official in the Council. 
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Bantam was collected near Bencoolen at a place called Silebar. 98 After receiving the 
invitation, Ord, arrived in Bencoolen and, after signing an agreement to settle an English 
fort, left a Mr. Benjamin Bloome in charge. The settlement did not get blessings from 
London. On the contrary, the London Directors wrote that a "fatal error" was made in 
breaking their orders regarding Priaman. They were angry that ships, money and men were 
spent to found a settlement at such "an unhealthful" place as Bencoolen 99 They objected to 
this place because it was too near Batavia, and therefore indefensible if a war broke out. 
Furthermore, Bencoolen had no trade for European goods, and, whether because of fear for 
the Dutch or otherwise, little pepper for the English. he directors reiterated that they had 
always wanted the seat of the pepper trade to be in Priaman or Aceh, among other reasons 
because these places were farthest from Batavia. 10° But precisely because Bencoolen was so 
disadvantageous, the Dutch saw no reason to spend money to wrest it from the English. So 
the sickly crew called the Pryaman Company was left in peace to build the first fortified 
English settlement in Sumatra, York Fort. "' 
In the 1690's, the EIC gradually consolidated its position in south-western Sumatra 
from its base in Bencoolen. In 1691, the Dutch failed to exert influence at Silebar and other 
southern areas in the name of the Sultan of Bantam. The English factory here and the region 
of Bencoolen were strengthened. Two more English settlements appeared - in 1695 in 
Triamang and in 1697 at Kattaun and Sablat. 
98 Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 451. 
99 BL, IOR E/3/91. Letter sent on "Loyall Merchant" and "Pink James" to Our Chief and Council at 
Bencoolen, dated 3td August 1687, ff. 351-356, f. 352. 
loo BL, IOR E/3/91. Letter sent on "Loyall Merchant" and "Pink James" to Our Chief and Council at 
Bencoolen, f. 356. 
101 For a detailed description of how York Fort was constructed and the deplorable conditions the soldiers 
faced, see A. G. Hayfield, Bencoolen: A History of the Honourable East India Company Garrison on the West Coast of 
Sumatra, (1685-1825) (Hampshire: A&J Partnership, 1995), pp. 1-15. 
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Conclusion 
To what extent Aceh lost her vassal states in SWC is not an easy question to answer, 
owing to the lack of information on Acehnese activities from Dutch sources. Partly because 
the VOC closed its factory in Aceh in 1663, officials reported sparingly on the Acehnese. 
Compared to the situation in Perak, the VOC made some significant gains in some of the 
polities at SWC, and managed to establish bases in Padang and Pulau Chinco, while Aceh 
lost the dominant position enjoyed under Iskandar Muda. Many scholars have perceived 
these changes as signs of Aceh's decline and of the failures of female rule. But Aceh's 
position was becoming untenable even before Saftiauddin's accession. Local leaders at SWC 
resented the Acehnese yoke. Iskandar Muda's recourse to violence as a means of control 
was a sign of weakness rather than strength. Where politics and alliances were fluid and 
loyalties shifting, territorial domination through coercion was illusory. Personal bonds 
forged based on reciprocal emotional, kinship and religious ties tended to engender more 
lasting loyalties than force. Aceh, for instance, was more successful in Perak because Aceh 
supported Perak's own royal family and did not attempt to place its own representatives on 
the throne. Of course, the Aceh royal family had kinship ties with the Perak royal family but 
Aceh under the Sultanah ensured that her candidate for the throne was not a puppet, and 
had support in Perak. 
The narrative of east-west interactions at SWC is not a simple one of western 
ascendency and indigenous decline. Power was contested and shifting. The VOC's increased 
influence and intervention in the SWC polities were the result of the initiatives and 
negotiations of both the Dutch and the local elites to advance mutual interests. The VOC's 
effort to use the indigenous system in SWC for its own ends achieved limited results. While 
obtaining sufficient local brokers and allies to procure pepper, the VOC also alienated 
groups whose interests they jeopardized. Whilst some saw the VOC as a useful ally because 
of its might, the VOC could not evoke a sense of spiritual loyalty or bonds as sovereign 
lords. In their attempt to revive the old Minangkabau kingdom, the VOC entered into a 
shadowy and confusing world that they found hard to fathom. Indeed their political 
dependency could be said to have increased when they tried to reinterpret and abuse the 
reciprocal rules of overlord vassal relations. 
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By the end of the seventeenth century, the political and commercial power of the 
kingdom of Aceh Dar al-Salam might have been restricted to the north of Sumatra, indeed 
only to Banda Aceh; however, Aceh's spiritual and cultural ties to these areas endured. At 
least there is enough evidence to re-examine the claim that Aceh declined by the mid- 
seventeenth century and lost its SWC vassals owing to weak female rulers. Aceh under the 
four Sultanahs did not make deals with the VOC that could jeopardize the kingdom's 
independence as happened in other areas in the archipelago. Internal disputes, succession 
troubles and the need to control their territories and vassals were reasons that made other 
local monarchs bargain away their sovereignty. For example in Mataram, Amangkurat I 
(1646-1677) appealed to the VOC to suppress rebels and regents and gave the Company 
great privileges in return for military support. "' 
The description of Aceh in the last decades of the century by the likes of Bowrey, 
Dampier and de Roy is invaluable. It does not paint a picture of a declining kingdom, which 
succumbed to European incursions, but one that was remarkably resilient. Ord's and 
Cawley's exchange with the Orangkaya Maharajah reveals an individual who was not only <J1 .1 
proud to be an Acehnese but was wining to defend independence till death. 
102 Nagtegaal, `The Dutch East India Company', p. 66. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Features of Female rule in Aceh 
Part I: From Ira et Malevolentia to Pax et Custodia 
Aceh under female monarchs: Ways of Seeing 
Chapter 1 of this thesis shows that the succession of the first female ruler of 
Aceh was sanctioned by adat and Islam. The elite also supported the second female 
ruler, Nakiatuddin Syah. Although there was some opposition to the accession of the 
third and fourth female rulers, the third ruler, Zakiatuddin Syah, ruled peacefully till her 
death in 1688. The reign of the last queen, Kamalat Syah, though peaceful, saw growing 
opposition from a group who regarded female rule as forbidden in Islam. Pressures 
from this group and afatwa purportedly produced from the Shariff of Mekah stating that 
a woman cannot rule in Islam led to the deposition of Sultanah Kamalat Syah in 1699. 
This raises important questions about female leadership from the viewpoints of 
religion, adat and patriarchy: Where did the Sultanahs fit in the narration of kings and 
the formulation of kingship? This chapter examines how indigenous writers depicted 
female rulers and to what extent European sources confirmed or echoed their views. 
A brief introduction on the literature regarding female status and roles in general 
in the Malay world is in order, followed by an examination of Malay and Muslim ideas on 
leadership. 
Status of Women in the Malay World 
George Coedes listed the importance of the role conferred on women and of 
relationships in the maternal line as characteristics illustrating the unity of the region he 
termed "Farther India". O. W. Wolters remarked on the concept of cognatic kinship as a 
well-represented feature of social organization in the region., Anthony Reid argued that 
women's relative autonomy and prominence in marketing, agriculture and ritual 
represented one aspect of a social system where a distinctive Southeast Asian pattern was 
I O. W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Arian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1982), p. 17. 
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especially evident 2 Studies in other disciplines, however, especially literature and 
anthropology, stress tensions between religion and other aspects of culture.; Their 
conclusions are ambivalent: that women were accorded low status when viewed from 
Islam, and represented as weak when viewed from adat laws. There has been very little 
historical study of the subject. I hope to suggest that in historical context - at least, in the 
context explored in this thesis, which deals with female rulers in seventeenth-century 
Aceh, women's status and roles are surprisingly complex. 
Unlike in the west, studies of gender and femininity in Southeast Asia began only 
in the 1990s. Reid's work and Andaya's historical survey, though providing an extremely 
useful overview, are general in nature4 and disagree about the impact of religion and 
custom on the position of women. Barbara Andaya argued that world religions such as 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam relegated women to domestic space, 
reducing their power and their public roles. s Malay Muslim literature, Andaya 
contended, stressed the need for a woman to be obedient and loyal to her husband 
whilst Hinduism demanded total sacrifice, manifested in the practice of *. rutti. 6 Reid 
stated that even the gradual strengthening of the influence of Islam, Christianity and 
Buddhism in over the last four centuries had not eliminated a common pattern of 
relatively high female autonomy and economic importance.? Reid pointed to the high 
value of daughters in Southeast Asian families, including Malay ones; men's recognition 
of women's sexual potency; easy divorce and remarriage for women; and the important 
reproductive role in childbearing, food and clothing, which accorded them magical and 
ritual powers. 8 Cheah Boon Keng 9 surveying powerful and influential women at court 
concurred. One thing is clear from scattered epitaphs that mention queens regnant, 
travellers' observations, court narratives, folklore and European records from the 
2 Reid, Southeast Aria in the Age of Commerce, Vol. 1, p. 146- 
3 For a summary of these studies, see Appendix 1. # 
4 See Reid, Age of Commerce and Barbara Andaya, The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern 
Soutbeast Asia (Honolulu: University Hawaii Press, 2006). 
5 B. Andaya, The Flaming Womb, p. 85. 
6 Barbara Andaya, `The Changing Religious Role of Women in Pre-Modern Southeast Asia, " in 
Representations of Gender, Democracy and Identity Politics in Relation to South Aria ed. by Renuka Sharma (New 
Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1996), p. 114. 
7 Reid, Age of Commerce Vol. 2, p. 629. 
8 Reid, Age of Commerce Vol. 1, p. 149. 
', 9 Cheah Boon Keng, `Power behind the Throne: The Role of Queens and Court Ladies in Malay History 
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the RoyalAsiatic Society, 66 (1993), Part 1, pp. 1-21. 
168 
sixteenth century onwards: politically influential women and female monarchs were not 
rare in this region, especially in Malay/Muslim Southeast Asia. 10 
Leadership in the Malay/Muslim World 
In lands spatially and culturally distant from the heartland of Islam, as in Central 
Asia, Islamic traditions tended to absorb local and regional idiosyncrasies and these in 
turn determined perceptions of leadership and the role of women and their status. " 
Similarly, in the far-flung regions of insular Southeast Asia, writers faced different 
political realities from those of mainland Islam. l2 
Still, Southeast Asia had been always exposed to outside influences through trade 
and migrations. The spread of new political, religious and technological innovations 
brought new ways of seeing and experience. Islam, the widely accepted religion in the 
Malay world in the early modern era, was especially important for Aceh since the 
kingdom was seen as staunchly Islamic and played a major role as an Islamic centre of 
learning in the seventeenth century. 
So it is worth looking at how the Acehnese elite negotiated their Islamic tenets 
with adat on rulership and women's status. There are two key texts. The Kanun Syarak 
Kerajaan Aceh'j laid out rulers' responsibilities as well as the candidate's qualifications 
discussed in Chapter 1. The ruler must uphold Islam, do good deeds for the benefit of 
the kingdom and its subjects, prosper the kingdom through trade, be vigilant of all court 
officials, mediate between court officials who slander and bicker with each other, protect 
the rights of the poor, punish those who disobeyed laws, sack officials who do wrong 
and forgive those who fail innocently. The Taj ur-Salatin10 stated that a ruler must be 
knowledgeable and courageous with a high degree of moral fortitude for he should 
uphold justice and resist worldly temptations. 'S In the tradition of absorbing and 
10 Nisriwani Yahya and Syed Zulflida Noor, eds., 101 Puteri Dunia Me/ayu: S jarah dan Legenda, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Jabatan Muzium dan Antikuiti, 2003). 
"Fatima, The ForgottenQueens of Islam, p. 21. # 
'2 Fatima, The Forgotten Queens of Islam, pp. 88-178. # 
13 Abdullah Sani Usman, Kanun, p. 39. 
"An examination of the structure and writing style of the Taj us-Salatin revealed that the text, perhaps 
consciously, copied the style and political writing tradition of the Islamic world. # 
15 Taj us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 59. 
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reflecting foreign influences in the local context, it was relatively easy to adopt 
mainstream Islamic doctrines, 16 which, while elaborate on the favourable traits kings 
should possess, were silent on the prerequisites of a good queen and implied that a 
leader should necessarily be male. 
Though the Quran and badith do not state that women are forbidden to rule, 
Aisha's legacy shaped early Islamic views. Her disastrous participation in the first civil 
war, resulting in not only her defeat but carnage amongst Muslims, was used as an 
exemplar of how women's involvement in politics would only lead to disaster. Despite 
her prestige as the beloved wife of the Prophet and the mother of all believers, her 
political actions remained a source of censure for Sunni and Shii Muslims alike. This 
common censure evolved into an almost universal Islamic principle, at least in 
mainstream Islamic lands, forbidding women to participate in politics, much less take up 
leadership positions. 17 Even Al- Ghazali, who was sensitive to women's spiritual merits, 
cited manliness, good horsemanship and skills in bearing arms as necessary qualities a 
ruler should possess. 18 Following the tradition set by al-Mawardi, he was severe towards 
women, barring them from holding even subordinate positions, such as those of a vizier, 
minister or judge. 19 Basing his interpretation on a hadith, he believed that power required 
independent reasoning and strength of determination for which women were too frail. 
20 
Feminization of negative attributes also deprived women of the opportunity to 
be considered for leadership roles. 2' Discussions on women and government in the 
third century (A. H. ) presented the defects of women as the greatestfitna a term, which in 
this context referred to all females as a source of temptation or chaos . 
Third-century 
hadith implicitly perceived women as flawed and prone to err. They seriously lacked aqi 
or reason. Powerful definitions of the feminine as dangerous, sinful and irrational set 
the stage for projections of the inevitable outcome when women became involved in 
politics. Since women were inherently flawed, consequences of female leadership or rule 
16 For example, the Hindu idea of divine kingship (chakravartin) prevalent in the region was transformed to 
the Islamic notion of the Khalifah (caliph), shadow of God on Earth. 
17 Denise A. Spellberg, Politics, Gender and the Islamic Part: The lega y ofAisah bin! Abi Bakr, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 137. 
18 Ann K. S. Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam: an introduction to the rtudy of Islamic political theory: the 
jurists, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 121. 
19 Al-Ghazali, Nasihat al-Mu/uk Nasihat kepada Raja-raja [Advice for Kings] translit. by Jelani Harun (Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2006), p. 208. 
20 Women in Islam: A Reader, ed. by Ruth Roded, (Imprint London: I. B. Tauris, 1999) p. 113. # 
21 Spellberg, Politics, Gender and the Islamic Past, p. 142. # 
22 Spellberg, Politics, Gender and the Islamic Past, p. 138. 
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would be decidedly dire. Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) in his "Book of Government or 
Rules for Kings" cited a series of famous females beginning with Eve to confirm the 
disastrous effects of women who gained access to political power. Nizam al-Mulk's view 
was a restatement of third-century perceptions and representative of later medieval 
Islamic views. 
In contrast to the writings and political theories of mainland Islam, the Taj us- 
Salatin concerned itself with theories of female leadership. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
by a distinctly local take on Islamic doctrines, the text helped a female succeed a male 
ruler, albeit with caveats. Following Wolters' analysis of the process of "Indianization" 
in Southeast Asia, I would argue that al Jauhari interpreted, adopted and adapted Islamic 
classical theories on leadership in order to suit them to the indigenous context. 23 This 
`localisation' not only eased acceptance of female rulers but also accorded legitimacy to a 
political situation that might be frowned upon in other more orthodox parts of the 
Islamic world. 
Al Jauhari, who saw female rule as slightly more tolerable than chaos, 24 actually 
detailed the theoretical basis of female leadership in the Malay world in ways that bridged 
adat and Islam. One condition attached to a female ruler in the Taj us-Salatin was that 
she discuss matters with male ministers and heed their advice. On the other hand, a male 
raja was forbidden to discuss matters concerning the kerajaan with women, though kings 
too were encouraged to discuss state matters with their male ministers. " 
Unlike al-Jauhari, who wrote in Aceh in 1603 before the period of female rule, al- 
Raniri had to grapple with this issue while writing the Bustan based on the political reality 
unfolding in front of his very eyes. Although heavily influenced by al-Gazali's Nasihat al- 
Mulk, 26 like al Jauhari, al-Raniri did not view female rule as contrary to Islamic tenets, 
despite following closely the Nasihat's explication on intelligence (aql) and women 
(wanita) 27 Whilst al-Raniri clearly agreed with al-Gazali on women in general, he deviated 
on the leadership position of women. Regardless of whether his praise for his queen, 
Safiatuddin, was due to his dependence on her patronage, his description of her in the 
Bustan as a good ruler attests his acceptance his support. 
23 For a fuller discussion, refer to, O. W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Arian Perjectives. 
24 Taj u. r-Salatin, Khalid, p. 61. 
u Taj ur-Satatin, Khalid, p. 61. 
26 Al-Ghazali Nasihat al-Muluk, Jelani, p. xvii-xviii. # 
27 Al-Ghazali Nasihat al-Muluk, Jelani, p. xxxix. 
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Another court chronicle, the Sulalat Us-Salatin, perhaps set the precedent by 
depicting some ladies at court of the Melakan Sultanate as very influential, even to the 
point of choosing the heir to the Sultan and bendahara. For example, the wife of Sultan 
Muhammad Syah, daughter of Raja Rekan chose her son, Raja Ibrahim to be his heir 
though the Sultan personally preferred Raja Kassim, his other son from another wife. 
According to Tun Sri Lanang, the court chronicler, Raja Ibrahim was named the heir 
because Sultan Muhammad Syah was obeying the wishes of the Raja Perempuan, the 
female king. (Raja Ibrahim dab dirajakan baginda menurut kehendak Raja Perempuan). 28 
From Predatory to Protective Rule 
Theoretical justification aside, how did female rule work in the largely patriarchal 
society of the kingdom of Aceh Dar-al-Salam for fifty-nine years? Were there unique 
features that might set the female monarchs apart from their male counterparts? 
Women rarely transgressed the political sphere, seen as a prerogative of men. So how did 
three queens survive in power till natural death when most male rulers were assassinated 
or deposed at will? How did these female sovereigns deal with their male elite? 
Anthony Reid identified three stages of development in his study of royal power 
in Aceh from c. 1550-1700. Stage one was the period of the great mercantile orangkaya up 
to 1589, followed by the second stage, a period which he identified as "royal absolutism" 
from 1589-1636 and finally stage three, which witnessed the decline of the crown and 
the rise of the three *sagi each ruled by a panglima. 29 Reid argued that the end of royal 
absolutism was a gradual process, where royal decline already set in as early as 1629 with 
the defeat of Iskandar Muda's forces in Melaka. The reduced skill and authority of rulers 
after Iskandar Muda and the growing commercial power of the Dutch speeded the 
decline. Although, there was no immediate change in the system of government, the 
style was quickly transformed by Iskandar Muda's successors, Iskandar Thani and his 
28 S jarah Melayu, Cheah, pp. 130-131. 
29 Reid, `Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. Three Stages: c. 1550-1700', in Pre-Colonial State 
Systems in Southeast Asia, ed. by Anthony Reid and Lance Castles, (Kuala Lumpur: Council of the Malaysian 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975), 45-55, pp. 47-55. 
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widow Safiatuddin who were mild. Royal absolutism30 continued, Reid argued, but 
without the royal jealousy which made life hazardous to the wealthy. " But, in the course 
of Safiatuddin's long reign, Reid claimed that fundamental changes were taking place in 
the balance of power which ultimately produced a radically different state structure. 
Reid's analysis begs several questions. What was the context in which these 
shifts in royal power took place? What were the political institutions like in Aceh in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century? How was power contested during the reigns of the 
female rulers and how did this impact the political order of the kingdom, royal power 
and the fortunes of both the elite and the kingdom? Aceh, like most of the other polities 
in the region, was ruled by a monarch who derived his/her legitimacy from age-old 
customs and tradition, lineage and religion. 32 Temporal and religious powers, in theory, 
rested in the ruler's hands. His royal prerogatives included political appointments and 
ownership of land and resources. Other political institutions were in place to assist the 
ruler in his task of governing the kingdom. It is not known with certainty when these 
institutions were created but Aceh did have executive and legislative councils and a 
judiciary. 33 Customs and religious traditions determined the norms and values of ideal 
leadership and exemplary subject in addition to laying out their codes of conduct, rights 
and responsibilities. The Malay ancient oath of allegiance or social contract was based 
on the ruler's task of manifesting his daulat and the subjects' obligation to obey him and 
never commit derhaka. The prescribed style of governance was one where the ruler and 
elite were engaged in mutual respect and advice. In reality, the ruler was checked by the 
merchant or landed nobility, whose main objectives were to promote their own interests 
and protect their descendents. This situation often brought about a clash of interest and 
a tussle for power and wealth between royalty and nobility, as described by Reid in his 
first two stages (1550-1636). The tension between monarchical prerogative and nobility 
power however, need not necessarily be a zero-sum game. The nature of royal-elite 
relations depended much on the personalities of the rulers and indeed, as will be shown 
30 See Anthony Reid, `Charismatic and Constitutional Queens: Women Rulers in Southern Asia', History 
Today, 53 (2003), 30-35, p. 35. 
31 Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh', p. 52. 
32 For a more general discussion on features of monarchy see, W. M Spellman, Monarchies 1000-2000, 
(London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2001) p. 17. 
33 See Van Langen, De Inrichting van hetAjehshe Staatrbertuur, p. iv. See also A. Hasjmy, IskandarMuda 
MeukutaAlam, Qakarta: Penerbit Bulan Bintang, 1975), pp. 70-73. These institutions are dealt with in 
greater detail in the following sections. # 
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below, royal-elite relations could be a mutually beneficial one characterised by 
interdependence and patronage. 
The nature of power and how it was wielded in Aceh depended much on the 
personalities and style of leadership of the rulers concerned and the circumstances in 
which the kingdom found itself. The personal nature of the system made it more fluid 
and dynamic where powers contracted and expanded and institutional lines blurred. A 
reduction in royal power need not necessarily signify its decline. Similarly, royal 
absolutism34 might exist in theory but in reality absolutism was limited by circumstances 
such as the nobility, the rulers' personalities, and provincial or local conditions. 
Provincial leaders could still temper a strong ruler such as Iskandar Muda since control 
of farther outlying territories and men raised for war came under their influence. 35 For 
example, local elites in SWC, unhappy with the trade conditions imposed by Iskandar 
Muda, requested a change of allegiance from Aceh to the VOC in Batavia even when 
they were supposedly under the yoke of this mighty king. "Absolutist states" could be 
fragile since besides force of personality, wealth and coercion, no lasting institutions or 
rule of law supported them. Iskandar Muda's "absolutism" was in itself a function of his 
personality and a reaction to the powers wielded by the orangkaya earlier. Being insecure 
as he would be because of the potential ability of the elite to dethrone or even 
assassinate him, as happened before to his predecessors, Iskandar Muda resorted to the 
use of force to strike fear and obedience into the hearts of his elite. His insecure yet 
showy disposition further inclined him to resort to terror and violent executions of those 
who dared to defy him, which made him more of a despot than an absolute monarch. " 
His son-in-law, Iskandar Thani was not as mild as he was commonly depicted. 
Indeed his style of leadership displayed many similarities to that of his predecessor. His 
violent executions of those who threatened him were testimony to his cruel streak. 
Iskandar Thani however was not able to protect himself as effectively as Iskandar Muda; 
his short-lived reign and his highly suspicious and unexpected death proved this. He was 
34 Reid, `Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh', pp. 45-55. Also, Kathirithamby-Wells, 
`Restraints on the Development of Merchant Capitalism in Southeast Asia before c. 1 800', in Southeast Asia 
in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief, ed. by Anthony Reid, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
p. 125. 
35 According to Beaulieu, even during Iskandar Muda's absolute reign, besides the senior orangkaya at the 
capital, there was a group of orangkaya who lived in their nanggeve where they had jurisdiction and authority 
over the inhabitants although they had to pay tribute to the ruler; quoted from Ito, The World of the Adat 
Aceh', p. 62. See also Beaulieu, `Memoires', p. 107. 
36 Spellman, Monarchies, p. 20. # 
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perhaps also seen as being too dangerous and was a potential source of instability to the 
kingdom. Internally, he supported al-Raniri's more orthodox religious stance and 
allowed him to undertake a bloody and divisive purge of Hamzah Fansuri and Sheikh 
Syamsudin's followers. Externally, despite the VOC's more threatening position for 
Aceh after the conquest of Melaka, he was also making the Dutch unhappy and irritated 
with his refusal to accept and pay for some very expensive jewels he had ordered. A 
despot but one as unstable as Iskandar Thani would just bring more harm to the 
kingdom. Iskandar Muda, though cruel and arbitrary were not putting the kingdom in 
harm's way. Furthermore, Iskandar Muda was a "son of the soil", where Iskandar Thani 
was a foreigner. Iskandar Thani was neither supported by his orangkaya not was he 
feared. 
Under Aceh's female rulers, I detect a different leadership style. Both Iskandar 
Muda and Iskandar Thani exhibited a style that could be described as characterised by 
wrath and malevolence (ira et malevolentia). This does not merely signify subjective mood 
but a system where a king could consciously and explicitly decide to deal with those who 
offended him by distraint to ensure obedience. 7 Royal anger could effectively though 
not technically put a man outside the law. " The personalities of subsequent rulers and 
the circumstances of Aceh after 1641 brought about a different style of leadership - 
more benevolent and moral. In contrast to predecessors who tended to be predatory 
and punitive, the female sovereigns were more peaceful and protective of their subjects 
(pax et custodia). 39 Whether rule based on coercion and fear was much more expensive 
and difficult to execute, or whether it was perhaps naturally offensive to women, Aceh's 
female rulers preferred to ensure support based on rewards and a sharing of the 
kingdom's wealth to promote a collective stake in the kingdom's survival. Indeed, under 
its female sovereigns, Aceh saw its longest period of peace and prosperity. A workable 
relationship based on co-operation between royalty and the nobility replaced the 
perpetual conflict that characterised royal-elite relations under earlier male kings. 
37 Robert Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075-1225, (New York: Oxford University 
Press Inc., 2000), p. 48. 
38 J. E A. Jolliffe, Angevin Kin ship, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1955), pp. 96-98. 
39 Pax et custodia is the counterpart of ita et malevolentia, see Jolliffe, Angevin Kingship, p. 97. 
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Queens Worthy of their Thrones 
The VOC official, Jacob Compostel once described Safiatuddin as having more 
royal worth than her predecessors. "' His contemporary, the indigenous ulama al-Raniri 
echoed this positive view of the Sultanah. Al-Raniri stated that Sultanah Safiatuddin 
demonstrated exemplary conduct; she was merciful to her subjects and was a blessing to 
the indigent. She loved her subjects as a mother would her children. She loved and 
respected the ulama and all the descendents of the Prophet and accorded them rewards 
and gifts. 41 It is rare praise indeed that both men, so culturally apart, could come to a 
similar assessment of a female sovereign, when it was not fashionable to discriminate in 
favour of women. This section illustrates that female rule in Aceh did manifest, to a 
large extent, the political ideals laid out in indigenous political treatises such as the Taj us- 
Salatin and the Bustan us-Salatin. 
The idea that rulers needed to share responsibilities with their ministers and to 
discuss matters of state with them was not merely a customary ideal but also a religious 
one. This responsibility of the ruler stated in the Taj us-Salatin was reinforced in the 
Bustan us- Salatin. Women rulers were especially encouraged to do this. The "Jewel 
Affair" illustrates the decision-making process at court under the Sultanah during 
audience days. This signalled a distinct departure from the period under her male 
predecessors. One main feature was the involvement of the orangkaya in through 
muafakat. This custom of muafakat had been practised in Aceh and instilled in the minds 
of its people from the simple villager to the nobility at court. 42 This age-old decision- 
making process was revived by Safiatuddin and adopted by her female successors. 
In the early years of Safiatuddin's reign, she allowed the orangkaya free access to 
the inner court, formerly restricted under her male predecessors. 43 According to Ito, 
during the reign of Iskandar Muda, it was not clear that the orangkaya had to be present at 
court regularly. The orangkaya's duty was to keep guard of the Dalam (palace quarters) 
every third day and night. Except for a few senior orangkaya who would be summoned 
40 Chijs, Dagh-Regirter, 1641-1642, p. 123. 
41 This is my translation of the text. See Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 43. See also Bustan, Iskandar, p. 59. 
42 See Snouck Hurgronje, TheAcehnese, trans. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan, (Leiden: E . J. Brill, 
1906) pp. 64-77. # 
43 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 31. Quoted from Beaulieu, `Memoires', pp. 49-50,102-103. This 
may sound to be a strange practice under female rulers, but this writer suggests that under male rulers, the 
harem would be the private quarter whilst under a female ruler; the harem would no longer be in existence. 
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ad hoc to the royal presence there were no court audiences except on state and religious 
occasions. There was no need to hold audiences regularly under Iskandar Muda. 4a 
Jan de Meere first mentioned a Saturday audience in 1640 when he visited Iskandar 
Thani at court. This practice was, however, institutionalised by Sultanah Safiatuddin 
since Dutch envoys mentioned the weekly Saturday audiences under her reign, and 
continued under her successors. 45 Two English envoys who visited Aceh in 1684 noted 
that every Saturday, the orangkaya met at the palace where all that had any business would 
come and appear before the Sultanah. 46 Here, all matters were heard and determined 
and the orangkaya were silent unless the Queen called upon them. 47 Saturday audiences 
were held regularly and would be cancelled only during heavy rain and flooding and 
when they fell during important religious and state festivities. Sunday audiences then 
replaced them. The Sultanah and her orangkaya were absent only because of illness. " 
Many important matters were debated, discussed and decisions made through a 
consensus and affirmed by all in attendance with the word, daulat, during these 
audiences. Indeed, the seating order of the state officials based on rank was first 
regularised and established under Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah. 49 
This regularised decision-making process did not make the Aceh court free from 
behind-the-scenes power struggles. As seen in the previous sections, Company officials 
reported intrigues, rumours, scandals, coups, counter-coups and assassinations. Many 
affairs were discussed outside the audience hall at court, in the shadows of the corridors 
and in the houses of the different orangkaya, in secret and in the darkness of the night 
away from the knowing eyes of the enemies and their followers. These power-struggles 
were played out before they were arbitrated at court. The Company officials also 
lobbied the different orangkaya with numerous gifts and always ensured that they knew 
who the Company's friends were, before their affairs were brought up in court. These 
manoeuvrings helped to determine when and how Company matters were brought up 
44 Ito, The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 32. 
as Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 32,43. This practice was mentioned right up until 1660, the last 
year when the Dagh-Registers of the Company Commissars are available. 
46 A. Farrington, 'Negotiations at Aceh in 1684: An unpublished English document', Indonesia and the Malay 
World, 27.77 (1999), 19-32, p. 25. 
47 Farrington, `Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 25. 
4$ The Company officials attending court would faithfully report on who was present during these 
audiences and who was sick, especially when the Company affairs were discussed on the Audience Days. 
49 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 44. See also AdatAceh, transliterated by Ramli Harun and Tjut 
Rahmah, aakarta: Departement Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1985), p. 69. 
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during audience days and by whom. On audience days, arbitration was finally made and 
the Sultanah still held the final say, which was still the mark of legitimacy. so 
The Dutch factors who were present at the court observed that jealousies were 
kept hidden and the Sultanah was successful in maintaining peace and authority as the 
final arbiter. 51 The coup and counter-coup of the 1650s showed that whilst the orangkaya 
factions were killing each other, the Sultanah intervened at the crucial moments to 
prevent matters from getting of hand. Her presence was necessary to restore stability 
and legitimacy. This suggests that the Sultanah was not a mere figurehead, restrained by 
obligations to the nobility. The queen's presence, on the contrary, was crucial to prevent 
jealousies and factionalism among the nobility from degenerating into civil wars that 
could have consigned Aceh to the fate of other polities in the region. In a private 
confession to a Dutch factor, one of the orangkaya admitted that he would not be able to 
last for even an hour without the Sultanah since he had so many enemies. 52 
Pieter Sourij remarked in 1642 that the Acehnese at the time were subject to a 
<eer debonnaire echter ontraghel jk government and each of the Councillors of the kingdom 
were respected as a king without which counsel and advice the queen could not 
perform. 53 Pieter Sourij's observation captured the essence of Sultanah Safiatuddin's 
reign - benevolent but not weak. This remark also revealed the interdependent and 
reciprocal nature of the Sultanah and her elite. Not all Dutch officials held such a 
positive view of the Sultanah's reign. In the same year, Pieter Willemszoon who 
remained in Aceh after the departure of Pieter Sourij, noted how the orangkaya were so 
factionalised that they shunned each other and their followers were very suspicious of 
each other. Pieter Willemszoon predicted that this government would not last long in 
peace under the "soft and gentle" government of the queen. He reasoned that this "bold 
and strong" nation had to be ruled the hard way. The more fear and awe the elite should 
know, he commented, the less resistance they would pose. 54 Willemszoon's prediction 
50 In 1643, Pieter Sourij advised that the Dutch must be contented with the Queen's verbal orders and that 
the Dutch should not always demand a written contract. He wrote that the Queen was an absolute queen 
and her words and verbal orders remain to be law. NA, f. 680R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij, 
1643. 
51 Chijs, Dagb-Register, 1641-42, pp. 96,123. 
52 NA, VOC 1143, ff. 559V-560R. Dagh-Register of Pieter Sourij, 15 Mei-18 August, 1642. 
53 NA, f. 565V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij gedeputeert als Commissaris in legatie aen de 
Coninginne van Atchin 15 Mei-18 Aug 1642. # 
54 NA, f. 511 V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
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did not come true since Sultanah Safiatuddin went on to rule for another thirty-three 
years. 
By the last decade of the seventeenth century, the kingdom of Aceh had evolved 
from a monarchy based on fear to one characterised by voluntary association based on 
rewards and consensus gathering. Jacob de Roy, a Dutch private trader who resided in 
Aceh at that time, went to the extent of even describing the kingdom as a "republic. " 
Though the term "republic" might be an exaggeration, Sultanah Kamalat, he wrote, "is a 
queen that presumes an unlimited power and authority and convenes the Assembly but 
she is obliged to wait for a favourable resolution from the majority of her courtiers. "IS 
The institution of "queenship" appeared to have been firmly established in the kingdom 
after a few decades of female rule. In the 1670's, Thomas Bowrey observed that Aceh 
had for a considerable amount of time been governed by a Queen that the very title of 
King proved to be nauseous to them. 56 In the 1680's, William Dampier noted that the 
English residents there were of the opinion that a Queen had ruled Aceh since the 
beginning, from the antiquity of the present constitution, it was believed that the Queen 
of Sheba was the queen of this country. 57 Bowrey explained that the men who served 
under her office were all very submissive and respectful to the Queen, not daring to do 
anything until they had thoroughly acquainted her regarding the matter. And if she 
agreed, she sent her chap as a signal of her permission to their request. 58 There was, 
however, a conflict of opinion among European observers. William Dampier, who 
resided in Aceh in 1689, observed that though her subjects respected and revered her, 
the Queen had little power or authority and was more of a figurehead with power resting 
in the hands of the orangkaya. 59 Dampier however provided no evidence for his opinion. 
Takeshi Ito, in his study of the Sultanate of Aceh in the seventeenth century, 
observed "the Sultanate under Safiyyat al-Din was undermined by the Dutch who 
pursued an aggressive commercial policy and promoted the disintegration of political 
unity and royal power by causing discord and at times power struggles amongst senior 
ss Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy to Borneo and Atcheen, 1691. Completed in 1698 in Batavia at the order 
of William van Oudtshoorn, Governor-General of Netherlands East Indies. Translated from Dutch into 
English in 1816. BL, India Office Records: MSS Eur/Mack (1822)/5, p. 366. 
56 Thomas Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount of the Countries around the Bay of Bengal, 1669.1679. Series edited by 
R. C. Temple, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1905), pp. 295-6. 
57 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, p. 99. 
58 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, pp. 299-300. 
59 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, p. 100. 
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orangkayd'. 60 Ito however conceded that "despite this shrinkage of political power under 
the four successive female rulers, the Sultanahs, though playing the role more or less of 
figureheads still maintained their honour and dignity and even exerted, to a certain 
extent, an influence on Aceh's political life. This was particularly true for the case of 
Safiyyat al-Din. "61 Many other writers such as Marsden, and more recent ones such as 
Mulaika Hijjas and Auni Luthfi however, viewed these female monarchs as having very 
little to do with governance since this was left in the hands of the orangkaya. 62 
Ito argued that factionalism brought political disunity and decline of the 
kingdom. Thus far, there is no conclusive evidence pointing to either the decline of 
royal power or the kingdom under these female sovereigns. Based on contemporary 
sources, Aceh was a peaceful and prosperous kingdom and its harbour was still thriving 
by the end of the century. 63 The Dutch or any other power could easily exploit the 
differences amongst the orangkaya to advance their interests at court. Viewed from 
another perspective, however, such factions represented the plurality of interests in the 
kingdom, which contributed to the check and balance on one another with the Sultanah 
acting as the final arbiter and balancer. Indeed, factionalism within the ranks of the 
orannkaya had been a permanent feature of the kingdom. As the Jewel and Perak Affairs 
illustrated, the Dutch demands split the elite because they differed as to how they should 
respond to these pressures. These differences nevertheless, did not bring about a 
political disintegration since these elites and the Sultanah had to compromise for the 
sake of the kingdom. Factionalism existed before the female sovereigns came to power 
and before the period of Dutch aggressive commercial pressures. For example, the 
orangkaya were plagued by the violent religious debates and were hopelessly disunited 
during the reigns of Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani. The success of the ruler lay in 
how he or she managed these divisions. Under the female sovereigns, royal power might 
be limited but it did not decline. This balancer and arbiter role played by Sultanah 
Safiatuddin served to enhance her unique position and her survivability on the throne for 
thirty-five years. 
60 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 103-104. 
61 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 120. 
62 See Marsden, `History of Sumatra', p. 447. Mulaika Hijjas, `The Woman Raja', p. 69. # 
63 See p. 242. 
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Another political feature introduced during the reign of female rulers was the 
institution of the three sagi. The smallest socio-political unit in Aceh was the *gampung, 
followed by the *muqim, then the *nanggroe/negeri headed by an uleebalan& a commander- 
in-chief of sorts. The highest level was the sagi, headed by a Panglima 64 There are a few 
versions as to the sagi's establishment. One was that it was established long before the 
time of the female rulers, another- during the time of either the first or the second 
Sultanah. 65 The other intriguing question was whether this was instituted by the ruler or 
by the powerful uleebalang of the district. According to Reid, Naqiatuddin Syah's reign 
brought a shift in the balance of power from the royal capital to the provinces, especially 
in the upland region of Aceh, which saw the creation of the institution of the three sagi 
consisting of mukim 22,25 and 26. Reid suggested that the illegitimate son of Iskandar 
Muda who headed the 22 muqim, established the sagi. This in turn brought about the 
formation of the other two lowland sagi, which changed the economic strength of the 
kingdom in favour of rural Aceh. 66 Reid claimed that this sagt became a source of 
political opposition to female rule. They also posed an economic challenge to the port- 
capital since they based their economic power on rice cultivation, which according to 
Reid appeared to be on the increase in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Reid 
argued that these men from the muqim 22 succeeded in overthrowing the fourth queen, 
Kamalat Syah, aided by a letter from Mekah forbidding female rule 67 Faced with this 
disruptive challenge from the interior and coupled with decreased trade because of 
Dutch pressures, Reid concluded that the promising movement towards institutionalised 
government broke down. 68 
Contrary to Reid, Veltman argued that the sagi came into being in all probability 
during the reign of Safiatuddin Syah with the aim of forming a counter-federation against 
the nobility and then assumed its more definite form during the reign of Naqiatuddin 
Syah when the sagi came to be headed by its own Panglima 69 Van Langen argued that 
Sultanah Naqiatuddin had formed the three sagi under a Panglima each, as an attempt to 
64 For a detailed explanation of the workings of the mukim, nanggroe and sagi, see Ito, `The World of the 
Adat Aceh', pp. 57-78. 
65 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 19,70. AdatAceh, transliterated by Ramli Harun and Tjut 
Rahmah, p. 29. # 
66 Reid, `Trade and the Problem of Royal Power', pp. 53-54. 
67 Reid, `Trade and the Problem of Royal Power', p. 54. 
68 Reid, `Trade and the Problem of Royal Power', p. 55. 
69 Veltman, Nota over thegeschiedenis, pp. 67-68. 
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centralize the administration of Eastern, Western and Southern Aceh. Although no 
information is available as to who these Panglima were and how they were appointed, 
Van Langen asserted that the Panglima were to execute royal orders and ensure that 
these were carried out by the numerous uleebalang in the nanggroe. 7° 
Ito pointed out that the institution of three sagi was most probably created during 
the reign of Safiatuddin because in the dagh-register of Pieter Sourij of 1643, he mentioned 
the driegemeenten (three municipalities) of the capital, in relation to the disappearance of a 
ship's crew member. This was in contrast to the description by Beaulieu in 1621 where 
the capital was divided into four districts, each under a Penghulu Kawal, for the 
maintenance of law and order. " 
An old manuscript, Peta Aceb dan susunan kabinet pemerintahan Aceb describing the 
court of Aceh and its institutions during the time of Iskandar Muda mentioned the three 
sagi consisting of mukims 22,25 and 26 72 This shows that this institution might have 
been formed during the reign of Iskandar Muda or pre-dated his rule. There has been 
no mention, however, thus far that Iskandar Muda ever used this institution. Given his 
centralizing and despotic style, this is not surprising. If this is indeed the case, in most 
probability Sultanah Safiatuddin did not initiate the creation of the . ragi 
but she was 
responsible for reviving the sagi in her effort to reorganise administration at the 
provincial level. 
In the first few years of her reign, Sultanah Safiatuddin had repossessed the lands 
granted to some orangkaya by her husband and redistributed them according to earlier 
grants made by her father Iskandar Muda. Based on her policy of rewarding certain 
orangkaya, she would most likely reward the orangkaya of her choice with these 
repossessed lands. A *sarakata, recorded that in 1613, Iskandar Muda granted a certain 
orangkaya by the name of Orangkaya Teuku Bahra an area consisting of six mukims in 
Samalanga, in the north coast. Sultanah Safiatuddin confirmed this orangkaya's right 
over this territory under the title Seri Paduka Tuan Seberang. She also appointed him as 
the Panglima Bandar, executive administrator of foreign traders and the port of Aceh 
during her reign. This was a new position created under Safiatuddin in a move to reduce 
70 Van Langen, De Inrichting van het AtJ'ebsche Staatsbestuur, p. 14 
71 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 70-71. 
72 Peta Aceb dan susunan kabinet pemerintahan Aceh [Map ofAceh andAceb Cabinet line-up] MS 4, (Kuala 
Lumpur; Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Tun Sri Lanang Library). 
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the responsibilities and powers of the anti-Dutch Laksamana 73 Before this, under 
Iskandar Muda, the Laksamana was in charge of security of the palace and the city 
including the port. When Orangkaya Teuku Bahra died in 1658, his son, Teuku Cik di 
Blang succeeded him 74 This showed that the Sultanah was no mere figurehead without 
right to make appointments, contrary to other writer's, such as Marsden's, claims. 
Furthermore, royal power was said to decline under female rulers because other writers 
claimed that the position of some orangkaya became hereditary, which meant that the 
ruler lost the right to appoint. It is not clear in this case whether the Sultanah granted 
this hereditary right, but it appeared that by keeping this position within the Teuku 
Bahra's family, the Sultanah was ensuring this orannkaya family's loyalty for her. 
Another incident which showed that the Sultanah was repossessing and 
redistributing land to new stakeholders was in October 1642, when a dispute arose 
between Sri Bijaya, (the Sultanah's eunuch in charge of the queen's book-keeping of the 
revenue derived from her lands) and a *tandil. A month later, the Sultanah resolved the 
issue by reclaiming all the land situated around Pidie ceded by her husband, Iskandar 
Thani and reconfirmed those grants made by her father, Iskandar Muda as lawful. The 
Sultanah charged the Panglima of Pidie to carry this into effect. " Yet, another incident 
was even more telling in illustrating that the Sultanah used land grants to reward her 
supporters. As mentioned in the previous section, the Sultanah adopted a pro-Dutch 
policy during the earlier years of her reign. Whilst the Lebai Kita Kali supported her, the 
Orangkaya Laksamana and the Maharaja Sri Maharajah and their followers were anti- 
Dutch. In November 1642, the Laksamana accused the Sultanah's eunuchs of 
dispossessing a certain person of his land granted by Iskandar Thani after what he 
deemed only as a perfunctory examination. The Sultanah granted this land to one 
uleebalang. The Maharajah Sri Maharajah's, (the most senior orangkaya) own attempt at 
possessing some land for himself at Pidie was thwarted by the Sultanah. He had even 
built a canal for irrigation through these royal estates without asking the Sultanah's 
73 Recall in the previous chapter how the Laksamana was anti-Dutch and opposed the Sultanah's policy of 
conciliation with the VOC. 
74 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 60-61. According to Ito, the sarakata referred to here was first 
brought to attention by Tichelman. The sarakata was probably issued during the reign of Jamal al-Alain 
Badr al-Munir (1703-1726). Quoted from Ito, `Tichelman "Een Atjehnese Sarakata (afschrift van een 
besluit van Iskandar Muda", in T#dschrift voor Indische Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde uitgeeven door het Bataviaarch 
Genootrchap van Kunst en Vetenschappen, 73 (1933), pp. 368-373. 
75 NA, f. 520V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
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permission. The Sultanah was furious and reprimanded him harshly. Unlike her father, 
however, it was enough that he soothed her wrath by apologising with his hands on his 
head for two hours. 76 
Even during Iskandar Muda's "absolute" reign, there was a group of senior 
sdiction and orangkaya at the capital and those in their nanggroe who commanded juri 
authority over their inhabitants although they paid tribute to the ruler. 
' Therefore, 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's possession and redistribution of lands was an attempt to bring the 
disparate areas under these commanders around the capital to be reorganised and 
streamlined. More importantly, by redistributing land and position to the orangkaya of 
her choice, Sultanah Safiatuddin was making sure that she received the necessary support 
and loyalty from them. 
It is not surprising then that her successor, Nakiatuddin Syah continued and 
institutionalised the three sagi formed by Safiatuddin Syah. As Van Langen argued, three 
Panglima Sagi were appointed to centralize administration in the provinces and to ensure 
that the uleebalang in the various nangroe execute the Sultanah's orders. He further added 
that these Panglima were not elected from their own people but they were from the royal 
family. The illegitimate son of Iskandar Muda, called Panglima Polem, became the 
Panglima Sagi of 22 mugim. '$ 
Very little evidence can be gleaned as to the effect of this new feature on the 
workings of the government. Whether this helped to increase or decrease royal power 
or whether it helped to centralize or decentralize political power. One thing is however 
clear, the formation and institutionalization of the three sagi survived the four Sultanah 
79 
It appears that these Panglima supported and accepted these female monarchs since 
there was no attempt on their part to depose these female rulers except for a few token 
protests from mukim 22. The same could not be said of these Panglima after their 
deaths. In the eighteenth century, these three Panglima, Muda Setia, Imam Muda and 
Perbawang Syah, when in agreement could set up and depose kings. "' To illustrate, 
Sultan Jamal al-Alan (r. 1703-1723) tried to bring one of the Panglima Sagi, Muda Setia 
76 NA, f. 527R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz.. Under Iskandar 
Muda, this Maharajah would probably lose his head. 
77 Quoted from Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 62. Beaulieu, "Memoires", p. 107. 
78 Van Langen, De Inrichtinn van bet A jehsche Staatsbestuur, p. 15 
79 The institution of the Panglima Sagi played the most significant roles in the political life of the Sultanate 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ito, 'he World of the Adat Aceh', p. 60. 
80 Marsden, `History of Sumatra', p. 457. 
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of the 22 Muqim under his control because this Panglima, according to him, had given 
him umbrage. The Panglima retaliated and the Sultan had to retreat and was finally 
deposed. The Three Panglima set up a Panglima Maharaja, with the title Johar al-Alam, 
as his successor. After seven days in power, this king was afflicted with a convulsive 
neck disorder and died. The nephew of Jamal al-Alam named Undei Tebang, having 
bribed the Three Panglima with thirty cattier of gold was placed on the throne. After 
allowing him the dignity of enjoying his throne for a few days, the Panglima deposed 
him. 81 
To summarize, female rulers engaged the process of collaboration between 
royalty and nobility and this became one main feature of the political system. Decision- 
making was through the process of muryawarah/muafakat. Collaboration did not signify 
the weakness of these queens indeed given the ideal of Malay leadership that even a king 
should discuss and take the advice of their Ministers, these queens were exemplary. 
Indeed, it made good political sense too. Most, if not all, local rulers had to rule over or 
rule by means of their elite or orangkaya, who had the wealth to support themselves and 
their armed followers. These elite also had a high sense of dignity and honour 
concerning their rights as individuals in the kingdom and their responsibilities towards 
their ruler and kingdom. It was not surprising that they displayed resentment or even 
violent opposition towards rulers who violated their rights and honour. 82 A ruler who 
respected these would be recognised as worthy to remain as their sovereign till death. 
The main task of a ruler was to manage the elite. The queens were successful in 
this to a large extent by giving patronage to encourage loyalty and service. Nevertheless, 
when necessary, they were also successful in withholding reward, by showing disfavour 
as a form of reprimand. Sultanah Safiatuddin did this expertly when the Orangkaya 
Maharajah took her best lands without her permission. 83 She was also able to survive by 
astutely balancing the factions of her elite and when necessary made a tactical retreat to 
prevent the formation of a sizeable opposition faction. Her actions during the Perak 
Affair amply demonstrated this. Sometimes it was even necessary to tolerate greed and 
81 Marsden, `History of Sumatra', p. 458. 
82 Bartlett discussed different types of nobility opposition to threats from royal government. Bartlett, 
England under the Norman and Angetvin Kings, p. 51. 
83 Raja Ijau of Patani also had an interesting way of dealing with her orangkaya who opposed her rule. 
Hikayat Patani, Siti Hawa, pp. 29-31 .# 
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violence to turn enemies into friends. This does not signify weakness but political 
astuteness and judgement, on which the ruler's survival depends 84 
Audience days and administration of the capital were also regularised and 
reorganised by the first and second Sultanah, which survived not only their rule but their 
successors as well. This helped to engender the peace and stability that characterized 
their reigns. The assassinations and frequent toppling of the ruler and the orangkaya and 
the perpetual fear and suspicion between royalty and nobility that characterized the 
period in the sixteenth century were minimized during the reign of these female rulers. 
Indeed, the period of female rule saw the most successful co-operative relationship 
between royalty and nobility. All three female rulers ended their reigns by natural deaths 
except for the fourth. With the ascendance of male rulers once more from 1699 
onwards, the aggressive and violent contest for power in the form of frequent 
depositions and assassinations of unpopular Sultans became a feature of the political 
system once again in eighteenth century Aceh. BS Collaborative rule during the reigns of 
female rulers brought about the strengthening of the political system and greater stability 
and peace to the kingdom. 
Women and Wealth 
The port of Aceh al-Raniri related in the Bustan us-Salatin was never quiet during 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's reign, being very busy with ships, junks and boats from many 
other lands that came to trade in Aceh. He elaborated that under her rule, food items 
were cheap and the kingdom was prosperous. " Al-Raniri mentioned the important find 
of abundant gold deposits during the rule of the Sultanah and claimed this increased the 
revenue of her kingdom. 87 
Aceh's main exports were the goods obtained from its dependencies of Sumatra 
West Coast and the Malay Peninsula especially tin and pepper. Aceh's most valuable 
94 Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, p. 58. 
85 Badr al-Alam Sharif Hashim who replaced Kamalat Ayah was himself induced to abdicate after a mere 
two years in power. Of the eight kings who succeeded him, only one died a natural death. Thomas 
Braddell, `On the History of Acheen', Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, 5 (1851) pp. 15-25, 
(p. 20). Badr al-Alam's successor, Perkasa Alam was deposed after one year in power. His successor, Jamal 
al-Alam though managed to rule until 1723 was also deposed. Marsden,, `History of Sumatra', pp. 455, 
458. 
86Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 43. 
87 Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 63. 
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mineral source, however, was gold. Gold was discovered in several mountains during 
the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin, and were mined with the outmost care that no 
foreigners were allowed to know or set foot here. De Roy attested that as late as the 
1690's, gold was still exported in very large quantities from three excellent goldmines. 88 
Acehnese coins (ma) were minted and the Sultanah had the right to coin money without 
any interference from her ministers. Each of the Sultanahs had their own coins minted 
and inscribed with their titles on the face of the coins and their names on the reverse 
side. 89 The Acehnese themselves were reputed to be richer than most because of these 
goldmines and the frequent visits by foreigners. In 1696, the largest of ships carrying 
merchandise to Aceh would be emptied in the course of three months due to the high 
level of consumption, every article being sold promptly and paid in ready money or gold 
dust. 90 
In his study of the AdatAceh, Ito concluded that the structure and offices of the 
port of Aceh Dar al-Salam came to be in place during the reign of Iskandar Muda and 
that by 1621, "the bureaucratic system of the port administration had reached a level of 
stability 91 Before 1621, the main areas of administration came under the secretariat 
under the charge of a Penghulu Kerkun, taking care of the ruler's interests including 
taxable goods and the customs house officials. The policing officials in charge of law 
and order were under the Penghulu Kawal. During Iskandar Muda's reign, both duties, 
i. e. protecting the ruler's interest and the overall supervision of the port were centralised 
in the hands of the most senior representative of the ruler, the Laksamana. It was also 
the Laksamana's duty to provide foreigners trading in Aceh protection and assistance. 
According to Ito, no significant change was made to the working of the port 
bureaucracy, except for one noticeable modification during the reign of Sultanah 
Safiatuddin. 92 In 1641, the duties of the Laksamana were divided into two and a new 
position, the Panglima Bandar was created. This Panglima Bandar was tasked with 
matters related to trade, foreign merchants and the west coast pepper trade. This was 
the sole responsibility of the Laksamana earlier. Thus, half of the Laksamana's duties 
88 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, pp. 84-89. Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy, p. 356. 
89 Ibrahim Alfian, Mata Uang EmasKerajaan-Kerajaan di Aceb [Gold coins of the Aceh Kerajaan], (Projek 
Rehabilitasi dan Perluasan Museum Daerah Istimewa Aceh, 1979), p. 45. 
90 Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy to Borneo and Atcheen, 1691, p. 361. 
91 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 278-279,284. For a detailed description of the port officials, 
refer to Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 276-324. # 
92 Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 291. 
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and therefore power, were taken away from him. The Laksamana, now also known as 
the Panglima Dalam would be in charge of policing and security. The post of Panglima 
Bandar went to none other than the earlier mentioned Orangkaya Seri Paduka Seberang 
and he held this post until his death in 1658. Therefore, Sultanah Safiatuddin ensured 
that the orangkaya in-charge of foreigners would be one who supported her policies 
towards foreigners, especially the Dutch. As mentioned before, the Laksamana at that 
time belonged to the anti-Dutch faction. This is contrary to Ito's observation that this 
change was insignificant, "nothing more than a demarcation of the dual function of the 
Laksamana". 93 In a similar move, the Sultanah appointed her half brother, who was the 
Kadhi Malik al-Adil, known to the Dutch as Lebei Kita Kali, the Company's good friend, 
to the position of Orang Kaya Maharaja Sri Maharaja in 1645. This was when anti- 
Dutch sentiments in Aceh were high due to the Company's blockade of Perak and Aceh 
harbours. It is not known what happened to the existing Maharajah but it appears that 
the Lebei's son took over his position as the Kadhi. 
The policy of welcoming traders from all nations and guaranteeing their security 
of life and property was an important feature of female rule in Aceh. 94 To this end, the 
Acehnese were concerned to facilitate trade and prevent capital flight. When the city 
was besieged by men from the hinterlands opposing the accession of the third queen, 
Dampier wrote, "the Shabander sent to the Foreigners, and desired them to keep in their 
own Houses in the night, and told them, that whatever might happen in the City by their 
own civil Broyls, yet no harm should come to them. "95 Sultanah Safiatuddin also granted 
foreigners a considerable degree of freedom. In 1668, she granted permission to the 
Franciscans to build a church and establish a mission in Aceh. Kamalat Syah even 
ensured the protection of private merchants besides the employees of the European 
Companies. Once, the EIC requested the queen to extradite an English merchant to 
Madras to be put on trial for some misdeeds he committed. This request was refused. 
In addition, the Sultanah was reported to have generously provided help to a Dutch ship, 
which had caught fire by giving them loans and sending them to Melaka 96 Under 
93 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 298. 
94 It appears that Raja Ijau of Patani also took an active part in trade negotiations, protected private 
property and established opportunities conducive to trade. Francis Bradley, `Piracy, Smuggling and Trade 
in the Rise of Patani, 1490-1600, ' in Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 96 (2008), pp. 27-50, p. 45. 
95 Dampier, Voyager and Discoveries, p. 145. 
96 Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy to Borneo andAtcheen, 1691, p. 328. 
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Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani, goods and treasures on wrecked ships were 
confiscated. 
While collaborative rule was an important feature of the style of governance 
instituted by Sultanah Safiatuddin, another characteristic feature was the distribution of 
the country's wealth amongst the ruling elite and the elites' freedom to acquire economic 
wealth. According to Beaulieu, the surest ways for the orangkaya to court death during 
Iskandar Muda's reign was to be notable for "the good reputation they have among the 
people, and secondly their wealth. "'97 Such predatory behaviour was not attested during 
the reigns of the queens. The orangkaya were free to make profits in peace. VOC 
officials such as Pieter Sourij, Peter Willemszoon and Arnold Vlamingh reported on the 
numerous orders for gold thread and Japanese paper by the orangkaya in exchange for 
pepper they procured from them. Despite tremendous pressures from the Dutch for a 
large share in the tin trade of Perak, the Sultanah also made sure that her orangkaya's right 
to procure tin from Perak for their own trade was protected. Jan Harmanszoon who 
was left in charge after the departure of Vlamingh reported that eight vessels that sailed 
to Perak belonged to the Acehnese orangkaya. The Sultanah, on her part, traded Gujerati 
cloth in exchange for tin in Perak. 98 Jan Harmanszoon noted the numerous trading ships 
belonging to the Sultanah and her orangkaya, which traded at Sumatra West Coast. The 
Laksamana's ship for instance brought gold, benzoin and camphor from Sumatra West 
Coast. The Sultanah's ship alone brought 100 bahar pepper from Sumatra West Coast, 
the Laksamana's 15 bahar and the Acehnese Panglima 20 bahar. 99 In return, the 
orangkaya presented the customary tribute to her. 100 
One source of royal revenue besides the highly lucrative product of pepper, 
coveted by the European companies, was tin. The "Perak Affair" showed that despite 
consistent pressures from the VOC officials even resorting to blockades (gun-boat 
diplomacy) large amounts of tin was exported from Perak to Aceh. By 1680, far from 
monopolising the trade, the Dutch still faced problems even procuring tin from Perak 
and competition from English, Portuguese and Indian traders actually increased since 
97 A. Beaulieu, Memoirs ofAdmiral Beaulieu'r Voyage to the East Indies (1619-1622) drawn up by himself, ' translated 
from M. Thevenot's large collection of voyages in John Harris, Voyager and Travels, 1744, p. 257. 
98 NA, VOC 1155, ff. 437-447, f. 460R. Vervolch van Atchin's dagh-register van 26 Feb-12 April 1645. 
99 NA, f. 442V. Vervolch van Atchin's dagh-register. 
101 Truijtman mentioned that the usual gifts from the Shahbandars were brought ceremoniously to court 
for her Majesty's satisfaction as part of their duty in serving her. NA, VOC 1171, ff 182-250, f. 223V. 
Truijtman's Dagh-Register, 13 August 1649-November 1649. 
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they could get tin from Aceh instead. Sultanah Safiatuddin was successful in resisting 
the VOC's demands to obtain toll-free privileges in Perak and Sumatra West Coast since 
she insisted that this was her subjects' customary right and livelihood and this should 
never be taken away from them. 
Even though keen to keep foreigners secure and happy to trade in Aceh, 
Sultanah Safiatuddin was careful to protect her own royal wealth. The `Jewel Affair" 
illustrated how Sultanah Safiatuddin was not willing to see her treasury depleted on 
"dead assets" - useless adornments. 101 Another commodity highly prized by the Sultanah 
and successfully protected by her since the VOC officials could only cast their jealous 
eyes on was elephants. These elephants were not only sources of great wealth but 
symbols of power and prestige. Truijtman reported that the Sultanah so jealously 
guarded her prized possession that she disapproved and did not consent for the VOC to 
buy even one head of the animal. Sultanah Safiatuddin reasoned with Truijtman that the 
Dutch should be content with the generous privileges she had granted to them in 
Sumatra West Coast and Perak. She further added that she was following the customary 
practices of her predecessors and had no wish to reverse their policy. Truijtman however 
reported to the Governor-General in Batavia that he suspected the real reason was that 
the Sultanah and her orangkaya found this trade very profitable indeed since they could 
benefit from the high customs and excise duties imposed. They also did not want to 
jeopardize the age-old commercial links they enjoyed with the Indian traders who were 
the main . 
buyers of these elephants in exchange for their cloth. 102 Not only were the 
Dutch not able to gain a hold in the elephant trade, Aceh's trade in this commodity 
actually grew from 1640s to 1660s. 103 
Aceh's female rulers did not waste the kingdom's resources on weaponry. The 
import of guns on a large scale took place around 1540 with the influx of military 
assistance from Ottoman Turks in the form of guns and gunners. 104 In the 1560s, during 
Aceh's holy war against the Portuguese in Melaka, al-Kahar imported more weapons in 
the form of heavy bronze guns, small guns and ammunitions. Whilst Sultanah 
101 Pieter Sourij reported that the Lebai Kita Kali told him that it was in the nature of woman not willing 
to see her treasury depleted. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij, f. 560V. 
102 NA, VOC 1175,1651, ff. 309R-310R, ff. 323V-324R. Origineel Rapport van den Oppercoopman Johan 
Truijtman in dato 13 Januarij. 
103 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 415. 
laº Anthony Reid, `Sixteenth century Turkish influence', pp. 402-403; Quoted from Ito, `The World of the 
Adat Aceh', p. 47. 
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Safiatuddin used elephants for trade, her father prized and kept them as war-elephants, 
nine hundred in number at least, according to Beaulieu. Iskandar Muda demanded the 
highest kind of training for these war-elephants that two of his nobles were nearly 
castrated for failing to ready the animals at the set time. Although there was no 
indication of a standing army except for the slaves and elephants' corps since the 
orangkaya were obliged to raise the army needed for the ruler as part of their tribute to 
him, Iskandar Muda had to spend money to provide them with guns and ammunition. 
Iskandar Muda's glorious army was nearly wiped out during the 1629 attack on Melaka. 
In 1633, after recovering from this ugly setback, Iskandar Muda began to rebuild his 
forces by constructing thirty galleys and purchasing artillery from the Dutch. By 1635, 
there was adequate naval force though not as strong as the pre-1629 might. Iskandar 
Thani continued to accumulate guns like his father-in-law and bought iron from the 
Dutch. Jan de Meere reported that Iskandar Thani queried him about methods of 
founding guns and making mortar shells and the destructive power of these weapons. '05 
It is not known to what extent these forces were rebuilt but according to Ito, they never 
seemed to have been restored to the pre-1 629 scale owing to difficulties in replacing 
manpower in a relatively short period and due to the diminishing royal power after the 
death of Iskandar Muda. 106 
This accumulation of weapons of mass destruction was most likely stopped 
during the reign of female rulers since no European sources mentioned the 
reconstruction of Acehnese forces from 1641 onwards. Sultanah Safiatuddin bought 60 
pieces of metal guns (metale stukiesgeschut) from the English, 107 in most probability, for 
defensive purposes in 1661. This was the time when tensions were high between the 
VOC and the Sultanate and when the elite of Aceh were expecting a war with the Dutch. 
This nevertheless was an exception rather than rule since the Sultanah preferred to tackle 
problems with diplomacy rather than guns. In the 1690's, De Roy commented on the 
lack of fortifications in Aceh, and concluded that the VOC could capture and subdue 
Aceh easily and with little expense. 1°8 
105 NA, f. 125V. Dagh-register gehouden door Jan de Meere. 
106 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 55. 
107 Chijs, Dash-Rgister, 1661, p. 16. See also Ito, ýI'he World', p. 126. 
108 Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy to Borneo andAtcheen, 1691, p. 369. 
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A Truly Golden Age 
Iskandar Muda's rule is generally seen as the "golden age" of Aceh's history 
because of his successful centralizing policies which boosted royal power, his expansion 
of the military and coercive powers of the state and his ability to control territories and 
resources albeit through coercive means. By comparison, the queens' subtler, more 
collaborative exercise of power and reluctance to resort to war are viewed as weakness 
and a fall of Aceh from its golden era. However, one could argue that even if one 
considers Iskandar Muda's centralizing and coercive policies as part of a pattern towards 
the creation of early modern states, this argument falls short since his policies did not 
bring about a change from personalism, patronage and caprice to a more rational, 
routined and impersonal form of administration. 109 I argue that his centralizing power in 
royal hands, his use of coercive powers and his capriciousness in administering justice 
stemmed partly from his personality and his response to the circumstances in Aceh at 
that time. 110 Indeed, even under his "golden rule" the military decline of Aceh had 
already set in. This was an example of the classic victim of his own expansionist policies. 
If one were to shift the definition of "golden age" from a more materialistic to a more 
moral one (as will be shown in the next section), female rule in Aceh could indeed 
constitute a golden period, certainly far from one of political decline, as commonly 
perceived. A devolution of power, an emphasis on a rule of law rather than military 
might, wariness of increasingly powerful external enemies, and an economical use of 
state resources provide for a different form of government but not necessarily a weaker 
one. In fact, a more accommodative and consensual approach based on law and the 
ability to keep foreign diplomats and merchants happy could well be the answer to 
Aceh's continued peace, prosperity and survival as an independent kingdom. Clearly, 
Aceh became weak, relatively speaking but that was a function of the regional balance of 
power, not a consequence of the shift to female rule. 
109 See Valerie Kivelson, "Merciful Father, Impersonal State: Russian Autocracy in Comparative 
Perspective, " in Beyond Binary Historien- Re-Imagining Eurasia to c. 1830, ed. by Victor Lieberman (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999) p. 218. # 
110 See p. 207. 
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Features of Female rule 
Part II: Piety Politics 
Aceh'c W/orldview and Islam 
The very name of the kingdom, Aceh Dar al-Salam (Aceh the Abode of Peace) 
shows, at least in theory that Islam was to play an important, if not integral role in the 
character and practice of the kingdom since its inception. In the sixteenth century, Aceh 
was known as the major pepper producing state but it was also well known for its rivalry 
with Portuguese Melaka in commerce and religion. Both the Hikayat A jeh and the 
Bustan us-Salatin were at pains to show Aceh's seemingly close relations with Turkey. 
According to Anthony Reid, Aceh's self-image in the 16`h century was bound up with 
two issues - its Islamic struggle against the Portuguese and its pivotal role in the revived 
Islamic trading system as the main supplier of pepper to the Mediterranean. During this 
time, Aceh viewed itself as a vassal of the Ottomans and the "verandah of Mekah" for 
Southeast Asia. "' 
In seventeenth century Aceh, under Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani, 
diplomatic missions and alliances with Turkey were no longer realities but the memory 
and the idea that Aceh had a privileged position as the representative of a local Islamic 
ummab remained. Interestingly, the justification for this superior position in the 
seventeenth century did not merely rest on the Islamic notion of the Caliphate but was 
also supported by older indigenous notions of supernatural power and universal 
kinghood. According to Reid, Iskandar Thani introduced what may reasonably be seen 
as a more Malay style of kingship. His emphasis on sacral kingship and the weakened 
link with the Red Sea suggests a shift towards a more Nusantara pattern. "' I suggest that 
under female sovereigns, the justification for the position of the ruler relied less on 
notions of sacral and charismatic power based on prowess but instead shifted to Muslim 
notions of piety and the just ruler. 
III Anthony Reid, `The pre-modem sultanate's view of its place in the world', in Verandah of Violence: the 
historical background of the Aceh problem, Anthony Reid, ed., (Singapore: University Press, 2006), 52-71, p. 55. 
112 Anthony Reid, `The pre-modern sultanate's view', p. 60. 
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Islam and State in Seventeenth-century Aceh 
Snouck Hurgronje, Takeshi Ito and Amirul Hadi examined the historical role of 
Islam in seventeenth century Aceh. Snouck Hurgronje, the first scholar who attempted 
to study Islam in Aceh wrote that though there was no reason to doubt the good 
intentions of Acehnese rulers in their edicts relating to the purely religious sphere, they 
rendered in purely formal manner due homage to the institution ordained by Allah, 
which were ill-observed in practice. "' Ito stated that the Sultans of Aceh "were heads of 
the Islamic community or state and were the central figures in purely Islamic rituals and 
that these religious rituals were very much syncretic in nature". "' Amirul Hadi 
concluded that since Aceh was neither the heir to any ancient higher culture nor an 
inland state, it showed itself to be more prone to Islamic influence. These in turn played 
a significant role in shaping the strong Islamic elements in that polity. Hadi believed that 
Snouck Hurgronje had underestimated the role the Islamic faith had in Acehnese 
political life. 11s 
The following section examines the role of the female rulers in the practice and 
execution of Islam in the kingdom and the role of religion, if any, in governance. Did 
the sex of the ruler change the role and practice of the religion in Aceh, in any way? 
Piety versus Pageantry: Comparison between the letters of Sultan Iskandar Thani and Sultanah 
Safiatuddin Syah 
According to Annabel Teh-Gallop, the single most striking feature of the 
compliments in Iskandar Muda's letter of 1615 to King James I, was the absence of any 
specifically Islamic formulae or references. 116 Instead, there were recognisable Indic 
vestiges. His titles appeared to have more in common with those of his contemporaries 
in Ayuthia and Arakan than those found in later Malay letters. What particularly set 
113 Hurgronje, The Acehnese, vol. 1. pp. 6-7. 
114 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 248. # 
115 Amirul, Islam and State, p. 247. 
116 Annabel Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli: Royal Letters from Aceh in the 17th century', 
presented at the First International Conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, 24-26 Feb. 2007, 
Banda Aceh: Sumatra, unpublished conference paper. # 
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these compliments apart from those in other subsequent royal Malay letters was the 
emphasis on the possession of material goods (even when these might have symbolic or 
ritual value) and worldly success rather than on moral attributes. 
Gallop argued that "the lack of overtly Islamic or otherwise spiritual or moral 
elements should be seen as a deliberate omission; the focus on material goods and 
worldly success reflecting both a relationship which was fundamentally materialistic in 
nature, and the subject matter of the letter, namely a request for trading rights". "' 
Nonetheless, she concluded, "the religious allegiance of the sovereign was unmistakable 
in the heading situated at the very top of the letter, in tiny letters but indubitably 
there. "1 is 
It is unfortunate that no original Malay letter of Iskandar Muda to other Malay, 
Muslim powers survives so that a comparison between his letters to Muslim powers and 
non-Muslim powers could be made. Perhaps the reason why Iskandar Muda used less 
Islamic references was because the idea of holy war or jihad that characterised relations 
between the Sultans of Aceh in the sixteenth century with the Portuguese had taken on a 
more commercial turn in the seventeenth century. Unlike the Portuguese, the English 
and the Dutch sailed to the East in search for commerce not converts. The other reason 
for the lack of Islamic reference, I suggest, is because of the more mystical and syncretic 
brand of Islam favoured in Aceh during the reign of Iskandar Muda. 
During the reign of Iskandar Thani, there is less documentary evidence in 
contemporary records for the involvement of Nuruddin in negotiations with foreigners, 
but the question of whether his hand can be discerned in the letter to Prince Frederik 
Hendrik is supported, according to Gallop by the internal evidence. Although this too, is 
a letter to a non-Muslim ruler, Gallop noted that a quite different approach was taken 
here. "Instead of all but shielding the Islamic element from the uninitiated and meeting 
materialism with materialism, we find a more didactic - and literary - approach 
in the 
introduction of suitable Islamic exemplars, for example Nusyirwan the just, who despite 
being a kafzrwas renowned for his goodness and justice, and Hatim Tai. ""' Gallop 
concluded that Iskandar Thani retained the emphasis on self-description in the 
compliments initiated by Iskandar Muda but a completely different flavour prevailed, 
117 Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', p. 24. 
118 Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', p. 24. 
119 Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', p. 24. 
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with the emphasis on virtues appropriate for a king who was the shadow of God on 
earth. 
Teh-Gallop did not suggest why a more Islamic imagery was projected here. I 
venture that Iskandar Thani used the title Caliph to present himself not only as a Muslim 
monarch of a Muslim polity but at the same time trying to claim the right to be the 
representative of the Muslim polities in the region, the ummah. Thus, whilst retaining 
Iskandar Muda's idea of a universal king, chakravartin, Iskandar Thani used an Islamic 
title to legitimise his position and status. This is perhaps a reflection of his embrace of a 
more orthodox form of Islam, propagated by Nuruddin al-Raniri whom Iskandar Thani 
himself appointed as the Sheikh al-Islam in Aceh. 
Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah adopted Iskandar Thani's epistolary style with no 
gendered changes made. The indubitably male sovereign epithets sultan al-muaZZam wa-al- 
khagan al-mukarram, `the great sultan and illustrious king' applied to Taj al-Alam. 120 Both 
the Bustan us-Salatin and AdatAceh addressed Safiatuddin and her successors with the title 
"Paduka Sri Sultan". Indeed, the only gendered epithet was the uniquely Acehnese 
Berdaulat, `the Sovereign one', accorded to all queens of Aceh, while all kings of Aceh 
from the time of Iskandar Muda onwards bore the title Johan Berdaulat, `the Sovereign 
Champion'. 121 In her royal seal however, Safiatuddin and her female successors chose to 
put the title "Sultanah". 122 It appears that Safiatuddin also used the title "Sultanah" on a 
new batch of coins minted during her reign, a template copied by her successors. '23 
In Iskandar Thani's letter, he was heralded as the sultan al-muazam wa-al-khagan 
al-mukarram and his name and title proper were followed by Muslim epithets of 
kingship, r llAllah fr al-`clam and khalifatAllah. I suggest that it is noteworthy that the 
Sultanah also took the full Muslim epithets 11Allah fr al-'alam and khal fatAllah, i. e. she 
as the the khalifat or Caliph, to illustrate that her role and duties as the shadow of Allah 
or representative of Allah on earth were similar to that of her male predecessors, 
120 Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', p. 25. 
12' Annabel Teh-Gallop, `Malay seal inscriptions: a study in Islamic epigraphy from Southeast Asia', 
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies: University of London, 2002), p. 89. 
122 According to Teh-Gallop, on Tajul Alam's royal seal, however, her title is given as "Sultanah" see Teh- 
Gallop, 'Malay seal inscription', p. 112. 
123 On the newly minted coins, the obverse side states her title "Paduka Sri Sultanah Taj al-Alam" and 
reverse side simply her name "Safiat al-Din Syah Berdaulat" (Safiat al-Din Syah, the Sovereign). The high 
sounding title of "Berdaulat Zillullah fil Alam" (trans Who rules as Allah's Shadow on Earth) was not 
adopted by her. The same format was used by her female successors. See Van Langen, De Inrichting, p. 66. 
See also, Nicholas Rhodes, Goh Han Peng and V. Mihailovs, 'The Gold Coinages of Samudra Pasai and 
Aceh Dar as-Salam', unpublished manuscript, Singapore, 2007, pp. 58-60. 
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regardless of sex. However, by the very title that she chose, Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin 
Syah or Safiyyat al-Din Syah124, "Taj al-Alam" meaning "Crown of the world" and "al- 
Din" referring to subjection to Allah's laws, she set herself apart from her male 
predecessors. 125 Whilst basing her rule on her status as crown or sovereign of the world 
she placed her rule firmly on the foundation that she was chosen by Allah, she was a 
representative of God to rule according to his laws. 126 Although Iskandar Thani saw 
himself as the representative of Allah on earth, no such submission to Allah's laws was 
mentioned. 
Teh-Gallop pointed out that Iskandar Thani likened his sense of justice to that of 
Nusyirwan Adil (a non-Muslim) but he compared his liberality to Hatim Tai. These 
names were ommitted from Tajul Alam's letter. Instead, she likened her sense of justice 
to that of `Sultan' Ibn Abd al-Aziz, referring to Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, the fifth Umayyad 
caliph (r. 717-720) and to later generations `an exemplar of the Muslim virtues of piety, 
equity and humility'. 127 
Upon closer examination, the Sultanah's use of Islamic imagery is only one 
feature of her letters. The other important feature is the emphasis on her attribution of 
her roles and duties as a Muslim ruler. There are 26 distinct sets of attributes in Iskandar 
Thani's letter. All but five are repeated in Safiatuddin's letter, which also include several 
new formulations, giving a total of 32 sets of attributes. The five that are not repeated 
pertain to descriptions of the king's material wealth such as how shiny (cemerlang 
cahayanya) his gold (mas kudrati) is and how bright (gilanggemilan, 0 his copper (swassa) is. 
The other omission is the description of the ruler as being studded and decorated with 
gems and precious stones. In contrast to her husband's emphasis on the material, almost 
all of the new formulations added by the Sultanah are of a religious or moral nature. As 
124 This is referring to the Arabic spelling or version of Safiatuddin which is Safiyat al-Din. 
125 http: //quranicteahings. co. uk/deen. htm. <Accessed 10 August 2007>. The word "al-Din" also refers to 
the establishment of a way of life which obedience is only to Allah. It could also mean, "... a way of 
dispensing judgement and rewards following Allah's laws". 
'26 Elizabeth I and Empress Wu Zhe Tian used providentialism as the most effective means of legitimating 
a female monarch. See Anne Mclaren, `Elizabeth I as Deborah: Biblical typology, prophecy and political 
power', in Gender, Power and Privilege in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Jessica Munns, & Penny Richards 
(Pearson Education Limited, 2003), pp. 99,105. Empress Wu Zhe Tian (r. 683-708) of China argued that 
she should be allowed to serve her country against strict patriarchal custom on grounds that she was the 
reincarnation of a previous female saint whom Buddha himself had promised spiritual rebirth. See P. N. 
Stearns, Gender in World History, (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 36. # 
127 Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', pp. 16-17. 
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mentioned earlier, Sultanah Safiatuddin adopted the full title of her male predecessors 
including the Islamic title of Khalifah for a ruler. The interesting difference is that she 
emphasised not only the title of Khalrfah but her role as Khalifah, (God's Deputy on 
Earth). In this letter, she writes that she is one "who manifests Allah's wisdom and 
blessings, who upholds Allah's laws, who clarifies those that are in doubt, whose shine 
brings forth Allah's light and goodness, who exhorts people to Allah's path, who treats 
Allah's creations with mercy, who dispenses Allah's justice with utmost care, who hides 
that which is ugly and forgives those who have sinned, and whose words are gracious. "128 
In contrast, Iskandar Thani attributes no such roles to himself. The Sultanah's modesty 
and humility in describing herself as dispensing Allah's laws contrasts with Iskandar 
Thani's arrogant depiction of his own powers. The other clause found in Iskandar 
Thani's letter but not in Safiatuddin's is "lagi rajayang ngumiai kesukaan akanyang 
dikasihinya dan kedukaan akanyang dimarahinya'; (a king who dispenses good fortune to 
those he favours and misfortune to those who have incurred his wrath). 129 
It is unfortunate that this is the only surviving original Malay letter belonging to 
the Sultanah. The rest of her correspondences with the Dutch in Batavia and Melaka 
and the rest of the polities are Dutch translations of her letters. These translated letters 
come with the attendant problems of omissions, additions and genuine 
misinterpretations. Nevertheless, they are very useful and the fact that most of these 
letters survive, it is possible to gain some insights and offer some generalizations as to 
the way the Sultanah represented herself and her basis of legitimacy and authority. In 
her other letters written to the various Dutch Governors in Batavia, she usually 
described herself as one who was chosen by God to succeed and to sit on the throne of 
Aceh Dar al-Salam. Indeed, one particular letter stood out in terms of not only the 
compliments attached to the beginning of the letter but to the main content of the letter. 
Indeed, this was the main message of the letter, the other being her request to the 
Governor General to send a capable and powerful envoy to Aceh so that he would be 
able to carry out the tasks assigned according to the Governor's intention. 
In her letter to Joan Maetsuyker, the Governor General in Batavia, in 1659130, she 
wrote, 
128 Writer's own translation. 
129 Teh-Gallop's translation in `Gold, Silver and Lapis Lazuli', p. 16. 
130 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1659, pp. 103-104. 
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God says that since antiquity there are no better things as these 
two things; namely, think always about God above all and always 
do good to other people. That the Governor General on his part 
I trust shall do. Over such work, one is more and more blessed 
and is honoured and praised by all other men in this world. The 
Acehnese and the Dutch have for many years continued in peace 
and friendship, but now as it has pleased God, we have come to 
war, but these differences are small, and with the help from God 
Almighty and the good resolve of a good outcome from the GG, 
once again the Acehnese and the Dutch are one. Therefore, the 
Governor General, herein, would do no other but to settle [the 
differences]. The wise people in earlier times say to warn [us] that 
always remember two things, namely always think foremost of 
God and of death and forget two things, all the virtues that we do 
to other men and all the bad things that are done to us, so that 
our conscience will remain pure and calm. 
In this letter, Sultanah Safiatuddin was almost giving a sermon to the Governor. She 
used religion to exhort the Dutch to undertake good deeds. Unlike in the past, where 
her male predecessors, especially Sultan Al-Kahar who used religion to wage holy war 
(jihad) against the Portuguese, Islam wa$ used not as a means to show the difference 
between the kafr (infidels) and Muslims but as a common denominator, a universal call 
to do good and bring peace to all mankind. Of course, this letter was carefully 
composed to persuade the Dutch not to wage war against Aceh and an appeal to peace 
by diplomacy since tensions between the VOC and Aceh were high given the murders of 
Dutch officials in Perak and Sumatra West Coast. This sermon, in all probability, would 
not sway the Governor General. He would consider other practical conditions such as 
costs of war and stoppage of commerce as more important considerations when 
deciding whether to go to war with Aceh. This letter, nevertheless, reveals an interesting 
insight as to how the Sultanah used diplomacy tempered by religion. Her religious 
tolerance was also manifested in her allowance for Franciscan priests to minister the 
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Catholic community in Aceh. This freedom to practise their religion was denied with the 
restoration of male rule in 1699. Furthermore, in 1688 with the death of the third queen, 
Zaqiatuddin, the orangkaya and conservative ulama who opposed the appointment of the 
last female ruler captured Fr Bento de Christo and took away his possessions. It was 
only after Kamalt Syah was appointed that Fr Bento was released and returned to his 
duties. 131 
To what extent did Sultanah Safiatuddin's religious advisor influence her? In 
1642, Pieter Sourij mentioned that the Lebai Kita Kali, the Sultanah's half brother and 
the high religious judge of the kingdom was responsible in drafting the Sultanah's letters 
and firman. '32 By 1649, however, the position of the Lebai Kita Kali was held by a young 
and inexperienced man, most probably his son. 133 No mention was made of the Syeikh 
al-Islam, Nuruddin al-Raniri's, role in letter writing. Furthermore, he left Aceh in 1644 
and Syaiful Rijal replaced him. The most senior role in the Council at that time was the 
Orangkaya Maharaja Sri Maharaja. Furthermore, if the opperste bischop mentioned by the 
Dutch who was murdered in 1653, was indeed Syaiful Rijal, then in 1659, Aceh was 
without any known prominent religious scholar and head. The other known prominent 
ulama, Abdul Rauf al-Singkel, returned to Aceh from Mekah only in 1661. Therefore, it 
was most likely that the 1659 "letter of sermon" sent to Governor Maetsuyker was a 
reflection of the Sultanah's own personal leanings. 
Another interesting feature of her letter that differs from her male predecessors 
and perhaps reflects a more feminine orientation is the mention of lagiyang mengitarkan 
segala bau-bauwan kemurahannya pada segala tepi langfit takhta kerajaan, (one who spreads her 
fragrance of generosity to all areas under her rule). 134 Sultanah Saftatuddin used the same 
imagery in her letter to the Viceroy of the Estado da India. '35 
131 Account by Jeronymo dos Reis, 24 October 1688 in Achilles Meersman OFM, The Franciscans in the 
IndonesainArchipelago, 1300-1775, (Nauwelaerts: Lovain 1967), pp. 129-130,133-134. Quoted from 
Anthony Reid, ed., Witnesses to Sumatra, A Travellers'Anthology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 
52. 
132 Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij, f. 586R. 
133 "e first Rijxraadt, the Lebe Kitta Calij, should be passed over for now, depending on his state of 
mind and health. In politics he is of little power since he is young and inexperienced and so we 
understand not highly esteemed". Truijtman's Dagh-Register 13 August 1649- November 1649. NA, 
VOC1171, ff. 182-250, f. 207V-208R. Sultanah Safiatuddin appointed the father, the Kali as the Maharajah 
Sri Maharajah. 
134 Letter from Sultanah Tajul Alam to Charles II in 1661. Quoted from Teh-Gallop, `Gold, Silver and 
Lapis Lazuli', p. 17. 
135 Letter from Sultanah Safiatuddin Tajul Alam to the Viceroy of the Estado da India, 1668. Portuguese 
copy, Arquivos Nacionais, Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, 558, n. 119. # 
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The Sultanahs and the Ulama 
Very little is known about how Islam was practiced at court and in the kingdom 
and the role of religious officials and scholars in the sixteenth century. The Bustan 
mentioned a few famous foreign scholars who came to Aceh from Mekah such as Syeikh 
Abu al-Khair and Syeikh Muhammad Yamani and Syeikh Muhammad Jailani from 
Gujerat. The Bustan suggested that these ulama had a tremendous influence on the 
Sultans of Aceh such as Sultan Alauddin (1579-86) who was described to be very pious 
and exhorted his subjects to pray and fast, even to sport beards. "' 
According to Ito, by the end of the sixteenth century, Islamic law had become an 
integral part of the law of the Sultanate. "' The ruler, represented by a group of religious 
judges headed by the Kadi Malik al-Adil as the head, administered law and order of the 
realm. A more detailed picture of the system of law and courts in Aceh emerged from 
the reign of Iskandar Muda based on European observations such as those from 
Beaulieu and Peter Mundy. 138 
Ito concluded that the system of administration of justice established by Iskandar 
Muda "was maintained by and large, even under the diminishing royal power of his 
successors. 131 Ito pointed out that the AdatAceb mentioned the existence of a number 
of religious scholars from Pidie during the reign of Safiatuddin. The Kadi Malik al-Adil, 
referred to by the Dutch as Lebai Kita Kali (Kali being the Acehnese variant of the 
Arabic Qadhi) was given first place in the order during Saturday audiences. Ito further 
added that with the return of Abdul Rauf al-Singkel, a local ulama, from Mekah to Aceh 
around 1661, the Sultanah's subsequent royal patronage further stimulated and 
encouraged the orientation to Islamic law in the judicial administration of the Sultanate. 
The duumvirate of this Kadi was possibly comparable to that of Syeikh Shamsuddin in 
the reign of Iskandar Muda. 140 
136 Bustan, Iskandar, p. 33. 
137 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 155. 
138 Please refer to Ito's thesis on the description of Aceh's law and court administration. Ito, `The World of 
the Adat Aceh', pp. 156-161. 
139 Ito, The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 165. 
140 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 164. 
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Whilst Sultanah Safiatuddin and her successors might have worked closely with 
Abdul Rauf al-Singkel till his death in 1693 to implement Islamic law in the 
administration of justice and other religious rituals and festivals, it appeared that Sultanah 
Safiatuddin kept herself above the politico-religious debates and struggles that gripped 
the kingdom at that time. Iskandar Muda had embraced a monistic brand of Sufism 
under his protege Syeikh Shamsuddin whilst Iskandar Thani had taken on a more 
orthodox approach by appointing al-Raniri as the Syeikh al-Islam in Aceh in 1637.1 
1 
This direct involvement of the rulers had resulted in a bloody struggle for power 
between these two groupings. With Iskandar Thani's blessings al-Raniri carried out a 
bloody purge of Syeikh Shamsuddin's followers. Many were executed, their books burnt 
and some fled the kingdom. This bitter struggle between these two groups reared its 
ugly head again in 1643. The return of Syaiful Rijal to Aceh from Mekah, a native from 
Minangkabau, who was a student of Jamal al-Din, a former follower of Syeikh 
Shamsuddin, brought about renewed opposition to al-Raniri. Pieter Sourij described the 
chaotic condition at court where the Sultanah was called upon to settle this dispute. 
Instead of taking sides, the Sultanah declared that she knew little about these religious 
debates and asked her elites to solve this conflict themselves. 112 The Sultanah waited 
until this struggle had been played out. Only after a clear winner had emerged in the 
person of Syaiful Rijal that the Sultanah decided to call him to court to honour him and 
appoint him as the Syeikh al-Islam. 143 It is especially important to note that despite this 
bitter struggle repeating itself, and al-Raniri's faction was defeated, this time there was no 
vengeful mass executions and bloodshed. Al-Raniri was allowed to return to Gujerat in 
1644 where he died in 1658. It is difficult though to infer from this episode what the 
ideological and theosophical leanings, if any, of Sultanah Safiatuddin were. 
The above episode shows, however, that Sultanah Safiatuddin refrained from 
actively supporting or giving political patronage to any particular Mama and their 
followers. Nor was there any evidence of her embracing a particular Islamic order, be it 
orthodox or mystical. One thing was clear though, she was a patron of religion. The 
proliferation of Islamic learning and literature, representing a golden age of Islamic and 
141 See Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay Indonesia [Vorld, (Singapore: Horizons Books, 2001) pp. 110-121. # 
142 NA, ff. 671V-672R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij. 
143 Pieter Sourij reported that one week after the bitter debate at court, the Sultanah summoned Syaiful 
Rijal to court where he was given the highest honour. NA, ff. 671V-673R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij 
Pieter Sourij. 
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Malay cultural renaissance, unrivalled till today, was testament to the effective 
collaboration between the Sultanahs and the ulama. Al-Raniri wrote at least seven well- 
known books pertaining to not only religious knowledge but also history, literature and 
law during the time of Sultanah Safiatuddin. Some examples are Shiratul Mustaqim (The 
Straight Path), Syaiful-utub (Medicine for the Heart) and Bustanul Salathin fr Dzrkril- 
awwalin walAkhirin (The Garden of Sultans concerning Biographies of People in the Past 
and Future). The same Sultanah also commissioned Abdul Rauf al-Singkel to write a 
book on figh (laws pertaining to ritual obligations) the result of which is the Mir'at al 
Tullab, the first book on Canon Law written in Malay. 1U Sultanah Inayat Zakiatuddin 
also commissioned Abdul Rauf to write his Commentary on Forty Hadiths. "S Although 
there was no mention of mosques being built on the instruction or sponsorship of these 
female sovereigns, Dampier noted in 1689 that the kingdom had a great number of 
mosques. 146 
The Ruler's Tasks 
The main tasks of an exemplary ruler, the defender of the faith, were laid out in 
the Kanun Syarak Kerajaan Aceb, Taj us-Salatin, Bustan u r-Salatin and the Adat Aceh. The 
main responsibilities were to uphold Allah's laws, pursue prosperity for subjects and to 
ensure public welfare. The most important pre-requisite the ruler must possess to carry 
out these tasks was his/her moral attributes. The ruler must be just, merciful, generous, 
thrifty, knowledgeable, pleasant/good looking, and possess good conduct. 147 Neither 
religious knowledge nor sex, were amongst the pre-requisites in the selection of a king, 
nor the yardsticks used to judge the quality of the ruler. 
This was what the highest-ranking ulama, with the tide Syeikh al-Islam writes in 
the Bustan us-Salatin about Sultanah Safiatuddin's religiosity, moral attributes and religious 
duties: 
144 Rusdi, `Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah', in W"anita Utama ed. by Ismail Sofyan and Others pp. 47-49. 
145 Amite, Islam and State, p. 74. 
146 Dampier, Voyager and Discoveries, p. 90. 
147 Taj us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 59. 
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Her royal highness, our lord Seri Sultan Tajul Alam Safiyyat al-Din Shah 
Berdaulat, the shadow of Allah on earth, possessed many praiseworthy 
and virtuous traits, as well as being fearful of Allah and always praying 
five times a day and reading the Quran aloud, repeating the name of 
Allah and always reading the book of Allah, and commanding people to 
perform good deeds and forbidding them to commit bad deeds, as was 
sent down by Allah to our Prophet Muhammad, and was extremely just 
in the matter of examining and sentencing all the servants of Allah. On 
account of the blessing of the royal power and good fortune of Yang 
Maha Mulia, there were many of the servants of Allah who were faithful 
believers and prayed five times a day and pursued knowledge. 148 
Al-Raniri depicted Sultanah Safiatuddin as a great and generous queen. Al-Raniri added 
that the Sultanah never failed to reward her nobles, captains and soldiers generously. 
She also accorded missions from abroad with the same generosity. Al-Raniri cited the 
example of Sultanah Safiatuddin presenting one mission from Gujerat with twenty-eight 
elephants unparalleled in their size and courage, one of which has four tusks instead of 
the usual two. "' Al-Raniri remarked that no ruler could give a more generous reward 
than that given by the queen. 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's generosity was evident from the many observations of the 
various Company delegates who resided in Aceh. Pieter Willemszoon reported in 1642 
Sultanah Safiatuddin granted an English surgeon by the name of Mr. Thomas, the title of 
"Orangkaya" and gave him four slaves as a gift. 150 Besides the customary gifts of clothes 
and daggers to the Dutch envoys attending her court and her generous gifts of large 
amounts of pepper and tin to the Governors in Melaka and Batavia, Company officials 
in Aceh mentioned the thoughtful and frequent gifts of baked foods and fruits, which 
the Sultanah ordered to be brought to the Company's lodge. The third Sultanah, Inayat 
Zakiatuddin Syah was another example of a generous queen. In 1683, she welcomed the 
delegation from the Syariff of Mekah, headed by the representative of Syariff Barakat 
148 Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 62. 
149 Bustan, Siti Hawa, pp. 43-44. 
150 NA, f. 508R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Wilemsz., 26 Sept 1642-27 
Nov 1642. 
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named El Hajj Yusuf E. Qodri with great ceremony. When the envoys returned to 
Mekah, they were laden with gifts of gold, five golden lamps for the Ka'bah, sandal 
wood, camphor and money to be donated to the poor people in Mekah. 1sI 
Sultanah Safiatuddin dispensed generous rewards to her own orangkaya, for 
example, when Maharaja Adonna Lilla returned from an elephant hunt with eleven huge 
elephants for the queen, she ordained that the elephants be presented to her orangkaya 
instead. Namely, the biggest one, plus two more for Maharaja Adonna Lilla himself, one 
for the Orangkaya Laksamana, one for the son of Maharaja Lilla, one for Orangkaya 
Maharaja di Raja, one for Raja Lila Wangsa and the remaining four to be given to the 
children at court. 152 On another occasion, the Sultanah was presented with thirty young 
Acehnese who were taken as slaves. She instead ordered these slaves to be distributed as 
gifts amongst her orangkaya. Another example was when the Orangkaya Paduka 
Mamentri offered her twenty young slaves to be at her disposal. She answered that those 
slaves under him should be kept by him. '" 
Sultanah Safiatuddin was also known for her piety. A Muslim traveller Al- 
Mutawakkil, who arrived in Aceh during her reign gave this interesting description of the 
Sultanah. He wrote, 
a very gracious, perfect Muslim woman, generous with money, rules them. She 
can read and knows science, beneficence and agreement on the Quran. She is 
called Safiyati `l-Din Shah Bardawla [Berdaulat, meaning sovereign]. Her name is 
written on the coins, on one side Safiyati `l-Din and on the other side Shah 
Berdawla. 154 
The VOC officials who were present in Aceh mentioned that the Sultanah observed 
fasting in Ramadhan, the third pillar of Islam. Truijtman, described one audience day as 
such: 
ist Snouck Hurgronje, Ten Mekkaansch Gezantschap naar Atjeh in 1683', B#dragen Taal-land-en- 
Volkenkunde, 1,37, (1888), 545-554, pp. 553-54. See fn. 246. 
ist NA, f. 523R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
153 NA, f. 523V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
154 The Hollanders in the Sirrab ofAl-Mutawakkil, from, papers of R. B. Serjeant found in Edinburgh University 
Library, p. 124. # 
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we were very welcomed and honourably treated with elephant rights, stage plays 
etc. It was fasting month, thus could not eat or drink. The Sultanah asked to be 
excused for this and hope that we would not blame her for not treating us with 
food. '55 Later in the evening, we were treated with more singing performances at 
court where the whole court was alight with lighted candles. We were treated 
with food served in gold plates and honoured with betel-box. 'sb 
Vlamingh noted that during Ramadhan, foreigners and guests at court were not served 
any food and drinks. However, in the evenings, after sunset, when Muslims broke their 
fast, the palace halls were filled with banquets once again. Also, if audience days fell 
during the time when the Acehnese celebrated the two Muslim canonical festivals, these 
audience days were cancelled. Of course, no mention was made about the Sultanah's 
observances of daily prayers and reciting the Quran since these were private rituals 
performed in the inner sanctum of the palace. 
Administration of law and justice under the Sultanabs 
As mentioned earlier, according to Ito, the justice system in Aceh was well 
established by the time of Iskandar Muda. More information is also available from 
travellers such as Beaulieu and Mundy. Based on these observations and information 
from the AdatAceh, the kingdom had four courts of law, one pertaining to ritual, family 
and inheritance, second dealing with criminal cases, third concerning commercial law 
and the last pertaining to the purely religious requirements and observances such as 
praying, fasting etc. Since Muslim jurists did not recognise any distinction between civil, 
criminal and other branches of law, the first three courts were also based on Islamic law. 
However, it appeared that cases were generally judged according to adat and in 
accordance with the law of the land. Ito inferred that the former referred to indigenous 
legal practice whilst the latter referred to Islamic law. "' 
155 NA, VOC 1171, ff. 182-250, f. 205R. Truijtman's Dagh-Register 13 August 1649-November 1649. 
'56 NA, f. 205V. Truijtman's Dagh-Register 13 August 1649-November 1649. 
157 Ito, 'he World of the Adat Aceh', p. 174. 
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Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani, often modified . yariah 
law of the Sultanate. 
In many cases, the penalties inflicted were harsher than the provisions of the . yariah. 
Penalties were meted out based on traditional judicial practices, which Ito described as 
trial by ordeal and discretion (more often whim) of the sovereign. "' Examples of trials 
by ordeal include plunging one's hand into boiling oil and licking heated iron. These 
were cruel enough by normal standards but the punishments meted out by these two 
male rulers went far beyond this. European observers reported on the harsh 
punishments especially during the reign of Iskandar Muda. Punishments were meted out 
based on caprice, jealousy or just plain bad temper. Verhoeff, Broecke, Best and 
Beaulieu mentioned that delay in attending to his needs, defeating him in cockfights and 
wearing too costly ornaments would lead to a loss of limbs and life. Wealth and 
popularity of an orangkaya could cost him his life or his property. 15' For more real crimes 
or the perception thereof, such as military indiscipline, breach of court etiquette and 
treason, his cruelty had no limits. An orangkaya who requested Iskandar Muda for 
deferment in preparation for war had him and his whole family killed. As if death was 
not punishment enough, they all had their noses, lips, ears, genitals and bellies cut off. 
Iskandar Thani meted out the same torture and death penalties as Iskandar Muda on 
those suspected of attempts at assassinating them. 160 Iskandar Muda forced his son to 
eat his own faeces and his mother's fingers for failing to make his obeisance. The 
mother's punishment was for neglecting her responsibility to teach her son. In 1636, 
Iskandar Thani punished four of his concubines by amputating their hands, feet and 
noses. Then their bellies were opened and the flesh excised from the bones. After which 
their bodies were burnt. 16' Francisco de Souza de Castro, the Portuguese envoy, was 
imprisoned by Iskandar Thani for failing to mount the elephant sent to convey him to 
the palace. Other orangkaya were either castrated, amputated or flogged owing to delay in 
offering their services. 
This form of ira et malevolentia was not reported during the reigns of the female 
rulers. Ironically, their pax et custodia checked by moral and religious values were deemed 
as soft or weak. In contrast to her father and husband, as related earlier, Sultanah 
158 Ito, The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 178. 
159 Ito, 'he World of the Adat Aceh', p. 180. 
160 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 181. 
161 Ito, `The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 172. 
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Safiatuddin merely admonished the Maharaja Sri Maharajah accused of taking her royal 
lands at court. Pieter Sourij who attended an audience day during the reign of Sultanah 
Safiatuddin related that on that day, 12 July, 1642, many criminal and civil cases were 
discussed and debated. Amongst others, a delinquent was brought to the Sultanah but 
by a request from someone, her Majesty was moved to be merciful. Pieter Sourij believed 
this was due to her nature as a woman, and the delinquent was pardoned. ' 62 In another 
case, a congregational member at a mosque had opposed the Penghulu Kawal, an official 
at court in charge of policing. He was supposed to receive a death sentence but thanks 
to appeals from many Indian Muslim traders requesting his pardon, the perpetrator was 
saved from the death sentence. Because he had committed a grave crime of beating the 
Penghulu Kawal in a mosque, his left hand was amputated. 161 
Another characteristic feature in the administration of justice under Sultanah 
Safiatuddin was to call upon the relevant courts to administer cases rather than to mete 
out punishment based on personal whim and caprice of the ruler. For example, a 
Muslim captain from Bengal by the name of Mirs Mamoet was accused of having sexual 
intercourse with the daughter of a certain Sayyid Sierip. Whilst the case was still being 
investigated, the Sayyid killed Mirs Mamoet because Mamoet had refused to marry his 
daughter. A fellow Bengali merchant, in retaliation to this murder, requested the 
Sultanah to put the Sayyid and his daughter to death. The Sultanah instead referred this 
to the relevant courts and adjudicators. The Laksamana and the Lebai Kita Kali 
eventually settled this case since the case involved a murder (to be tried at the criminal 
court) and a sexual liason (under the jurisdiction of the religious court). The verdict was 
death for both father and daughter. The Sultanah, however, had the right to hear the 
final appeal. It turned out that the Sultanah saved the father from the death sentence but 
the daughter was sentenced according to the law of the land, which was strangling for 
fornication. "' 
Under the Sultanah, the punishment for adultery was consistent - either flogging 
or strangling which was in accordance with the law of the land. In one case, Sultanah 
Safiatuddin ordered the Lebai Kita Kali to investigate and try the case of a man who 
wanted her to punish his wife for committing adultery whilst he was working on a fort. 
162 NA, f. 565V. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij, 1642. 
163 NA, ff. 567V-568R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij, 1642. 
164 NA, f. 503R-503V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
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The punishment meted out in this case was similar to another case where both the 
adulterer and adulteress were punished by flogging. Thomas Best reported that during 
Iskandar Muda's reign, a man who committed adultery was put to death (not mentioned 
how) but his corpse was left lying near the gate of the palace to be eaten by dogs. "' This 
was unnecessarily cruel, even to the dead and ran counter to both custom and Islam. It 
would be good to know how the Sultanah punished sexual transgressions generally, 
especially those punishable under Muslim codes -- but the sources are rather silent on 
this point. 
Not much detailed information is available for the succeeding Sultanahs' 
approach and execution of justice since the VOC officials were no longer residing in 
Aceh to write detailed reports after the VOC closed their factory in Aceh in 1663. 
Observations from European travellers residing in Aceh such as Thomas Bowrey and 
William Dampier from 1669-1689 did not reveal or describe any unnecessary harsh 
punishments meted out based on caprice of the sovereign except for the customary 
amputation of hands and feet for thefts and banishment to a nearby island called Pulo 
Wei for incorrigibles. Dampier wrote that he never heard of anyone who suffered death 
for theft. ' Bowrey, however observed that for theft of what was considered of 
considerable value such as cow or buffalo then a death sentence was meted as an 
example to others. 117 The attitude to this kind of crime, according to Ito, "was typically 
Islamic and the letter of the law book was rigorously applied". "' 
Religious Rituals and Festivities 
Among the indices for assessing commitment to Islam in seventeenth-century 
Aceh, were the celebration of Friday prayer169 and the two canonical festivals of the 
Muslim year - Id al-Fitr celebrated after a month of fasting in Ramadhan and Id al-Adha, 
165 Thomas Best, The Voyage of Best to the East Indies, 1612-1614 ed. by Sir William Foster (London: Hakluyt 
Society, 1938), 75, p. 164. 
166 Dampier, Voyager and Discoveries, pp. 96-97. 
161 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, p. 315. 
"8 Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 173. 
169 Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', p. 206. 
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the festival of sacrifice celebrated on the 10`h of the month of Dzulhijja. 17° The third part 
of the AdatAceh provided a detailed description, including the sovereign's role. "' 
The main responsibilities of the ruler were as follows - a. Sultan led the 
procession on an elephant from the palace to the main mosque, Bait al-Rahman, 
accompanied by state officials, courtiers and servants. b. Sultan entered mosque and 
proceeded to a private alcove"' in the mosque where curtains were then drawn. c. Sultan 
performed the obligatory prayers in this alcove with the imam leading the prayers. d. 
After prayers, all the officials and nobility pledged allegiance to the Sultan. e. The 
procession reformed and made its way back to the palace with the Sultan riding an 
elephant. f. Sultan welcomed by old womenfolk at the palace with sprinkles of yellow 
toasted rice mixed with gold foils. An additional ritual took place during the celebration 
of Id al-Adha, the feast of sacrifice. Here after the prayers at the mosque, the Sultan, led 
by religious officials would begin the sacrifice by putting his knife to the jugular vein of 
the animal specially prepared for this occasion. After the first cut and as soon as blood 
began to flow, the Syeikh al-Islam took over this ceremony, which he finished 
accordingly. 
No Islamic doctrine based on the Quran and Hadith forbids a woman from 
appearing in public processions. Nor is there one that forbids a woman from going to 
the mosque to pray although this is not encouraged. Yet no evidence has been found 
in either indigenous records nor in European accounts or observations regarding the 
participation of female rulers in the above religious rituals and festivals. Does this 
silence mean that these rituals did not take place under female rulers? It is difficult to 
suggest that these rituals did not take place. These rituals are mandatory for all Muslim 
adult males. Thus, the question here is, how or at what scale were these ceremonies and 
processions undertaken? Since no evidence mentions the participation of the various 
Sultanahs in these processions going to the mosques nor their participation in 
congregational prayers and the ritual of the sacrifice, it is difficult to conclude otherwise. 
The responsibility of congregational prayer, Friday prayers in particular, in mosques falls 
only on adult Muslim males. The imam must also be necessarily male. The prayer hall in 
170 Id al-Adha marks the sacrifice of Prophet Ibrahim and his son Prophet Ismail respectively. 
171 For a detailed description of how these rituals were performed and festivals celebrated, see Ito's study 
on the AdatAceh, in Ito, 'The World of the Adat Aceh', pp. 209-248. 
172 According to the Adat Aceh, this curtained alcove is called merj'id kelambu. Ito, `The World of the Adat 
Aceh', p. 216. # 
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the mosque is regarded strictly as a male domain. The Taj us-Salatin differentiated a male 
ruler from a female one by stating that a male ruler, as mandatory to all adult male 
Muslims, ought (harus) to go to the mosque for Friday and Id prayers. The Taj continued 
that the male ruler ought to go to the mosque adorned and accompanied by his ministers 
and soldiers. A female ruler could not do this (raja perempuan itu tiada dapat berbuat 
demikian). 13 A female ruler could only pray in a place that was quiet so as not to be seen 
by other males (sembahyann pada suatu tempatyang sunyi rupaya jangan dilihat Drang laki-laki 
adanya). Given these injunctions that are followed rather strictly in almost all Muslim 
communities in the world and the silence in the sources, unless new evidence is found, it 
appears that the Sultanahs did not lead the processions to the mosques during these 
religious rituals. Nor would they perform any prayers in the curtained alcove, which was 
situated in the main prayer hall of the mosque. Id al-Fitr and Id al Adha, however, were 
celebrated with much pomp and fanfare. Truijtman recounted one such celebration 
during the reign of Safiatuddin at the end of the fasting month. He mentioned that as 
customary, 400 buffaloes were slaughtered and the meat eaten to mark the ceremony. 114 
The above seems to suggest that the female ruler's capacity to manifest Allah's 
laws was limited. Furthermore, as in a "theatre state", "' the construction of these 
ceremonies and public rituals was an important means to enhance the sovereign's 
charisma and status, in this instance his religious authority. 16 However, upon closer 
examination, it is important to note that the above religious rituals were mandatory to all 
adult male believers but not to rulers. The ruler's roles in these processions were merely 
ceremonial based on culture and politics of power but not religion. The authority of the 
ruler was religiously sanctioned, but the ruler himself was not a religious leader. The 
need for rulers to take part in these ceremonies was a created one designed to balance 
the authority of religious leaders or to show that the ruler held supreme or ultimate 
authority. These ceremonies and processions were designed to enhance the power of 
the ruler and his religiously sanctioned authority but were in no way obligated by the 
doctrines of the religion. Indeed, the palace, instead of the mosque was used as the 
173 Taj us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 61. 
174 NA, VOC 1171, ff. 182-250, f. 224R. Truijtman's Dagh-Register 13 August 1649-November 1649. 
175 See Geertz's, elucidation of this concept in Clifford Geertz, Negara: the Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century 
Bali, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980), p. 103. 
176 According to Anthony Milner, many unIslamic practices pertaining to kingship and pageantry survived 
even after the adoption of Islam. For more detailed assessment of Malay political culture, see, A. C. Milner, 
Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule, (Arizona: Arizona University Press, 1982). # 
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starting point and the end of these ceremonies. The palace, the abode of the ruler, 
where royal insignia and regalia were kept, then carried to the mosque during these 
processions and returned created a new pivot of authority and power that balanced the 
mosque complex. The main task of a ruler in a Muslim community was to uphold 
religious laws and to ensure that the subjects could practice the religion freely and in 
peace. The ruler was never expected to be an imam to lead congregational prayers nor to 
initiate the sacrifice during the feast of Id al-Adha. These were court traditions given a 
veneer of religion. 
The female ruler's absence from rituals returned religious duty to its proper 
sphere. This was in line with other features of female rule: duties and responsibilities 
were distinctly delineated to authorised persons, but with the monarch as the ultimate 
arbiter. This might have created a more limited monarchy but not necessarily a weak 
one, much less declining, as most writers claimed. "' The female rulers might not have 
taken part in processions which were really a showcase of power rather than faith, and 
might in consequence have appeared to be less charismatic. They might have erased the 
veneer of religious grandiosity and pageantry but they upheld the piety, the substance of 
the faith. 
Absence from processions to the mosque, but this does not mean that these 
female rulers did not take part in other public processions. Numerous observations by 
European travellers, residents and VOC officials in Aceh illustrate that the Sultanahs 
ventured out in public on elephants to perform other rituals such as funeral ceremonies, 
visiting graves of deceased, and taking part in the bathing ceremony during the month of 
Safar. The queens also participated in numerous outdoor entertainments and recreation 
and presided over the elephant and tiger fights organised by the Acehnese court to 
entertain foreign envoys and their own subjects. 
Al-Raniri described the placing of the headstone at the tomb of Iskandar Thani 
in detail and noted how the Sultanah, just after a few months after taking power, led the 
177 In her study of the Byzantine Book of Ceremonies, Averil Cameron observes that the more centralized 
the government became, the more the rituals themselves would need to and tend to include all officials 
who mattered. Thus, the ceremonial was both self-generating and self-reinforcing. Ambition engendered 
ceremony and ceremony made ambition respectable. Averil Cameron, The Construction of court Ritual: 
The Byzantine Book of Ceremonies', in Rituale of Royally: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, ed. by 
David Cannadine and Simon Price, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 106-136, p. 131. 
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procession mounted on an elephant. "' Pieter Sourij described an excursion to a ipeelh jJ 
(a place for amusement) headed by Sultanah Safiatuddin in 1642. He reported that all 
the elites and foreign delegates took part in enjoying the singing, dancing and bathing 
activities not to mention the sumptuous seven course meals. "' On another occasion, 
Pieter Sourij related another outing where this time, the Sultanah, the elites and foreign 
guests went to a beautiful field with a lake where there was bathing and fishing. Pieter 
Willemszoon mentioned another expedition where the Sultanah heading another trip, 
started out early one November morning to a place called Indrapur(i)? about three hours 
away from the palace. Pieter Willemszoon described the procession as an elaborate one 
involving all the horses, elephants and royal ornaments. After arriving at a great river 
near a village, they settled at a very entertaining . rpeelhuis where the wives of the orangkaya 
and the eunuchs went fishing. Pieter Willemszoon also mentioned gold and silver 
trumpets being played on this occasion. 18° Sourij mentioned yet another fishing trip in 
1643 whilst he was in Aceh appointed for the second time as the VOC envoy. Arnold 
Vlamingh, recounted the magnificent spectacle of elephant and tiger fights staged by the 
Acehnese court during Sultanah Safiatuddin's reign to welcome the VOC officials. He 
also described how the Sultanah appeared from the palace accompanied by her female 
maidens to sit on a stone building at the palace square to watch the fight. 
One festival described by Bowrey illustrates the elaborate procession undertaken 
during the reign of the third queen, Sultanah Inayat Zaqiatuddin Syah. He witnessed a 
royal procession down the river, "the like I believe was never paralleled in the universe, " 
which took place shortly after Zaqiatuddin became queen. '8' Interestingly, no accounts, 
to the best of this writer's knowledge, describe the physical appearance of any of the 
queens, except for an estimate of their age. 182 Bowrey estimated Sultanah Zakiatuddin to 
be at least sixty years old. Dampier described the same Sultanah as an "old Maid". 183 
Referring to the same queen, two English delegates, Ralph Ord and William Cawley 
noted that "the queen appears not to be forty years of age, is of a large size and the 
strongest voice that we have heard, " which made them suspicious enough to think that 
178 Busfan, Siti Hawa, p. 57. 
179 NA, 1642, ff. 566V-567R. Dagh-Register gehouden bij Pieter Sourij. 
180 NA, ff. 523V-524R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Wiiemsz. 
181 For a fuller description of this procession, see Bowrey, A GeographicalAcroxnt, pp. 325-326. 
182 For that matter, there are also no descriptions available of kings, even one who is as famous as Iskandar 
Muda. Of course imaginary depictions in paintings abound! 
183 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, p. 99. Dampier was in Aceh in 1688-1689. 
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they she might be a eunuch dressed in woman's apparel. "" These vague and uncertain 
descriptions of the Sultanah give the impression that they were not clearly in sight, that 
they were shadowy figures, almost invisible even. 
Glimpse of the Invisible 
In theory, the Taj us-Salatin differentiated the rule of male and female rulers 
according to their degree of visibility. The Taj stated that a male raja was seen and not 
hidden but a female raja was hidden and should not be seen. 1 ' The Taj continued, the 
male raja sat in front of those who have an audience with him without any intervening 
curtain (tirai) and must be clearly in sight. The female raja, on the other hand, ought not 
be seen and must face her audience from behind a curtain. "' Only wives of Ministers, 
other females and males who have not reached puberty were allowed to face the queen 
in the audience hall. 187 This restriction was extended to her voice even. The Taj stated 
that a female raja's voice could not be heard except from behind the curtain. 
Unlike this clear delineation of visibility and space in the Tys gender-based 
construct on leadership, a reading of the Bustan us-Salatin and the S jarah Melayu provided 
a more ambiguous picture. On the one hand, al-Raniri described the Sultanah as hidden 
from public view. According to the description given in the Bustan us -Salatin, the queen 
received her ministers and subjects in the audience hall (Peratna Sembab) behind an 
intervening curtain of gold brocade. The ladies of the court, seated outside the curtain, 
became her voice and acted as the intermediary between her and her audience-188 Yet, on 
special occasions like the placing of the headstone on Iskandar Thani's tomb, al-Raniri 
mentioned that the Queen ventured out to appear in public. 1B' Al-Raniri gave the 
impression that Sultanah Safiatuddin rode on an elephant and gave instructions on the 
placing of the headstone. Unfortunately, al-Raniri was vague here and did not clearly 
describe whether the queen was visible to the public or whether she remained hidden in 
Asa Farrington, `Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 25. 
the Sultanah in 1688. 
tas Taj us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 60. 
Tai us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 60. 
lay Taj us-Salatin, Khalid, p. 61 
188 Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 46. 
187 Bustan, Siti Hawa, p. 57. 
This was four years before Dampier's description of 
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a curtained pavilion on the elephant»'° The S jarah Melayu described the mother of 
Sultan Mahmud I, who watched or eavesdropped, the discussion on the choosing of a 
new Bendahara from behind a door. When Sultan Mahmud asked which amongst you 
should become Bendahara, the chiefs answered that all nine chiefs were eligible. Who 
ever His Highness preferred should be made Bendahara. At this juncture, the Sultan's 
mother was said to have shouted out, "Let it be Tun Mutahir. " The Sultan immediately 
agreed with his mother's choice and announced that Tun Mutahir should be Bendahara 
and the chiefs all agreed. The writer of the S jarah Melayu even recognised her choice as 
an excellent one since Tun Mutahir (her younger brother) turned out to be one of the 
best Bendahara Melaka ever had. The ambiguities are starkly presented in this episode, 
the very idea that she made one of the best political choices in the kingdom, and yet she 
remained behind the door. This not only presents a complex picture of women's status 
and roles but blurs the distinction between private and public. Physical barriers or 
spaces do not clearly mark the distinction between inside and outside, private and public. 
To what extent do these indigenous writings reflect the political reality of the 
time? Could European records corroborate the above instances? According to Balthasar 
Bort, the VOC envoy to Aceh in 1660, Sultanah Safiatuddin handled business as 
customary; the only difference was that she was not visible to the audience. She had to 
make sure, however, that her voice was recognizable to all, thus during the entire 
audience, Bort reported that the Sultanah spoke in such a loud voice that her words 
could be fully heard and understood by all. "' Thomas Bowrey reported that on the 
occasion that he accompanied the English Commander to the palace to have an audience 
with Sultanah Zakiatuddin, they were seated on fine carpets and "sit with our faces 
directly towards the queen's lodgings... making a *sembah to the queen's windows , she all 
the while look upon us although we cannot see her. "192 William Dampier related that 
after ascending the throne, Sultanah Zakiatuddin was largely confined to the palace and 
she seldom "go abroad". Neither was she seen by people of inferior quality or rank 
except for some of her "Domesticks". The exception was that once a year dressed in 
190 Bustan, Siti Hawa p. 57. 
191 NA, VOC 1237,1661, f. 354V, f. 356R. Balthasar Bort Dagh-Register. Quoted from Andaya, 'A very 
good-natured but awe-inspiring government', p. 71. Leonard Andaya mentioned that during audience days, 
the Sultanah was always seated behind a screen or door. Unfortunately, he gave no specific reference to 
this claim. 
192 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, p. 307. 
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white, she would ride an elephant to the river to wash herself. "' Dampier was not able 
to affirm whether the common folk could see her in the parade. Dampier observed that 
it was the custom of Eastern princes to screen themselves from the sight of their 
subjects. If they did venture out, the people would be ordered to turn their backs or to 
hold their hands before their eyes. 194 Ralph Ord and William Cawley described their 
audience with Sultanah Zakiatuddin as such- adjoining to the audience hall, was an upper 
and open room where the Queen sat on a throne of ivory and tortoise and around her, a 
row of ladies. Below the throne, two more rows of ladies were seated. Before this 
room, hung a thin gauze which did not hinder the audience but prevented any perfect 
view of the queen. They commented that the Sultanah had a strong voice but not 
manly. '9S Earlier on, in 1642, Pieter Sourij related that Sultanah Safiatuddin, upon the 
Company's delegates' arrival, and despite the rainy weather, appeared outside, in the 
presence of well 3-4000 men. 196 He also reported that when the business at hand was 
urgent, the Sultanah commanded them to sit right in front of the throne (recht over des 
Conincklýken troon). 197 Vlamingh and Truijtrnan also have noted that in some cases when 
the queen was displeased (with one of the Dutch incessant demands), she would raise 
her voice and speak in anger but they did not mention that the Sultanah only spoke to 
her female attendants and this in turn was then related to the male audience or listeners. 
They, too did not mention any intervening curtain. A Muslim traveller, al-Mutawakkil, 
who was in Aceh during the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin made another interesting and 
rare observation. He described her as a good Muslim ruler and noted that "she puts 
between her and the ministers an overflowing curtain when she gives orders. When she 
is riding on the hunt or strolling about she is completely veiled. "1 
The evidences gathered from European records and travellers' accounts do not 
paint a clear picture either. Whilst Sultanah Safiatuddin was reported to go on frequent 
outings- fishing, hunting and amusement trips, Sultanah Zakiatuddin did not venture out 
much. At times, the queens were said to have been behind a thin gauze, other occasions 
behind a screen or door, even window. Furthermore, more references were made to an 
193 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, pp. 325-326. 
194 Dampier, Voyager and Discoveries, p. 99. 
195 Farrington, 'Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 25. 
196 NA, f. 554R. Pieter Sourij's Dagh-Register, May-Aug, 1642. 
197 NA, f. 558V. Pieter Sourij's Dagh-Register, May-Aug, 1642. 
198 The Hollanders in the Sirrah ofAl-Mutawakkil, from papers of R. B. Serjeant found in Edinburgh University 
Library, p. 124. 
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intervening barrier between the queen and her audience towards the latter part of their 
reigns, from 1660's onwards rather than earlier. Did the Acehnese court become more 
conservative towards the latter part of the seventeenth century? Opposition to female 
rule did increase from the 1680's onwards when a group of Arab delegates arrived in 
Aceh and it was from this group that the fatwa forbidding female rule was procured from 
Mekah. Or did the age of the individual queens affect the kind of activities they indulged 
in? Sultanah Zakiatuddin was certainly old when she ascended the throne whilst 
Sultanah Safiatuddin was only twenty-nine years old. As mentioned earlier, the evidences 
are inconclusive. 
Were the Acehnese female sovereigns good Muslims and as such they chose to 
remain behind the curtain when they were discoursing in public, especially with men? 
These female monarchs appeared to have adhered to the treatise on female leadership of 
the Taj rather closely. As mentioned earlier, there was no evidence that they participated 
in the procession to the mosque since women were not encouraged to go to the mosque 
or pray in public. Could it be concluded then that with the coming of Islam, local 
females, at least those in the upper class became more secluded? Barbara Andaya 
asserted that Sultanah Safiatuddin spoke to men from behind a screen because of the 
strongly Islamic court of Aceh. 199 She also claimed that Quranic teaching differentiated 
respectable women from their social inferiors by their degree of visibility. Respectable 
women were distinguished by their retreating into the confines of domestic space. 00 
Contrary to B. Andaya's assertion, the Quran does not make any distinction between 
upper class and lower class women, nor does the Quran advocate seclusion of women; 
the Quran urges women to dress modestly, to cover their bosoms and jewellery and asks 
the wives of Prophet Muhammad to cloak their bodies so that they will not be bothered 
in public. The Quran does not mention veiling and seclusion of women from public 
space . 
20" So this idea of seclusion and veiling did not originate from Islam. It was part 
of the complexities of Islam that this veiling habit had spread so widely that it became 
synonymous with the practice in Islam and assumed to be sanctioned in the Quran. 
199 B. Andaya, Flaming Womb, p. 85. 
zoo B. Andaya, Flaming Womb, p. 86. 
201 A woman's face is not part of aurat (forbidden to be seen by a male that is not kin or mubrim. Indeed 
even in prayers, women are not allowed to cover their faces. Women during Prophet's Muhammad's time 
joined their men in battles, fighting along with men, nursing the wounded and burying the dead. They too 
were given a share of the war booty. 
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If this practice did not originate from Islam then did this come from adat? Adat 
practise in the region also did not seclude women. Indeed, on the contrary, one of the 
identifying features of this region was the relative freedom of women to appear in public, 
though Islam did help to cover a larger part of their bodies. The "Islamic" dress of hab 
and veiling never took on in the region, certainly not amongst the common people. This 
idea of seclusion and exclusivity though did take root among the upper ruling class of 
society and royalty as a sign of elite status. As observed by Dampier, eastern monarchs 
could not be looked upon by lowly subjects. This was part of the aura of mystery and 
semi-divinity that these rulers wished to project to their subjects to inspire awe. 02 This 
idea of veiling and seclusion originated from the Eastern Roman Empire and Persia and 
spread to pre-Islamic Middle East. 203 Veiling signified the sexual unavailability of 
respectable women. Arab Muslims adopted the practice of veiling from the people they 
conquered and this became part of the practice in royal households 204 Al-Jauhari, the 
author of the Taj us-Salatin concurred and adopted the Persian and Sassanid tradition 
found in the Umayyad and Abbasid courts where women from the upper classes were 
veiled, where they were invisible to the non- *muhrim male gaze. As mentioned earlier, 
al-Jauhari might not want to veer too much away from what was believed to be the 
established orthodox view of Muslims in the heartland, thus, his conditional acceptance 
of female rule in the region. But in copying the practice of the seclusion of women in 
the Umayyad and Abbasid courts, he was adopting not Islamic practices but a syncretic 
version of Islam. There were some Arab women at court who were very influential 
politically in Islamic dynasties such as the Umayyad's, and the Abbasid's but they held 
power from behind the throne. In contrast, the ladies that held power in Malay, Muslim 
polities in this region actually held power on the throne and were reigning monarchs in 
their own right. 
Based on earlier evidences that the Sultanahs of Aceh did rule in their own right 
and were certainly not mere figure-heads or shadow queens one can conclude that even 
if these female monarchs did rule from behind some sort of barrier that prevented a 
202 Milner, Kerajaan, p. 26. See also, John M. Gullick, Malay Society in the Late 19'" Century, (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 282. 
203 See Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Books, 1991) pp. 
94-95. # 
204 Stearns, Gender in World History, (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 40. 
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clear sight of them, these queens were not invisible 205 The Sultanahs of Acch, ruling 
from behind a curtain might have been secluded but certainly not isolated or powerless. 
The idea that women, belonged to the dalam (inside/private) domain and men, to the 
outside or public domain, was blurred here. The physical barrier did not in any way 
confine these rulers nor impede their very public roles as reigning monarchs. Like Sultan 
Mahmud mother's voice, their voices and authority emanated from this curtain and these 
were obeyed through out the kingdom. This curtain also did not prevent them from 
being plugged to the news, rumours and happenings outside their private domain since 
the network of eunuchs and women was well utilized by these queens. 206 Neither did 
this curtain make the queens more inaccessible since under these queens; any man and 
woman could come to appear before them if they had a business every Saturday on 
audience day. Indeed, under female monarchs the palace became more accessible since 
the harem, the private chambers of the Sultan's numerous wives and concubines need no 
longer be protected or out of bounds to others. 207 Neither were the other court ladies 
secluded from the male gaze. Thus, one may conclude that this seclusion of female 
monarchs was not so much a function of their sex, religion or due to the need to protect 
female modesty. 208 It was more a function of style of governance which emphasized the 
exclusivity of the ruler that was influenced by a mixture of a syncretic tradition of Islam 
that originated from the Middle East and the region's own Indic past. This practice was 
not unique to the female sex but also to male monarchs in line with the tradition of 
creating a mystique and aura of inaccessibility of a ruler that may prove advantageous. 2® 
It is indeed powerful to see and yet not be seen. How else does one reconcile this idea 
of a female ruler's seclusion due to their sex to their very public participation in the 
numerous processions, amusement trips and outings? 
205 How else could Ord and Cawley knew that the queen sat on the throne of ivory and tortoise, unless it 
was just their imagination? 
201 See section on "Jewel Affair" to show how successfully this was achieved by Sultanah Safiatuddin. 
207 Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani were always described to be surrounded by hundreds of women 
guards and eunuchs. Beaulieu mentioned that Iskandar Muda had three thousand women in his palace. 
Van Goens noted that Sultan Agung of Mataram had ten thousand. Quoted from Reid, Age of Commerce, 
Vol. 1, p. 167. Peter Mundy described an elephant fight in Aceh in 1637 where Iskandar Thani was seated 
on an elevated stone platform, under a pavilion and surrounded by his guards of women. Mundy, The 
Travels of Peter Mandy, pp. 126-130. 
208 In a letter from Iskandar Muda to King James I of England, he described himself as "he who is not 
seen by the seers, who is not heard by the hearers. " Annabel Teh-Gallop and B. Arps, Golden Letterr. 
Writing Traditions of Indonesia, (Jakarta: Yayasan Lontar, 1991), p. 128. Quoted from Mulaika, `The Woman 
Raja', p. 78. 
209 Reid, Age of Commerce, Vol. 1, pp. 179-181. # 
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Politics of Entertainment 
Sultanah Safiatuddin's methods were something of a template for her female 
successors. Royal proceedings and grand court ceremonies as in the Ottoman and 
Mughal courts seem to have been quite consistent from the time of Sultanah Safiatuddin 
Syah to that of Sultanah Kamalat Syah. Although continuing the tradition of her 
husband and father in practices such as the reception of letters from foreign powers, the 
presentation of gifts and the sending down the royal seal to newly arrived vessels, 
Safiatuddin's reign was noted for her impeccable hospitality since these were all 
consistently reported throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. The VOC 
envoys like Pieter Sourij and Vlamingh reported how Sultanah Safiatuddin treated them 
royally. In the balai, they were treated with seven to nine course meals served on silver 
and gold dishes. At the palace courtyard in front of the Sultanah's lodgings, the foreign 
missions and the local guests would be seated on fine carpets, entertained and served 
with a big golden box of betel leaves, fruits and areca nuts. The whole ceremony 
continued with more merry-making, dancing and feasting. To sweeten the palate, 
sweetmeats, delicacies and all sorts of excellent fruits were served. Entertainment for the 
guests was just as varied as the foods and drinks served. The foreign missions were 
treated to elephant and tiger fights in the palace yard 210 The queen's eunuchs carried the 
presents brought by the foreign ambassadors, which were placed on golden vessels or 
trays. These eunuchs were flanked and protected by gilded pavilions carried over them. 
If there was an official letter from any of the foreign representatives, it would receive an 
even more dignified reception. The letter would be carried separately with great stately 
ceremony and royally attended by the Sultanah's favourites. The letter was placed on a 
silver plate covered with yellow silk cloth and carried on an elephant. The foreign 
mission bringing the letter would accept gifts and the envoy was given a suit of silk 
clothes and a turban. On taking their leave, at the palace yard, awaiting the envoy, was a 
stately elephant richly decorated to transport him back to his dwelling or factory. The 
orangkaya and other important men of the court would accompany him. This procession 
was a grand one with music from pipes, drums and flags carried by footmen. The 
210 NA, ff. 598R-598V. Dagh-Register of Arnold Vlamingh. 
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procession was accorded much respect and importance that according to Thomas 
Bowrey if any native was in their way and did not move after being told to do so by the 
footmen, they would be lanced. As the grand procession passed by the city, many other 
merchants would sprinkle rosewater on them as a mark of honour and respect. When 
the parade finally ended at the house or the factory of the foreign diplomat, they alighted 
from the elephants and exchanged ceremonial complements and good wishes before the 
orangkaya took their leave. 
Besides court protocols, many festivities and amusements peppered the queens' 
reigns. Sultanah Safiatuddin, who ascended the throne as a young widow of only twenty- 
nine, was fond of entertaining and organising outings and hunting. These amusements 
could be as elaborate as the court ceremonies themselves. During these outings and 
festivities, not only the orangkaya of Aceh were invited but also all the foreign envoys and 
important merchants. Sourij who joined one of her fishing trips described the merry 
ceremony with lots of dancing and feasting where her Majesty's ladies-in-waiting served 
him fish they caught themselves. 211 Vlamingh reported that on another of the Queen's 
fishing trips, he was served with fish caught by Her Majesty herselfl212 On another 
occasion, the Sultanah invited the Dutch envoys to a celebration organized by one of the 
Sultanah's officials to honour her. Vlamingh described the festive atmosphere vividly 
when he related that special small paper houses filled with various types of delicacies 
were laid out but alas the festivities had to stop abruptly because of the pouring rain. 
Once the Dutch envoy described how the whole palace was set alight with candles 
everywhere. One could just imagine the whole spectacle. The Sultanah was also fond of 
singing and dancing and invited the Dutch to join the Acehnese to enjoy these pleasures. 
Typical of the Dutch perhaps, they were not too happy that they had to add dancers and 
entertainers to their lists of gifts. Nevertheless, these relaxed occasions, numerous under 
female rule, provided excellent opportunities for the Acehnese elite to forge friendships 
and alliances with these foreign representatives and merchants. 
Whilst the Sultanahs were impeccable hosts to foreigners and guests, they were 
exemplary rulers to their subjects since they did not forget their subjects during times of 
festivities. Throwing huge parties for their subjects was part of sharing the kingdom's 
bounties with its subjects. It reflected the generosity of the monarch and increased the 
211 NA, ff. 568V-569R. Dagh-Register of Pieter Sourij. 
212 NA, ff. 604V-605R. Dagh-Register of Arnold Vlamingh. 
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subjects' loyalty and allegiance to their provider. In his study of Malay court rituals, A. 
C. Milner suggested that ceremonial functions, public processions and state festivities 
were not meant for the rulers to enjoy themselves but these were part and parcel of a 
raja 'c work. 2' Thus, to attend these monarch-sponsored festivities and to enjoy 
themselves (bersuka-suka) were part of a subject's duty214 Sultanah Safiatuddin's 
preparations and organization of her husband's funeral was one of the first tasks she 
undertook when she became queen Z'S Al-Raniri in the Busfan described in detail how 
this procession, organized by the Sultanah, successfully completed the extremely 
important task of ensuring the proper burial rites of the previous king. The Bustan also 
described in similar details the seemingly unimportant aspects of the procession where 
the multitude of spectator subjects took such delight and joy in absorbing the almost 
carnival atmosphere of the funeral procession where specially made floats and giant 
puppets of mythical animals and monsters were paraded. Many came from great 
distances to witness these grand spectacles. Alms in the form of gold and silver foils and 
jewels were strewn on the streets in such a huge amount that subjects who received these 
could actually become rich. According to A. Reid, the popular enjoyment of royal 
festivals was another indication of the power and cosmic beneficence of a great ruler. 
Or simply, subjects having a great time when a generous ruler was on the throne. The 
multitude of subjects who attended these state-sponsored festivities not only 
demonstrated the populousness of the realm, but more importantly, it testified to the 
skill and greatness of the ruler. "' 
Network of Women and Eunuchs 
According to Hamka, an indigenous manuscript entitled "Qanun a1 A /i 
Darussalam" laid out several institutions whose duties were to assist the ruler in governing 
the kingdom. The ruler's closest advisors were the Wazir, Perdana Menteri and the 
Kadhi Malikul Adil. The executive branch consisted of the Balai Laksamana, a kind of 
213 Milner, Kerajaan, p. 45. 
214 Milner, Kerajaan, pp. 23-24. 
215 See Chapter 2 for details of the funeral procession. 
216 Reid, Age of Commerce, VoL 1, p. 182. 
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military arm led by an admiral and the Menteri Dirham and Balai Furdah, the 
commercial arm in charge of taxes and issuing money. 217 The legislative branch, called 
the Balai Musyawarah, whose task was to swear on the consensus undertaken (angkat 
muafakab) consisted of three branches, the Balairungsari, Balai Gadeng and Balai Majelis 
Mahkamah Rakyat. The Balairungsari consisted of the four senior orangkaya, the Balai 
Gadeng consisted of twenty-two prominent religious scholars in Aceh and the Balai 
Majelis Mahkamah Rakyat made up of seventy-three members, each representing a 
muqim in Aceh 218 During Safiatuddin's reign, many women members served in this Balai 
Mahkamah Rakyat, a House of Representative of sorts219 It is unclear whether the 
Sultanah appointed these women or the people from their own muqim elected them. 
' 
One thing is clear though - no matter how they were chosen, this reflects the 
representative nature of the Sultanah's rule. 
The only mention of women Council members in contemporary European 
sources was in the Dagh-Register of Pieter Willemszoon. He remained in Aceh as the 
Resident and senior trader of the VOC after the departure of Pieter Sourij in August 
1642. After two months in Aceh, in early November, Willemszoon got into financial 
trouble and tried to borrow 2,000 taels from the orangkqya. At that time, the situation 
between the Company officials and the Acehnese elite was rather tense because of the 
jewel affair. The anti-Dutch Maharaja Sri Maharaja refused to lend Pieter Willemszoon 
any money and asked him to request this from the Sultanah instead. 
u' 
217 Hamka, `Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Atjeh diabad ketujuhbelas' [Aceh's House of Representative in the 
17th C] in Gema Islam, no. 36/37 (15 Djuli, 1963), p. 11-12. According to Hamka, thisQanun al-Aýi 
Darussalam was written during Iskandar Muda's reign and was copied from generation to generation by the 
family of Tengku di Abai, Ibnu Ahmad from Habib Abubakar bin Usman bin Hasan bin Wundi Molek 
Sjarif Abdullah bin Sultan Djamalul'I Alam Badrul Munir Djamalullail Ba'alawi, the Sultan of Aceh of Arab 
descent. The last copy was rewritten 1310H/1893AD. # 
218 Hamka, Dewan Perwakilan', p. 11. 
219 TheQanun al-A ji Daressalam lists the names of these women as such, Si Njak Bunga, Si Halifah, Si 
Sanah, Hidajat, Munabinah, Sid Tjahaya, Mahkijah, Si Bukih, Si Nyak Ukat, Si Manjak Puan, Nadisah, Si 
Djibah, Uli Puan Siti Awan, Si Njak Angka, Si Njak Tampli, Si Mawar, and Si Manis. Hamka, `Dewan 
Perwakilan' p. 11. 
220 The Adat Meukuta Alam , states that a Panglima 
Sagi or Uleebalang representing a particular muqim must 
be elected by the village head (keuchik), the religious head (imam), and the elders (orang tuha-tuha), through 
consensus. See Adat Meukuta Alam, ed. by Tuanku Abdul jalil, (Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh, 
Banda Aceh, 1991), pp. 1-2. According to Hamka, Sultanah Safiatuddin made a royal decree in 
1059H/1649AD renewing the members of the Balai Majelis Mahkamah Rakyat and added women 
members. Hamka, "Dewan Perwakilan" p. 11. # 
221 NA, f. 516V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
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After one month of unsuccessfully lobbying the orangkaya, 222 Pieter Willemszoon 
was desperate and decided to go to court to request for the 2000 taels. He reported that 
despite making obeisance to the orangkaya four times at the court, he received no hearing. 
For good measure, the orangkaya told him that her Majesty did not have any money now 
since she had paid 4,000 for the jewels and that Her Majesty still owed the Dutch 
6,000. E The Company's friend, the Sultanah's favourite eunuch, Radia Adonna Lilla, 
however, provided him a ray of hope. Adonna Lilla told him that one of the principal 
woman member of the council, (een derprincipaale Raadt Vmuwen), had spoken that her 
Majesty would grant Pieter Willemszoon's request, on condition that he gave her and her 
followers gifts as customary. She and two other women would see to it that the Dutch 
obtain the 2,000 tael in Acehnese mas. 224 A few days later, Pieter Willemszoon sent the 
translator, Andries to Adonna Lilla to enquire about the money. Andries was told that 
Adonna Lila had spoken to these ladies and they ordered that in the coming Saturday, 
Pieter Willemszoon should go to court and make obeisance to the Sultanah and without 
doubt, the Dutch would succeed in getting their request granted. The Dutch were 
reminded that they should be mindful of them. It was unfortunate that Pieter 
Willemszoon did not report on the outcome of this affair. He did write however, at the 
end of his dagh-register how desolate he was waiting at the Company lodge with rain 
pattering down. He died in Aceh in early 1643. 
A powerful woman at court, related to the royal family and a close confidant of 
Sultanah Safiatuddin, was Putra Dewa. She was exiled to the Maldives in 1653 because 
she was accused of arranging a sexual dalliance between the Sultanah and her Muslim 
tutor. " It is difficult to ascertain whether the main reason for her forced exile was due 
to her involvement in this alleged scandal or the orangkaya's fear of her increasing power 
at court. Nevertheless, she was forced into exile because of the strong pressures from 
the orangkaya. Since the court was inflicted with a bitter factional struggle amongst the 
orangkaya in 1653,227 the Sultanah might have relented and allowed her close confidant to 
Pieter Willemsz. listed down all the gifts given to the different orangkaya which totalled fl. 25,9.0, 
which he found to be a great waste since the Dutch could not get their requests granted. NA, ff. 526V- 
527R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
M NA, f. 526V. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz. 
224 NA, f. 527R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz,. 
225 NA, f. 528R. Copie dagh-Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Pieter Willemsz,. 
226 Andaya, 'A very good-natured but awe-inspiring government', p. 72. # 
227 See Chapter 3. 
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be taken away from her side. By 1660, Sultanah Safiatuddin was secure once more on 
the throne and decided that enough time had lapsed for her to grant a pardon. Putra 
Dewa was brought back from the Maldives in December 1660. She returned in a ship 
from Surat named the "Moessady" belonging to a Mamer Talcki, a resident in Acch. It 
appeared that during her exile she had gone on the half pilgrimage since the Dutch 
mentioned that she had visited the grave of Mahomet (Muhammad). The Dutch 
reported that the Sultanah was very happy that she (Petra Deenava), an old woman, had 
returned to Aceh but the orangkaya wished she had not returned. " 
It appears that these powerful women who held the purse strings were influential 
in court as late as the 1690's. De Roy noted that in the Council of Ministers during the 
reign of Sultanah Kamalat Syah, those who surpassed in wealth certainly had more 
authoritative power. More of those in the Council were supported by the wealthy and 
these wealthy orangkaya were supported, according to dc Roy, by the influence of their 
own kin, their wives, or sons and daughter in-laws. 9 
Capados or eunuchs may not be unique to female rule but they appeared to have 
extensive functions since Sultanah Safiatuddin established a women's network of sorts 
together with her eunuchs, to assist her in her execution of her policies and to act as a 
counter-weight against the male elite. Pieter Willemszoon's case above is one example. 
Besides serving guests at court, bearing messages and participating in royal processions; a 
few rose to positions of political prominence. As a key intermediary between the 
Sultanah and the Dutch envoys in the jewel Affair, Raja Adona Lilla, was critical to 
executing an outcome favourable to the Sultanah at the expense of the hardliners headed 
by the Laksamana. Enjoying free access from the inner recesses of the court to the 
orangkaya s houses and foreign factories and lodges, these capados were uniquely 
positioned to report on the latest rumours and intrigues and to convey the Sultanah's 
instructions directly outside the formality of the audience hall. Though there is less 
information on the roles of the eunuchs in court during the reign of her successors, they 
continued to serve in varying capacities. Thomas Bowrey describing the situation in 
Aceh during the reigns of Sultanah Naqiatuddin and Sultanah Zaqiatuddin, related that 
about five hundred women and eunuchs attended to them. Bowrey mentioned that 
Sultanah Zaqiatuddin had several eunuchs "of very acute wit about her that advise with 
228 Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1661, p. 17. 
2-29 Voyage made by Jacob Jansen de Roy to Borneo and Atcheen, 1691, p. 367. 
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her to condescend to what is requisite! "" Though these eunuchs were mentioned in 
both European and indigenous sources, 231 unfortunately, none shed light as to their 
origins. 
Women's interests - Mrs HarmansZoon. and European Fachion 
Typical of a court ruled by a woman but certainly not of her male predecessors 
was the personal interest the Sultanah took in the envoys that were appointed by the 
Company to the court of Aceh. Some of Sultanah Safiatuddin's favourites which she 
mentioned in person and requested them to come and stay in Aceh together with their 
families were Willem Harmanszoon and Balthasar Bort. So fond was she of Bort that 
there was a rumour that she wished to marry him but was prevented by the Company. 232 
True to her word, when she heard that Harmanszoon had brought his wife and eight- 
year-old son to Aceh with him on board the ship, the Sultanah invited them to her 
palace, even before they landed. Indeed, they were fetched to the palace for an informal 
audience with her even before Arnold Vlamingh, the Commissar who led the Dutch 
delegation, was fetched to court for a formal audience. 
Just four days after the Company delegation landed, on 29 July 1644, early Friday 
morning, (which was not an official audience day), a number of female slaves belonging 
to Sri Bidia Indra, the main Acehnese envoy to Batavia and a good friend of the 
Company's, came to the Company's lodge to fetch Mrs. Harmanszoon to his house. Sri 
Bidia Indra's wife and daughter accompanied Mrs. Harmanszoon in a stately procession 
of female slaves to court. Mrs. Harmanszoon, placed in a palanquin, rode an elephant, 
which was expensively dressed in the Acehnese way. She remained at the palace for four 
hours until noon. Vlamingh wrote that Mrs. Harmanszoon related that she was treated 
with many dishes and she had a nice discussion with the Sultanah and her noble women 
(groote Vrouwen) and was treated in a very friendly manner indeed and given gifts. Jan 
Harmansz also reported that when he sent his wife to court there were very powerful 
women who were with the Sultanah day and night and gifts had to be prepared for them 
230 Bowrey, Voyages and Discoveries, p. 299. 
231 In classical Malay literature, the term a2-sida sometimes refers to eunuchs. See Leonard Andaya, `The 
Seventeenth-Century Acehnese model of Malay Society, " in Husken & Van der Meij (eds), Reading 
Asia: New Research in Asian Studies, (Curzon Press: Richmond Surrey, 2001), p. 94. 
232 Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 448. 
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too. 233 Sultanah Safiatuddin invited Mrs. Harmanszoon to go to the palace again on 
Sunday and requested that she wear what Dutch women would wear when they go to 
church. Mrs. Harmanszoon was then sent back home to the Company's lodge. 234 
Mrs. Harmanszoon went to the palace for the second time following the 
Sultanah's express desire. She was asked to bring her son along but when he saw the 
formidable escorts of women bearing gold and silver weapons, he was too frightened to 
go with them. The Sultanah, upon hearing this, sent the boy a special gift of Acehnese 
clothing. On this occasion, one is reminded of the Bustan'r characterisation of her reign, 
"she loves her subjects as a mother would her children5 Mrs. Harmanszoon was 
fetched to court and there she remained the whole day till evening. Vlamingh tried to 
exploit this women's network or affinity by trying to get Mrs. Harmanszoon to get the 
ear of the Sultanah. Discussions were made regarding the suitable gifts that should be 
given to the Sultanah by Mrs. Harmanszoon so that the Company need no longer waste 
money on gifts for the orangkaya and eunuchs to get their business advanced to the 
Sultanah. The Dutch finally decided to present the Sultanah with a beautiful Spanish 
wine glass and gold and silver cloth since the Dutch were told that the Sultanah already 
had an over abundance of gold, silver, gems and cloth. Nothing seemed to have come to 
fruition from this feminine liaison. Nevertheless, the visits continued, since according to 
Vlamingh, this happened two to three more times. Vlamingh, jealous of 
Mrs. Harmanszoon's privileged position, complained about how men were shut out in 
this prudish Muslim court. 236 
In 1684, two English representatives from the Madras Council, Ralph Ord and 
William Cawley, went to Aceh to negotiate for an English fortified settlement in Aceh. 
During their second audience with Sultanah Zakiatuddin, she asked the two Englishmen 
to sit nearer to her. The main reason for this seemingly strange request was because the 
Sultanah wanted to have a closer look, not at the two Englishmen, but at the wigs they 
were wearing. 237 The Sultanah was so fascinated by the wigs worn by Ord and Cawley 
and she queried them about their uses, which they tried to answer as best as they could. 
233 NA, VOC 1155, ff. 437-447, f. 446R Vervolch van Atchin's dagh-register van 26 Feb-12 April 1645. 
234 NA, VOC 1157, ff. 576V-577V. Vlamingh's dagh-register. It is unfortunate that there is no account of 
this event, or the Acehnese court written by Mrs. Harmansz. herself. 
235 Btutan, Siti Hawa, pp. 43-44. 
236 NA, VOC 1157, f. 578V. Vlamingh's dagh-register. 
237 "... the Queen was pleased to order us to come nearer, where Her Majestyc was very inquisitive into the 
use of our wearing perrywigs. " See Farrington, 'Negotiations at Aceh in 1684', p. 27. 
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Then the Sultanah requested Ord that if it was of no inconvenience to him, would lic 
mind taking off the wig so that she could see how he looked without it - in which the 
English gentleman kindly obliged. 
End of Female Rule 
Contemporary indigenous and European records are silent on the issue of 
Kamalat Syah stepping down from the kingdom's throne in 1699. Did she abdicate 
willingly or was she forced, or was she deposed? The only passing mention of 
deposition is found in the AdatAceb where it stated that "she is deposed by all the 
Ministers and all the people because of a letter from Mekah from the Qadhi Malik al- 
Adil stating that a female raja is not within the laws. "238 In view of the long acceptance 
of female rulers, and the broad convergence of customs and traditions in favour of their 
legitimacy, this contention requires examination. 
According to Veth, there had been opposition to female rule by a group 
influenced by Arabs in Aceh who believed that female rule was against the tenets of 
Islam. He called them the prierterpartý/Arabische part. Against this group was the 
orangkaya faction who according to Veth acted as protectors of ancestral institutions 
whom he referred to as the nationale part.? " In 1688, with the death of Inayat Syah, the 
nationale party immediately chose a young female from the royal family as her successor. 
The priesterpartý, though in the minority, was joined by some orangkaya to protest against 
another female successor and called for a return to male rule. An armed struggle ensued 
between these two parties with the nationale party gaining the upper hand. Kamalat Syah 
was installed and ruled for eleven years. The priesterpartý did not give up and sought 
other means to achieve their goal. The weapon that they sought was the schrj ven from the 
Kadhi Malik al-Adil from Mekah stating that female rule was illegal. Armed with this 
writing they went to the people of Aceh to inform them that female rule was against 
238 Baginda itupun dimak, ulkan oleh regala wa tr dan fegala rakyat kerana tebab dating rurat dani Mekah dikirim oleb 
Kadi Mahku/Adil tiada sampai hukum rebab raja perempuan. See Adat Aceh, Rani h Harun and Tjut Rahmah, p. 
29. 
239 Veth, `Vrouwenregeering, p. 368. 
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Islamic law. The nationale party could not withstand this opposition any longer and 
Kamalat Syah was deposed. 240 
Although Veth did not mention who the orangkaya who joined the Arab group 
were, it is probable that they were the uleebalang from the hinterland. Jacob de Roy 
related that now and then the highlanders would come from their mountains to Aceh 
with about 3-4000 men to demand a king. 241 Thomas Bowrey mentioned that the 
inhabitants up in the country were not happy with a female ruler and would rather have a 
king rule over them. They believed that the true heir was still alive and they would obey 
him. Bowrey however, did not see him as a serious rival to the queen, "it is and will be 
past his reach or skill ever to obtain the government of Achin. 242 More serious 
opposition happened during the choosing of the fourth queen, Kamalat Syah, which 
Dampier described as a "civil war" in Aceh. Dampier related that four orangkaya who 
lived in a more remote part of the court took up arms to oppose the new queen and the 
rest of the orangkaya. They managed to amass 5-6,000 men against the capital. They 
stayed near the landing place by the river near the city. The queen's party, under the 
Shahbandar, set up tent, kept a small guard of soldiers and placed 2 or 3 brass guns on 
the opposite bank. Dampier's "civil war" turned out to be a mere skirmish since he 
related that these soldiers were calling out to each other and were discussing why they 
were fighting rather than engaging in actual fighting. They did this the whole night and 
the next morning everyone went about their usual business. The next night, the whole 
process was repeated. 243 The hinterland group returned without success. 
Besides desiring male rule, there was another reason for this group of 
agricultural-based hinterland uleebalang to oppose the trading-based, port city-dwelling 
orangkaya. Marsden mentioned that in the 1680's, agriculture had suffered considerably, 
owing to the general licence given to all inhabitants to search for gold in the rivers and 
mountains, whereas prior to this, only authorized persons could seek for gold whereas 
the rest were obliged to cultivate the ground. 244 Whether this group of disaffected 
inlanders co-operated with the Arabs cannot be ascertained, but it is unlikely that the 
240 Veth, Vrouwenregeering', p. 369. 
241 Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy, p. 367. 
242 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, p. 313. This "true heir to the Crown" might be the descendent of the 
illegitimate son of Iskandar Muda, from the Panglima Polem family. 
243 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, pp. 100-101. 
244 Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 450. 
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small and remote threat posed by the inlanders alone could unseat Sultanah Kamalat 
Syah, who still had the support of the mercantile city orangkaya at court. 
Veth too did not mention who this Arabische party were, but since an Arab 
succeeded Kamalat Syah, it is probable that he was part of an Arab group who opposed 
female rule. Whether they were native-born or foreign Arabs, however, remains a 
mystery. Arabs had migrated to Aceh as merchants and religious scholars and sayyids, in 
particular, enjoyed a high degree of prestige and were very welcomed by the Acehnese 
into their society. 245 Given that the ulama and the orangkaya accepted the first three 
female rulers, it is somewhat curious that the appointment of the fourth would cause 
opposition and deposition after eleven years. An explanation that could be ventured is 
that those who opposed Kamalat Syah's rule were foreign-born Arabs. In 1683, a 
Mekkan delegation sent by Syariff Barakat arrived in Aceh. 246 Since opposition to female 
rule became louder in the 1680's, it may be possible that the priesterpartý mentioned by 
Veth refers to the delegates of this Mekan visitors. According to one source which this 
author cannot verify, when the delegation returned in September 1683, two delegates 
remained in Aceh, where they were quickly accepted into court circles. 247 In the 1680's, 
the opposition to female rule was not strong enough but the situation changed in the 
1690s. The death of the moderate local ulama, Abdul Rauf al-Singkel in 1693 might have 
allowed the Arabs to gain more influence. In the 1690s, the arrival of a letter from 
Mekah stating that female rule was against Islam strengthened the Arabs' hand and 
Kamalat Syah had to step down. 
It is beyond my purpose to determine who exactly the Arab successors of the last 
Sultanah were but it is possible to venture that the members of this Arab group had risen 
to positions of prominence in court and may have established ties with the royal family 
245 According to Snouck, the sayyids occupy as high a position in Aceh as in any other country in the 
Archipelago, they command deeply-rooted respect and fear. Snouck Hurgronge, The Achehnese, p. 155. 
246 Snouck wrote that he based his account on Ahmad Dahlan's Khulasat al-Kalam, p. 146-7, no other 
reference details provided. Unfortunately, Snouck too did not shed any more light on this delegation nor 
their activities in Aceh. Snouck Hurgronje, `Een Mekkaansch Gezantschap naar Atjeh in 1683', p, 553. 
Azyumardi Azra mentioned this same delegation, besides citing Snouck's article he quoted Ahmad Dahlan, 
Khulasat al-Kahm fa Bayan Umara al-Ba/ad al-Haram, Cairo: n. p., 1305/1888,104-5. See Azyumardi Azra, The 
Origins of Islamic Reformism, p. 181. This author, not reading Arabic is unable to verify this Arab source. 
247 One of them, Sayyid Ibrahim Syarif Hasyimsyah al-Jamalullail was appointed as the Kadhi Malik a1- 
m Adil. See Teuku Syahbuddin Razi, Salarilah Raja-Raja Islam diAceh dan hubxngannya dengan Raja-Raja Isla 
Nusantara, Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Perlak, Aceh Timur. Quoted from Suzana Hj Othman & 
Muzaffar Hj Mohamad, Ahlu! -Bait, (Kuala Lumpur: Crescent News Sdn. Bhd., 2006), p. 158. 
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itself. The potent mix of prestige, kinship ties to the royal family, plus the mentioned 
letter from Mekah finally clinched the throne for Sultan l3adrul Alam Syariff Hashim 
Jamal-al-Din in 1699.248 This ended the fifty-nine year long rule of female sovereigns in 
Aceh. 
Conclusion 
To our earlier question about how female rule is possible in a largely patriarchal 
system, such as that of Aceh, the answer is that the potential for patriarchal emphases 
differs in different societies. 24' Patriarchy is shaped by the socio-political philosophy of 
the society concerned. Since Aceh already had a tradition, adat, of strong and powerful 
women who held reins of power it is not difficult to imagine that the male elite, in 
special circumstances, as found in Aceh in 1641, accepted a female ruler. If adat did not 
directly contradict religious doctrine, then Islam would most likely to be adapted, 
modified or syncretised, giving it a distinctly local version. 
How and to what extent religion was adapted depended on the main power 
holders at the time. Islam, like other major religions, had complex and sometimes 
ambiguous ideas regarding women 250 Furthermore, Islam, born in the Middle East, had 
picked up some older practices concerning gender - an instance of syncretism within the 
Middle East - such as the isolation and veiling of women that were not 
integral to Islam, 
but came to seem so. 251 Complexities such as these affected Islam's impact on gender 
construction and practices in the more peripheral areas of Islam. 
" "Cultural 
shopping"253 would inevitably take place depending on the context and circumstances of 
the time. Which way the gender balance was tilted became then, a matter of emphasis, 
248 Even their family names were uncertain, the Adat Acheh gave the name as Paduka Seri Sultan Badrul 
Alam Syarif Hasyim Jamalu11ai1, AdatAcheh, p. 24. Djajadiningrat used both Sultan Badr al-alam Sjarif 
Hasjim Djamal ad-din and Djamal al-leil, Djajadiningrat, Kesu/tananAreh, p. 60. Veth mentioned that he was 
Badroel-alam Scherief Haschim Djamaloed-din, P. M. 
249 Peter Steams gave the example of two civilizations-Mesopotamia and Egypt. Where Mesopotamia 
stressed on women's inferiority and subjection to male control, Egypt, though largely patriarchal, gave 
women more credit, at least those in the upper class and experienced the rule of several powerful queens 
such as Nefertiti and Cleopatra. See Steams, P., Gender in World History, p. 13. 
250 Steams, Gender in World History, p. 40. # 
251 Stearns, Gender in World History, p. 38. 
252 Steams, Gender in World History, p. 39. # 
253 Steams, Gender in World Hi Cory, p. 44. 
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which would also change through time. Hence the seemingly paradoxical situation: 
Islam was used to legitimize the accession of the first Sultanah and rc-used fifty-nine 
years later to end the reign of the last female ruler. 
The very character and emphasis of Islamic teaching in Aceh depended largely 
on the sovereign's will. The position of Islam (and how this was negotiated and 
reconciled with existing customary laws) must be understood in the context of the 
political situation and the ruler's own attitude and approach. Unlike their male 
predecessors, the Sultanahs intervened less in religious matters and largely allowed the 
religious scholars to settle matters pertaining to religion. In this sense, they took the 
politics out of religion. Yet, in the practice of court traditions and governance, they were 
more Islamic. Politics under the female sovereigns were tempered by moral and 
religious values. Thus, whilst these female rulers put religion into politics they took 
politics out of religion. Pageantry, theatre-politics and emphasis on material wealth and 
prowess were less important to these female rulers, piety and thriftiness were. Iskandar 
Muda and Iskandar Thani were acutely aware of their image and wanted to be perceived 
as king of kings by other kings. A slight to their ego or personal honour would invite 
their wrath and a violent response was in order regardless of whether this could cause 
injury to the kingdom254 On the contrary, Sultanah, Safiatuddin Syah emphasized her 
role as an upholder of God's laws and wished to be seen as a just, merciful and generous 
ruler. Execution of law and justice were more humane and Islamic under these female 
monarchs. Although the Sultanahs' own Islamic leanings, whether orthodox or 
suf stic/mystical, were unknown, these female rulers were dedicated patrons of religion. 
The court became the most important centre of Islamic studies and learning in the 
region. It appeared that Islam under female rulers was more publicised but less 
politicized. 
According to Barbara Andaya, despite some toleration of female rulers in 
Southeast Asia, two factors ensured that political consolidation privileged male authority 
and patrilineal descent even when bilateral or matrilineal systems operated in society. 
The standing of individual queens did not undermine the general categorization of 
females as mentally and emotionally weaker than males and more vulnerable to 
254 See chapter 3 on Iskandar Thani's response to the perceived VOC slight upon his honour when they 
allied themselves with Johor first, a mere vassal, according to Iskandar Thani, before sealing an alliance of 
friendship with Aceh. 
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exploitation or manipulation by spouses, lovers or relatives. " A second disadvantage of 
femaleness was rooted in the notion that a successful ruler was by definition a great 
conqueror who vanquished lesser kings and claimed their possessions. "" Andaya 
asserted that indigenous view on female rulers was ambiguous. A text from central Java 
denied that authority could be given to a woman yet accepted that a highborn and 
capable woman was deserving of male respect. Le Quy Don (1726-84) in his biographies 
of early Le Dynasty stated that women should confine their activities to the inner realm. 
Yet, despite his disapproval of women in politics, Le acknowledged that Nguyen Thi 
Anh, the dowager queen who ruled Vietnam during her son's minority held her own in a 
male environment and had followed established custom in fostering peace and 
harmony. 25' 
In the above case study of Aceh, female rule was acceptable as seen in the Taft 
exposition of female leadership. Indeed female rule was highly praised in the other 
indigenous text, the Bustan. Overall, European records corroborated the positive 
representation of Acehnese female sovereigns in indigenous records. Sex was not a 
criterion for choosing a ruler and the ideal or exemplary ruler was not so much defined 
and judged by his/her sex but determined by his/her moral and religious attributes. This 
study does not examine the status of ordinary women in Aceh at that point in time but 
one can certainly conclude that men accepted and respected high born, powerful women 
regardless of their sex. 
Contrary to popular definition that a successful ruler was one who displayed 
prowess and vanquished others, the generally good natured, moderate and peaceful 
female monarchs, generous in the sharing of power and wealth provided an alternative 
definition. They were just what Aceh needed to maintain her independence and position 
in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 
255 B. Andaya, The Flaming Womb, p. 169. 
256 B. Andaya, The Flaming Irlomb, p. 170. 
257 B. Andaya, The Flaming Womb, pp. 171-2. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Reasons forAdopting Female Rule: Succession of the First Female Sovereign 
Why and how the tradition of male rulers in Aceh was broken in the seventeenth 
century is the focus of this study. The phenomenon of female rule in Aceh occurred 
over six decades, a long time indeed, but only once in the kingdom's history. Was it an 
accident of history? Half a century was rather long for an accident to happen without 
returning to normalcy. Was it an experiment? Perhaps; it was never tried before. If so, it 
was an experiment that lasted. In any case, it generally takes an unusual confluence of 
conditions to produce a turn or a twist that sets events on a new path. I suggest that the 
beginning of female rule in Aceh was a function of a unique situation in the Acehnese 
kingdom. 
In Chapter One on the succession of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah, I argued that 
that there were no fixed laws of succession in Aceh. But one condition necessary to 
ensure the accession and acceptance of a ruler was the consensus of the orangkaya. So 
why did the elite agree to accept a woman on the throne in 1641? I favour an 
explanation rooted in political realities of the time. Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah's lineage 
was impeccable, as she was the widow of Iskandar Thani and a daughter of Iskandar 
Muda by a royal wife. The dearth of royal males in 1641 was another factor. Iskandar 
Muda and Iskandar Thani contributed to this problem by killing those they deemed as 
royal rivals. Iskandar Muda ensured that no orangkaya or faction of the orangkaya would 
be strong enough to challenge his rule and that the orangkaya remained deeply 
factionalised and weak. His successor's, Iskandar Thani's, succession was an aberration. 
Uniquely - for Aceh - the existing ruler designated him. This procedure, however, was 
common in other Malay kingdoms and was one of the preconditions recognized in the 
S jarah Melayu for legitimate succession. Iskandar Muda's absolute style, which was also 
an exception rather than the rule in Acehnese history, allowed him to choose his own 
successor without opposition from his orangkaya. But because the elite did not choose 
Iskandar Thani, they did not support him. At the time of Iskandar Thani's death, no 
orangkaya or a faction of the elite had regained enough power to impose a candidate of 
their choice. Furthermore, owing to the lack of a strong, credible, royal, male candidate, 
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no aspirant could stand without the backing of a strong faction of the orangkaya, not be 
accepted by the majority. In these circumstances, a candidate with a chance of election 
had to be neutral, uninvolved with any orangkaya faction, and of course of royal blood, 
which conferred legitimacy. 
In Aceh's genealogy of kings up to 1641, three Sultans were of foreign origin, 
Sultan Ala al-Din known as Mansur Syah (1577-1586), of Perak origin, Sultan Mahkota 
Buyung (1586-88) from Inderapura and Iskandar Thani (1636-1641) from Pahang. The 
former two were killed and Iskandar Thani was believed to be poisoned. This reveals or 
at least reflects the anti-foreign sentiment of the Acehnese elite. Iskandar 11ani was 
remembered without love because he was a foreigner. Anti-foreign sentiment was 
intense enough to spur the Acehnese elite to make a pact among them never to allow 
any more foreign kings to rule over them. Therefore, the next successor must be locally 
born and chosen from Aceh's own dynasty. 
By process of elimination, Safiatuddin was the most suitable candidate. She was 
closest, by consanguinity or marriage, to both male predecessors. She was an adult, 
whereas the nearest male might be a minor; she was healthy, not handicapped; and she 
was native. But she was female. There were surely discussions on the issue of her sex 
since this was a new element in the history of Aceh's dynastic succession. Nevertheless, 
her contemporaries overlooked her sex to preserve the larger principles of legitimacy. 
Acehnese adat and historical antecedent allowed women to be in powerful positions and 
Islamic doctrines as interpreted by the ulama of the time did not ban a woman from 
leadership. Externally, the strengthening of Dutch power after the conquest of Melaka 
had swung the balance of power against the Acehnese. Owing to the circumstances and 
the willingness of the majority of the elite to take a chance on a female ruler, she was 
elected, but not because she was female. ' 
Still, femininity had its advantages. It made the Sultanah a neutral, placed her 
apart, a stranger even, to the rest of the male elite. ' The combination of neutrality and 
legitimacy enabled her to be elected and accepted by the majority of the orangkaya. The 
1 For a discussion on female succession in Europe, see Armin Wolf, `Reigning Queens in Medieval 
Europe: When, Where and Why' in MedievalQueenship ed. by John Carmi Parsons (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993,1998) pp. 169-178. No such study has been undertaken on female succession in the Southeast 
Asian context. 
2 See Femändez-Armesto, `The stranger-effect in early modem Asia', pp. 181-202. # 
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oraqkaya must have seen the advantages of having a young and inexperienced female 
ruler, who would need their instruction and guidance, though marriage might introduce a 
source of unwelcome influence. So the elite jealously guarded her widowhood and 
chastity. ' This was revealed during the episode where the head ulama was killed for an 
alleged sexual liaison with Sultanah Safiatuddin. The truth of this allegation could not be 
ascertained but it was certain that no one could or would be allowed to capture her heart 
and therefore open the way to capture the throne. 
I suggest that the second, third and fourth female sovereigns were chosen because 
they were female. Sex became a more important consideration in choosing the 
successors of the first female ruler. New criteria were introduced, such as age and marital 
status. Marsden pointed out that the initial opposition to the election of the last female 
ruler, Kamalat Syah was because she did not meet criteria which were "esteemed 
essential" in a female ruler: that besides being royal, "she should be a maiden advanced 
in years". Bowrey mentioned, "the Queen should never marry or know the use of 
man". ' Although the ages and marital status of the second to the fourth queens are 
unknown, the second and third queens were probably rather old. Sultanah Naqiatuddin 
died after a two-year reign in 1678 - which would be consistent with advanced age at her 
accession. Bowrey, Dampier, Ord and Cawley described Sultanah Zaqiatuddin as an old 
maid. It is most likely that reasons why Kamalat Syah did not last as queen till her death 
included her youth and the strong probability that she got married. 
The practice of electing a female after the death of Sultanah Safiatuddin in 1675 
was due to a deliberate effort on the part of the orangkaya, following the success of the 
experiment with the first female ruler. The "Jewel Affair" illustrates that the first 
Sultanah was not absolute but neither was she a weakling. Not as deferential as the 
orangkqya would have hoped, she ruled in her own right, making some fancy political 
manoeuvres of her own that at times derailed some of the orangkaya's plans. Most 
significantly, she had instituted a successful and beneficial co-operative relationship with 
her elite where diversity was not eliminated but balanced. It was a workable system, one 
that even the orangkaya wished to perpetuate. Thomas Bowrey wrote that "Achin now 
and hath for a considerable time been governed by a Queen... in soe much that the very 
3 Veth, `Vrouwenregeeringen', pp. 367-368. # 
4 Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, p. 298. 
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name of a Kinge is longe since become nautious unto them, first caused through the 
tyrannicall Government of theire last Kinge". 5 Female rule provided some solutions to 
the perennial conflict between royalty and nobility. Marsden wrote that "the people 
being now accustomed and reconciled to female rule which they found more lenient 
than that of their kings, acquiesced in general in the established mode of government". 
Women in Power: Why Female Rule lasted for sic decades 
Contrary to popular belief that the elite was homogeneous and preferred female 
rulers since they were mere figureheads, there was sporadic opposition to female rule 
during the accession of the third and fourth female monarchs. Overall, though, female 
rule was generally accepted and supported since it was only under female sovereigns that 
Aceh witnessed prolonged peace. As illustrated in Chapter Five of this thesis, women's 
rule, viewed through the lenses of adat and Islam, was exemplary. The fact that all 
female rulers adopted a similar style suggests that this might have something to do with 
their being female. 
According to traditional Malay ideas of political leadership as found in 
indigenous chronicles and *hikayat, the ruler, or raja had a central role since the state or 
the government was constructed around his person. Similarly, a country and people 
without its raja would be one that was in a state of disorder and loss. So central was his 
role that customs, ceremonies and laws of the land were said to be in his hands' 
Despite this central role, the raja was not directly involved in the ruling of the kingdom. 
Like the ruler portrayed in the Hikayat Pahang, he was valued more for his manners than 
his practical skills. ' The mark of a true king lay in his behaviour. An exemplary raja 
should exhibit excellent manners (balk budi bahasanya) and speak in a graceful/sweet 
(manic), gentle (lemab lembut) and polite way. One of the most important duties of a raja 
was to bestow titles, gifts and honours to his subjects according to their rank. ' A raja 
s Bowrey, A GeographicalAccount, pp. 295-296. 
6 Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 449. 
7 Milner, The Malay Raja, p. 196. 
8 Milner, The Malay Raja, p. 198. 
9 Milner, The Malay Raja, p. 196. 
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should behave with propriety (patut) and if he did not, he would be considered unjust 
(tiada adil). If a raja was unjust, the subject could leave him and settle elsewhere but the 
subject was not allowed to rebel or overthrow a raja because this was regarded as derbaka. 
Milner asserted that the raja's authority as presented in the Hikayat Deli was not even 
specifically political in nature since the ruler could offer his subjects little more than titles 
and audiences. However, Milner went on to argue that titles and ceremonies were not 
subsidiary aspects of government but they were precisely what the subjects sought from 
their raja. Titles were not empty rewards and the festive events organised for subjects 
were part of a rajas work. These plus good manners and the ability to treat his subjects 
in the appropriately formal way were the raja's most valuable attributes. 
From the perspective of the adat, sex does not factor at all in the Malay 
conception of leadership. A female could be as well suited to be an exemplary raja as a 
male. Indeed judging from most contemporary observers' description of female rule in 
Aceh as gentle, generous and graceful, the female sovereigns were the epitome of good 
leadership. The generosity of Sultanah Safiatuddin and Sultanah Zaqiatuddin to both 
subjects and foreign envoys and the justice meted out through a more humane penal 
system illustrate a leadership style that is favoured by adat. The adat sanctioned the 
practice of decision-making through mutyawarab. Muafakat, which female rulers 
promoted, created an environment where power and wealth sharing was possible, 
turning the relationship between nobility and royalty from one of conflict to co- 
operation. The queens, perhaps by virtue of their female sex, remained separate and 
neutral from the masculine jealousies, egos and rivalries which characterised relations 
between the male king and his elite. 
The ulama in Aceh, such as Nuruddin al-Raniri and Abdul Rauf al-Singkel in 
1641, did not view female rule as a contravention of Islamic law. The ruler's moral 
attributes rather than sex determined good leadership. Nevertheless, how leadership and 
female roles and status were contested, conceived, defined and practised in a Muslim 
society depended on how the power-holders of the time interpreted Islamic tenets. 
There was no eternally or universally established model of Islamic political, social and 
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cultural forms since such forms were historically constituted. " Thus, while Acch 
tolerated female rule, Muslim communities elsewhere such as in Mughal India and 
Ottoman Turkey saw even women influence at court as disastrous. " Even in Aceh it 
became illegal from 1699. It would be interesting to see how debate on female rule 
might develop in modem Aceh, if an opportunity were to arise, given the current 
popular calls for the implementation of . yariah 
law. How will the present elite negotiate 
between adat and religion? 
Generally, despite the peculiar scope for gynaecocracy in the Malay world, and in 
Aceh in particular, Islamic tradition viewed political and public realms as male by default. 
A female had no place or very little space in them. On the rare occasions when a female 
became sovereign, she was deemed to be placed on the throne and tolerated by the male 
elite, to whom she would have to defer since, being a woman; she would have very little 
knowledge in the art of governance, war, trade and religion. In Muslim kingdoms, elite 
women were generally secluded and their mobility severely limited. Unlike a male king, a 
female monarch would not have the opportunity to forge alliances by marrying 
princesses and daughters from noble families or by taking them as concubines. Worse, a 
female ruler would be more susceptible to sexual scandals and liaisons, which could 
easily threaten her position and the stability of the kingdom. Marriage itself could 
compromise her position. 
Given these limitations, how did the female sovereigns of Aceh contest and 
negotiate their powers and rights th-ä-tis the male elite? Chapter 2 on the "Jewel Affair" 
illustrated how through a deliberate deference to her elite and with a dash of feminine 
softness to sooth ruffled tempers when needed, Sultanah Safiatuddin was able to get her 
own way and successfully steered her kingdom away from troubled waters through 
peaceful diplomacy. Her rule was indeed collaborative - designed to keep the rival 
factions of her orangkaya in balance. Compromises balanced the interests of throne, elite 
and kingdom. The authority of the orangkaya was respected and their rights honoured. 
10 As in the Islamic world, in the Christian world and other world traditions as well, differing views exist 
on the roles of women in politics. See Brenda Meehan-Waters, `Catherine the Great and the Problem of 
Female Rule', Russian Review, 34.3 (1975), 293-307, p. 306. # 
11 See Ruby Lal, Domesticity and Power in the Earlr Mughal World, (Cambridge: UK, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 220-225. See also, Hambly, Women in the Medieval, p. 9. Sunullah Effendi and Ahmad Refik 
saw the "sultanate of women" in Turkey as harmful. Imperial women in Mughal India were profoundly 
invisible in chronicles. # 
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Final authority, however, as demonstrated in the jewel Affair, lay in the Sultanah's hands. 
Unlike her male predecessors' reigns characterised by conspicuous consumption and 
extravagant spending on jewels to gain charisma, prowess, and status, her reign saw a 
more pragmatic spending and conservation of the kingdom's resources. Instead of 
prowess, she emphasized piety and her moral attributes to inspire devotion from her 
subjects. To other kings and Governors she exhorted peace and goodwill in diplomatic 
relations, without high rhetoric and virile antics. 
Chapter 3 showed how the Sultanah survived two coups, which threatened not 
only her position but possibly her life. She also managed to survive a sex scandal and 
still maintained her position on the throne. She survived all these by balancing the 
factions of the orangkaya, giving favours to her supporters and withholding rewards to 
weaken factions that oppose her. When the need arose, for example, at the height of 
tensions during the Perak Affair, she astutely manoeuvred to please the Laksamana, who 
was against her policy of accommodating the Dutch. Meanwhile, she continued to 
strengthen the faction under the Maharajah, who supported her policy. In the end, her 
policy of accommodating the Dutch prevailed. 
Chapter 5 illustrated how seclusion did not entail isolation. It was a function of 
royalty rather than sex, an important element to enhance the exclusivity and mystique of 
royal power. Nevertheless, as a female ruler in a largely patriarchal court, the Sultanah 
had to devise means to stay abreast of court happenings, be they rumours or real. In this 
context, the Sultanah's numerous and trustworthy eunuchs, especially Maradia Adonna 
Lilla and other powerful court ladies assumed important roles when they acted as 
intermediaries between the Sultanah and her oran$kaya. Maradia Adonna Lilla was the 
perfect conduit used by the Sultanah to engage the male sex and to serve as her eyes and 
ears in a largely male dominated court. Indeed, gendered perceptions such as the queen 
being inaccessible and inconsistent because she was a woman were cleverly turned to an 
advantage. The "inaccessibility problem, " during negotiations proved valuable since her 
actions, seen as unfathomable to others, gave her room for manoeuvre. Her 
"inconsistencies" bought time for the Acehnese during periods of difficult negotiations. 
Benevolent and pious, female rule met both the criteria of adat and Islam and 
helps explain why they were able to maintain power for six decades. Perhaps their 
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greatest achievement was to soften their male predecessors' harsh and tyrannical rule 
without entirely emasculating it. t2 
End of Female Rule 
It is difficult to ascertain why Kamalat Syah was deposed in 1699. It is safe to 
venture though that the political and religious contexts in Aceh in the 1690's did not 
favour female rule. By the 1680s, religious sentiment was on the increase in both Aceh 
and the surrounding territories of Sumatra West-Coast. Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim's 
comment on female rule as a Persian diplomat in Aceh in 1685, reflected a more 
orthodox view representative of heartland Muslim notions of female status. The 
women's appeal was sexual. Real power stayed in men's hands. And only the weakness 
and effeminacy of the orangkaya could explain the unorthodox situation. He wrote: 
Thus the councillors kept the reins of power in their own hands and 
governed the island without any problem. Their hypocrisy did not 
balk at this unmanly solution. They simply hid their heads under a 
female kerchief of shamelessness and disloyalty. These women- 
hearted men of state seated the maiden of their virgin thought on the 
throne of deception and from that time on this kingdom... has been 
given to Houri-like beauties, women as charming as angels. " 
In Aceh, the arrival of the Mekkan delegates stimulated and reflected such 
sentiments. By the 1690s, the group that was hostile to female rule became powerful 
thanks to their prestige and political ties to royalty. A more patriarchic interpretation of 
Islam sealed Sultanah Kamalat Syah's deposition. While the letter from Mekah stated 
12 Nicholas Karamzin described the greatest achievement of Catherine the Great of Russia "was to soften 
autocracy without emasculating it" in `Karam#n'sMemoir on Ancient and Modern Russia A Translation and 
Anafyrir by Richard Pipes (Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 130. 
13 The Ship ofSulaiman, translated by John O'Kane, Persian Heritage Series no. 11, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 174-178 quoted in Witnesses to Sumatra: A Travellers 'Anthology, ed. by Anthony Reid, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 92. 
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that female rule was forbidden in Islam, the real reason for Kamalat Syah's deposition 
had more to do with politics of power. 
DidAceb decline under Female Rule? 
One of the most popular assertions regarding female rule was that royal power 
declined under the women sovereigns, precipitating Aceh's decline. This view has gone 
unchallenged. A more detailed study of Aceh during this period, using contemporary 
Dutch, English and indigenous sources does not support it. Accounts by private 
merchants such as Bowrey, Dampier and Jacob de Roy who resided in Aceh towards the 
end of the seventeenth century reveal a politically stable and peaceful kingdom. They 
described a thriving and cosmopolitan entreport port attractive to private merchants. 
Aceh remained a centre of Islamic learning and a training centre for would-be ulamar. 
The description of Aceh as a busy and thriving port with numerous ships from 
Europe, India and the region through out the latter half of the seventeenth century 
appeared frequently in VOC records and other travellers' accounts. The Company 
officials' frequent complaints in the 1640s and 1650s regarding the tough competition 
between them and the English and the other "Moorish traders" testified to this. " In the 
1670s, Bowrey described numerous traders and craftsmen such as the English, Dutch, 
Danes, Portuguese, Chinese, Malabarese, Bengalese, Gujeratis, Javanese, Malays, 
Makassarese etc. frequenting the port of Aceh. ` In the two years Dampier was in Aceh 
(1688-89), he found Aceh to be the largest, richest and most populous of all the Isle of 
Sumatra. " Aceh's harbour was seldom without at least 10-15 ships from all nations. 
Food was abundant and cheap and he mentioned that rice, which was usually imported, 
was recently cultivated. Aceh was rich in natural resources, especially gold and the 
goldmines attracted many foreigners. Aceh was a cosmopolitan city with many 
foreigners such as the English, Danes, Portuguese, Gujeratis, Chinese and many more. 
Dampier made a special note of the Chinese traders whom he described as 
14 Around 1640, Surat had four times the trade of Goa. Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean, (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 135. 
15 Bowrey, Geographical account, p. 286. 
16 Dampier noted about 7-8000 houses in the city alone. Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, pp. 84-89. 
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"remarkable". Some Chinese lived in Aceh all year long whilst others made annual 
voyages. The Chinese came in June in about 10-15 ships and settled at the end of town, 
called the China Camp. There they lived and traded and amongst them were carpenters, 
painters, musicians. For two months, they transformed the whole camp into a fair selling 
all sorts of goods including Chinese toys. 17 
John Pitt who was in Aceh in 1685 mentioned "a great fleet of ships that lay in 
the road with bales of cloth and laden with rice. " In the 1690's, de Roy wrote about the 
thriving port city of Aceh where some one hundred European vessels came each year as 
well as a great number of native vessels. De Roy rated Aceh as the best place in the East 
Indies to make one's fortune. " From these testimonies, while Aceh might have retreated 
from long distance commerce by the end of the seventeenth century, it continued to be a 
busy and lucrative port for regional traders. The description of Aceh in the last decades 
of the century by the likes of Bowrey, Dampier and de Roy is invaluable. It does not 
paint a picture of a declining kingdom, one that succumbed to the pressures from 
European incursions, but one that was remarkably resilient. 
Contemporary indigenous and Dutch assessments of the female sovereigns were 
positive. Jacob Compostel noted that Sultanah Safiatuddin had more royal worth than 
her male predecessors. Pieter Sourij commented that the Sultanah's rule was gentle but 
awe-inspiring. Al-Raniri related that because of the excellent attributes of the Sultanah, 
Aceh remained to be peaceful and prosperous. The twists and turns of the jewel and 
Perak Affairs revealed a queen who was well able to manage both her local male elite and 
foreign ones. By facilitating a more inclusive and collaborative style of government and 
administering justice based on the laws of the land, the Sultanah had certainly dismantled 
her father's despotic, personal and arbitrary style. Collaborative rule meant a reduction 
or a limitation of royal power but it did not bring about a deterioration or decline of 
royal power. On the contrary, it strengthened the institution of royalty since Iskandar 
Muda's personalism was fragile and arbitrary. Royal monopoly of power in the hands of 
the ruler was now broken and distributed amongst her orangkaya especially those who 
shared her policies. Her promotion of her half-brother from the position of Kali to the 
highest-ranking position of Maharajah Sri Maharajah was one such example. This 
17 Dampier, Voyager and Discoveries, p. 95. 
18 Voyage made by Jacob Janssen de Roy to Borneo and Atcheen, 1691, pp. 356,363. 
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showed also that royalty and nobility were never totally distinct and the royalty-nobility 
balance of power was never a zero-sum game but a negotiated one. I argue that this 
limitation of monarchical power and return to state institutions ushered in by the first 
Sultanah brought about a more stable institutionalisation of power sharing which was 
key to the kingdom's continued stability and prosperity until the last decade of the 
seventeenth century. Her immediate successors continued this style of government until 
the end of the century. Since there are no first-hand accounts, of the audiences at court 
during their reigns it is rather difficult to ascertain the degree of power sharing and how 
the balance of power between royalty and nobility was played out. It is possible to 
speculate though that by the fourth female ruler, the oranýgkaya, especially the Arab group, 
gradually wielded more power, at least enough to depose the last female ruler, Kamalat 
Syah. It is unfortunate that the style and substance of limited monarchy instituted under 
these female rulers did not survive their reigns. It could have paved the way for a 
gradual transformation from a limited monarchy to a constitutional one. Kamalat Syah's 
successor, Badr al-Alam Syariff Hasyim Jamal al-Din, changed the rules of the game 
once more and resorted to the style of the Sultanah's male predecessors by accumulating 
more royal wealth at the expense of the orangkaya and foreign merchants. A period of 
political crisis in Aceh in the eighteenth century paved the way for the decline of the 
monarchy, which the queens arrested, to resume. 
This thesis has presented a different picture of Aceh under female sovereigns 
from the commonly accepted one of decline and decay. The assertion that Aceh 
declined after its "golden age" during the reign of Iskandar Muda ought to be revisited. 
What are the criteria of a "golden age"? Expansions of trade, territories, manpower, and 
codification of laws are some indicators of progress. These did take place under 
Iskandar Muda and he displayed his wealth and power ostentatiously to inspire awe and 
fear amongst his allies and enemies alike. Nevertheless, this "progress" was achieved at 
high cost. The "golden age" of Iskandar Muda relied on coercion backed by the threat 
of force. The tyranny and cruelty of the ruler shadowed the gleam of the "golden age". 
Thousands of lives were lost as a result of conquests and resettlements; the sultan's 
profligate nature drained the kingdom's resources. The dismantling of this arbitrary 
power and the institutionalization of law to protect the rights of subjects and foreigners 
alike were the key features of female rule. In this regard, the adverse course Iskandar 
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Muda began was actually reversed by his female successors. It is time to recognise their 
work and its positive effects. 
Aceb in Relation to Other Powers 
Contrary to Reid's thesis that critical military encounters with Europeans brought 
about an eclipse of local ethnic shipping, trade and revenue decline and the failure of the 
last stand of Islamic commerce by 1680, the case of Aceh shows a resilient regional 
network of Muslim and non-Muslim traders. 19 European private merchants flocked to 
Aceh and profited by participating in the regional network of trade. Aceh remained to 
be the port of call for Muslim traders from India and the region and though Muslim 
trade might be affected by disruptions from the VOC blockades and pass system, this 
ancient trade survived. Although the pepper trade fluctuated in the last two decades of 
the seventeenth century, Aceh still profited from its gold and elephant trade. 
The "Perak Affair" showed how the VOC failed to engross the tin trade and 
execute its monopolistic policies in the northern part of the Straits of Melaka. Aceh 
retained commercial autonomy and, unlike other local polities, was not subjected to 
unequal trading relations with European Companies. The accommodating and 
conciliatory stance adopted by the female sovereigns in response to VOC blockades and 
pressures ensured that Aceh did not become embroiled in wasteful and dangerous wars. 
Sultanah Safiatuddin concluded many treaties and contracts with the VOC and EIC fully 
embracing these new instruments of peace in international diplomacy. The Sultanah 
signed away some trade privileges and revenues but she ensured that customs duties and 
tolls were protected. The Sultanah granted only limited toll-free privileges for definite 
periods. In Perak, she allowed equal sharing of tin between the VOC and Aceh. 
Safiatuddin excluded Dutch Company officials from Aceh's lucrative elephant trade with 
the Indian merchants. 
Another widely accepted assertion needs re-examination: that female rule was 
responsible for the loss of Aceh's power over its vassal states of Perak and West Coast 
19 Ottoman decline in the eighteenth century is no longer universally accepted, so was India's since Mughal 
successor states were still commercially viable. Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 118. 
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Sumatra. Close examination of evidence regarding relations between Aceh, its vassals, 
the VOC and EIC revealed a more complex picture than the rather simplistic 
generalisation that with European ascendancy the indigenous polities declined. The 
VOC's increased influence and intervention in the SWC politics were the result of the 
initiatives and negotiations of both the Dutch and the local elites to advance their mutual 
interests. 
The Perak Affair revealed the resilience of the traditional vassal-overlord system 
working to the advantage of local polities. Kinship and loyalty ties between Aceh and 
Perak courts were very much evident and as a result, the Company officials failed to 
bring the Perak murderers to justice and in the end, the Company had to cancel 
reparation debts. The VOC's increased involvement in Sumatra West Coast was not so 
much the result of its ascent as a powerful power in the Straits of Melaka nor was it 
because of Aceh's decline. Rather, it was because of the initiative of local leaders who 
saw that the Company presented new opportunities for them to change allegiance and to 
rework their political and commercial networks to their benefit. " The Acehnese- 
appointed panglima(s) were chased out of Sumatra West Coast and the revenue Aceh was 
entitled to was lost. The system of tributary control erected by Iskandar Muda along the 
west coast was dismantled because new patrons were available. Aceh however, did not 
lose its traditional commercial and political links with the coastal polities. Aceh 
continued to receive pepper and gold brought directly by the Minangkabau inhabitants 
from both the east and west coasts of Sumatra. Unhappy with the Company's one-sided 
commercial policy of price-fixing and attempts at monopolising trade, these traders 
continued to frequent Aceh instead of the VOC commercial base in Padang. Deli and 
Asahan on the east coast, which supplied a substantial amount of rice to Aceh, had 
defected to the Company in the 1660's. But commercial links were maintained since rice 
continued to be exported to Aceh despite the VOC. 21 
The VOC officials became embroiled in local political factions and from the 
1660's right up to the mid-eighteenth century; the Dutch never enjoyed more than half a 
year's peace. The numerous wars frustrated the enforcement of contracts. The Dutch 
20 Recall that the local Sumatra West Coast elite had sought to seek allegiance from the VOC even when 
they were under the control of the mighty Iskandar hiuda. 
21 NA, VOC 1200,1653, ff. 227R-227V, 228V. Quoted from Andaya, A very good natured but awe- 
inspiring government', pp. 74-75. 
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were not able to control the pepper and gold trade of the island since small planters and 
traders carried their harvests across jungles and rivers to places all over the coast. It was 
impossible to close off more than 4,500 kilometres of Sumatran coastline to rivals. ' In 
1670, the VOC decided to take up production of gold itself and imported experts and 
equipments to mine the gold from the Barisan Mountains. But European mining 
methods did not suit local conditions and European miners could not survive the 
tropical working conditions. In the 1680's, with the beginnings of religious revivalism of 
sorts, partly as a response to increased incursions from the Christian west, spiritual ties 
were rekindled between Aceh and these west coast polities. Polities such as Oelakkan 
and Barus looked towards Aceh for spiritual leadership. Indeed, in an amorphous and 
fluid political culture as in the Malay world in the pre-modern era where territorial and 
physical control was never the norm, these cultural, religious and commercial ties were 
truly the ones that bound patron-client loyalty. 
A different picture emerged in the south. Nearer to the VOC headquarters in 
Batavia, and farther away from Aceh, the kingdom's rebellious subordinate states of 
Johor and Pahang were able to establish independence. This presented yet another 
configuration with a different set of results, difficult to categorize under the heading of 
"European ascendancy and local decline". With the mediation of the Company, Aceh 
and Johor signed a peace treaty with each other and vowed never to interfere in each 
other's affairs henceforth. The Company in this regard, did not play its usual aggressor 
role but brokered peace that aided strong local polities to survive. Sultanah Safiatuddin 
agreed to cede Pahang to Johor; given the new constellation and balance of power in the 
southern part of the Straits in 1641. Johor, seizing the chance to be protected by a new 
patron, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the VOC. This enabled Johor to 
enjoy peace and concentrate on commercial advancement. 
The Perak Affair resonated with the new noise of East-West encounters. They 
demanded adjustments, sometimes creative at others clumsy, in what John Wills calls 
interactive emergence. As the Perak affair illustrated, interaction happened at many 
levels and junctures, from basic hate and fear to commerce, politics, language and legal 
structures. The VOC had limited success in the use of legal instruments of diplomacy 
72 Els M . Jacobs, 
Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East Indies Company during the Eighteenth Century 
(Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006), p. 60. 
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such as contracts and treaties. According to Grotius, Europeans and Asians were bound 
by the same legal agreements since both societies were equal. But when did this 
international system, laid by Europeans and initially confined to Europe become 
universal? In many cases Europeans did not treat other non-Europeans and non- 
Christians equally and vice-versa. China saw Dutch merchant-ambassadors as tribute 
bearers and the Chinese viewed the limited trade allowed for the Dutch as a grant or 
privilege. ' The legalistic, letter-of-the-law approach adopted by the VOC to the signing 
of contracts and treaties contrasted with the personal, spirit of the law approach 
preferred by Asian monarchs. While VOC officials viewed contracts as inviolable and 
permanent, the locals saw them as transient and changeable based on changing 
circumstances. Similarly, in Aceh, the instructions granting Dutch trade privileges in the 
form ofirman, estemie or kurnia could be viewed as unilateral grants, given at will and 
taken at will as a royal prerogative. Indeed the word kurnia literally means grant. By no 
stretch of the imagination was this seen as mutually obligatory nor was it meant to be a 
permanent contract. 
The contrasting approaches led to many misunderstandings and misperceptions. 
The Acehnese saw the VOC officials as being too demanding, rude to the extent of 
forcing the hand of the ruler to accede to their ways, rather than be satisfied and 
thankful for the grants given based on the ruler's benevolence. The officials, in contrast, 
saw that they were demanding only what was their right. This in turn led to 
Company officials stereotyping Acehnese as treacherous and untrustworthy and the 
Acehnese viewing the Company officials as essentially merchants robed in ambassadorial 
clothings. They constantly questioned the Company's sincerity in its friendship with 
them. The exchanges between Arnold de Vlamingh and the Laksamana during the 
"Jewel Affair" episode vividly illustrate this type of relationship. Furthermore, with these 
contrasting perceptions, ambassadorial language usually got lost in translation. In 
Europe, during the Middle Ages and Renaissance period, diplomatic exchanges between 
east and west required eloquence in both Greek and Latin, preferred languages of 
international diplomacy. As these became complex, the drafting of legal and political 
documents, mastery of public speaking and ambassadorial business became prized 
23 Goor, `Merchants as diplomats', pp. 10-11. # 
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skills. 24 In Southeast Asia, in the seventeenth century, no such languages of international 
diplomacy nor ambassadorial skill or protocol existed yet. This is why the likes of 
Truijtman and Vlamingh and Sri Bidia Indra faced so many problems. Even the 
Europeans themselves, the English and the Dutch disagreed as to what constituted legal 
commercial practices in relation to their rivalry with each other in this part of the world 
and their relations with indigenous local powers. 23 
Not all these encounters leave a bad taste, however, as one reads with delight 
how Truijtman or Vlamingh enjoyed their pleasurable moments savouring the exotic 
delights of local food, fruits and cultural entertainments. One is reminded that Europe 
was not that different after all when one compares how Sultanah Safiatuddin welcomed 
her Christian ambassadors with how Queen Elizabeth welcomed her Moorish 
ambassadors from Turkey and Morocco 26 In terms of hospitality and accommodating 
inter-cultural exchanges, both queens were impeccable ' 
Safiatuddin had her share of favourites amongst the Dutch envoys. She had a 
soft spot for Justus Schouten and Balthazar Bort and did not hesitate to tell the 
Governor-General in Batavia in her letters requesting the return of these men. Besides 
European men, commerce and diplomacy Sultanah Safiatuddin learnt about European 
fashion from Mrs. Harmanszoon and Sultanah Zaqiatuddin about men's wigs from 
Messrs Ord and Cawley. In the course of this long process of interaction between the 
European officials and locals, friendships too were also struck. Sri Bidia Indra's (the 
long term Acehnese envoy to Batavia) friendship with the VOC's envoy to Aceh such as 
Johan Truijtman is one such example. 
The diversity of responses to European intrusions and the different degrees of 
impact on indigenous polities by the end of the seventeenth century showed that 
although East and West might no longer interact as equals, European ascendancy 
remained patchy. Aceh, by the end of the century was no longer an expanding empire, 
as it was at the beginning, and, relative to the gradual strengthening of the VOC's 
territorial and commercial empire, Aceh was a just a port-polity. Unlike the rest of the 
Muslim polities in the region, however, Aceh was not a backwater nor was it a subjected 
24 Brotton, The Renaissance Baliaar, p. 86. 
25 See, E. B. Sainsbury, A Calendar of the Court Minutes, etc., of the East India Company, 1669, p. 225. # 
26 Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen, p. 34. 
27 Matar, Turks, Moorr and Englishmen, pp. 66,70. # 
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state. Partly thanks to the good governance of women rulers and their creative and 
accommodative diplomacy, Aceh remained to be an independent kingdom, an important 
regional port of call with its own autonomous commercial networks and continued its 
role as the veranda of Mekah for the region. The VOC was not successful in dominating 
the northern part of the Straits of Melaka even by the end of the eighteenth century. For 
another two hundred years Aceh remained independent, even after the demise of the 
Dutch East Indies Company in 1802. Aceh remained to be a thorn in the Dutch flesh 
when the rest of the East Indies had long been subjected colonies. The Dutch colonial 
government had to fight a thirty- year war (1873-1903) to bring this last frontier within 
its colonial borders. 
Contributions of this thesis: Uses and Limitations 
This thesis has not answered all the questions raised. It is not yet possible to 
ascertain the identities and origins of the second, third and fourth female rulers. Sources 
at times suggest more questions than answers. The sources, however, have provided 
enough evidence to challenge popular claims about Aceh under the rule of the female 
Sultanahs. Contrary to claims that they were responsible for Aceh's decline, one has to 
accord due recognition to their contributions in keeping the kingdom peaceful and 
independent. The experiment carried out in 1641 worked and this prevented Aceh from 
meeting the same fate as the other Malay polities who had to succumb to Dutch power. 
Female rulers, especially Sultanah Safiatuddin, showed that a female ruler could be as 
capable and successful as a male one. In this regard, present Acehnese women could 
draw some inspiration and confidence that they too could play important roles and 
contribute to the makings of a new and more successful Aceh in the future. 
A balanced assessment of the Sultanahs' reigns is possible. Rather than 
universalising stereotypes of "female rule" or "female rulers" or making cosmic 
generalisations about them, this thesis presents a particular case study of a succession of 
women rulers in a certain place at a specific time in history - the representations and 
their lived realities. To take the scope of the conclusions further, more research would 
be needed on other female sovereigns in the contexts of female rulership in Southeast 
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Asia, Islam, and the world. Nevertheless, the achievements, and the interest, of the 
queenly phase of Aceh's history would surely withstand any comparison. 
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Appendix 1 
Explanatory Notes 
CHAPTER 1 
Fn. 2 p. 30 
There are many different versions of the founding of the kingdom, differing accounts of the 
identity of the first Sultan and the dates of succession of the following Sultans. The 
indigenous accounts of the founding of the Sultanate and the genealogy of its Sultans are 
found in the AdatAceh, HikayatAceh and the Bustan us-Salatin. The first two chronicles, 
believed to be written in the early half of the seventeenth century, authors unknown, are 
indigenous court chronicles that intersperse myths with history. The Butan written by the 
ulama Nuruddin al-Raniri in 1638, is also a court chronicle but is less mythical and more 
historical in character. Bustan us-Salatin meaning Garden of Kings, was written in Aceh in 
1638 by the leading Gujerati ulama, Nuruddin ar-Raniri. The I3ustan was commissioned to be 
written by Sultan Iskandar Thani. It is not known exactly when Al-Raniri completed the 
Bustan for he left Aceh in 1643 during the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah. It is believed 
that this work was completed in Gujerat. The Bustan us-Salatin is the most significant piece of 
Al-Raniri's writings and touted to be one of the most well written Malay works of the period. 
The Bustan us-Salatin combines all the different aspects of history, literature and religion in its 
seven chapters. In chapter II, part 13, the writer refers to historical characters, in this case, 
the royal members of the court of Aceh where he worked in. The original manuscripts have 
been studied and published in these three publications- 1. Iskandar, T. ed., Bustan us-Salatin. 
(Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966) 2. Siti Hawa Salleh ed., Busfan us-Salatin, 
(Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992). 3. Jelani Harun, ed., Busfan al-Salatin, 
(Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 2004). 
These indigenous chronicles do not reveal in detail the circumstances surrounding 
succession. In order to get a clearer picture of the historical account of the genealogy of the 
Sultanate, the accounts from these indigenous chronicles should be corroborated with 
European sources, namely Portuguese, English, French and Dutch descriptions of the 
Sultanate. These descriptions are those from travellers such as Joao de Barros, Diogo do 
Couto, Fernao Mendes Pinto, Godinho de Eredia, John Davis, James Lancaster, Augustin de 
Beaulieu amongst others. Earlier studies on the genealogy of the Sultans of Aceh were 
carried out by Marsden and Veth. Marsden, W., (1811), History of Sumatra and Veth, (1873), 
"Atchin en zijn betrekkingen tot Nederland: topographisch-historische beschrijving. "The 
latter and more comprehensive studies of the genealogy combining both Malay and 
European sources were undertaken by H. Djajadiningrat and D. Lombard. Djajadiningrat, 
Hoesein, (1911), "Critisch overzicht van de in Malaische werken vervatte over the 
geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh, " BKI, 65, pp135-215. Raden Hoesein 
Djajadiningrat, translated by Teuku Hamid, Kesultanan Acheh (Suatu Pembaharan Tentang S jarah 
Kesultanan Aceb Berdasarkan Bahan-bahan Yang Terdapat Dalam Kaya Melayu), Departmen 
Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan: Proyek Pengembangan Permuseuman, Daerah Istimewa Aceh, 
1982-1983). See Denys Lombard, (1967), Le Sultanate dAjeb au temps d%skandarMuda 1607- 
1636. Paris: Ecole Francaise d' Extreme-Orient translated by Winarsih Arifin Kerajaan Aceh : 
Daman Sultan IskandarMuda (1607-1636) (Jakarta : Balai Pustaka 1986), pp. 247-249. It is 
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beyond the purview of this research to illustrate the inconsistencies in the genealogy, suffice 
to say that these inconsistencies relate more to the history of the Sultanate in the sixteenth 
century. By the mid-sixteenth to early seventeenth century, the genealogy of the Sultans of 
Aceh is much clearer. 
Fn. 5 p. 30 
Another version is based on the account that Aceh, a vassal of Pedir, was freed by its ruler 
who then expanded his territory by conquering Daya, Pasai and Pedir itself. It is not clear 
who this person was, to the Portuguese he was a Raja Ibrahim. 
Fn. 16 p. 32 
H. M. Zainuddin gave a differing account of Sultan Zayn al-Abidin who was the son of Al- 
Qahar's first born son, Raja Abdullah, ruler of Aru. According to Zainuddin, he was a bad- 
tempered man and he was deposed. Afraid that he would be killed, he exiled himself to 
Mount Seulawaih and became a farmer. After turning a new life, he returned and claimed the 
throne again in 1585 and ruled the kingdom well up to 1604. He was the one who came to 
be known as al-Mukamrnil. See Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 399. 
Fn. 20 p. 33 
After Aceh's conquest of Perak in 1575, the widow of the former Perak ruler and her family 
were taken to Aceh. Sultan Ala al-Din who succeeded to the Aceh throne was her eldest son. 
He married the widow of the Sultan of Aceh. 
Fn. 21 p. 33 
They were not happy with this Perak Sultan because he married his daughter to the Sultan of 
Johor. As a result of this union, they had a son, Raja Hasjim, and the Sultan had the 
intention to name this grandson as his successor. The elites of Aceh opposed this and he was 
eventually killed by a uleebalang. 
Fn. 24 p. 33 
Djajadiningrat, however, discussed other accounts by John Davis, F. M. de Vitre and 
Beaulieu, which mention that this person was a mere fisherman who was chosen by the 
orannkaya. Apart from these European accounts, the HikayatAceb reveals that this person 
was the descendent of Inayat Syah from the . Dar al-Kamal Dynasty, HikayatAceh, p. 99. The 
Bastan states that he is the son of Firman Syah, Bustan, p. 34. See also Lombard, p. 248. 
Considering the cases of earlier Sultans who were of royal lineage, including the foreign-born 
ones, it is difficult to imagine that the orangkqya would choose someone from such a lowly 
background that would be acceptable to all. Amirul Hadi did not discuss this person's 
contested identity, merely stating that he is from Dar al-Kamal Dynasty without quoting any 
evidence. Amirul Hadi, p. 69. Perhaps the most interesting and plausible explanation was 
one given by Zainuddin. He stated, as mentioned above, that this Sultan was the same 
person who exiled himself at Mount Seulawaih and then returned to claim the throne. This 
would solve the problem of contradictory accounts between European and indigenous 
sources. Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 401. 
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Fn. 27 p. 33 
If Zainuddin's account was accepted, this explains why this king was already very old. The 
orangkaya whom he was alleged to have killed would be those either from Indcrapura or 
those supporting the former Sultan from Inderapura. 
Fn. 33 p. 34 
Not much information could be found regarding this son, Sultan Muda. When Beaulieu was 
in Aceh, he observed that this son was disliked and unpopular and believed to be involved in 
an alleged conspiracy. Hasjimy claimed that he was killed because he committed adultery 
with a Captain's wife. 
Fn. 76 p. 44 
The issue of whether females could be an imam or wali was essentially religious in nature with 
little bearing on the issue of political succession. Furthermore, the Adat Aceh, an indigenous 
text covering rules and regulations for kings in the seventeenth century, states that these 
religious duties of an imam and a wali were not actually carried out even by a male monarch, 
but by the religious head or kadhi, thus these so-called objections are not relevant. 
Fn. 79 p. 47 
He was born in Ranir (present day Rander). It has been suggested that his mother is Malay. 
Before coming to Aceh in 1637, it is believed that he spent some time in the Malay 
Peninsula, namely Pahang. He had extensive knowledge of other Malay works such as the 
S jarah Melayu. He died in India in 1658. 
Fn. 84 p. 48 
Al-Singkel viewed equality between men and women as a component of humanity, 
opportunity and rights that extended into the political domain. To him, a female could be 
regarded as a leader of an Islamic community and be accepted as God's khal([ah (deputy) in 
implementing God's laws and the community should offer its loyalty in return. He himself 
served as an example of a loyal subject to his queen. In the Mirat al-Tullab, which Sultanah 
Safiatuddin commissioned, he wrote that his acceptance of this commission was in honour 
of Her Majesty and professed his loyalty to her. Amirul concluded, "it is safe to suggest that 
even though the enthronement of the ruler occurred in the context of dar urah (crisis), female 
rule was to al-Singkel, a normal phenomenon. 
Fn. 89 p. 50 
The concept of imam is open to various interpretations amongst the Islamic jurists 
depending on their cultural and political affiliations. A general definition of imam, however, is 
someone who is a religious leader and leads congregational prayers in mosques. One 
interpretation' is that a woman may lead her own kind in prayers but is forbidden to lead 
men, thus, debarring her from taking this position. 
Fn. 91 p. 50 
Following the tradition set by al-Mawardi, he was severe towards women, for, according to 
him, they should be barred from holding even subordinate positions, such as those of a 
vizier, minister or judge. 
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Fn. 101 p. 52 
Out of the thirteen female Muslim sovereigns who ascended the thrones of Muslim states 
between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries holding the official insignia of sovereignty, 
i. e having their names mentioned in the Friday khutbah and on coins, two were Turks; six 
were Mongolians, two Yemenis and three from the Maldives. 
Fn. 116 p. 55 
To meet the contentions of her rivals that she could not rule as a woman, Njinga acted like a 
man. She married many dependent husbands who became her concubines. She required 
them to dress in women's clothes and sleep among her maids in waiting. She engaged in 
virile pursuits by heading her troops to battle personally. 
Fn. 118 p. 56 
Four of the orangkaya who lived in a more remote part from the court took up arms to 
oppose the new queen and the rest of the orangkaya. This opposition group met the pro- 
queen party on the opposite banks of the Aceh River. Dampier commented that the soldiers 
were calling out to each other discussing why they were fighting rather than engaging in 
actual fighting. Nothing came out of this and the anti-queen party left for home. No civil 
war broke out and the third queen ruled peacefully until her death. 
CHAPTER 2 
Fn. 6 p. 60 
Aside from Mundy, no one else has mentioned that Safiatuddin had other sisters and that 
Iskandar Muda had other daughters. It is probable that this instigator was one of Iskandar 
Muda other "wives" not of royal origin rather than his daughter. It might refer to his non- 
royal wife from Lam Si who had a son, Imeum Hitam, also known to be Panglima Polem, 
thus, a half-brother of Safiatuddin. See Zainuddin, Tarich A jeh, p. 426. Alternatively, this 
might refer to Iskandar Muda daughters from non-royal wives who might wish to claim the 
throne for their sons. 
Fn. 12 p. 63 
The Butan detailed this ceremony: 
Once the headstone was ready, it was carried in a grand procession to the burial site. 
Warriors took the first row in full combat gear riding on elephants, taking the stance as if 
they were charging for battle. Eighty elephants ridden by warriors took the second row 
carrying small canons and firing them making such a tremendous noise. Eighty war-horses 
followed carrying warriors with gold-plated swords. Next came hundreds of elephants and 
horses all dressed with golden or suassa saddles. Then, came a huge man made figurine with 
huge eyes and fangs carrying a spear. An artificially made dragon with a lion-like head and 
body of a crocodile followed; then, an enormous man made bird pecking a huge snake. 
Another dragon followed fronted by two figurines which when moved, was followed suit by 
the dragon. At times, these figurines `ran' into the crowd pursued by the dragon much to 
the amusement of the massive crowd that gathered to catch this spectacular procession. 
Animals, wild and tame including lions and tigers, rhinoceros, cows and deer followed this 
floats section. Each of the animals, dressed with cloth of all kinds of colours thoroughly 
delighted the children. Huge lanterns and kites followed. Behind that, a huge artificial 
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dragon snaked on with a body like a horse with tusks like elephants carrying a huge tray of 
delicacies on its back. A huge bird with a face like an elephant's with a puppeteer inside and 
controlling it came next. When the puppeteer danced, the bird followed suit. Next came a 
retinue of silver `cars', each bearing a puppeteer from the neighbouring lands such as Java, 
Pahang and Johor. Two huge elephants carrying golden weapons followed by a band of 
musicians marked the highlight of this procession. After this band, came a magnificent 
elephant carrying a court official dressed in armour equipped with a weapon. The weapon 
was made of gold encrusted with gems, his sword was made of gold, its sheath made of 
gems, and the handle was made of gold, encrusted with multi-coloured gems. Behind this 
elephant, came a seven-story golden pyramid-like structure that glittered in the sun. The 
first 
level held four noblemen, each with a whip in hand directing the warriors guarding this 
golden `car'. A few good-looking noblemen lined the middle level. A level higher was a 
bevy of courtly ladies dressed in their finery. Four dancing Acehnese puppets, two dressed 
in glittering man's clothes, and the other two in women's were right at the top. The 
king's 
headstone crowned this splendid structure. A group of well-dressed princesses, each 
carrying the kingdom's sword, dagger, and fan flanked this tombstone. Right at the top of 
this structure, together with the headstone was a golden tree, its leaves made of copper, 
flowers made of gold, fruits made of nine precious stones that so glittered that they 
resembled stars in the sky. Noblewomen, court ladies, women escorts, and female slaves 
surrounded this seven-story pyramid. More elephants carrying weapons and expensively 
decorated palanquins accompanied this awesome structure. The kingdom's subjects came 
from far and wide to witness this amazing spectacle. Those who were fishing would stop 
fishing; those who were peddling would stop peddling. Young, unmarried ladies beautifying 
themselves would even bun their hair, wear their jewelleries mid-way whilst hurrying to join 
the crowd. Wives quarrelled with their husbands as to who would stay behind to look after 
the house. Pregnant women came from so far away that they had to give birth along the 
way. 
Fn. 36 p. 69 
"The auspicious Sultan, the honoured and revered Paduka Seri Sultan Alauddin Mughayat 
Syah, Champion Sovereign, shadow of God on earth, the vicegerent of Allah, King of the 
whole world, who like God, is glittering like the sun at midday, whose attributes are like the 
full moon, is the king chosen by Allah whose characteristics are like the Pleiades, who is king 
of kings, descendents of Alexander the Great. " 
Fn. 105 p. 90 
In the HikayatAceh, Sultan Sri Alam was depicted as extravagant since he had depleted the 
kingdom's Treasury by giving expensive gifts to certain soldiers and elites from Fansur 
(Barns). The HikayatAceh relates that the orangkaya and ulama in Aceh had then gathered 
together and decided that this state of affairs was injurious to the kingdom and that this 
Sultan must be deposed. 
CHAPTER 3 
Fn. 4 p. 93 
Derived from the Arabic word khalifa, the title of caliph encompasses many meanings. The 
first Caliph, Abu Bakar (r. 632-634) was the successor of Muhammad and acted as a leader of 
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the Muslim community in a temporal sense. In the Quran, the word kha/ifa significs the 
vicegerency of God on earth. According to Hodgson, the concept of kha! fa as representing 
shadow of God on earth is a later importation from Persian/Sassanid tradition where the 
pre-Islamic king was seen as mystical and semi-divine who acted as an intcrmcdiary between 
God and man to demonstrate God's will. The rulers in Southeast Asia arrogated this title to 
themselves although this designation had lost its force in the Muslim world following the 
sack of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongols. 
Fn. 16 p. 98 
After the Dutch conquest of Melaka, the Company was unable to decide between two 
conflicting aims. One was to continue and expand existing lines of traffic in trade. To 
preserve and develop the emporium character of Melaka as a port of call for traders and 
normalise trade disrupted by the long siege of Melaka. Passes were freely issued to traders, 
especially Indian traders to Melaka and orders were placed to stock Melaka with goods 
desired by these merchants. The other was to monopolize trade, which meant to restrict 
existing trade and to control main articles of import and export with a view to dictate prices. 
Fn. 17 p. 98 
Sultan Muzaffar Shah of Perak allowed the Dutch to trade in Perak but in competition with 
other merchants in 1639. It was probable that this was only allowed after obtaining 
permission from Iskandar Thani since an earlier private arrangement between the Perak 
Sultan and the Dutch was disallowed. The Sultan, though eager to acquire a new ally in the 
VOC, had to defer to Iskandar Thani and future relations between the Perak and the VOC 
depended on Aceh's attitude as the overlord. 
Fn. 18 p. 99 
According to Irwin, as heir to the Melakan Sultans, the Portuguese Crown reserved for itself 
the whole of Perak's tin. The Portuguese Captains were able to monopolize this tin and 
gained much profits but this happened only when the Portuguese power was at its height in 
the mid-sixteenth century. The rise of Aceh and the advent of the Dutch made it 
increasingly difficult for the Portuguese to control trade outside Melaka. After Aceh 
conquered Perak, the profits from tin trade went to Aceh and the Asian merchants who 
traded in Aceh and Perak. 
Fn. 30 p. 102 
The legal frame where European nations traded with local powers consisted of court orders 
(farmans) where special rights were granted. Difference between Mughal and Persian fan ans 
was in Mughal empire the farmans were irrevocable where as in Persia farmans were brought 
under renewed scrutiny when a new shah-in shah came to power. Privileges had to be 
reconfirmed after a new emissary was sent. The exceptions were the British-Persian Treaty 
of 1622 and the Persian-Portuguese Treaty of 1626, which were permanent. 
Fn. 117 p. 128 
Truijtman wrote, this "reformed" or altered court was a result of the revolt that took place at 
the end of 1651 where the Company's "affectionate friend", of many years, the Maharaja had 
faced distress and jealousies from the other orangkaya. He was demoted landet eGracht) and on 
the contrary, the most important person from those who disfavored us (who was of the 
lowest of the low/sediment) were now driven to the top [the Laxamana and his followers], 
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whose evil influence was partly funded not only perhaps by their envy and hatred for our 
good friend but also especially by their grudge against the Company's prerogatives in Perak's 
trade which we obtained last year which they had sought to annul. 
Fn. 127 p. 130 
Truijtman's mission to Kedah was also ill-fated. Truijtman was at first warmly welcomed by 
the Sultan but when he started discussing Company's business, the Sultan became angry. He 
also started objecting to the number of armed soldiers escorting Truijtman and demanded 
them to surrender their weapons. One soldier resisted and a scuffle ensued where one 
Dutchman was killed and another wounded. The rest of the delegation including Truijtman 
were sent to jail. They were held captive from May to October 1652. To add insult to injury, 
the Company lost 12,809 teals. 
Fn. 152 p. 136 
Although B. Andaya argued that Aceh's influence in Perak had declined drastically under the 
Sultanah, she pointed out that one reason why the Temenggong not only escaped 
punishment but was even promoted to Bendahara's position was because of his uncle's 
influence as a leading member of the Aceh Council. Safiatuddin Syah refused to take any 
action against the new Bendahara arguing that he could not be deposed since the new ruler 
was too young and the Regent too old. 
Chapter 4 
Fn. 1 p. 142 
The main aim of this section is not to provide an exhaustive account of the political nor 
socio-economic situation of the area in the latter half of the seventeenth century, but to 
examine the nature of changing relations between Aceh and its subordinate states and the 
beginning of VOC interference in their affairs. No such analysis has been undertaken 
though E. Francis (1856) has provided a descriptive account of the establishment of the 
Dutch in SWC and J. C. M. Radermacher (1824) descriptions of the island of Sumatra. De 
Leeuw's (1926) study on these relations ended with the signing of the Painan Treaty in 1663 
and further developments up to 1665. This section owes much to studies that have been 
undertaken by scholars on the individual polities. For example, F. De Haan (1897) on 
Middle Sumatra, Kathirithamby-Wells' (1976) study on the InderapuraSultanate, Jane 
Drakard's (1990) on Minangkabau kingdom and Barus and Timothy Barnard (2003) on Siak. 
Fn-5 p. 142 
In 1661, the delegation led by Raja Panjang who represented the Minangkabau rajas of Silida, 
Painan, Batang, Kapas, Kambang and Lakitan went to Batavia to place themselves under 
Dutch protection. This was followed by the rajas of Dua-belas kota, Padang, Inderpoura 
and Ticou. In April 1668, another treaty was signed between the VOC and the 
Minangkabau ruler who recognized the independence of the Minangkabau territories. The 
area from Barus to Manjuta acknowledged Minangkabau authority under the protection of 
the Company. 
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Fn. 54 p. 155 
The Minangkabau world could be divided into two areas - the heartland known as darat and 
the coasts known as rantau. Within the Minangkabau heartland were numerous autonomous 
settlements, with the most complex form known as Hegen. Most negeri consisted of four to ten 
suku or extended families or matrilineal clans. The leading male of the suku was known as 
the penghulu. These penghulus would get together in a council that acted as authority for the 
negeri. One neger! could form defensive alliances with other negeri to form federations known 
as laras. These federations could be either cooperative or conflicting in matters of trade, 
access to resources and routes and status. The other division of power was between the 
upstream (hulu) and downstream (hilir) centres. Tensions sometimes occurred between the 
production areas upstream and the distribution centres downstream though at most times 
trade between these two rested on mutual recognition of rights and obligations. 
Fn. 65 p. 157 
In 1665, the Sultanah sent 28 small vessels with 500 soldiers to SWC to assist, followed by 
another 9 bantengs (big ships). The 28 vessels successfully passed the Company's blockade 
in Baros by night. They then landed in Tiku which caused great dismay amongst the 
Company's allies. This expedition however did little to try to wrest the vassals away from 
the VOC. Groenewegen reported that out of the 28,9 fell into a trap, 1 was conquered at 
sea, 4 hit against rampart, the rest returned. The 500 soldiers it appeared, did not arrive. See 
Chijs, Dagh-Register, 1665, p. 239. 
CHAPTER 5 
Fn. 3 p. 168 
Thus far, studies of Malay women in the region in the past, elite and commoner, have 
centred on how women were represented in indigenous court narratives and literature such 
as the S jarah Melayu, Undang-Undang Melaka, Hikayat Siak, Tnhfat al-Nafis, Mira MeI yu, and 
Hikqyat Banjar. See studies by Ismail Satbini, Sharifah Zaleha and Rashila Ramli, Monique 
Zaini-Lajoubert and Siti Hawa Salleh. Anthropological studies concentrate on exploring 
tensions between Islam and adat laws and how they affected women's positions. Sec studies 
by Wazir Jahan Karim, Carol Laderman, Aihwa Ong, Michael Peletz, Penny van Esterik, 
Robert Winzeler and Ruzy Suliza Hashim. 
References for the above literature are detailed in the bibliography. 
Fn. 11 p. 169 
One of the problems faced by Mongol princes after converting to Islam was how to 
reconcile the very public status of women in their culture and with the very private status of 
women in Arabic mainland Islam. Judging from the numerous khatun (women who held 
political authority) in the Mongol and Turkish dynasties, it is clear that Islam was interpreted 
from the lens of local culture and traditions. Ibn Battuta was struck by the constant 
involvement of women in politics when he crossed the Mongol Empire. He noted that 
amongst the Turks and Tartars, their wives enjoyed a very high position that when they 
issued an order, they decreed it in the name of the Sultan and the Khatuns. 
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Fn. 12 p. 169 
In her study on Muslim queens in history, Fatima Mernissi identified fifteen female 
sovereigns, two Mamluk Sultanahs, six Mongol Khatuns, three queens in the Maldives and 
four in Sumatra. She identified only two Arab Yemeni reigning queens from the Shiite 
Fatimid dynasty. Sitt al-Mulk also from the Fatimid dynasty administered the kingdom from 
1020-1024 but the khutba was never preached in her name. There were, however, many more 
reigning queens in Southeast Asia from the 1500-1700 besides the four she mentioned in 
Aceh. See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
Fn. 14 p. 169 
This tradition was established during the rule of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties where 
Islamic jurisprudence took shape and theories on Islamic political thought that could be 
regarded as orthodox were formulated and elaborated. In traditional Islamic literature, 
theories on the art of governance and ideals of kingship arc found in Arab-Persian treatises 
generally known as "Mirrors for Princes". Some examples arc Kitab al- Sultan by Ibn 
Qutaybah, Kitab al-Taj by al-Jahiz, Sjyasatnama/Sjyaral-Muluk by Nizm al-Mulk, Qabusnara by 
Kay Kaus ibn Iskandar and Narihat al-Muluk by al-Ghazali. This genre spread to other parts 
of the Islamic lands such as Mughal India. One example is Mau'itiah-1 Jahangiri by 
Muhammad Baqir Najm-I Sani. In the Malay-Muslim literature, this genre is exemplified in 
works such as the Taj us-Salatin by Bukhari al-Jauhari and IBustan us-Salatin by Nuruddin al- 
Raniri. Jelani Harun (ed), (2006), Nasihat al-Muluk - Nasihat kepada Raja-Raja karangan 
Imam al-Ghazali, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, pp. xiv-xv. See also, Ruth 
Roded (ed), Women in Islam, p. 75. 
The Taj us-Salatin adopted the style of advice (narihat) and guidance (petunjuk) for kings 
prominently found in mainstream Islam. Although written in classical Malay, it incorporated 
many Arab and Persian words and quoted many Persian political treatises and famous stories 
such as the Akhlak I-Muhrini and Tanbihul Gharilin. See Khalid Hussain (ed), Taj Us-Salatin, 
p. xxi. 
This is presumably, in an effort to include Malay works as part of the mainstream writing 
tradition and put Malay writings on par with the great political writing tradition of the 
Islamic world. In his formulation of the concept of leadership, Bukhari al Jauhari was 
careful not to upset the mainstream ideas of leadership found in the great Islamic political 
writing tradition and he faithfully restated the mandatory qualities already cited by renowned 
classical political thinkers such as al-Farabi and al-Mawardi. Al-Farabi (d. 339H/950AD) was 
a Shii philosopher who was the first Muslim to harmonise Greek political philosophy with 
Islam. His ideas were later developed and extended by Al-Mawardi. Al-Mawardi 
(d450H/1058AD) wrote al-Abkam al-Sultaniya, a key document for the theory of rule. He 
held the position of qadi in many towns namely Baghdad and acted for the Caliph Al- 
Qadirbillah (991-1031). See Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 71,84. 
Fn. 20 P. 170 
According to Ruth Roded, Al-Mawardi in his al-abkam al-sultaniya, chapter two, states that a 
woman may not undertake the position of a Minister even though the information she 
transmits is acceptable. This is because it involves powers, of a sovereign nature that could 
be regarded as foreign to women. He bases this interpretation on a hadith (some believed to 
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be a weak one) where the Prophet states that, "A people who entrusts their affairs to a 
woman will not prosper". A hadith is considered to be weak when it is related by a single 
narrator or it is an isolated hadith, that is, it is not supported and verified by a large number 
of people. 
Fn. 21 p. 170 
The stand that exclusively female biological defects prohibit women's participation in public 
life was first suggested by Aristotle in his Politics and the Greeks philosopher's conclusions 
were re-echoed in both Islamic and Christian medieval treatises. 
Fn. 26 p. 171 
According to Jelani Harun, a version of the Arab text of the Nasibat arrived in Aceh in late 
16' or early 17" century brought by Gujerati or Arab merchants. A Malay version of this 
kitab dated 1700 is found in the University of Edinburgh library (Dc. 6.73-74). In his study of 
both the Nasihat and the Bustan, Jelani concludes that the Bustan is clearly influenced by the 
Nasihat. Indeed, al-Raniri acknowledged his source from al-Gazali in his chapter II of the 
Bustan. 
Fn. 33 p. 173 
Aceh's institutions of state and laws were believed to have originated by Sultan Alauddin 
Riayat Syah al-Kahar known as Kanun Al A yi and completed by Iskandar Muda. Owing to 
the role of this ruler in formulating and codifying these laws, they became known as Kanun 
Meukuta Alam. 
Fn. 36 p. 174 
According to Spellman, despotic rule normally begins by military conquest and marked by 
the unchecked power and capricious decision-making of one individual; despotism does not 
allow for political opposition, free expression, a known rule of law, an impartial judiciary and 
private property free from the depredations of the ruler. Under the despot, the subject has 
no temporal existence independent of the master, no private sphere where one's autonomy 
is respected. 
Fn. 42 p. 176 
This age-old practice formed the basis of Acehnese decision-making process from the level 
of the (gampong) village, to the mukim, (a collection of villages into districts) and the sagi (a 
federation of districts). Snouck Hurgronje wrote that Habib Abdurrahman told him that the 
mupakat (Arabic muwafakab) forms the strongest factor in the statescraft of an administrator. 
The administration of the gampong composed of three elements- the keuchi (village head), 
teungku (religious village head), urrueng tuba (man of wisdom). All three components had a 
role in the discussion and decision-making process. 
Fn. 53 p. 178 
Pieter Sourij made this remark during a Saturday audience day. Whilst he was waiting to 
discuss company affairs with the Sultanah, he observed that many criminal and civil cases 
were debated at the hall. A delinquent was brought to face the queen but after a 
request/appeal was made on his behalf (not mentioned who made this appeal) the queen 
Sourij wrote, with the soft character of a woman was moved to be merciful and pardoned 
the wrong-doer doch door voorbidden (dat haar hoochheighd naden sachten aart der vrouwen tot 
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barmharticheid beweechden)Lepardoneert... It was evident that the Acehnese nowadays were 
subject to a Zeer debonnaire echter ontragheeck re, geringe.. 
Fn. 62 p. 180 
Marsden wrote that "the nobles finding their power less restrained, and their individual 
consequence more felt under an administration of this kind than when ruled by kings (as 
sometimes they were with a rod of iron) supported these pageants, whom they governed as 
they saw fit. " He asserted that it was not probable that the queen had the power of 
appointing or removing any of these great officers. Mulaika Hijjas although agreeing with 
Marsden that the female rulers were pageant queens qualified this statement by concluding 
that although these women rulers presided over stately spectacle, this is not a sign of their 
frailty but rather of the robustness of the traditional Malay idea of the state. Auni Luthfi 
asserts that by the time of the second queen, "the powers of the queen was fully transferred 
to the Council of the twelve orangkaya. " 
Fn. 65 p. 181 
Snouck Hurgronje claimed that the sagi was in existence long before the Sultanate of Dar at- 
Salam. An old manuscript Peta Acheh dan Susunan kabinet pemerintahan Acheh showed that the 
sagi was already in existence during the reign of Iskandar Muda. Since the copier of this 
manuscript mentioned that this description was based on an even earlier kitab - Tatikirah 
Tabakab, then the sagi could even pre-date Iskandar Muda's reign. Others, however, 
disagreed. It is not clear, however, whether the formation of the three sagi was undertaken 
during the reign of Sultanah Safiatuddin or her successor, Sultanah Naqiatuddin Syah. 
Takeshi Ito, states that Safiatuddin's reign was characterised by the enhancement of the 
orangkaya and the formation of the three sagis. The Adat Aceh states otherwise. The Adat 
Aceh, consists of a collection of royal edits (sarakata). The first edicts were compiled in 1607, 
during the reign of Iskandar Muda, the second during the reign of Safatuddin Syah in 1645- 
46 and the third in 1708-09. The Adat Aceh was compiled in its present format in the 1810s. 
It mentioned that the sagis were formed during the reign of Sultanah Naqiatuddin Syah. 
Fn. 83 p. 185 
Bendahara Kayu Kelat had gathered about five thousand men to march to the palace to 
oppose Raja Ijau's rule. When the Bendahara reached the palace steps, Raja Ijau adorned a 
green dress and a golden headscarf and went to greet him at the top of the steps 
accompanied by her bentara and court ladies. She threw her golden scarf to the Bendahara 
who immediately caught it and wrapped it round his head. He then placed his kris on the 
ground and kneeling, he paid obeisance to the queen by uttering the word "daulat tuanku". 
He then left the palace and Raja Ijau went in. Curious about this dramatic turn of events, 
the Bendahara's men queried him about his strange behaviour. He replied that the queen had 
asked him for her life in that symbolic gesture of throwing him the scarf. By accepting it, he 
had accepted the queen's request. 
Fn. 91 p. 187 
The AdatAceh is an important indigenous source since two-thirds of its content relates to 
seventeenth century Aceh. Although like most Malay texts where the author is unknown, 
according to Ito, internal evidence suggests many linguistic and descriptive parallels with the 
HikayatAceh and Bustan us-Salatin both written in seventeenth century Acch. TheAdatAceh 
comprises of four parts, the first relates to the Orders for Rulers, the second, Genealogy of 
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Acehnese rulers, third, Customs of Kings and the fourth, List of the kingdom's sources of 
revenue and merchant ships. See also, Ramli Harun and Tjut Rahmah, (transliterators), ildat 
Aceh. 
Fn-109 p. 192 
Like Iskandar Muda, Peter the Great continued to rely on personal connections at court, 
punished those who displeased him and relied on his force of personality but unlike Iskandar 
Muda, Peter the Great implemented rigid regulation, strict military discipline and regularized 
hierarchies of authority and jurisdiction and the tenor of official discourse favoured 
procedure, routine and system. But unlike Iskandar Muda, Peter the Great implemented rigid 
regulation, strict military discipline and regularized hierarchies of authority and jurisdiction 
and the tenor of official discourse did shift to favour procedure, routine and system. 
Fn. 114 p. 194 
Ito identifies indices to assess the level of commitment to the practice of Islam in a state. 
These are, the role of the ulama, public celebration of the two canonical festivals of the 
Muslim year, the level of observance of Friday congregational prayers, the five daily prayers, 
fasting in Ramadhan, the proportion of people making the hajj pilgrimage and finally the 
extent to which the syariah is put to effect. One immediate problem that arises when 
applying these kinds of indices, as Ito himself points out, is the lack of information from 
both indigenous and European to measure them. Nevertheless, there are some references to 
religious observances mentioned in European records and the third part of Adat Aceh 
provides useful information on how religious festivals were celebrated in the kingdom in the 
seventeenth century. Little information can be gleaned, though on the religious institutions, 
the patrons and officials, what more the daily observance of Islam amongst the people in 
general. See, Ito, The World of the Adat Aceh, p. 206. 
Fn. 116 p. 194 
In this paper, Gallop states that until recently, only one royal Malay letter was known, from 
Iskandar Muda to King James I of England dated 1615. More recently, two other original 
letters have surfaced, one from Iskandar Thani of 1639 and another from Sultanah Tajul 
Alam of 1661. In this paper, Gallop attempts a critical examination of these three letters, 
with a special scrutiny of their philological, codicological and diplomatic features. 
Fn-126 p. 197 
Elizabeth argued that she was the final arbiter of God's will so far as it manifested itself with 
regard to her realm. English clergymen who were initially uncomfortable with what they 
deemed as unnatural female rule, sort to reconcile this fact by identifying Elizabeth with 
Deborah. According to an interpretation of the recent past, Elizabeth was called to the 
English crown by God and on behalf of his people. By means of this extraordinary 
dispensation, he gave the English nation a second chance to effect a spiritual reformation 
after the declension into adulatory during Mary's reign. 
Fn. 135 p. 200 
I am indebted to Professor Jorge Santos Alves from Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, 
Lisbon, for this letter and his help in translation from Portuguese to English. 
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Fn. 141 p. 202 
Syeikh Syamsuddin initiated Sultan Iskandar Muda into the Nagsbband a order. The study 
of Islam in the kingdom during that period was oriented towards speculative theosophical 
doctrines such as monistic Sufism initially expounded by Hamzah Fansuri and consolidated 
by Syeikh Syamsuddin. This doctrine states that God's essence is not different from man's, 
all that exists derives its existence from the light of God, the difference being only in the 
diverse manifestations. Human effort under appropriate guidance can unlock the secrets of 
divine unity and achieve union with the Creator. Al-Raniri considered this as a deviation 
from orthodoxy, even heretical arguing that one cannot equate the Creator and the created 
and the exercise to know God and to achieve unity with God is in vain. 
Fn. 154 p. 205 
I am indebted to Michael Laffan for this reference. Personal communication with Micheal 
Laffan, Leiden, 2005. 
Fn. 172 p. 210 
Little else is known about this structure and the layout of the mosque itself. A similar 
concept to this is the maqsura (a box or compartment built near the mihrab of the mosque 
where the imam leads the prayers, in the other parts of the Muslim empire. It is meant to 
protect the ruler from hostile attack. 
Fn. 176 p. 211 
The Malay kerajaan (having a Raja) must be inherited from the Malay world animistic and 
Indian influenced past. The Malay concept of raja could be traced to the Hindu concept of 
devaraja, in which the king was believed to be the reincarnation of the Hindu deities. Indeed 
kingship and pageantry are antithetical to Islam since Islam promotes equality of status 
whilst monarchical institution privileges hierarchical differences. 
Fn. 203 p. 218 
The curtain or hab (in Arabic) is a three dimensional concept - visual, spatial and ethical. 
Understood in its visual dimension, it means to hide, spatially it means to separate, mark a 
border, a threshold, ethically, it means it belongs to the realm of the forbidden. Used in the 
political context, in governance, it marks a separation between the ruler and ruled. The Hab 
alAmir, Hijab of the Prince, or the Caliph, the most powerful man in the Muslim 
community, has recourse to the veil to escape the gaze of his entourage. The blab refers to 
the curtain behind which the Caliphs sat to avoid the gaze of members of their court. 
Quoting the Encyclopedia of Islam, Mernissi states that this custom was unknown to the early 
inhabitants of the Hidjaz, and seems to be introduced into Islam by the Umayyads under the 
influence of the Sassanid civilization. This custom was first practised by the fifth Caliph, 
Mu'awiya and was adopted by the rulers of Andalusia, North Africa and Egypt. The Fatimid 
dynasty (909-1171) institutionalised it into a veritable ceremonial. With the Fatimids, the 
sacred dimension of the Caliph acquired special significance. The Caliph, considered as the 
hypostasis of the Active Intelligence of the world became almost the object of worship. As 
such, he had to hide himself from the eyes of his faithful followers who were thus protected 
from the radiance of his countenance. 
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Fn. 209 p. 219 
A Dutch Resident in Siam during the reign of Prasat Thong described a procession on the 
river where the king was seated in the finest boat, under a decorated canopy, hidden in all 
kinds of costly things so that neither his body nor his face can be seen. In seventeenth 
century Siam, only Europeans defied the rule that no one should look upon the king as he 
passed on his elephant or galley. He is surrounded by nobles and courtiers who pay him 
reverence at the foot. The combination of outward display of wealth and the power of 
seclusion of the person of the ruler is a characteristic feature of Southeast Asian kingship 
during the period. Thus, seclusion is necessitated more by royal status rather than sex. 
Fn. 217 p. 223 
This copy fell into the hands of Muhammad Husin Hitam during the Dutch-Acch war. 
Unlike Hamka, according to Rusdi Sufi, the indigenous manuscript that laid out the 
executive and legislative branches of the kingdom is entitled "Qanun MeukutaAlam". This 
writer is not able to locate either manuscripts but the institutions described in both these 
manuscripts are similar. They were the executive branch consisting of the Balai Laksamana, 
a kind of military arm led by an admiral and Balai Furdah, the commercial arm in charge of 
taxes and issuing money. The legislative branch, called the Balai Musyawarah, consisted of 
three branches, the Balairungsari, Balai Gadeng and Balai Majchs Mahkamah Rakyat. The 
Balairungsari consisted of the four senior orangkaya, the Balai Gadeng consisted of twenty- 
two prominent religious scholars in Aceh and the Balai Majelis Mahkamah Rakyat made up 
of seventy-three members, each representing a muqim in Aceh. See Rusdi Sufi, "Sultanah 
Safiatuddin Syah, " pp. 56-57. This writer found an old manuscript entitled PetaAcheh dan 
susunan kabinetpemerintahanAceh, describing Aceh political institutions during the reign of 
Iskandar Muda. The institutions listed were similar to the above two manuscripts but with a 
few minor differences in terms of the numbers of hulubalang and ulama mentioned in the 
Balairungsari and Balai Gadeng. This particular manuscript does not list the members of the 
Balai Majelis Mahkamah Rakyat. 
Fn. 220 p. 223 
TheAdatMeukutaA/am is a set of customs and traditions compiled during the reign of 
Iskandar Muda. 
Fn. 226 p. 224 
Unfortunately, no more information is available regarding this scandal. In all probability, 
this Muslim tutor was the same individual who the Dutch mentioned as the oppersten paap 
who was accused of having a sexual liaison with the Sultanah. See chapter 3 on the coup and 
counter coup that wrecked the Acehnese court. 
Fn. 250 p. 231 
Some possible ambiguities are the seemingly contradictory ideas that on the one hand 
women are spiritually equal to men, women have property, sexual and divorce rights and yet 
men have authority over women and could marry four wives (but only if certain conditions 
are met). Unfortunately, the very notions that women have property, spiritual and sexual 
rights that make it vital for men to regulate their contacts, thus men's insistence on women's 
seclusion. This is an ironic result of women's rights in Islam. 
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Vn. 252 p. 231 
Even today, feminists dispute Islam: some holding up western standards of women's 
liberation urging that Islam must change whilst others contend that the answer to women's 
problems can be found in Islamic doctrine itself. 
pn. 2 p. 235 
The concept of Stranger-hood formulated by Fernandez-Armesto is an important schema to 
help explain the various numerous cultural encounters in the early modern era and to 
understand the formation of early colonial societies. His stranger-as-arbitrator or even as 
king model is helpful here to understand why strangers were entrusted with power. The 
female ruler here could be seen as a stranger in two senses- firstly differentiated by her sex 
which was a novel phenomenon in Aceh and secondly she did not belong to any of the male 
dominated factions and thus was not bound to any. As a result, she was more likely to be 
accepted as non-partisan. This mediator and arbitrator role helped the Sultanah to survive 
her long reign. 
Fn. 3 p. 236 
Veth asserted that to maintain their influence, the nobility was very careful and jealously 
guarded the queens so that they would never marry. Similarly, Marsden too contended that 
they were particularly jealous of the)ohor Sultan whose marriage with the Sultanah was not 
a distant probability and as a result could lay his claim on the throne of Aceh. Valcntijn, too 
supported this view when he narrated that when the queen was about forty years old, there 
was a strange circumstance where the queen was reported to desire to marry a Dutchman. 
Although no details were given, he argued that it was the Company who refused this which 
he contended was prove of the Company's might over the Queen. 
Fn. 10 p. 239 
There was no philosophical confrontation of the issue of female rule amongst most Russian 
writers. In this respect, the Russian opinion of Catherine II and of female rule in general was 
more positive than that of West European contemporaries of Catherine. On the whole, 
Russian writers displayed much less agitation over the female issue. Catherine was 
desexualizcd to the extent that she was treated as an individual rather than as a woman. 
Fn. 11 p. 239 
Most of the writings that arc favourable towards women's contributions in public affairs 
belong to the earlier period of Islam that is from the eighth to the ninth centuries. This is 
when Islamic societies appear to have allowed a great deal of prominence to women in 
general and in the arena of politics in particular. During the latter period, especially from the 
seventeenth century, women's involvement in politics is viewed derisively and women arc 
seen as a factor contributing to the decline of the Ottoman and other Islamic dynasties. The 
rise of powerful concubines such as Hurrem, Sulayman I favourite concubine during his 
reign and Nurbanu the haseki and the first great valide sultan saw the beginnings of "the public 
culture of sovereignty" in the Ottoman Empire. But, Sunullah Effendi, the foremost 
guardian of Islam publicly lamented and described this as harmful and disruptive to the 
empire. He believed that women should have nothing to do with government and 
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sovereignty. Virtually all historians of the Ottoman Empire, whether local or Western have 
concurred that the influence of the harem, contributed to Ottoman decline. Interestingly 
enough, during this period of Islamic history, the same event of Aishah leading the Battle of 
the Camel is being used to argue in favour of the exclusion of women from public life. This 
battle is seen by most as disastrous because it resulted in the major schism that splits the 
Muslim community into the Sunni and Shi'i sects. This is in contrast to Safavid Iran, which 
held both royal men and women with an air of sanctity and elevated them almost to 
sainthood. Both men and women were believed to be laced with divinely-bestowed charisma 
and Safavid women such as Pari-Khan Khanum and Shahzadeh Sultanum were considered 
to have wielded considerable authority. 
Fn. 23 p. 248 
In general merchants were not regarded as diplomats nor did diplomats consider themselves 
merchants. In the opinion of many diplomats trading was taboo, especially in the 
seventeenth century. Furthermore, the Dutch Republic had not yet obtained clear sovereign 
status, this happened only in 1648, after the Peace of Munster. Until then, the position of the 
representatives of the Republic had been vague. Foreign European noblemen looked upon 
Dutch diplomats with disdain according them a status no higher than a merchant's. Van 
Goor, J., "Merchants as Diplomats: Embassies as an illustration of European-Asian 
relations", p. 5. 
Fn. 25 p. 249 
From 1669, the English and the Dutch were intensely engaged in defining such terms of 
trade in the East Indies. One main issue of contention was the "common right" for freedom 
to trade with nations not under the subjection of either company. The Secretaries of State 
judged it important that an article be framed to prevent future misunderstandings in places, 
where differences had arisen about trade such as the coast of India, in Trincomale, Ceylon, 
on the island of Sumatra such as Aceh, Tiku, Priaman, Indrapura, Palembang, and other 
places such as Benjarmassin, Macassar and Celebes. The General Article drawn up by order 
of the Lord Keeper, July 27,1669. 
Fn. 27 p. 249 
Queen Elizabeth frequently wrote to the Moroccan ruler requesting legal action on behalf of 
her subjects, sometimes she wanted him to arbitrate among her merchants and at others 
between her merchants and other European traders. The English submitted to Muslim law 
and court in European lands. In an attempt to ensure good relations with Msoroco after the 
Moroccan ambassador had visited England the year before, the Queen authorized passes for 
the two men and urged payment of all their expenses. 
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